


THE
LIFE OF NAPOLEON
BY
SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART
VOL. 2.



LIFE
OF
NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

WITH A PRELIMINARY VIEW
OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

BY
SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

WITH NOTES.

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LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

CHAPTER I.

Corsica—Family of Buonaparte—Napoleon born 15th August, 1769—His early habits—Sent to the Royal Military School at Brienne—His great Progress in Mathematical Science—Deficiency in Classical Literature—Anecdotes—Removed to the General School of Paris—When in his Seventeenth Year, appointed Second Lieutenant of Artillery—His early Politics—Promoted to a Captaincy—Pascal Paoli—Napoleon sides with the French Government against Paoli—And is banished from Corsica—Visits Marseilles, and publishes the Souper de Beaucaire.

THE island of Corsica was, in ancient times, remarkable as the scene of Seneca's exile, and in the last century was distinguished by the memorable stand which the natives made in defence of their liberties against the Genoese and French, during a war which tended to show the high and indomitable spirit of the islanders, united as it is with the fiery and vindictive feelings proper to their country and climate.

In this island, which was destined to derive its future importance chiefly from the circumstance, NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE, or BONAPARTE,¹ had his origin. His family was noble, though not of much distinction, and rather reduced in fortune. Flattery

¹ There was an ab as trifles often do, a fluous u, which his ne, which became, disused the super- ed a more modern spelling. This was represented on one side as an attempt to bring his name more nearly to the French idiom; and, as if it had been a matter of the last moment, the vowel was obstinately replaced in the name, by a class of writers who deemed it politic not to permit the successful general to relinquish the slightest mark of his Italian extraction, which was in every respect impossible for him either to conceal or to deny, even if he had nourished such an idea. In his baptismal register, his name is spelled Napoleone Bonaparte, though the father subscribes, Carlo Buonaparte. The spelling seems to have been quite indifferent.—S.—“During Napoleon's first campaign in Italy, he dropped the u. In this change he had no other motive than to assimilate the orthography to the pronunciation, and to abbreviate his signature.”—BOURRIENNE, tom. i., p. 3.

deal of firmness of character. She partook the dangers of her husband during the years of civil war, and is said to have accompanied him on horseback in some military expeditions, or perhaps hasty flights, shortly before her being delivered of the future emperor.¹ Though left a widow in the prime of life, she had already born her husband thirteen children, of whom five sons and three daughters survived him. I. Joseph, the eldest, who, though placed by his brother in an obnoxious situation, as intrusive King of Spain, held the reputation of a good and moderate man. II. Napoleon himself. III. Lucien, scarce inferior to his brother in ambition and talent. IV. Louis, the merit of whose character consists in its unpretending worth, and who renounced a crown rather than consent to the oppression of his subjects. V. Jerome, whose disposition is said to have been chiefly marked by a tendency to dissipation. The females were, I. Maria Anne, afterwards Grand Duchess of Tuscany, by the name of Eliza.² II. Maria Annonciata, who became Maria Pauline, Princess of Borghese.³ III. Carlotta, or Caroline, wife of Murat, and Queen of Naples.

The family of Buonaparte being reconciled to the French government after the emigration of Paoli, enjoyed the protection of the Count de Marboëuf, the French Governor of Corsica, by whose interest Charles was included in a deputation of the nobles of the island, sent to Louis XVI. in 1779. As a consequence of this mission, he was appointed to a judicial situation—that of assessor of the Tribunal of Ajaccio—the income of which aided him to maintain his increasing family, which the smallness of his patrimony, and some habits of expense, would otherwise have rendered difficult. Charles Buonaparte, the father of Napoleon, died at the age of about forty years, of an ulcer in the stomach, on the 24th February 1785.⁴ His celebrated son fell a victim to the same disease. During Napoleon's grandeur, the community of Montpellier expressed a desire to erect a monument to the memory of Charles Buonaparte. His answer was both sensible and in good taste. "Had I lost my father yesterday," he said, "it would be natural to pay his memory some mark of respect consistent with my present situation. But it is twenty years since the event, and it is one in which the public can take no concern. Let us leave the dead in peace."

¹ Las Cases, vol. i., p. 108.

² Died at Trieste, 9th August, 1820. "On accidentally reading, at St. Helena, the account of her death, Napoleon exclaimed, 'Eliza has just shown us the way; death, which seemed to have overlooked our family, now begins to strike it. I shall be the next to follow her to the grave.'—ANTOMMAREHI, vol. i., p. 384.

³ She died at the Borghese Palace, near Florence, 9th June, 1825.

⁴ "I was quietly pursuing my studies whilst my father was struggling against the violence of a painful agony. He died, and I had not the consolation to close his eyes: that sad duty was reserved for Joseph, who acquitted himself of it with all the zeal of an affectionate son."—NAPOLEON, Antommarchi, vol. i., p. 240.

The subject of our narrative was born upon the 15th day of August 1769, at his father's house in Ajaccio, forming one side of a court which leads out of the Rue Charles.¹ We read with

temporary couch prepared for her accommodation, and covered with an ancient piece of tapestry, representing the heroes of the Iliad. The infant was christened by the name of Napoleon, an obscure saint, who had dropped to leeward, and fallen altogether out of the calendar, so that his namesake never knew which day he was to celebrate as the festival of his patron. When questioned on this subject by the bishop who confirmed him, he answered smartly, that there were a great many saints, and only three hundred and sixty-five days to divide amongst them. The politeness of the Pope promoted the patron in order to compliment

and in his infancy was not remarkable for more than that ani-

exhibit, as the ominous plaything of Napoleon's boyhood, the model of a brass cannon, weighing about thirty pounds.² We leave it to philosophers to inquire, whether the future love of war was suggested by the accidental possession of such a toy; or whether the tendency of the mind dictated the selection of it; or, lastly, whether the nature of the pastime, corresponding with the taste which chose it, may not have had each their action and reaction, and contributed between them to the formation of a character so warlike.

The same traveller who furnishes the above anecdote, gives an

¹ "The patrimonial house of Napoleon, at present in the possession of M. Ramolini, member of the Chamber of Deputies for the department of Corsica, continues an object of great veneration with travellers and military men."—*Hickman's Corsica*, p. 4.

² *Las Cases*, vol. 1. p. 121.

³ "In my infancy I was noisy and quarrelsome, and feared nobody. I beat one, scratched another and made myself formidable to all."—*NAPOLEON, Autograph*, vol. 1. p. 27.

⁴ *Benson's Sketches of Corsica*, p. 4.—B.

interesting account of the country retreat of the family of Buonaparte, during the summer.

Going along the sea-shore from Ajaccio towards the Isle Sanguinière, about a mile from the town, occur two stone pillars, the remains of a door-way, leading up to a dilapidated villa, once the residence of Madame Buonaparte's half-brother on the mother's side, whom Napoleon created Cardinal Fesch.¹ The house is approached by an avenue, surrounded and overhung by the cactus and other shrubs, which luxuriate in a warm climate. It has a garden and a lawn, showing amidst neglect, vestiges of their former beauty, and the house is surrounded by shrubberies, permitted to run to wilderness. This was the summer residence of Madame Buonaparte and her family. Almost enclosed by the wild olive, the cactus, the clematis, and the almond-tree, is a very singular and isolated granite rock, called Napoleon's grotto, which seems to have resisted the decomposition which has taken place around. The remains of a small summer-house are visible beneath the rock, the entrance to which is nearly closed by a luxuriant fig-tree. This was Buonaparte's frequent retreat, when the vacations of the school at which he studied permitted him to visit home.—How the imagination labours to form an idea of the visions, which, in this sequestered and romantic spot, must have arisen before the eyes of the future hero of a hundred battles!

The Count de Marbœuf, already mentioned as Governor of Corsica, interested himself in the young Napoleon, so much as to obtain him an appointment [April, 1779] to the Royal Military School at Brienne, which was maintained at the royal expense, in order to bring up youths for the engineer and artillery service. The malignity of contemporary historians has ascribed a motive of gallantry towards Madame Buonaparte as the foundation of this kindness; but Count Marbœuf had arrived at a period of life when such connexions are not to be presumed, nor did the scandal receive any currency from the natives of Ajaccio.

Nothing could be more suitable to the nature of young Buonaparte's genius, than the line of study which thus fortunately was opened before him. His ardour for the abstract sciences amounted to a passion, and was combined with a singular aptitude for applying them to the purposes of war, while his attention to pursuits so interesting and exhaustless in themselves, was stimulated by his natural ambition and desire of distinction. Almost all the scientific teachers at Brienne, being accustomed to study the character of their pupils, and obliged by their duty to make memoranda and occasional reports on the subject, spoke of the talents of Buonaparte, and the progress of his studies, with admiration. Circumstances of various kinds, exaggerated or invented, have been cir-

¹ The mother of Letitia Ramolini, wife of Carlo Buonaparte, married a Swiss officer in the French service, named Fesch, after the death of Letitia's father.—S.

yet at different times when he chose to exert it, he exhibited considerable influence over his fellow-students, and when there was any joint plan to be carried into effect, he was frequently chosen dictator of the little republic.

In the time of winter, Buonaparte upon one occasion engaged

purpose, until the battle became so keen that their superiors

account of a quarrel betwixt them and the country people upon a former occasion, or for some such cause, the masters of the insti-

encompassed their exercising ground, with so much skill and secrecy, that their operations remained entirely unknown till the morning of the fair, when a part of the boundary unexpectedly fell, and gave a free passage to the imprisoned students, of which they immediately took the advantage, by hurrying to the prohibited scene of amusement.

But although on these, and perhaps other occasions, Buonaparte displayed some of the frolic temper of youth, mixed with

wards able to simplify the most difficult and complicated undertakings. His mathematical teacher was proud of the young islander,

at the head of his school, and his other scientific instructions had the same year to be satisfied.

As languages Buonaparte was less a proficient, and never acquired the art of writing or spelling French, far less foreign languages, with accuracy or celerity; and he had the merits of Bonaparte any way, in to prize that soldier on the classical proficiency of the school. The full energies of his mind being devoted to the science of government and his profession, left little time for cultivation of his other studies.

Though of Italian origin, Buonaparte had in a decided taste for the French, as his taste in composition seems to have leaned towards the antique and the bombastic. He used always the most exaggerated phrases; as if it were said, if ever, that his education prevented the freedom of criticism which are to be found in every act of his life.

Notwithstanding the external calmness and reserve of his deportment, he was destined for much great things, and, while yet a student at Brienne, a full share of that mind and resolution, to avoid dread of disgrace, that troubles and irritating fear of failure, which is the spur to extraordinary attempts. Sparks of this hot temper sometimes showed themselves. One occasion, a harsh expression fell from the future Emperor, for a trifling fault, the disgrace of wearing a gentleman's dress, and being excluded from the table of the students, and obliged to eat his meal apart. His pride felt the indignity so severely, that it brought on a severe nervous attack; to which, though otherwise of good constitution, he was subject up to occasions of extraordinary irritation. Father Petrucci, the professor of mathematics, hastened to deliver his favourite pupil from the punishment by which he was so much affected.

It is also said that an early disposition to the popular side distinguished Buonaparte even when at Brienne. Pichegru, afterwards so celebrated, who acted as his monitor in the military school, (a singular circumstance,) bore witness to his early principles, and to the peculiar energy and tenacity of his temper. He was long afterwards consulted whether means might not be found to engage the commander of the Italian armies in the royal interest. "It will be but lost time to attempt it," said Pichegru. "I knew him in his youth—his character is inflexible—he has taken his side, and he will not change it."

In October, 1784, Napoleon Buonaparte, then only fifteen years old, was, though under the usual age, selected by M. de Kerallio,² the inspector of the twelve military schools, to be sent

¹ Father Petrucci was subsequently secularized, and joined the army of Italy, where he served his pupil in the capacity of secretary. On Buonaparte's return from Egypt, he found him a competent financier; but commencing usurer, he was soon reduced to beggary. Napoleon granted him a pension sufficient for his subsistence.—*LAS CASES*, vol. I., p. 119.

² *LAS CASES*, vol. I., p. 120.

³ The following is a copy of Kerallio's report:—"M. de Buonaparte, (Napo-

to have his education completed in the general school of Paris. It was a compliment paid to the precocity of his extraordinary mathematical talent, and the steadiness of his application. While at Paris he attracted the same notice as at Brerney; and among other society, frequented that of the celebrated Abbe Haysnal, and was admitted to his literary parties. His taste did not become correct, but his appetite for study in all departments was greatly enlarged; and notwithstanding the quantity which he daily read, his memory was strong enough to retain, and his judgment sufficiently ripe to arrange and digest, the knowledge which he then acquired; so that he had it at his command during all the rest of his busy life. Plutarch was his favourite author; upon the style of whom he had so modelled his epistolary and labors of thought, that Paris afterwards pronounced him a young man of an antique cast, and resembling one of the classical heroes.¹

Some of his biographers have, about this time, ascribed to him the anecdote of a certain youthful pupil of the military school, who desired to award in the ear of a balloon with the servant Haneland, and was so mortified at being refused, that he made an attempt to cut the balloon with a sword.² The story has but a flimsy support, and indeed does not accord well with the character of the hero, which was deep and reflective, as well as bold and determined, and not likely to suffer the energies to escape in idle and useless adventure.

A letter authenticated anecdote states, that at this time he expressed himself disrespectfully towards the king in one of his letters to his family. According to the practice of the school, he was obliged to submit the letter to the censorship of M. Bismarck, the performer of letters to the king, who, taking notice of the offensive passage, insisted upon the letter being burnt, and added a severe rebuke. Long afterwards, in 1805, M. Bismarck appeared at Napoleon's levee; when the first emotion reminded him still to be good humoredly, that time had changed considerably since the burning of the letter.

Napoleon Bonaparte, in his seventeenth year, [September, 1775,] received his first commission as second lieutenant by the regiment of La Fere, or first artillery, then quartered at Valence.

¹ "I have been very much surprised to find that some biographers have ascribed to him the anecdote of a certain youthful pupil of the military school, who desired to award in the ear of a balloon with the servant Haneland, and was so mortified at being refused, that he made an attempt to cut the balloon with a sword. The story has but a flimsy support, and indeed does not accord well with the character of the hero, which was deep and reflective, as well as bold and determined, and not likely to suffer the energies to escape in idle and useless adventure."

² "I have often noticed some of the biographers of Napoleon Bonaparte. I have found that some of the biographers ascribe to him the anecdote of a certain youthful pupil of the military school, who desired to award in the ear of a balloon with the servant Haneland, and was so mortified at being refused, that he made an attempt to cut the balloon with a sword."

³ "The anecdote of a certain youthful pupil of the military school, who desired to award in the ear of a balloon with the servant Haneland, and was so mortified at being refused, that he made an attempt to cut the balloon with a sword."

He mingled with society when he joined his regiment, more than he had hitherto been accustomed to do; mixed in public amusements, and exhibited the powers of pleasing which he possessed in an uncommon degree, when he chose to exert them. His handsome and intelligent features, with his active and neat, though slight figure, gave him additional advantages. His manners could scarcely be called elegant, but made up in vivacity and variety of expression, and often in great spirit and energy, for what they wanted in grace and polish.

In 1766, he became an adventurer for the honours of literature also, and was anonymously a competitor for the prize offered by the Academy of Lyons on Raynal's question, "What are the principles and institutions, by application of which mankind can be raised to the highest pitch of happiness?" The prize was adjudged to the young soldier. It is impossible to avoid feeling curiosity to know the character of the juvenile theories respecting government, advocated by one who at length attained the power of practically making what experiments he pleased. Probably his early ideas did not exactly coincide with his more mature practice; for when Talleyrand, many years afterwards, got the Essay out of the records of the Academy, and returned it to the author, Buonaparte destroyed it, after he had read a few pages.¹ He also laboured under the temptation of writing a journey from Valence to Mount Genis, after the manner of Sterne, which he was fortunate enough finally to resist.² The affectation which pervades Sterne's peculiar style of composition, was not likely to be simplified under the pen of Buonaparte.

In 1769, Buonaparte, then quartered at Auxonne, had composed a work, which might form two volumes, on the political, civil, and military history of Corsica. He addressed a letter to General Paoli, then residing in London, on the subject of the proposed work, and the actual condition of his countrymen.³ He also submitted it to the Abbé Raynal, who recommended the publication of it.⁴ With this view, Buonaparte invited M. Joly, a bookseller of Dole, to visit him at Auxonne. He came, he says, and found the future Emperor in a naked barrack room, the sole furniture of which consisted of a wretched bed without curtains, a table placed in the embrasure of a window, loaded with books and papers, and two chairs. His brother Louis, whom he was teaching mathematics, lay on a wretched mattress, in an adjoining closet. M. Joly and the author agreed on the price of the impression of the book, but Napoleon was at the time in

¹ Las Cases, vol. I., p. 122. A copy of the Essay had, however, been taken by his brother Louis. It was published in 1826 by Gourgaud.

² Las Cases, vol. I., p. 125.

³ A copy of this letter is given in the Appendix, No. I. A few months after it was written, Paoli, in consequence of Mirabeau's motion for the recall of the Corsican exiles, left England for Corsica.

⁴ Las Cases, vol. II., p. 345.

uncertainty whether he was to remain at Auxonne or not. The work was never printed, nor has a trace of it been discovered.¹

In 1790, Buonaparte, still at Auxonne, composed a political tract in the form of a letter to M. de Bottafranca, major-general, and deputy of the Corsican noblesse in the National Assembly. A hundred copies were printed and sent to Corsica; where it was adopted and republished by the patriotic society of Ajaccio,² who passed a resolution, attaching the epithet *insolent*, to the name of their noble deputy.³

Sternier times were fast approaching, and the nation was now fully divided by those factions which produced the Revolution. The officers of Buonaparte's regiment were also divided into Royalists and Patriots; and it is easily to be imagined, that the young and the friendless stranger and adventurer should adopt that side to which he had already shown some inclination, and which promised to open the most free career to those who had only their merit to rely upon. "Were I a general officer," he is alleged to have said, "I would have adhered to the King; being a subaltern, I join the Patriots."

There was a story current, that in a debate with some brother officers on the politics of the time, Buonaparte expressed himself so outrageously, that they were provoked to throw him into the Saône, where he had nearly perished. But this is an inaccurate account of the accident which actually befall him. He was seized with the cramp when bathing in the river. His comrades saved him with difficulty; but his danger was matter of pure chance.

Napoleon has himself recorded that he was a warm patriot during the whole sitting of the National Assembly; but that, on the appointment of the Legislative Assembly, he became shaken in his opinions. If so, his original sentiments regained force; for we shortly afterwards find him entertaining such as went to the extreme heights of the Revolution.

Early in the year 1792, Buonaparte became a captain in the artillery by seniority; and in the same year, being at Paris, he witnessed the two insurrections of the 20th June and 10th August. He was accustomed to speak of the insurgents as the

¹ This passage is not correct. I recollect very well that, on one occasion a large and more comfortable apartment was assigned to me than was given to the other officers of the same rank. I had a good chamber and an excellent bed. My brother directed my studies, but I had proper masters drawn to instruct me.—*Letter to Bottafranca*, p. 26.

² See vol. i. p. 12.

³ The letter to Bottafranca is a satire against that French nobleman, who had been, during the war with France, a strong opponent of the interests of his country. He had been, of course, the enemy of the family of Fieschi. He with Napoleon at the time was warmly attached. He had possessed the command of an entire brigade though the fact of his withdrawing from the field and style of conduct he drops into a character of the first part of the history and of his conduct descended to a singularly unbecoming and disgraceful grade, which it proved both to himself and to his countrymen that he possessed more of the
—*See Appendix*, No. 31.

most despicable banditti, and to express with what ease a determined officer could have checked these apparently formidable, but dastardly and unwieldy masses.¹ But, with what a different feeling of interest would Napoleon have looked on that infuriated populace, those still reeking though overpowered Switz, and that burning palace, had any voice whispered to him, "Emperor that shall be, all this blood and massacre is but to secure your future empire!" Little anticipating the potent effect which the passing events were to bear on his own fortune, Buonaparte, anxious for the safety of his mother and family, was now desirous to exchange France for Corsica, where the same things were acting on a less distinguished stage.

It was a singular feature in the French Revolution, that it brought out from his retirement the celebrated Pascal Paoli, who, long banished from Corsica, the freedom and independence of which he had so valiantly defended, returned from exile with the flattering hope of still witnessing the progress of liberty in his native land. On visiting Paris, he was received there with enthusiastic veneration, and the National Assembly and Royal Family extended which should show him most distinction. He was created president of the department, and commander of the national guard of his native island, and used the powers intrusted to him with great wisdom and patriotism.

But Paoli's views of liberty were different from those which unhappily began to be popular in France. He was desirous of establishing that freedom, which is the protector, not the destroyer of property, and which confers practical happiness, instead of aiming at theoretical perfection. In a word, he endeavoured to keep Corsica free from the prevailing infection of Jacobinism; and in reward, he was denounced in the Assembly. Paoli, summoned to attend for the purpose of standing on his defence, declined the journey on account of his age, but offered to withdraw from the island.

A large proportion of the inhabitants took part with the aged champion of their freedom, while the Convention sent an expedition, at the head of which were La Combe Saint Michel,² and Salicetti,³ one of the Corsican deputies to the Convention, with the usual instructions for bloodshed and pillage issued to their commissaries.⁴

Buonaparte was in Corsica, upon leave of absence from his regiment, when these events were taking place; and although he himself, and Paoli, had hitherto been on friendly terms, the young artillery officer did not hesitate which side to choose. He

¹ See *ante*, vol. I., p. 161; Las Cases, vol. III., p. 143; and Bourrienne, tom. I., p. 48.

² La Combe Saint Michel was afterwards employed by Napoleon in Italy, Spain, and Germany. He died in 1812.

³ During the reign of Joseph, he was appointed minister of police at Naples, where he died in 1809.

⁴ Napoleon, *Memoirs*, vol. iv., p. 51.

embraced that of the Convention with heart and hand; and his first military exploit was in the civil war of his native island. In the year 1793, he was despatched from Bastia, in possession of the French party, to suppress his native town Ajaccio, then occupied by Paoli and his adherents. Bonaparte was acting personally, as commanding a battalion of national guards. He landed in the gulf of Ajaccio with about fifty men, to take possession of a tower called the Torre di Capicelli, on the opposite side of the gulf, and almost facing the city. He succeeded in taking the place; but as there arose a gale of wind which prevented his communicating with the frigate which had put him ashore, he was beset in his new conquest by the opposite faction, and reduced to such distress, that he and his little garrison were obliged to feed on horse flesh. After five days he was relieved by the frigate, and evacuated the tower, having first in vain attempted to blow it up. The Torre di Capicelli still shows marks of the damage it then sustained, and its remains may be looked on as a curiosity, as the first scene of his exile, before whom

" Temple and tower
Went to the ground."

The strength of Paoli increasing, and the English preparing to assist him, Corsica became no longer a safe or convenient residence for the Bonaparte family. In brief, both Napoleon and his brother Joseph, who had distinguished themselves as partisans of the French, were subjected to a decree of banishment from their native island; and Madame Bonaparte, with two of her daughters, set sail under their protection, and settled for a time, first at Nice, and afterwards at Marseilles, where the fa-

remind the country he ruled that he was not a child of her soil, nay, was in fact very near having been born an alien, for Corsica was not united to, or made an integral part of France, until June 1769, a few weeks only before Napoleon's birth. This

¹ Paoli is the report of the Corsicans concerning the alleged first exploit of their celebrated countryman. See *Monum. & Mém.*, p. 4. But there is room to believe that Bonaparte had been in action so early as February, 1793. Admiral Truguet, with a strong fleet and having on board a large body of troops, had been at anchor for several weeks in the Corsican harbours, announcing a descent upon Paoli &c. At length, having received on board an additional number of troops, he set sail on his expedition. Bonaparte is supposed to have accompanied the admiral, of whose talent and judgment he is made in

origins was repeatedly cast upon him by his opponents, some of whom reproached the French with having adopted a master, from a country from which the ancient Romans were unwilling even to receive a slave; and Napoleon may have been so far sensible to it, as to avoid showing any predilection to the place of his birth, which might bring the circumstances strongly under observation of the generation, with which he and his family seemed to be indissolubly united. But as a traveller already quoted, and who had the best opportunities to become acquainted with the feelings of the proud islanders, has expressed it,—"The Corsicans are still highly patriotic, and possess strong local attachment—in their opinion, contempt for the country of one's birth is never to be redeemed by any other qualities." Napoleon, therefore, certainly was not popular in Corsica, nor in his memory cherished there."¹

The feelings of the parties were not unnatural on either side. Napoleon, little interested in the land of his birth, and having such an immense stake in that of his adoption, in which he had every thing to keep and lose; observed a policy towards Corsica which his position rendered advisable; and who can blame the high-spirited islanders, who, seeing one of their countrymen raised to such exalted eminence, and disposed to forget his connexion with them, returned with slight and indifference the disregard with which he treated them?

On his return from Corsica, Buonaparte had arrived at Nice, and was preparing to join his regiment, when General Degen, who commanded the artillery of "the army of Italy," then encamped round the city, required his services, and employed him in several delicate operations. Shortly after, the insurrection of Marseilles broke out—a movement consequent upon the arrest of the leaders of the Girondist party in the Convention, on the first Prairial (31st May;) and which extended with violence into the departments. The insurgents of Marseilles organized a force of six thousand men, with which they took possession of Avignon, and thereby intercepted the communications of the army of Italy. The general-in-chief being much embarrassed by this circumstance, sent Buonaparte to the insurgents, to try to induce them to let the convoys pass. In July he went to Marseilles and Avignon, had interviews with the leaders, convinced them that it was their own interest not to excite the resentment of the army of Italy, and in fine secured the transit of the convoys.

During his residence at Marseilles, when sent to the insurgents, having, he says, an opportunity of observing all the weakness and incoherence of their means of resistance, he drew up a little pamphlet, which he called "*Le Souper de Beaucaire*," and which

¹ Benson's *Sketches of Corsica*, p. 121.—S.

² Not literally, however; for it is worth mentioning, that when he was in full-blown possession of his power, an inheritance fell to the family, situated near Ajaccio, and was divided amongst them. The First Consul, or Emperor, received an olive garden as his share.—*Sketches of Corsica*.—S.

he published in that city. "He endeavoured," he says, "to open


joined the army on the 12th of September.

CHAPTER II.

Siege of Toulon—Recapitulation—Buonaparte appointed to the

England censured on this occasion—Lord Lynedoch—Fame of Buonaparte increases, and he is appointed Chief of Battalion in the Army of Italy—Joins Headquarters at Nice—On the Fall

Buonaparte, and those of the Sections of Paris under Danican—The latter defeated with much slaughter—Buonaparte appointed Second in Command of the Army of the Interior—then





General-in-Chief—Marries Madame Beauharnais—Her Character—Bonaparte immediately afterwards joins the Army of Italy.

THE siege of Toulon was the first incident of importance, which enabled Buonaparte to distinguish himself in the eyes of the French Government, and of the world at large.

Buonaparte's professional qualifications were still better vouched than the soundness of his political principles, though these were sufficiently decided. The notes which the inspectors of the Military School always preserve concerning their scholars, described his genius as being of the first order; and to these he owed his promotion to the rank of a lieutenant-colonel of artillery, with the command of the artillery during this siege.

We have already mentioned that a general diffidence, and dread of the proceedings of the Jacobins, joined to the intrigues of the Girondists, had, after the fall of the latter party, induced several of the principal towns in France to take arms against the Convention, or rather against the Jacobin party, who had attained the complete mastery in that body. We have also said that Toulon, taking a more decided step than either Marseilles or Lyons, had declared for the King and the Constitution of 1791, and invited the support of the English and Spanish squadrons, who were cruising upon the coast. A disembarkation was made, and a miscellaneous force, hastily collected, of Spaniards, Sardinians, Neapolitans, and English, was thrown into the place.

This was one of the critical periods when vigorous measures, on the part of the allies, might have produced marked effects on the result of the war. Toulon is the arsenal of France, and contained at that time immense naval stores, besides a fleet of seventeen sail of the line ready for sea, and thirteen or fourteen more, which stood in need of refitting. The possession of it was of the last importance, and with a sufficiently large garrison, or rather an army strong enough to cover the more exposed points without the town, the English might have maintained their footing at Toulon, as they did at a later period both at Lisbon and Cadiz. The sea would, by maintaining the defensive lines necessary to protect the roadstead, have been entirely at the command of the besieged; and they could have been supplied with provisions in any quantity from Sicily, or the Barbary States, while the besiegers would have experienced great difficulty, such was the dearth in Provence at the time, in supporting their own army. But to have played this bold game, the presence of an army, instead of a few battalions, would have been requisite; and a general of consummate ability must have held the chief command. This was the more especially necessary, as Toulon, from the nature of the place, must have been defended by a war of posts, requiring peculiar alertness, sagacity, and vigilance. On the other hand, there were circumstances very favourable for the defence, had it been conducted with talent and vigour. In order to invest Toulon on the right

and left side at once, it was necessary there should be two distinct blockading armies; and these could scarce communicate with each other, as a steep ridge of mountains, called Pharon, must interpose betwixt them. This gave opportunity to the besieged to combine their force, and choose the object of attack when they sallied; while, on the other hand, the two bodies of besiegers could not easily connect their operations, either for attack or defence.

Lord Mulgrave,¹ who commanded personally in the place, notwithstanding the motley character of the garrison, and other discouraging circumstances, began the defence with spirit. Sir

out from it Cartaux, a republican general whom we have already mentioned,² now advanced on the west of Toulon, at the head of a very considerable army, while General Lapoype blockaded the city on the east, with a part of the army of Italy. It was

termed Fort Mulgrave

Several sallies and skirmishes took place, in most of which the Republicans were worsted. Lieutenant-General O'Hara arrived from Gibraltar with reinforcements, and assumed the chief command.

Little could be said for the union of the commanders within Toulon; yet their enterprises were so far successful, that the French began to be alarmed at the slow progress of the siege. The dearth of provisions was daily increasing, the discontent of

¹ His lordship died the 7th of April, 1831.

But while weaker minds were despairing, talents of the first order were preparing to achieve the conquest of Toulon.

When Napoleon arrived at the scene of action, and had visited the posts of the besieging army, he found so many marks of incapacity, that he could not conceal his astonishment. Batteries had been erected for destroying the English shipping, but they were three gun-shots' distance from the point which they were designed to command: red-hot balls were preparing, but they were not heated in furnaces beside the guns, but in the country-houses in the neighbourhood at the most ridiculous distance, as if they had been articles of easy and ordinary transportation. Buonaparte with difficulty obtained General Cartaux's permission to make a shot or two by way of experiment; and when they fell more than half-way short of the mark, the general had no excuse but to rail against the aristocrats, who had, he said, spoiled the quality of the powder with which he was supplied.¹

The young officer of artillery, with prudence, and at the same time with spirit, made his remonstrances to the member of Convention, Gasparin,² who witnessed the experiment, and explained the necessity of proceeding more systematically, if any successful result was expected.

At a council of war, where Gasparin presided, the instructions of the Committee of Public Safety were read, directing that the siege of Toulon should be commenced according to the usual forms, by investing the body of the place, in other words, the city itself. The orders of the Committee of Public Safety were no safe subject of discussion or criticism for those who were to act under them; yet Buonaparte ventured to recommend their being departed from on this important occasion. His comprehensive genius had at once discovered a less direct, yet more certain manner, of obtaining the surrender of the place. He advised, that, neglecting the body of the town, the attention of the besiegers should be turned to attain possession of the promontory called Hauteur de Grasse, by driving the besiegers from the strong work of fort Mulgrave, and the two redoubts of L'Egnillette and Balagnier, by means of which the English had established the line of defence necessary to protect the fleet and harbour. The fortress of Malbosquet, on the same point, he also recommended as a principal object of attack. He argued, that if the besiegers succeeded in possessing themselves of these fortifications, they must obtain a complete command of the roads where the English fleet lay, and oblige them to put to sea. They would, in the same manner, effectually command the entrance of the bay, and prevent supplies or provisions from being thrown into the city. If

¹ Las Cases, vol. i., p. 140.

² It was to Gasparin that Napoleon was indebted for the triumph of his plan over the objections of the committees of the Convention. He preserved a grateful recollection of this circumstance, as appears by his will. It was Gasparin, he used to say, who had first opened his career.—LAS CASES, vol. i., p. 144.

the garrison were that in case of failure, the city should be defended until they might be compelled to surrender by famine.

The plan was adopted by the council of war after much hesitation, and the young officer by whom it was projected received full powers to carry it on. He rallied round him a number of excellent artillery officers and soldiers; assembled against Toulon more than two hundred pieces of cannon, well served; and

and Malbosquet, by which they were in a great measure protected.

In the meanwhile, General Doppet, formerly a physician, had superseded Cartaux, whose incapacity could no longer be concealed by his rhodomontading language; and, wonderful to tell, it had nearly been the fate of the ex-doctor to take Toulon, at a time when such an event seemed least within his calculation. A tumultuary attack of some French Chasseurs on a body of Spanish troops very nearly been successful.

in his turn superseded by Dugommier, a veteran who had served for fifty years, was covered with scars, and as fearless as the weapon he wore.

From this time the commandant of artillery, having the complete concurrence of his general, had no doubt of success. To

rafter. An artilleryman being shot at the gun which he was serving, while Napoleon was visiting a battery, he took up the dead man's rammer, and, to give encouragement to the soldiers, charged the gun repeatedly with his own hands. In consequence

marked the latter part of his life.¹

Upon another occasion, while Napoleon was overlooking the

¹ Las Cases, vol. I, p. 147.

construction of a battery, which the enemy endeavoured to interrupt by their fire, he called for some person who could write, that he might dictate an order. A young soldier stepped out of the ranks, and resting the paper on the breast-work, began to write accordingly. A shot from the enemy's battery covered the letter with earth the instant it was finished. "Thank you—we shall have no occasion for sand this bout," said the military secretary. The gaiety and courage of the remark drew Buonaparte's attention on the young man, who was the celebrated General Junot, afterwards created Duke D'Abrantes.¹ During this siege, also, he discovered the talents of Duroc, afterwards one of his most faithful adherents. In these and many other instances, Buonaparte showed his extensive knowledge of mankind, by the deep sagacity which enabled him to discover and attach to him those whose talents were most capable of rendering him service.

Notwithstanding the influence which the commandant of artillery had acquired, he found himself occasionally thwarted by the members of the Convention upon mission to the siege of Toulon, who latterly were Fréron, Ricord, Salicetti, and the younger Robespierre. These representatives of the people, knowing that their commission gave them supreme power over generals and armies, never seem to have paused to consider whether nature or education had qualified them to exercise it, with advantage to the public and credit to themselves. They criticized Buonaparte's plan of attack, finding it impossible to conceive how his operations, being directed against detached fortifications at a distance from Toulon, could be eventually the means of placing the town itself with facility in their hands. But Napoleon was patient and temporizing; and having the good opinion of Salicetti, and some intimacy with young Robespierre, he contrived to have the works conducted according to his own plan.

The presumption of these dignitaries became the means of precipitating his operations. It was his intention to complete his proposed works against fort Mulgrave before opening a large and powerful battery, which he had constructed with great silence and secrecy against Malbosquet, so that the whole of his meditated assault might confound the enemy by commencing at the same time. The operations being shrouded by an olive plantation, had been completed without being observed by the English, whom Buonaparte proposed to attack on the whole line of defence simultaneously. Messrs. Fréron and Robespierre, however, in visiting the military posts, stumbled upon this masked battery; and having no notion why four mortars and eight twenty-four pounders should remain inactive, they commanded the fire to be opened on Malbosquet without any farther delay.

General O'Hara, confounded at finding this important post exposed to a fire so formidable and unexpected, determined by a

¹ Las Cases, vol. i., p. 154.

ciously forgot, in their despatches, to mention so much as the name of Buonaparte, to whom the victory was entirely to be ascribed.¹

In the meantime, Napoleon's sagacity was not deceived in the event. The officers of the allied troops, after a hurried council of war, resolved to evacuate Toulon, since the posts gained by the French must drive the English ships from their anchorage, and deprive them of a future opportunity of retreating, if they neglected the passing moment. Lord Hood alone urged a bolder resolution, and recommended the making a desperate effort to regain fort Mulgrave, and the heights which it commanded. But his spirited counsel was rejected, and the evacuation resolved on;² which the panic of the foreign troops, especially the Neapolitans, would have rendered still more horrible than it proved, but for the steadiness of the British seamen.

The safety of the unfortunate citizens, who had invoked their protection, was not neglected even amid the confusion of the retreat. The numerous merchant vessels and other craft, offered means of transportation to all, who, having to fear the resentment of the Republicans, might be desirous of quitting Toulon. Such was the dread of the victors' cruelty, that upwards of fourteen thousand persons accepted this melancholy refuge.³ Meantime there was other work to do.

It had been resolved, that the arsenal and naval stores, with such of the French ships as were not ready for sea, should be destroyed; and they were set on fire accordingly. This task was in a great measure intrusted to the dauntless intrepidity of Sir Sydney Smith, who carried it through with a degree of order, which, everything considered, was almost marvellous. The assistance of the Spaniards was offered and accepted; and they undertook the duty of scuttling and sinking two vessels used as powder magazines, and destroying some part of the disabled shipping. The rising conflagration growing redder and redder, seemed at length a great volcano, amid which were long distinctly seen the masts and yards of the burning vessels, and which rendered obscurely visible the advancing bodies of Republican troops, who attempted on different points to push their way into the place. The Jacobins began to rise in the town upon the flying Royalists;—horrid screams and yells of vengeance, and revolutionary echorusses, were heard to mingle with the cries and plaintive entreaties of the remaining fugitives, who had not yet found means of embarkation. The guns from Malbosquet, now possessed by the French, and turned on the bulwarks of the town, increased the

¹ "Amongst those who chiefly distinguished themselves are the citizens Buonaparte, commandant of the artillery, Arena, and Gervoni."—DUGOMMIER to the Minister of War.

² Rivington's Annual Register, 1793, p. 415.

³ James's Naval History, vol. i., p. 115; Thiers, tom. vi., p. 59.—"The total number borne away amounted to 14,877."—*Mémoires de Joubert*, p. 75.

uproar. At once a shock, like that of an earthquake, occasioned

magazine blew up, with the same dreadful effects.

This tremendous addition to the terrors of the scene, so dread-

THE CAPTURE

The capture of Toulon crushed all the hopes of resistance to the Jacobins, which had been cherished in the south of France. There was a strong distrust excited against England, who was

such a great assistance was employed and granted. Such efforts

the siege might probably have ensued.

So many of the citizens of Toulon concerned in the late resistance had escaped, by the means provided by the English, that Republican vengeance could not collect its victims in the usual

¹ Mr. Graham of Balgowan, now Lord Lynedoch. He marched out on one of the sorties, and when the affair became hot, seized the musket and cartridge box of a fallen soldier, and afforded such an example to the troops, as contributed greatly to their gaining the object desired.—S.

numbers.¹ Many were shot, however, and it has been said that Buonaparte commanded the artillery, by which, as at Lyons, they were exterminated; and also that he wrote a letter to Fréron and the younger Robespierre, congratulating them and himself on the execution of these aristocrats, and signed Brutus Buonaparte, Sans-Culotte. If he actually commanded at this execution, he had the poor apology, that he must do so or himself perish; but, had the fact and the letter been genuine, there has been enough of time since his downfall to prove the truth of the accusation, and certainly enough of writers disposed to give these proofs publicity. He himself positively denied the charge; and alleged that the victims were shot by a detachment of what was called the Revolutionary Army, and not by troops of the line.² This we think highly probable. Buonaparte has besides affirmed, that far from desiring to sharpen the vengeance of the Jacobins, or act as their agent, he hazarded the displeasure of those whose frown was death, by interposing his protection to save the unfortunate family of Chabrilan, emigrants and aristocrats, who, being thrown by a storm on the coast of France, shortly after the siege of Toulon, became liable to punishment by the guillotine, but whom he saved by procuring them the means of escape by sea.³

In the meanwhile, the young general of artillery was rapidly rising in reputation. The praises which were suppressed by the representatives of the people, were willingly conferred and promulgated by the frank old veteran, Dugommier. Buonaparte's name was placed on the list of those whom he recommended for promotion, with the pointed addition, that if neglected, he would be sure to force his own way.⁴ He was accordingly confirmed in his provisional situation of chief of battalion, and appointed [March] to hold that rank in the army of Italy. Before joining that army, the genius of Napoleon was employed by the Convention in surveying and fortifying the sea-coast of the Mediterranean; a very troublesome task, as it involved many disputes with the local authorities of small towns and villages, and even hamlets, all of whom wished to have batteries erected for their own special protection, without regard to the general safety. It involved him, moreover, as we shall presently see, in some risk with the Convention at home.

The chief of battalion discharged his task scientifically. He

¹ Jomini, tom. iv., p. 226; Lacretelle, tom. xi., p. 189.

² Montholon, tom. iii., p. 13; Jomini, tom. iv., p. 226; Las Cases, vol. i., p. 153.

³ Las Cases, vol. i., p. 152.

⁴ "Dugommier wrote to the Committee of Public Safety, soliciting the rank of brigadier-general for him, and concluded with these words, 'Reward this young man, and promote him, for should he be ungratefully treated, he will promote himself.'"—*NAPOLEON, Montholon*, tom. iii., p. 15.

Dugommier was killed on the following November, by the bursting of a field-piece. Napoleon bequeathed to his descendant 100,000 francs, "as a testimonial of gratitude for the esteem, affection, and friendship of that brave and intrepid general."

situations, to prevent insults and partial descents on the coast by an enemy superior at sea. Napoleon dictated to General Gourgaud¹ *hints on this subject, which must be of consequence to the sea-coasts which need such military defences.*²

of this position, forcing them to retreat beyond the higher Alps, and taking Saorgio; all which measures succeeded as he had predicted.³ Saorgio surrendered, [April 29,] with much stores and baggage, and the French army obtained possession of the chain of the higher Alps, which, being tenable by defending few and difficult passes, placed a great part of the army of Italy, (as it was already termed, though only upon the frontier,) at disposal for actual service.⁴

he was involved in an accusation before the Convention, which, had his reputation been less for approved patriotism, might have cost him dear.

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i. p. 37.

² An Englishman will probably remember the sublime passage in "The

³ "Brunet being unjustly accused of favouring the insurrection at Marseille, was arrested by the Revolutionary Tribunal at Paris and perished."

⁴ "Happily, he allowed himself to be directed entirely by the young Buonaparte."—Turgot, tom. vi. p. 283.

⁵ Gourgaud, tom. i. p. 42.

⁶ Jomini, tom. v. p. 284, Thiers, tom. vi. p. 283; Montholon, tom. III. p. 9; Betta, tom. i. p. 120. General Dumerblon, in his despatch to the government, describing his successes, says, "It is to the talent of General Buonaparte that I am indebted for the skilful plans which have assured our victory."

In his plans for the defence of the Mediterranean, Napoleon had proposed repairing an old state prison at Marseilles, called fort Saint Nicholas, that it might serve as a powder Magazine. This plan his successor on the station proceeded to execute, and by doing so, gave umbrage to the patriots, who charged the commandant of artillery then at Marseilles, and superintending the work, with an intention to rebuild this fort, to serve as a Bastille for controlling the good citizens. The officer being summoned to the bar of the Convention, proved that the plan was not his own, but drawn out by Buonaparte. The representatives of the army in Italy, however, not being able to dispense with his services, wrote to the Convention in his behalf, and gave such an account of the origin and purpose of the undertaking, as divested it of all shade of suspicion even in the suspicious eye of the Committee of Public Safety.¹

In the remainder of the year 1794, there was little service of consequence in the army of Italy, and the 9th and 10th Thermidor (27th and 28th July) of that year, brought the downfall of Robespierre, and threatened unfavourable consequences to Buonaparte, who had been in close communication with the tyrant's brother, and was understood to have participated in the tone of exaggerated patriotism affected by his party. He endeavoured to shelter himself under his ignorance of the real tendency of the proceedings of those who had fallen,—an apology which resolves itself into the ordinary excuse, that he found his late friends had not been the persons he took them for. According to this line of defence, he made all haste to disclaim accession to the political schemes of which they were accused. "I am somewhat affected," he wrote to a correspondent,² "at the fate of the younger Robespierre; but, had he been my brother, I would have poniarded him with my own hand, had I been aware that he was forming schemes of tyranny."

Buonaparte's disclamations do not seem at first to have been favourably received. His situation was now precarious; and when those members were restored to the Convention, who had been expelled and proscribed by the Jacobins, it became still more so. The reaction of the moderate party, accompanied by horrible recollections of the past, and fears for the future, began now to be more strongly felt, as their numbers in the Convention acquired strength. Those officers who had attached themselves to the Jacobin party, were the objects of their animosity; and, besides, they were desirous to purify the armies, as far as possible, of those whom they considered as their own enemies, and those of good order; the rather, that the Jacobinical principles still continued to be more favoured in the armies than in the interior. To the causes of this we have before alluded; but it

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 48.

² General Tilly. See *Nouvelle Biog. de Bruxelles*, 1822.

may not be unnecessary to repeat, that the soldiers had experienced all the advantages of the fierce energies of a government which sent them out to conquest, and offered them the means of achieving it; and they had not been witnesses to the atrocities of their tyranny in the interior.

Before the downfall of Robespierre took place, Buonaparte had received regular but secret instructions to examine the fortifications of Genoa. M. Record, by whom these instructions had been signed, having now been superseded, and the younger Robespierre guillotined, Albitte, Salicetti, and Laporte, the new superintendents of the army of Italy, were pleased to suspect that Buonaparte had engaged in some plot of betraying Genoa to the enemy: he was arrested accordingly early in August; but his papers effectually established his innocence, and after the lapse of a fortnight he was released.¹

In March 1795, he was sent to Toulon to take the command of the artillery in an expedition destined against Rome; but this scheme was not persevered in. During his visit to Toulon, however, he had the opportunity of saving from the violence of the populace, a party of unfortunate emigrants, including the noble family of Chabillant, who had been landed from a Spanish prize.

He was removed to the infantry. He recovered them

at Marseilles, and found his brother Joseph respectably married in that city.

On reaching Paris in May, he found his pretensions thwarted

¹ "In the despatch of Salicetti and Albitte to the Government, dated 25th August, they declare, that there existed no foundation for the charges made against him"—JOMINI, tom. vi., p. 114, *Bourbienné et ses Erreurs*, tom. 4, p. 27.

not been much in action, considered his reply as a personal insult; and Napoleon, disdaining farther answer, tendered his resignation.¹ It was not, however, accepted; and he still remained in the rank of expectants, but among those whose hopes were entirely dependent upon their merits.²

It may be observed that, at a subsequent period, Aubry, being among those belonging to Pichegru's party who were banished to Cayenne, was excepted from the decree which permitted the return of those unfortunate exiles, and died at Demerara.

Meantime, his situation becoming daily more unpleasant, Buonaparte solicited Barras and Fréron, who, as Thermidoriens, had preserved their credit, for occupation in almost any line of his profession, and even negotiated for permission to go into the Turkish service, to train the Mussulmans to the use of artillery. A fanciful imagination may pursue him to the rank of pacha, or higher; for, go where he would, he could not have remained in mediocrity. His own ideas had a similar tendency. "How strange," he said, "it would be, if a little Corsican officer of artillery were to become King of Jerusalem!" He was offered a command in La Vendée, which he declined to accept, and was finally named to command a brigade of artillery in Holland. But it was in a land where there still existed so many separate and conflicting factions, as in France, that he was doomed to be raised, amid the struggles of his contending countrymen, and upon their shoulders and over their heads, to the very highest eminence to which fortune can exalt an individual. The times required such talents as his, and the opportunity for exercising them soon arose.

The French nation were in general tired of the National Convention, which successive proscriptions had drained of all the talent, eloquence, and energy it had once possessed; and that Assembly had become hateful and contemptible to all men, by suffering itself to be the passive tool of the Terrorists for two years, when, if they had shown proper firmness, the revolution of the 9th Thermidor might as well have been achieved at the beginning of that frightful anarchy, as after that long period of unheard-of suffering. The Convention was not greatly improved in point of talent, even by the return of their banished brethren; and, in a word, they had lost the confidence of the public entirely. They therefore prepared to gratify the general wish by dissolving themselves.

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 50; Las Cases, vol. i., p. 155; Louis Buonaparte, p. 14.

² Buonaparte is represented by some writers as having at this period found his situation extremely embarrassing, even as regarded pecuniary means, in the capital of which he was at no distant period to be the ruler. Among others who are said to have assisted him was the celebrated actor Talma; and such may have been the case; but the story of Talma's having been acquainted with Napoleon at the Academy of Brienne, and at that early period predicting the greatness of "*le petit Buonaparte*," has been expressly contradicted by Louis, the ex-King of Holland, who was at this epoch in Paris along with his brother.

But before they resigned their ostensible authority, it was necessary to prepare some mode of carrying on the government in future.

The Jacobin constitution of 1793 still existed on paper; but

over and abrogated as a matter of course, by a tacit but unanimous consent. Neither was there any disposition to adopt the Girondist constitution of 1791, or to revert to the democratic monarchy of 1792, the only one of these models which could be said to have had even the dubious endurance of a few months. As at the general change of the world, all former things were to be done away—all was to be made anew.

Each of these forms of government had been solemnized by the national oaths and processions customary on such occasions; but the opinion was now universally entertained, that not one of them was founded on just principles, or contained the power of defending itself against aggression, and protecting the lives and rights of the subject. On the other hand, every one not deeply interested in the late anarchy, and implicated in the horrid course of bloodshed and tyranny which was its very essence, was

been rendered necessary. To have continued the revolutionary

able crisis.

It seems to have been in general felt and admitted, that the

tending, by some exercise of an intermediate authority, to qualify the rash rapidity of a single chamber, and obstruct the progress

of any individual, who might, like Robespierre, obtain a dictatorship in such a body, and become, in doing so, an arbitrary tyrant over the whole authorities of the state. Thus, loth and late, the French began to cast an eye on the British constitution, and the system of checks and balances upon which it is founded, as the best means of uniting the protection of liberty with the preservation of order. Thinking men had come gradually to be aware, that in hopes of getting something better than a system which had been sanctioned by the experience of ages, they had only produced a set of models, which were successively wondered at, applauded, neglected, and broken to pieces, instead of a simple machine, capable, in mechanical phrase, of working well.

Had such a feeling prevailed during the commencement of the Revolution, as was advocated by Mounier and others,¹ France and Europe might have been spared the bloodshed and distress which afflicted them during a period of more than twenty years of war, with all the various evils which accompanied that great convulsion. France had then a king; nobles, out of whom a senate might have been selected; and abundance of able men to have formed a lower house, or house of commons. But the golden opportunity was passed over; and when the architects might, perhaps, have been disposed to execute the new fabric which they meditated, on the plan of a limited monarchy, the materials for the structure were no longer to be found.

The legitimate King of France no doubt existed, but he was an exile in a foreign country; and the race of gentry, from whom a house of peers, or hereditary senate, might have been chiefly selected, were to be found only in foreign service, too much exasperated by their sufferings to admit a rational hope that they would ever make any compromise with those who had forced them from their native land, and confiscated their family property. Saving for these circumstances, and the combinations which arose out of them, it seems very likely, that at the period at which we have now arrived, the tide, which began to set strongly against the Jacobins, might have been adroitly turned in favour of the Bourbons. But, though there was a general feeling of melancholy regret, which naturally arose from comparing the peaceful days of the monarchy with those of the Reign of Terror,—the rule of Louis the XVI. with that of Robespierre,—the memory of former quiet and security with the more recent recollections of blood and plunder,—still it seems to have existed rather in the state of a predisposition to form a royal party, than as the principle of one already existing. Fuel was lying ready to catch the flame of loyalty, but the match had not yet been applied; and to counteract this general tendency, there existed the most formidable obstacles.

In the first place, we have shown already the circumstances

¹ See *ante*, vol. i., p. 164.

neither saw nor felt the misery entailed on the nation at large.

driven back, by those who used the opposite signal-word, *Vive le Roi*. The Royalists were, indeed, the most formidable opponents of the military part of the French nation; and such was the animosity of the latter at this period to the idea of returning to the ancient system, that if a general could have been found capable of playing the part of Monk, he would probably have experienced the fate of La Fayette and Dumouriez.

A second and almost insuperable objection to the restoration of the Bourbons, occurred in the extensive change of property that had taken place. If the exiled family had been recalled, they could not, at this very recent period, but have made stipulations for their devoted followers, and insisted that the estates forfeited in their cause, should have been compensated or restored; and such a resumption would have inferred ruin to all the purchasers of national demesnes, and, in consequence, a general shock to the security of property through the kingdom.

The same argument applied to the Church lands. The Most Christian King could not resume his throne, without restoring the ecclesiastical establishment in part, if not in whole. It was impossible to calculate the mass of persons of property and wealth, with their various connexions, who, as possessors of national demesnes, that is, of the property of the Church, or of the emigrants, were

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verished; but their estates were still, generally speaking, in their possession; and they retained, though under oppression and poverty, the influence of a national aristocracy, diminished, but not annihilated. In France, that influence of resident proprietors had all been transferred to other hands, tenacious in holding what

the chief power in France for the time, induced them to view their own safety as deeply compromised by any proposition of restoring the exiled royal family. This present sitting and ruling Convention had put to death Louis XVI.,—with what hope of safety could they install his brother on the throne? They had formally, and in full conclave, renounced belief in the existence of a Deity—with what consistence could they be accessory to restore a national church? Some remained Republicans from their heart and upon conviction; and a great many more of the deputies could not abjure democracy, without confessing at the same time, that all the violent measures which they had carried through for the support of that system, were so many great and treasonable crimes.

These fears of a retributive reaction were very generally felt in the Convention. The Thermidoriens, in particular, who had killed Robespierre, and now reigned in his stead, had more substantial grounds of apprehension from any counter-revolutionary movement, than even the body of the representatives at large, many of whom had been merely passive in scenes where Barras and Tallien had been active agents. The timid party of The Plain might be overawed by the returning prince; and the members of the Girondists, who could indeed scarce be said to exist as a party, might be safely despised. But the Thermidoriens themselves stood in a different predicament. They were of importance enough to attract both detestation and jealousy; they held power, which must be an object of distrust to the restored monarch; and they stood on precarious ground, betwixt the hatred of the moderate party, who remembered them as colleagues of Robespierre and Danton, and that of the Jacobins, who saw in Tallien and Barras deserters of that party, and the destroyers of the power of the Sans-Culottes. They had, therefore, just reason to fear, that, stripped of the power which they at present possessed, they might become the unpitied and unaided scape-goats, to expiate all the offences of the Revolution.

Thus each favourable sentiment towards the cause of the Bourbons was opposed; I. By their unpopularity with the armies; II. By the apprehensions of the confusion and distress which must arise from a general change of property; and III. By the conscious fears of those influential persons, who conceived their own safety concerned in sustaining the republican model.

Still, the idea of monarchy was so generally received as the simplest and best mode of once more re-establishing good order and a fixed government, that some statesmen proposed to resume the form, but change the dynasty. With this view, divers persons were suggested by those, who supposed that by passing over the legitimate heir to the crown, the dangers annexed to his rights and claims might be avoided, and the apprehended measures of resumption and reaction might be guarded against. The son of the Duke of Orleans was named, but the infamy of his fa-

ther clung to him. In another wild hypothesis the Duke of York, or the Duke of Brunswick, were suggested as fit to be named constitutional Kings of France. The Abbé Siéyes is said

thus repair at once former errors, and preserve an appearance of consistency in the eyes of Europe.

duct of peace and war, the execution of the laws, and the general administration of the government. They were permitted no share of the legislative authority.

¹ This amendment was adopted to comply with the jealousy

bon heir elected.² But the inconvenience of this penitentiary council not be disguised; and it seemed to follow as a necessary consequence of such a numerous executive council, either that there

¹ The Memoirs published under the name of Fouché make this assertion. But although that work shows great intimacy with the secret history of the times, it is not to be implicitly relied upon.—S.

² "Faut-il te en jour, on vous nommerait un Bourbon."—*THIERS*, tom. viii. p. 10

ents. The legislators, however, though they knew that the whole Roman empire was found insufficient to satiate the ambition of three men, yet appeared to hope that the concord and unanimity of their five directors might continue unbroken, though they had but one nation to govern; and they decided accordingly.

The executive power being thus provided for, the legislative body was to consist of two councils; one of Elders, as it was called, serving as a House of Lords; another of Youngers, which they termed, from its number, the Council of Five Hundred. Both were elective, and the difference of age was the only circumstance which placed a distinction betwixt the two bodies. The members of the Council of Five Hundred were to be at least twenty-five years old, a qualification which, after the seventh year of the Republic, was to rise to thirty years complete. In this assembly laws were to be first proposed; and, having received its approbation, they were to be referred to the Council of Ancients. The requisites to sit in the latter senate, were the age of forty years complete, and the being a married man or a widower. Bachelors, though above that age, were deemed unfit for legislation, perhaps from want of domestic experience.

The Council of Ancients had the power of rejecting the propositions laid before them by the Council of Five Hundred, or, by adopting and approving them, that of passing them into laws. These regulations certainly gained one great point, in submitting each proposed legislative enactment to two separate bodies, and of course, to mature and deliberate consideration. It is true, that neither of the councils had any especial character, or separate interest which could enable or induce the Ancients, as a body, to suggest to the Five Hundred a different principle of considering any proposed measure, from that which was likely to occur to them in their own previous deliberation. No such varied views, therefore, were to be expected, as must arise between assemblies composed of persons who differ in rank or fortune, and consequently view the same question in various and opposite lights. Still, delay and reconsideration were attained, before the irrevocable fiat was imposed upon any measure of consequence; and so far much was gained. An orator was supposed to answer all objections to the system of the two councils thus constituted, when he described that of the Juniors as being the imagination, that of the Ancients as being the judgment of the nation; the one designed to invent and suggest national measures, the other to deliberate and decide upon them. This was, though liable to many objections, an ingenious illustration indeed; but an illustration is not an argument, though often passing current as such.

On the whole, the form of the Constitution¹ of the year Three, *i. e.* 1795, showed a greater degree of practical efficacy, sense,

¹ "Its authors were Lesage, Daunou, Boissy d'Anglas, Crenzée-Latouche Berlier, Louvet, Lareveillière-Lepaux, Languinais, Durand-Maillaune, Baudin des Ardennes, and Thibaudeau."—*THIERS*, tom. viii., p. 9.

by the experience either of France or any other country; a mere experiment in politics, the result of which could not be known until it had been put in exercise, and which, for many years at least, must be necessarily less the object of respect than of criticism. Wise legislators, even when lapse of time, alteration of manners, or increased liberality of sentiment, require corresponding alterations in the institutions of their fathers, are careful, as far as possible, to preserve the ancient form and

cause they are ours, but because they have been those of our fathers; and if a new constitution were to be presented to us, although perhaps theoretically showing more symmetry than that by which the nation had been long governed, it would be as difficult to transfer to it the allegiance of the people, as it would

crees to be passed; the first ordaining the electoral bodies of France to choose, as representatives to the two councils under the new constitution, at least two-thirds of the members presently

sitting in Convention; and the second declaring, that in default of a return of two-thirds of the present deputies, as prescribed, the Convention themselves should fill up the vacancies out of their own body; in other words, should name a large proportion of themselves their own successors in legislative power.¹

These decrees were sent down to the Primary Assemblies of the people, and every art was used to render them acceptable.

But the nation, and particularly the city of Paris, generally revolted at this stretch of arbitrary authority. They recollected, that all the members who had sat in the first National Assembly, so remarkable for talent, had been declared ineligible, on that single account, for the second legislative body; and now, men so infinitely the inferiors of those who were the colleagues of Mirabeau, Mounier, and other great names, presumed not only to declare themselves eligible by re-election, but dared to establish two-thirds of their number as indispensable ingredients of the legislative assemblies, which, according to the words alike and spirit of the constitution, ought to be chosen by the free voice of the people. The electors, and particularly those of the sections of Paris, angrily demanded to know, upon what public services the deputies of the Convention founded their title to a privilege so unjust and anomalous. Among the more active part of them, to whom the measure was chiefly to be ascribed, they saw but a few reformed Terrorists, who wished to retain the power of tyranny, though disposed to exercise it with some degree of moderation, and the loss of whose places might be possibly followed by that of their heads; in the others, they only beheld a flock of timid and discountenanced Helots, willing to purchase personal security at the sacrifice of personal honour and duty to the public; while in the Convention as a body, who pronounced so large a proportion of their number as indispensable to the service of the state, judging from their conduct hitherto, they could but discover an image composed partly of iron, partly of clay, deluged with the blood of many thousand victims—a pageant without a will of its own, and which had been capable of giving its countenance to the worst of actions, at the instigation of the worst of men—a sort of Moloch, whose name had been used by its priests to compel the most barbarous sacrifices. To sum up the whole, these experienced men of public business, without whose intermediation it was pretended the national affairs could not be carried on, could only shelter themselves from the charge of unbounded wickedness, by pleading their unlimited cowardice, and by poorly alleging that for two years they had sat, voted, and deliberated under a system of compulsion and terror. So much meanness rendered those who were degraded by it unfit, not merely to rule, but to live; and yet two-thirds of their number were, according to their own decrees, to be intruded on the nation as an indispensable portion of its representatives.

¹ *Thiers, tom. viii., p. 13.*

Such was the language held in the assemblies of the sections of Paris, who were the more irritated against the domineering and

In the meanwhile, reports continued to be made from the Primary Assemblies, of their adhesion to the constitution, in which

such as they desired them to be, and announced that the two decrees had been accepted by a majority of the Primary Assem-

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as the revolutionary mob of the suburbs used to do with their pikes.

The Convention, unpopular themselves, and embarked in an unpopular cause, began to look anxiously around for assistance. They chiefly relied on the aid of about five thousand regular troops, who were assembled in and around Paris. These declared for government with the greater readiness, that the insurrection was of a character decidedly aristocratical, and that the French armies, as already repeatedly noticed, were attached to the Republic. But besides, these professional troops entertained the usual degree of contempt for the national guards, and on this account alone were quite ready to correct the insolence of the *pekings*,² or *muscadins*,³ who usurped the dress and charac-

¹ "La Harpe, Lacretelle, Jun, Euard Morellet, Vaublanc, Pastoret, Dupont de Nemours, Quatremerre de Quincy, Delalot, Marchenna, and General Miranda, all either published pamphlets or made speeches in the sections."—TUTTAS, tom viii., p. 13.

² *Pekins*, a word of contempt, by which the soldiers distinguished those who did not belong to their profession.

³ *Muscadins*, fops—a phrase applied to the better class of *Sans-Culottes*—3.

ter of soldiers. The Convention had also the assistance of several hundred artillerymen, who, since the taking of the Bastile, had been always zealous democrats. Still apprehensive of the result, they added to this force another of a more ominous description. It was a body of volunteers, consisting of about fifteen hundred men, whom they chose to denominate the Sacred Band, or the Patriots of 1789. They were gleaned out of the suburbs, and from the jails, the remnants of the insurrectional battalions which had formed the body-guard of Hébert and Robespierre, and had been the instruments by which they executed their atrocities. The Convention proclaimed them men of the 10th of August—undoubtedly, they were also men of the massacres of September. It was conceived that the beholding such a pack of blood-hounds, ready to be let loose, might inspire horror into the citizens of Paris, to whom their very aspect brought so many fearful recollections. It did so, but it also inspired hatred; and the number and zeal of the citizens, compensating for the fury of the Terrorists, and for the superior discipline of the regular troops to be employed against them, promised an arduous and doubtful conflict.

Much, it was obvious, must depend on the courage and conduct of the leaders.

The sections employed, as their commander-in-chief, General Danican, an old officer of no high reputation for military skill, but otherwise a worthy and sincere man. The Convention at first made choice of Menou, and directed him, supported by a strong military force, to march into the section Le Pelletier, and disarm the national guards of that district. This section is one of the most wealthy, and of course most aristocratic, in Paris, being inhabited by bankers, merchants, the wealthiest class of tradesmen, and the better orders in general. Its inhabitants had formerly composed the battalion of national guards des Filles Saint Thomas, the only one which, taking part in the defence of the Tuileries, shared the fate of the Swiss Guards upon the memorable 10th of August. The section continued to entertain sentiments of the same character, and when Menou appeared at the head of his forces, accompanied by La Porte, a member of the Convention, he found the citizens under arms, and exhibiting such a show of resistance, as induced him, after a parley, to retreat without venturing an attack upon them.

Menou's indecision showed that he was not a man suited to the times, and he was suspended from his command by the Convention, and placed under arrest. The general management of affairs and the direction of the Conventional forces, was then committed to Barras; but the utmost anxiety prevailed among the members of the committees by whom government was administered, to find a general of nerve and decision enough to act under Barras, in the actual command of the military force, in a service so delicate, and times so menacing. It was then that a

The acquaintance of Barras and Buonaparte had been, as we have already said, formed at the siege of Toulon, and the former had not forgotten the inventive and decisive genius of the young officer to whom the conquest of that city was to be ascribed. On the recommendation of Barras, Buonaparte was sent for. He had witnessed the retreat of Menou, and explained with much sim-

A merely civic army, having no cannon, (for the field-pieces, of which each section possessed two, had been almost all given up

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1 "For several months, Napoleon, not being actively employed, laboured in the military committee, and was well acquainted with Carnot and Talien, whom he saw daily. How, then, could Barras make them the proposal attributed to him?"—LOUIS BUCCHAPART, p. 17.

On the thirteenth Vendemaire, corresponding to the 4th October, the civil affray, commonly called the Day of the Sections, took place. The national guards assembled, to the number of thirty thousand men and upwards, but having no artillery. They advanced by different avenues, in close columns, but everywhere found the most formidable resistance. One large force occupied the quays on the left bank of the Seine, threatening the palace from that side of the river. Another strong division advanced on the Tuileries, through the Rue St. Honoré, designing to debouche on the palace, where the Convention was sitting, by the Rue de Echelle. They did so, without duly reflecting that they were flanked on most points by strong posts in the lanes and crossings, defended by artillery.

The contest began in the Rue St. Honoré. Buonaparte had established a strong post with two guns at the cul-de-sac Dauphine, opposite to the church of St. Roche. He permitted the imprudent Parisians to involve their long and dense columns in the narrow street without interruption, until they established a body of grenadiers in the front of the church, and opposite to the position at the cul-de-sac. Each party, as usual, throws on the other the blame of commencing the civil contest for which both were prepared. But all agree the firing commenced with musketry. It was instantly followed by discharges of grape-shot and cannister, which, pointed as the guns were, upon thick columns of the national guards, arranged on the quays and in the narrow streets, made an astounding carnage. The national guards offered a brave resistance, and even attempted to rush on the artillery, and carry the guns by main force. But a measure which is desperate enough in the open field, becomes impossible when the road to assault lies through narrow streets, which are swept by the cannon at every discharge. The citizens were compelled to give way. By a more judicious arrangement of their respective forces, different results might have been hoped ; but how could Danican, in any circumstances have competed with Buonaparte ? The affair, in which several hundred men were killed and wounded, was terminated as a general action in about an hour ; and the victorious troops of the Convention, marching into the different sections, completed the dispersion and disarming of their opponents, an operation which lasted till late at night.

The Convention used this victory with the moderation which recollection of the Reign of Terror had inspired. Only two persons suffered death for the Day of the Sections. One of them, La Fond, had been a garde de corps, was distinguished for his intrepidity, and repeatedly rallied the national guard under the storm of grape shot. Several other persons having fled, were in their absence capitally condemned, but were not strictly looked after ; and deportation was the punishment inflicted upon others. The accused were indebted for this clemency chiefly to the interference of those members of the Convention, who, themselves

exiled on the 31st of May, had suffered persecution and learned mercy.

The Convention showed themselves at the same time liberal to their protectors. General Berruyer,¹ who commanded the volunteers of 1789, and other general officers employed on the Day of the Sections, were loaded with praises and preferment. But a separate triumph was destined to Buonaparte, as the hero of the day. Five days after the battle, Barras solicited the attention of the Convention to the young officer, by whose prompt and skilful dispositions the Tuileries had been protected on the 13th Vende-

their resentment against Menou, whom they suspected of treachery; but Buonaparte interfering as a mediator, they were content to look over his offence.

OF ELDERS AND FIVE HUNDRED.

After this change of names and dresses, resembling the shifts of a strolling company of players, the two-thirds of the old Convention, with one-third of members newly elected, took upon them the administration of the new constitution. The two re-elected

sibly royalist, but several of its leaders were of that party in secret, and, if successful, it would most certainly have assumed that complexion. Thus, the first step of Napoleon's rise commenced by the destruction of the hopes of the House of Bourbon, under the reviving influence of which, twenty years afterwards, he himself

¹ In 1796, the Directory appointed Berruyer commander of the *Hôpital des Invalides*, which situation he held till his death, in 1804.

was obliged to succumb. But the long path which closed so darkly, was now opening upon him in light and joy. Buonaparte's high services, and the rank which he had obtained, rendered him now a young man of the first hope and expectation, mingling on terms of consideration among the rulers of the state, instead of being regarded as a neglected stranger, supporting himself with difficulty, and haunting public offices and bureaux in vain, to obtain some chance of preferment, or even employment.

From second in command, the new general soon became general-in-chief of the army of the interior, Barras having found his duties as a director incompatible with those of military command. He employed his genius, equally prompt and profound, in improving the state of the military forces; and, in order to prevent the recurrence of such insurrections as that of the 13th Vendemaire, or Day of the Sections, and as the many others by which it was preceded, he appointed and organized a guard for the protection of the representative body.

As the dearth of bread, and other causes of disaffection, continued to produce commotions in Paris, the general of the interior was sometimes obliged to oppose them with a military force. On one occasion, it is said, that when Buonaparte was anxiously admonishing the multitude to disperse, a very bulky woman exhorted them to keep their ground. "Never mind these cockcombs with the epaulets," she said; "they do not care if we are all starved, so they themselves feed and get fat."—"Look at me, good woman," said Buonaparte, who was then as thin as a shadow, "and tell me which is the fatter of us two." This turned the laugh against the Amazon, and the rabble dispersed in good-humour.¹ If not among the most distinguished of Napoleon's victories, this is certainly worthy of record, as achieved at the least cost.

Meantime, circumstances, which we will relate, according to his own statement, introduced Buonaparte to an acquaintance, which was destined to have much influence on his future fate. A fine boy of ten or twelve years old, presented himself at the levee of the general of the interior, with a request of a nature unusually interesting. He stated his name to be Eugene Beauharnais, son of the ci-devant Vicomte de Beauharnais, who, adhering to the revolutionary party, had been a general in the Republican service upon the Rhine, and falling under the causeless suspicion of the Committee of Public Safety, was delivered to the Revolutionary Tribunal, and fell by its sentence just four days before the overthrow of Robespierre. Eugene was come to request of Buonaparte, as general of the interior, that his father's sword might be restored to him. The prayer of the young suppliant was as interesting as his manners were engaging, and Napoleon felt so much interest in him, that he was induced to

¹ Les Cécès, tom. I., p. 161.

cultivate the acquaintance of Eugene's mother, afterwards the Empress Josephine.¹

This lady was a Creolian, the daughter of a planter in St. Domingo. Her name at full length was Marie-Joseph Rose Detacher de la Pag rie. She had suffered her share of revolutionary miseries. After her husband, General Beauharnais, had been deprived of his command, she was arrested as a suspected person, and detained in prison till the general liberation, which succeeded the revolution of 9th Thermidor. While in confinement, Madame Beauharnais had formed an intimacy with a companion in distress, Madame Fontenai, now Madame Tallien,² from which she derived great advantage after her friend's marriage. With

self an ex-noble, was fond of society, desirous of enjoying it on an agreeable scale, and of washing away the dregs which Jacobinism had mingled with all the dearest interests of life. He loved show, too, and pleasure, and might now indulge both without the risk of falling under the suspicion of incivism, which, in the Reign of Terror, would have been incurred by any attempt

ther with or without foundation.

able in her manners, he was induced, solely by her personal charms, to make her an offer of his hand, heart, and fortunes,—little supposing, of course, to what a pitch the latter were to rise.

Although he himself is said to have been a fatalist, believing in destiny and in the influence of his star, he knew nothing, probably, of the prediction of a negro sorceress, who, while Marie-Joseph was but a child, prophesied she should rise to a dignity greater than that of a queen, yet fall from it before her death.⁴

¹ Montholon, tom. iii. p. 22

² See vol. i. p. 335

³ Buonaparte was then in his twenty-sixth year. Josephine gave herself in the marriage contract for twenty-eight — 8.

⁴ A lady of high rank, who happened to live for some time in the same convent at Paris, where Josephine was also a pensioner or boarder, heard her mention the prophecy, and told it herself to the author, just about the time of the Italian expedition, when Buonaparte was beginning to attract notice. An-

This was one of those vague auguries, delivered at random by fools or imposters, which the caprice of Fortune sometimes matches with a corresponding and conforming event. But without trusting to the African sibyl's prediction, Buonaparte may have formed his match under the auspices of ambition as well as love. The marrying Madame Beauharnais was a mean of uniting his fortune with those of Barras and Tallien, the first of whom governed France as one of the directors; and the last, from talents and political connexions, had scarcely inferior influence. He had already deserved well of them for his conduct on the Day of the Sections, but he required their countenance to rise still higher; and without derogating from the bride's merits, we may suppose her influence in their society corresponded with the views of her lover. It is, however, certain, that he always regarded her with peculiar affection; that he relied on her fate, which he considered as linked with and strengthening his own; and reposed, besides, considerable confidence in Josephine's tact and address in political business. She had at all times the art of mitigating his temper, and turning aside the hasty determinations of his angry moments, not by directly opposing, but by gradually parrying and disarming them. It must be added, to her great praise, that she was always a willing, and often a successful advocate, in the cause of humanity.

They were married 9th March 1796; and the dowry of the bride was the chief command of the Italian armies, a scene which opened a full career to the ambition of the youthful general. Buonaparte remained with his wife only three days after his marriage, hastened to see his family, who were still at Marseilles, and having enjoyed the pleasure of exhibiting himself as a favourite of Fortune in the city which he had lately left in a very subordinate capacity, proceeded rapidly to commence the career to which Fate called him, by placing himself at the head of the Italian army.¹

CHAPTER III.

The Alps—Feelings and Views of Buonaparte on being appointed to the Command of the Army of Italy—General Account of his new Principles of Warfare—Mountainous Countries peculiarly favourable to them—Retrospect of Military Proceedings since

other clause is usually added to the prediction—that the party whom it concerned should die in an hospital, which was afterwards explained as referring to Malmison. This the author did not hear from the same authority. The lady mentioned used to speak in the highest terms of the simple manners and great kindness of Madame Beauharnais.—S.

¹ "It was I who proposed Buonaparte for the command of the army of Italy, not Barras."—CARROT, *Réponse à Rivind*.

"Napoleon owed the appointment to the command of the army of Italy to his signal services under Dumerbion."—JOMINI, tom. viii., p. 49.

October 1795—Hostility of the French Government to the Pope

Takes possession of Cherasco—King of Sardinia requests an Armistice, which leads to a Peace, concluded on very severe Terms—Close of the Piedmontese Campaign—Napoleon's Character at this period.

NAPOLEON has himself observed, that no country in the world is more distinctly marked out by its natural boundaries than Italy.¹ The Alps seem a barrier erected by Nature herself, on which she has inscribed in gigantic characters, "Here let ambi-

spoke indeed of the Alps as a natural boundary, so far as to authorise them to claim all which lay on the western side of these mountains, as naturally pertaining to their dominions; but they

her interest.

politan force³ was also to be added, so that in general numbers their opponents were much superior to the French; but a great part of this force was cooped up in garrisons which could not be abandoned.

It may be imagined with what delight the general, scarce aged

¹ Napoleon, *Memoirs*, tom. iii. p. 91.

² Victor Amadeus III. He was born in 1726, and died in 1796.

³ "The Neapolitan army was 60,000 strong, the cavalry was excellent."—NAPOLEON, *Memoirs*, tom. iii. p. 134.

twenty-six, advanced to an independent field of glory and conquest, confident in his own powers, and in the perfect knowledge of the country, which he had acquired when by his scientific plans of the campaign, he had enabled General Dumerbion to drive the Austrians back, and obtain possession of the Col di Tende, Saorgio, and the gorges of the higher Alps.¹ Buonaparte's achievements had hitherto been under the auspices of others. He made the dispositions before Toulon, but it was Dugommier who had the credit of taking the place. Dumerbion, as we have just said, obtained the merit of the advantages in Piedmont. Even in the civil turmoil of the 13th Vendemiaire, his actual services had been overshadowed by the official dignity of Barras as commander-in-chief. But if he reaped honour in Italy, the success would be exclusively his own; and that proud heart must have throbbled to meet danger upon such terms; that keen spirit have toiled to discover the means of success.

For victory he relied chiefly upon a system of tactics hitherto unpractised in war, or at least upon any considerable or uniform scale. It may not be unnecessary to pause, to take a general view of the principles which he now called into action.

Nations in the savage state, being constantly engaged in war, always form for themselves some peculiar mode of fighting, suited to the country they inhabit, and to the mode in which they are armed. The North-American Indian becomes formidable as a rifleman or sharpshooter, lays ambuscades in his pathless forests, and practises all the arts of irregular war. The Arab, or Scythian, manœuvres his clouds of cavalry, so as to envelope and destroy his enemy in his deserts by sudden onsets, rapid retreats, and unexpected rallies; desolating the country around, cutting off his antagonist's supplies, and practising, in short, the species of war proper to a people superior in light cavalry.

The first stage of civilisation is less favourable to success in war. As a nation advances in the peaceful arts, and the character of the soldier begins to be less familiarly united with that of the citizen, this system of natural tactics falls out of practice; and when foreign invasion, or civil broils, call the inhabitants to arms, they have no idea save that of finding out the enemy, rushing upon him, and committing the event to superior strength, bravery, or numbers. An example may be seen in the great Civil War of England, where men fought on both sides, in almost every county of the kingdom, without any combination, or exact idea of uniting in mutual support, or manœuvring so as to form their insulated bands into an army of preponderating force. At least, what was attempted for that purpose must have been on the rudest plan possible, where, even in actual fight, that part of an army which obtained any advantage, pursued it as far as they could, instead of using their success for the support of their companions;

¹ Viz. in April, 1794.—See Napoleon, *Memoirs*, tom. iii., p. 27.

campaign.¹ Among the generals to whom this paltry supply was rendered acceptable by their wants, were, or might have been, many whose names became afterwards the praise and dread of war.² Augereau, Massena,³ Serrurier, Joubert, Lasnes, and Murat, all generals of the first consideration, served under Buonaparte in his first Italian campaign.

The position of the French army had repeatedly varied since October 1795, after the skirmish at Cairo. At that time the extreme left of the line, which extended from south to north, rested upon the Col d'Argentine, and communicated with the higher Alps—the centre was on the Col di Tende and Mount Bertrand—the left occupied the heights of Saint Bertrand, Saint Jacques, and other ridges running in the same direction, which

cient talent to act as commander-in-chief, was superseded, and Scherer was placed in command of the army of Italy. He risked a battle with the Austrians near Loana, in which the talents of

left by Buonaparte.⁴

But though Scherer had been thus far victorious, he was not

¹ This reminds us of the liberality of the Kings of Brentford to their Knights-bridge forces—

² "The King of Brentford to their Knights-bridge forces—"

⁴ Napoleon, *Memoirs*, tom. ii., p. 51.

varied success, but unabated vigour, upon the Rhine. The rulers of France had a farther object in this bold scheme. They desired to intimidate, or annihilate and dethrone the Pope. He was odious to them as head of the Church, because the attachment of the French clergy to the Roman See, and the points of conscience which rested upon that dependence, had occasioned the recusancy of the priests, especially of those who were most esteemed by the people, to take the constitutional oath. To the Pope, and his claims of supremacy, were therefore laid the charge of the great civil war in La Vendée, and the general disaffection of the Catholics in the south of France.

But this was not the only cause of the animosity entertained by the Directory against the head of the Catholic Church. They had, three years before, sustained an actual injury from the See of Rome, which was yet unavenged. The people of Rome were extremely provoked that the French residing there, and particularly the young artists, had displayed the three-coloured cockade, and were proposing to exhibit the scutcheon containing the emblems of the Republic, over the door of the French consul. The Pope, through his minister, had intimated his desire that this should not be attempted, as he had not acknowledged the Republic as a legitimate government. The French, however, pursued their purpose; and the consequence was, that a popular commotion arose, which the papal troops did not greatly exert themselves to suppress. The carriage of the French envoy, or chargé des affaires, named Basseville, was attacked in the streets, and chased home; his house was broken into by the mob, and he himself, unarmed and unresisting, was cruelly assassinated. The French Government considered this very naturally as a gross insult, and were the more desirous of avenging it, that by doing so they would approach nearer to the dignified conduct of the Roman Republic, which, in good or evil, seems always to have been their model. The affair happened in 1793, but was not forgotten in 1796.¹

The original idea entertained by the French Government for prosecuting their resentment, had been by a proposed landing at Civita Vecchia with an army of ten thousand men, marching to Rome, and exacting from the pontiff complete atonement for the murder of Basseville. But as the English fleet rode unopposed in the Mediterranean, it became a matter of very doubtful success to transport such a body of troops to Civita Vecchia by sea, not to mention the chance that, even if safely landed, they would have found themselves in the centre of Italy, cut off from supplies and succours, assaulted on all hands, and most probably blockaded

¹ "He received a thrust of a bayonet in the abdomen: he was dragged into the streets, holding his bowels in his hands, and at length left on a bed-bed in a guard-house, where he expired."—*Moniteur*, tom. iii., p. 41; *Botta*, *Storia d'Italia*, tom. iv., p. 271. Basseville, in 1793, was editor of the *Mercur* National. He published *Éléments de Médecine*, &c.

by the British fleet. Buonaparte, who was consulted, recommended that the north of Italy should be first conquered, in order that Rome might be with safety approached and chastised; and this scheme, though in appearance scarce a less bold measure, was a much safer one than the Directory had at first inclined to,

the deputy who accompanied him as a commissioner of the Government, was not probably much disposed to intrude his opinions. He had been Buonaparte's patron, and was still his friend.* The

means of conveyance there were only mules, and not above five hundred of these could be reckoned upon.

The headquarters had never been removed from Nice, since the commencement of the war; they were instantly ordered to be transferred to Albenga. On the march thither, along the rugged and precipitous shore of the Mediterranean, the staff,

* Montholon, tom. ii., p. 43. Thibaudeau, Hist. Gen. de Napoleon, tom. i. p. 133. Jomini, tom. i., p. 42.

bitious hopes, he addressed the army of Italy to the following purpose :—"Soldiers, you are hungry and naked.—The Republic owes you much, but she has not the means to acquit herself of her debts. The patience with which you support your hardships among these barren rocks is admirable, but it cannot procure you glory. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains that the sun beholds—Rich provinces, opulent towns, all shall be at your disposal—Soldiers, with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and constancy?" This was showing the deer to the hound when the leash is about to be slipped.

The Austro-Sardinian army, to which Buonaparte was opposed, was commanded by Beaulieu, an Austrian general of great experience and some talent, but no less than seventy-five years old ; accustomed all his life to the ancient rules of tactics, and unlikely to suspect, anticipate, or frustrate, those plans, formed by a genius so fertile as that of Napoleon.

Buonaparte's plan for entering Italy differed from that of former conquerors and invaders, who had approached that fine country by penetrating or surmounting at some point or other her Alpine barriers. This inventive warrior resolved to attain the same object, by turning round the southern extremity of the Alpine range, keeping as close as possible to the shores of the Mediterranean, and passing through the Genoese territory by the narrow pass called the Bocchetta leading around the extremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea. Thus he proposed to penetrate into Italy, by the lowest level which the surface of the country presented, which must be of course where the range of the Alps unites with that of the Apennines. The point of junction where these two immense ranges of mountains touch upon each other, is at the heights of Mount Saint Jacques, above Genoa, where the Alps, running north-westward, ascend to Mont Blanc, their highest peak, and the Apennines, running to the south-east, gradually elevate themselves to Monte Velino, the tallest mountain of the range.

To attain his object of turning the Alps in the manner proposed, it was necessary that Buonaparte should totally change the situation of his army ; those occupying a defensive line, running north and south, being to assume an offensive position, extending east and west. Speaking of an army as of a battalion, he was to form into column upon the right of the line which he had hitherto occupied. This was an extremely delicate operation, to be undertaken in presence of an active enemy, his superior in numbers ; nor was he permitted to execute it uninterrupted.

No sooner did Beaulieu learn that the French general was concentrating his forces, and about to change his position, than he hastened to preserve Genoa, without possession of which, or at least of the adjacent territory, Buonaparte's scheme of advance could scarce have been accomplished. The Austrian divided his army into three bodies. Colli, at the head of a Sardinian divi-

sion, he stationed on the extreme right at Ceva; his centre division, under D'Argenteau, having its head at Sasiello, had directions to march on a mountain called Montenotte, with two

were like to be held in little reverence. Thus it appears, that while the French were endeavouring to penetrate into Italy by an advance from Sardinia by the way of Genoa, their line of march was threatened by three armies of Austro-Sardinians,

teau by the most determined resistance. At the head of not more than fifteen hundred men, whom he inspired with his own courage, and caused to swear either to maintain their post or die there,¹ he continued to defend the redoubts, during the whole of the 11th, until D'Argenteau, whose conduct was afterwards greatly blamed for not making more determined efforts to carry them, drew off his forces for the evening, intending to renew the attack next morning.

general was obliged to retreat by a circuitous route.

¹ Thiers, tom. vii., p. 173. Lacretelle, tom. xii., p. 131.

leaving behind him colours and cannon, a thousand slain, and two thousand prisoners.¹

Such was the battle of Montenotte, the first of Buonaparte's victories; eminently displaying that truth and mathematical certainty of combination,² which enabled him on many more memorable occasions, even when his forces were inferior in numbers, and apparently disunited in position, suddenly to concentrate them and defeat his enemy, by overpowering him on the very point where he thought himself strongest. He had accumulated a superior force on the Austrian centre, and destroyed it, while Colli, on the right, and Beaulieu himself, on the left, each at the head of numerous forces, did not even hear of the action till it was fought and won.³

In consequence of the success at Montenotte, and the close pursuit of the defeated Austrians, the French obtained possession of Cairo, which placed them on that side of the Alps which slopes towards Lombardy, and where the streams from these mountains run to join the Po.

Beaulieu had advanced to Voltri, while the French withdrew to unite themselves in the attack upon D'Argenteau. He had now to retreat northward with all haste to Dego, in the valley of the river Bormida, in order to resume communication with the right wing of his army, consisting chiefly of Sardinians, from which he was now nearly separated by the defeat of the centre. General Colli, by a corresponding movement on the right, occupied Millesimo, a small town about nine miles from Dego, with which he resumed and maintained communication by a brigade stationed on the heights of Biastro. From the strength of this position, though his forces were scarce sufficiently concentrated, Beaulieu hoped to maintain his ground till he should receive supplies from Lombardy, and recover the consequences of the defeat at Montenotte. But the antagonist whom he had in front had no purpose of permitting him such respite.

Determined upon a general attack on all points of the Austrian position, the French army advanced in three bodies upon a space of four leagues in extent. Augereau, at the head of the division which had not fought at Montenotte, advanced on the left against Millesimo; the centre, under Massena, directed themselves upon Dego, by the vale of the Bormida; the right wing, commanded by La Harpe, proceeded by the heights of Cairo, for the purpose of turning Beaulieu's left flank. Augereau, whose division had not engaged at the battle of Montenotte, was the first who came in contact with the enemy. He attacked General Colli

¹ Napoleon, *Memoirs*, tom. iii., p. 145; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 70; Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 107.

² "Napoleon placed himself on a ridge in the centre of his divisions, the better to judge of the turn of affairs, and to prescribe the manœuvres which might become necessary."—JOMINI, tom. viii., p. 72.

³ Montbenon, tom. ii., p. 145; Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 100; Thiers, tom. viii., p. 173.

on the 13th April. His troops, emulous of the honour acquired by their companions, behaved with great bravery, rushed upon the outposts of the Sardinian army at Millesimo, forced, and retained possession of the gorge by which it was defended, and thus separated from the Sardinian army a body of about two thousand men, under the Austrian General Provera, who occupied a detached eminence called Cossaria, which covered the extreme left of General Coll's position. But the Austrian showed the most obstinate courage. Although surrounded by the enemy, he threw himself into the ruinous castle of Cossaria, which crowned the eminence, and showed a disposition to maintain the place to the last; the rather that, as he could see from the turrets of his stronghold the Sardinian troops, from whom he had been separated, preparing to fight on the ensuing day, he might reasonably hope to be disengaged.¹

Buonaparte in person came up; and seeing the necessity of dislodging the enemy from this strong post, ordered three successive attacks to be made on the castle. Joubert, at the head of one of

heights of Biastro were carried, and the Piedmontese routed.

D'Aqui.²

Even the morning after the victory, it was nearly wrested out of

¹ Montholon, tom. III., p. 146. Las Cases, tom. II., p. 122. Jomini, tom. vii., p. 76.

² Las Cases, tom. II., p. 133. Montholon, tom. II., p. 147. Thiers, tom. vii., p. 181.

the hands of the conquerors. A fresh division of Austrians, who had evacuated Voltri later than the others, and were approaching to form a junction with their general, found the enemy in possession of Beaulieu's position. They arrived at Dego like men who had been led astray, and were no doubt surprised at finding it in the hands of the French. Yet they did not hesitate to assume the offensive, and by a brisk attack drove out the enemy, and replaced the Austrian eagles in the village. Great alarm was occasioned by this sudden apparition; for no one among the French could conceive the meaning of an alarm beginning on the opposite quarter to that on which the enemy had retreated, and without its being announced from the outposts towards D'Aqui.

Buonaparte hastily marched on the village. The Austrians repelled two attacks; at the third, General Lanusse, afterwards killed in Egypt, put his hat upon the point of his sword, and advancing to the charge, penetrated into the place. Lannes also, afterwards Duke of Montebello, distinguished himself on the same occasion by courage and military skill, and was recommended by Buonaparte to the Directory for promotion. In this battle of Dego, more commonly called of Millesimo, the Austro-Sardinian army lost five or six thousand men, thirty pieces of cannon, with a great quantity of baggage. Besides, the Austrians were divided from the Sardinians; and the two generals began to show, not only that their forces were disunited, but that they themselves were acting upon separate motives; the Sardinians desiring to protect Turin, whereas the movements of Beaulieu seemed still directed to prevent the French from entering the Milanese territory.¹

Leaving a sufficient force on the Bormida to keep in check Beaulieu, Buonaparte now turned his strength against Colli, who, overpowered, and without hopes of succour, abandoned his line of defence near Ceva, and retreated to the line of the Tanaro.

Napoleon, in the meantime, fixed his head-quarters at Ceva, and enjoyed from the heights of Montezemoto, the splendid view of the fertile fields of Piedmont stretching in boundless perspective beneath his feet, watered by the Po, the Tanaro, and a thousand other streams which descend from the Alps. Before the eyes of the delighted army of victors lay this rich expanse like a promised land; behind them was the wilderness they had passed; —not indeed, a desert of barren sand, similar to that in which the Israelites wandered, but a huge tract of rocks and inaccessible mountains, crested with ice and snow, seeming by nature designed as the barrier and rampart of the blessed regions which stretched eastward beneath them. We can sympathize with the self-congratulation of the general who had surmounted such tremendous obstacles in a way so unusual. He said to the officers around him, as they gazed upon this magnificent scene, “*Han-*

¹ Montebello, tom. iii., p. 143; Las Cases, tom. li., p. 293; Lacretelle, tom. xiii., p. 229.

so that the main body was often defeated when a victorious wing was in pursuit of those whom their first onset had broken.

But—as war becomes a profession, and a subject of deep study—it is gradually discovered, that the principles of tactics depend upon mathematical and arithmetical science; and that the commander will be victorious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides. No man ever possessed in a greater degree than Buonaparte, the power of calculation and

at the exact time when their service was necessary; and above

... almost always the effect of surprise. Napoleon was

It is true that the abandonment of every object, save success

in the field, augmented frightfully all the usual horrors of war. The soldier, with arms in his hands, and wanting bread, became a marauder in self-defence; and, in supplying his wants by rapine, did mischief to the inhabitants, in a degree infinitely beyond the benefit he himself received; for it may be said of military requisition, as truly as of despotism, that it resembles the proceedings of a savage, who cuts down a tree to come at the fruit. Still, though purchased at a high rate, that advantage was gained by this rapid system of tactics, which in a slower progress, during which the soldier was regularly maintained, and kept under the restraint of discipline, might have been rendered doubtful. It wasted the army through disease, fatigue, and all the consequences of want and toil; but still the victory was attained, and that was enough to make the survivors forget their hardships, and to draw forth new recruits to replace the fallen. Patient of labours, light of heart and temper, and elated by success beyond all painful recollections, the French soldiers were the very men calculated to execute this desperate species of service under a chief, who, their sagacity soon discovered, was sure to lead to victory all those who could sustain the hardships by which it was to be won.

The character of the mountainous countries, among which he was, for the first time, to exercise his system, was highly favourable to Buonaparte's views. Presenting many lines and defensible positions, it induced the Austrian generals to become stationary, and occupy a considerable extent of ground, according to their old system of tactics. But though abounding in such positions as might at first sight seem absolutely impregnable, and were too often trusted to as such, the mountains also exhibited to the sagacious eye of a great captain, gorges, defiles, and difficult and unsuspected points of access, by which he could turn the positions that appeared in front so formidable; and, by threatening them on the flank and on the rear, compel the enemy to a battle at disadvantage, or to a retreat with loss.

The forces which Buonaparte had under his command were between fifty and sixty thousand good troops, having, many of them, been brought from the Spanish campaign, in consequence of the peace with that country; but very indifferently provided with clothing, and suffering from the hardships they had endured in those mountainous, barren, and cold regions.¹ The cavalry, in particular, were in very poor order; but the nature of their new field of action not admitting of their being much employed, rendered this of less consequence. The misery of the French army, until these Alpine campaigns were victoriously closed by the armistice of Cherasco, could, according to Buonaparte's authority,² scarce bear description. The officers for several years had received no more than eight livres a-month (twenty pence

¹ Napoleon states his fighting force, fit for duty, at about 31,000 men.—*Mem. de N.*, tom. iii., p. 160; *Journ.*, tom. xli., p. 22, at 42,400.

² *Les Cés.*, tom. i., p. 162.

campaign.¹ Among the generals to whom this paltry supply was rendered acceptable by their wants, were, or might have been, many whose names became afterwards the praise and dread of war.² Augereau, Massena,³ Serrurier, Joubert, Lasnes, and Murat, all generals of the first consideration, served under Buonaparte in his first Italian campaign.

The position of the French army had repeatedly varied since October 1795, after the skirmish at Cairo. At that time the extreme left of the line, which extended from south to north, rested upon the Col d'Argentine, and communicated with the higher Alps—the centre was on the Col di Tende and Mount Bertrand—the left occupied the heights of Saint Bertrand, Saint Jacques, and other ridges running in the same direction, which terminated on the Mediterranean shore, near Finale.

The Austrians, strongly reinforced, attacked this line, and

cient talent to act as commander-in-chief, was superseded, and Scherer was placed in command of the army of Italy. He risked a battle with the Austrians near Loana, in which the talents of Massena and Augereau were conspicuous; and by the victory

left by Buonaparte.⁴

But though Scherer had been thus far victorious, he was not the person to whom the Directory desired to intrust the daring plan of assuming the offensive on a grand scale upon the Alpine

¹ This reminds us of the liberality of the Kings of Brentford to their Knight-bridge forces—

First King Here, take five guineas to these warlike men

Second King And here, five more, which makes the sum just ten.

Herald We have not seen so much the Lord knows when—&c.

² *See* *the* *History* *of* *the* *French* *Republic* *in* *Italy* *from* *1795* *to* *1801* *vol.* *ii.* *p.* *101.*

³ *See* *the* *History* *of* *the* *French* *Republic* *in* *Italy* *from* *1795* *to* *1801* *vol.* *ii.* *p.* *101.*

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varied success, but unabated vigour, upon the Rhine. The rulers of France had a farther object in this bold scheme. They desired to intimidate, or annihilate and dethrone the Pope. He was odious to them as head of the Church, because the attachment of the French clergy to the Roman See, and the points of conscience which rested upon that dependence, had occasioned the recusancy of the priests, especially of those who were most esteemed by the people, to take the constitutional oath. To the Pope, and his claims of supremacy, were therefore laid the charge of the great civil war in La Vendée, and the general disaffection of the Catholics in the south of France.

But this was not the only cause of the animosity entertained by the Directory against the head of the Catholic Church. They had, three years before, sustained an actual injury from the See of Rome, which was yet unavenged. The people of Rome were extremely provoked that the French residing there, and particularly the young artists, had displayed the three-coloured cockade, and were proposing to exhibit the seuteheon containing the emblems of the Republic, over the door of the French consul. The Pope, through his minister, had intimated his desire that this should not be attempted, as he had not acknowledged the Republic as a legitimate government. The French, however, pursued their purpose; and the consequence was, that a popular commotion arose, which the papal troops did not greatly exert themselves to suppress. The carriage of the French envoy, or chargé des affaires, named Basseville, was attacked in the streets, and chased home; his house was broken into by the mob, and he himself, unarmed and unresisting, was cruelly assassinated. The French Government considered this very naturally as a gross insult, and were the more desirous of avenging it, that by doing so they would approach nearer to the dignified conduct of the Roman Republic, which, in good or evil, seems always to have been their model. The affair happened in 1793, but was not forgotten in 1796.¹

The original idea entertained by the French Government for prosecuting their resentment, had been by a proposed landing at Civita Vecchia with an army of ten thousand men, marching to Rome, and exacting from the pontiff complete atonement for the murder of Basseville. But as the English fleet rode unopposed in the Mediterranean, it became a matter of very doubtful success to transport such a body of troops to Civita Vecchia by sea, not to mention the chance that, even if safely landed, they would have found themselves in the centre of Italy, cut off from supplies and succours, assaulted on all hands, and most probably blockaded

¹ "He received a thrust of a bayonet in the abdomen: he was dragged into the streets, holding his bowels in his hands, and at length left on a bed-bed in a guard-house, where he expired."—MONTMAYON, tom. iii., p. 41; Botta, *Storia d'Italia*, tom. i., p. 271. Basseville, in 1793, was editor of the *Mercur National*. He published *Element de Méthode, &c.*

by the British fleet. Buonaparte, who was consulted, recommended that the north of Italy should be first conquered, in order that Rome might be with safety approached and chastised; and this scheme, though in appearance scarce a less bold measure, was a much safer one than the Directory had at first inclined to, since Buonaparte would only approach Rome in the event of his

worse than he had formed any idea of. The supply of bread was very uncertain; distributions of meat had long ceased; and for means of conveyance there were only mules, and not above five hundred of these could be reckoned upon.

The headquarters had never been removed from Nice, since the commencement of the war: they were instantly ordered to be transferred to Albenga. On the march thither, along the rugged and precipitous shore of the Mediterranean, the staff,

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 43. Thibaudan, Hist. Gen. de Napoleon, tom. i.

bitious hopes, he addressed the army of Italy to the following purpose :—"Soldiers, you are hungry and naked.—The Republic owes you much, but she has not the means to acquit herself of her debts. The patience with which you support your hardships among these barren rocks is admirable, but it cannot procure you glory. I am come to lead you into the most fertile plains that the sun beholds—Rich provinces, opulent towns, all shall be at your disposal—Soldiers, with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and constancy?" This was showing the deer to the hound when the leash is about to be slipped.

The Austro-Sardinian army, to which Buonaparte was opposed, was commanded by Beaulieu, an Austrian general of great experience and some talent, but no less than seventy-five years old ; accustomed all his life to the ancient rules of tactics, and unlikely to suspect, anticipate, or frustrate, those plans, formed by a genius so fertile as that of Napoleon.

Buonaparte's plan for entering Italy differed from that of former conquerors and invaders, who had approached that fine country by penetrating or surmounting at some point or other her Alpine barriers. This inventive warrior resolved to attain the same object, by turning round the southern extremity of the Alpine range, keeping as close as possible to the shores of the Mediterranean, and passing through the Genoese territory by the narrow pass called the Bocchetta leading around the extremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea. Thus he proposed to penetrate into Italy, by the lowest level which the surface of the country presented, which must be of course where the range of the Alps unites with that of the Apennines. The point of junction where these two immense ranges of mountains touch upon each other, is at the heights of Mount Saint Jacques, above Genoa, where the Alps, running north-westward, ascend to Mont Blanc, their highest peak, and the Apennines, running to the south-east, gradually elevate themselves to Monte Velino, the tallest mountain of the range.

To attain his object of turning the Alps in the manner proposed, it was necessary that Buonaparte should totally change the situation of his army ; those occupying a defensive line, running north and south, being to assume an offensive position, extending east and west. Speaking of an army as of a battalion, he was to form into column upon the right of the line which he had hitherto occupied. This was an extremely delicate operation, to be undertaken in presence of an active enemy, his superior in numbers ; nor was he permitted to execute it uninterrupted.

No sooner did Beaulieu learn that the French general was concentrating his forces, and about to change his position, than he hastened to preserve Genoa, without possession of which, or at least of the adjacent territory, Buonaparte's scheme of advance could scarce have been accomplished. The Austrian divided his army into three bodies. Colli, at the head of a Sardinian divi-

sion, he stationed on the extreme right at Ceva; his centre division, under D'Argenteau, having its head at Sasiello, had directions to march on a mountain called Montenotte, with two villages of the same name, near to which was a strong position at a place called Montelegrino, which the French had occupied in order to cover their flank during their march towards the east.

were like to be held in little reverence. AND it appears, that while the French were endeavouring to penetrate into Italy by an advance from Sardinia by the way of Genoa, their line of march was threatened by three armies of Austro-Sardinians,

teau by the most determined resistance. At the head of not more than fifteen hundred men, whom he inspired with his own courage, and caused to swear either to maintain their post or

attack next morning

The divisions of Augereau
tes, on the flank and
that next morning,
bought, the Austrian
general was obliged to extricate himself by a disastrous retreat,

¹ Thiers, tom. viii., p. 179. Lacretelle, tom. xxi., p. 111

leaving behind him colours and cannon, a thousand slain, and two thousand prisoners.¹

Such was the battle of Montenotte, the first of Buonaparte's victories; and by displaying that truth and mathematical certainty of calculation, which enabled him on many more memorable occasions, even when his forces were inferior in numbers, and apparently disimitted in position, suddenly to concentrate them and defeat his enemy, by overpowering him on the very point where he thought himself strongest. He had accumulated a superior force on the Austrian centre, and destroyed it, while Colli, on the right, and Beaulieu himself, on the left, each at the head of numerous forces, did not even hear of the action till it was fought and won.²

In consequence of the success at Montenotte, and the close pursuit of the defeated Austrians, the French obtained possession of Cairo, which placed them on that side of the Alps which slopes towards Lombardy, and where the streams from these mountains run to join the Po.

Beaulieu had advanced to Voltri, while the French withdrew to unite themselves in the attack upon D'Argenteau. He had now to retreat northward with all haste to Dego, in the valley of the river Bormida, in order to resume communication with the right wing of his army, consisting chiefly of Sardinians, from which he was now nearly separated by the defeat of the centre. General Colli, by a corresponding movement on the right, occupied Millesimo, a small town about nine miles from Dego, with which he resumed and maintained communication by a brigade stationed on the heights of Biastro. From the strength of this position, though his forces were scarce sufficiently concentrated, Beaulieu hoped to maintain his ground till he should receive supplies from Lombardy, and recover the consequences of the defeat at Montenotte. But the antagonist whom he had in front had no purpose of permitting him such respite.

Determined upon a general attack on all points of the Austrian position, the French army advanced in three bodies upon a space of four leagues in extent. Augereau, at the head of the division which had not fought at Montenotte, advanced on the left against Millesimo; the centre, under Massena, directed themselves upon Dego, by the vale of the Bormida; the right wing, commanded by La Harpe, proceeded by the heights of Cairo, for the purpose of turning Beaulieu's left flank. Augereau, whose division had not engaged at the battle of Montenotte, was the first who came in contact with the enemy. He attacked General Colli

¹ Napoleon, *Memoirs*, tom. iii., p. 145; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 70; Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 17.

² "Napoleon placed himself on a ridge in the centre of his divisions, the better to judge of the turn of affairs, and to prescribe the manœuvres which might become necessary."—JOMINI, tom. viii., p. 72.

³ Montfalcon, tom. ii., p. 145; Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 190; Thiers, tom. vii., p. 172.

on the 13th April. His troops, emulous of the honour acquired by their companions, behaved with great bravery, rushed upon the outposts of the Sardinian army at Millesimo, forced, and retained possession of the gorge by which it was defended, and thus separated from the Sardinian army a body of about two thousand men, under the Austrian General Provera, who occupied a detached eminence called Cossaria, which covered the extreme left of General Colli's position. But the Austrian showed the most

stronghold the Sardinian troops, from whom he had been separated, preparing to fight on the ensuing day, he might reasonably hope to be disengaged.¹

made every effort to relieve it. These attempts were all in vain.

heights of Diastro were carried, and the Piedmontese routed. The assault of Dego was not less so, although after a harder struggle. Beaulieu was compelled to retreat, and was entirely

D'Aqui.²

Even the morning after the victory, it was nearly wrested out of

¹ Montholon, tom. i. l. p. 146; Las Cases, tom. ii. p. 127; Jomini, tom. vii.

p. 76.

² Las Cases, tom. ii. p. 129; Montholon, tom. i. l. p. 147; Thiers, tom. xii.

p. 131

the hands of the conquerors. A fresh division of Austrians, who had evacuated Voltri later than the others, and were approaching to form a junction with their general, found the enemy in possession of Beaulieu's position. They arrived at Dego like men who had been led astray, and were no doubt surprised at finding it in the hands of the French. Yet they did not hesitate to assume the offensive, and by a brisk attack drove out the enemy, and replaced the Austrian eagles in the village. Great alarm was occasioned by this sudden apparition; for no one among the French could conceive the meaning of an alarm beginning on the opposite quarter to that on which the enemy had retreated, and without its being announced from the outposts towards D'Aqui.

Buonaparte hastily marched on the village. The Austrians repelled two attacks; at the third, General Lanusse, afterwards killed in Egypt, put his hat upon the point of his sword, and advancing to the charge, penetrated into the place. Lannes also, afterwards Duke of Montebello, distinguished himself on the same occasion by courage and military skill, and was recommended by Buonaparte to the Directory for promotion. In this battle of Dego, more commonly called of Millesimo, the Austro-Sardinian army lost five or six thousand men, thirty pieces of cannon, with a great quantity of baggage. Besides, the Austrians were divided from the Sardinians; and the two generals began to show, not only that their forces were disunited, but that they themselves were acting upon separate motives; the Sardinians desiring to protect Turin, whereas the movements of Beaulieu seemed still directed to prevent the French from entering the Milanese territory.¹

Leaving a sufficient force on the Bormida to keep in check Beaulieu, Buonaparte now turned his strength against Colli, who, overpowered, and without hopes of succour, abandoned his line of defence near Ceva, and retreated to the line of the Tanaro.

Napoleon, in the meantime, fixed his head-quarters at Ceva, and enjoyed from the heights of Montezemoto, the splendid view of the fertile fields of Piedmont stretching in boundless perspective beneath his feet, watered by the Po, the Tanaro, and a thousand other streams which descend from the Alps. Before the eyes of the delighted army of victors lay this rich expanse like a promised land; behind them was the wilderness they had passed;—not indeed, a desert of barren sand, similar to that in which the Israelites wandered, but a huge tract of rocks and inaccessible mountains, crested with ice and snow, seeming by nature designed as the barrier and rampart of the blessed regions which stretched eastward beneath them. We can sympathize with the self-congratulation of the general who had surmounted such tremendous obstacles in a way so unusual. He said to the officers around him, as they gazed upon this magnificent scene, “Hau-

¹ Montebello, tom. iii., p. 145; Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 193; Lacretelle, tom. ii., p. 139.

nibal took the Alps by storm. We have succeeded as well by turning their flank."¹

desperate.² The cavalry of the Piedmontese made an effort to renew the combat. For a time they overpowered and drove back those of the French; and General Stengel, who commanded the latter, was slain in attempting to get them into order.³ But the desperate valour of Murat, unrivalled perhaps in the heady

forces of the French army, had no longer hopes of effectually

gained three battles over forces far superior to his own; inflicted on the enemy a loss of twenty-five thousand men in killed, wounded, and prisoners; taken eighty pieces of cannon, and twenty-one stand of colours;⁴ reduced to inaction the Austrian army; almost annihilated that of Sardinia; and stood in full communication with France upon the eastern side of the Alps, with Italy lying open before him, as if to invite his invasion. But it was not even with such laurels, and with facilities which now pre-

¹ "Annibal a forcé les Alpes; nous nous les avons tournées."—NAPOLEON, *Montholon*, tom. iii., p. 151.

² "The rapidity of Massena's movements was a subject of astonishment and terror with the Piedmontese, who regarded him as a rebel. He was born at Nice, but attached himself early in his youth to the French service. The Revolution found him a sergeant in the Royal Italian regiment."—LACAS TELLE, tom. xiii., p. 161.

³ "General Stengel, a native of Alsace, was an excellent house officer; he had served under Dismouriez, and in the other campaigns of the North; he was adroit, intelligent, and active, combining the qualities of youth with those of maturity, he was the true general for advanced posts."—NAPOLEON, *Montholon*, tom. iii., p. 152.

⁴ *Montholon*, tom. iii., p. 151. *Jemina*, tom. viii., p. 63.

⁵ Murat was despatched to Paris with them, and the treaty for the armistice of Cherasco. His arrival, by way of Mount Cenis, with so many trophies, and the King of Sardinia's submission, caused great joy in the capital. Janet, who had been despatched after the battle of Millesimo by the Nice road, arrived later than Murat.

sented themselves for the accomplishment of new and more important victories upon a larger scale, and with more magnificent results, that the career of Buonaparte's earliest campaign was to be closed. The head of the royal house of Savoy, if not one of the most powerful, still one of the most distinguished in Europe, was to have the melancholy experience, that he had encountered with the Man of Destiny, as he was afterwards proudly called, who, for a time, had power, in the emphatic phrase of Scripture, "to bind kings with chains, and nobles with fetters of iron."

The shattered relics of the Sardinian army had fallen back, or rather fled, to within two leagues of Turin, without hope of being again able to make an effectual stand. The Sovereign of Sardinia, Savoy, and Piedmont, had no means of preserving his capital, nay, his existence on the continent, excepting by an almost total submission to the will of the victor. Let it be remembered, that Victor Amadeus the Third was the descendant of a race of heroes, who, from the peculiar situation of their territories, as constituting a neutral ground of great strength betwixt France and the Italian possessions of Austria, had often been called on to play a part in the general affairs of Europe, of importance far superior to that which their condition as a second-rate power could otherwise have demanded. In general, they had compensated their inferiority of force by an ability and gallantry which did them the highest credit, both as generals and as politicians; and now Piedmont was at the feet, in her turn, of an enemy weaker in numbers than her own. Besides the reflections on the past fame of his country, the present humiliating situation of the King was rendered more mortifying by the state of his family connexions. Victor Amadeus was the father-in-law of Monsieur (Louis XVIII.,) and of the Comte d'Artois, (afterwards Charles X.) He had received his sons-in-law at his court at Turin, had afforded them an opportunity of assembling around them their forces, consisting of the emigrant noblesse, and had strained all the power he possessed, and in many instances successfully, to withstand both the artifices and the arms of the French Republicans. And now, so born, so connected, and with such principles, he was condemned to sue for peace, on any terms which might be dictated, from a General of France, aged twenty-six years, who, a few months before, was desirous of an appointment in the artillery service of the Grand Signior.

Under these afflicting circumstances, a suspension of hostilities was requested by the King of Sardinia; and, on the 24th April, conferences were held at Carru, the headquarters of the French, but an armistice could only be purchased by placing two of the King's strongest fortresses—Coni and Tortona, in the hands of the French, and thus acknowledging that he surrendered at discretion. The armistice was agreed on [April 28] at Cherasco, but commissioners were sent by the King to Paris,

to arrange with the Directory the final terms of peace. These were such as victors give to the vanquished.

Besides the fortresses already surrendered, the King of Sardinia was to place in the hands of the French five others of the first importance. The road from France to Italy was to be at all times open to the French armies; and indeed the King, by surrender of the places mentioned, had lost the power of interrupting their progress. He was to break off every species of alliance and connexion with the combined powers at war with France, and become bound not to entertain at his court, or in his service, any French emigrants whatever, or any of their connexions; nor was an exception even made in favour of his own two daughters. In short, the surrender was absolute.¹ Victor Amadeus exhibited the utmost reluctance to subscribe this

naparte displayed at that period. The talents as a general which he had exhibited were of the very first order. There was no disconnexion in his objects; they were all attained by the very means he proposed, and the success was improved to the utmost. A different conduct usually characterises those who struggle unexpectedly on victory, either by good fortune or by the valour of their troops. When the favourable opportunity occurs to such leaders, they are nearly as much embarrassed by it as by a defeat. But Buonaparte, who had foreseen the result of each operation by his sagacity, stood also prepared to make the most of the advantages which might be derived from it.

His style in addressing the Convention was, at this period, more modest and simple, and therefore more impressive, than

high
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-ful,

¹ The treaty was concluded at Paris, on the 13th May. For a copy of it, see *Annual Register*, vol. xxxiii., p. 262.

² Victor Amadeus died of apoplexy, in the following October, and was succeeded by his son, Charles Emanuel.

³ See *Correspondence Intime*, tom. i., p. 23.

their general had the gratitude due for the benefit; were they overlooked, thanks equally belonged to him for his good wishes, and the resentment for the slight attached itself to the government, who did not give effect to them.

If Buonaparte spoke simply and modestly on his own achievements, the bombast which he spared was liberally dealt out to the Convention by an orator named Daubermesnil, who invokes all bards, from Tyrtæus and Ossian down to the author of the Marseillois Hymn—all painters, from Apelles to David—all musicians, from Orpheus to the author of the *Chant du départ*, to sing, paint, and compose music, upon the achievements of the General and Army of Italy.¹

With better taste, a medal of Buonaparte was struck in the character of the Conqueror of the battle of Montenotte. The face is extremely thin, with lank hair, a striking contrast to the fleshy square countenance exhibited on his later coins. On the reverse, Victory, bearing a palm branch, a wreath of laurel, and a naked sword, is seen flying over the Alps. This medal we notice as the first of the splendid series which records the victories and honours of Napoleon, and which was designed by Denon as a tribute to the genius of his patron.

CHAPTER IV.

Farther progress of the French Army under Buonaparte—He crosses the Po, at Placenza, on 7th May—Battle of Lodi takes place on the 10th, in which the French are victorious—Remarks on Napoleon's Tactics in this celebrated Action—French take possession of Cremona and Pizzighitone—Milan deserted by the Archduke Ferdinand and his Duchess—Buonaparte enters Milan on the 15th May—General situation of the Italian States at this period—Napoleon inflicts Fines upon the neutral and unoffending States of Parma and Modena, and extorts the surrender of some of their finest Pictures—Remarks upon this novel procedure.

THE ardent disposition of Buonaparte did not long permit him to rest after the advantages which he had secured. He had gazed on Italy with an eagle's eye; but it was only for a moment, ere stooping on her with the wing, and pouncing on her with the talons, of the king of birds.

A general with less extraordinary talent would perhaps have thought it sufficient to have obtained possession of Piedmont, revolutionizing its government as the French had done that of Holland, and would have awaited fresh supplies and reinforcements from France before advancing to farther and more distant con-

¹ See the speech in the *Moniteur*, No. 233, 12th May.

quests, and leaving the Alps under the dominion of a hostile,

Their terror and surprise could not fail to be increased by a sudden irruption; while months, weeks, even days of consideration, might afford those states, attached as the rulers must be to their ancient oligarchical forms of government, time and composure to

furnishes perhaps the most experienced and most formidable sharpshooters in the world. The whole was to be united to the remnants of Bonaparte's defeated troops. If suffered to form a

celerity. These were the more necessary, as, although the thanks of the French Government had been voted to the army of Italy

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 162

² "—proci obsecro colles hamilemque videmus

Italiam. Italiam! primus exclamavit Achates.

Italiam! leto socii clamore salutant."

Vind. Acad. Book iii.—2.

"Now every star before Aurora flies,
Whose glowing blushes streak the purple skies;

idea of penetrating into a country so guarded and defended by nature, as well as by military skill, the consciousness of having surmounted obstacles of a nature so extraordinary, and the hope that they were approaching the reward of so many labours—above all, their full confidence in a leader, who seemed to have bound Victory to his standard—made the soldiers follow their general, without counting their own deficiencies, or the enemy's numbers.¹

To encourage this ardour, Buonaparte circulated an address,² in which, complimenting the army on the victories they had gained, he desired them at the same time "to consider nothing as won so long as the Austrians held Milan, and while the ashes of those who had conquered the Tarquins were soiled by the presence of the assassins of Basseville." It would appear that classical allusions are either familiar to the French soldiers, or that, without being more learned than others of their rank, they are pleased with being supposed to understand them. They probably considered the oratory of their great leader as soldier-like words, and words of exceeding good command. The English soldier, addressed in such flights of eloquence, would either have laughed at them, or supposed that he had got a crazed play-actor put over him, instead of a general. But there is this peculiar trait in the French character, that they are willing to take every thing of a complimentary kind in the manner in which it seems to be meant. They appear to have made that bargain with themselves on many points, which the audience usually do in a theatre,—to accept of the appearance of things for the reality. They never inquire whether a triumphal arch is of stone or of wood; whether a scutcheon is of solid metal, or only gilt; or whether a speech, of which the tendency is flattering to their national vanity, contains genuine eloquence, or only tumid extravagance.

All thoughts were therefore turned to Italy. The fortress of Tortona was surrendered to the French by the King of Sardinia; Buonaparte's headquarters were fixed there, [May 4.] Massena concentrated another part of the army at Alexandria, menacing Milan, and threatening, by the passage of the Po, to invade the territories belonging to Austria on the northern bank of that

When the dim hills of Italy we view'd,
That peep'd by turns, and dived beneath the flood,
Lo! Italy appears, Achates cries,
And, Italy! with shouts the crowd replies."

DRYDEN.

¹ "The army, on reaching the Adige, will command all the states of the House of Austria in Italy, and all those of the Pope on this side of the Apennines; it will be in a situation to proclaim the principles of liberty, and to excite Italian patriotism against the sway of foreigners. The word *Italian!* proclaimed at Milan, Bologna, and Verona, will produce a magical effect."—NAPOLEON, *Montholon*, tom. iii., p. 165.

² It was dated Cherasco, April the 26th, and sufficiently proves, that notwithstanding all their victories, many of the soldiery, nay, even of the superior officers, were still alarmed at the magnitude of the enterprise on which Napoleon was entering with apparently very inadequate resources.

stream. As Buonaparte himself observed, the passage of a great river is one of the most critical operations in modern war; and Beaulieu had collected his forces to cover Milan, and prevent the French, if possible, from crossing the Po. But, in order to avert the dangerous consequences of attempting to force his passage on the river, defended by a formidable enemy in front, Buonaparte's

frontier of Piedmont, and is situated upon the Po. During the conferences previous to the armistice of Cherasco, Buonaparte had thrown out hints as if he were particularly desirous to be

of the route by which Buonaparte meant to advance upon Milan, he hastened to concentrate his army on the opposite bank, at a place called Valeggio, about eighteen miles from Valenza, the point near which he expected the attempt to be made, and from

the position at Valeggio, arose out of a stratagem of war. It was never Buonaparte's intention to cross the Po at Valenza. The proposal was a feint to draw Beaulieu's attention to that

of five hundred men. They had to pass in the common ferry-boats, and the crossing required nearly half an hour; so that the difficulty, or rather impossibility, of achieving the operation, had they been seriously opposed, appears to demonstration. Colonel Lannes threw himself ashore first with a body of grenadiers, and speedily dispersed the Austrian hussars, who attempted to resist their landing. The vanguard having thus opened the passage, the other divisions of the army were enabled to cross in succession, and in the course of two days the whole were in the Milanese territory, and on the left bank of the Po. The military manœuvres, by means of which Buonaparte achieved, without the loss of a man, an operation of so much consequence, and which, without such address as he displayed, must have been attended with great loss, and risk of failure, have often been considered as among his most masterly movements.

Beaulieu, informed too late of the real plans of the French general, moved his advanced guard, composed of the division of General Liptay, from Valeggio towards the Po, in the direction of Placenza. But here also the alert general of the French had been too rapid in his movements for the aged German. Buonaparte had no intention to wait an attack from the enemy with such a river as the Po in his rear, which he had no means of recrossing if the day should go against him; so that a defeat, or even a material check, would have endangered the total loss of his army. He was, therefore, pushing forward in order to gain ground on which to manœuvre, and the advanced divisions of the two armies met at a village called Fombio, not far from Casal, on the 8th of May. The Austrians threw themselves into the place, fortified and manned the steeples, and whatever posts else could be made effectual for defence, and reckoned upon defending themselves there until the main body of Beaulieu's army should come up to support them. But they were unable to sustain the vivacity of the French onset, to which so many successive victories had now given a double impulse. The village was carried at the bayonet's point; the Austrians lost their cannon, and left behind one-third of their men, in slain, wounded, and prisoners. The wreck of Liptay's division saved themselves by crossing the Adda at Pizzighitone, while they protected their retreat by a hasty defence of that fortress.¹

Another body of Austrians having advanced from Casal, to support, it may be supposed, the division of Liptay, occasioned a great loss to the French army in the person of a very promising officer. This was General La Harpe, highly respected and trusted by Buonaparte, and repeatedly mentioned in the campaigns of Piedmont. Hearing the alarm given by the out-posts, when the Austrian patrols came in contact with them, La Harpe

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 169; Thibaudeau, tom. i., p. 206; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 117.

his country on account of his democratical opinions; a grenadier, says Buonaparte, in stature and in courage, but of a restless disposition. The soldiers with the superstition belonging to their profession, remarked, that during the battle of Fombio, on the day before, he was less animated than usual, as if an obscure sense of his approaching fate already overwhelmed him.¹

The Austrian regiment of cavalry which occasioned this loss, after some skirmishing, was content to escape to Lodi, a point upon which Beaulieu was again collecting his scattered forces, for the purpose of covering Milan, by protecting the line of the Adda.

gratulated himself on this hard-won victory, and as it has become in a manner especially connected with his name and military character, we must, according to our plan, be somewhat minute in our details respecting it.

the victor before whom he had so often retreated, and he conjectured (on this occasion rightly) that, to prosecute his victory to dis-
 he could
 enemy
 he also

Th'g is a large town with more than a hundred thousand inhabitants.

Adda.

¹ Montholon tom. II., p. 172

² *Moniteur*, No 241, May 24.

Buonaparte calculated that, if he could accomplish the passage of the Adda at Lodi, he might overtake and disperse the remainder of Beaulien's army, without allowing the veteran time to concentrate them for farther resistance in Milan, or even for rallying under the walls of the strong fortress of Mantua. The judgment of the French general was in war not more remarkable for seizing the most advantageous moment of attack, than for availing himself to the very uttermost of success when obtained. The quick-sighted faculty and power of instant decision with which nature had endowed him, had, it may be supposed, provided beforehand for the consequences of the victory ere it was yet won, and left no room for doubt or hesitation when his hopes had become certainties. We have already remarked, that there have been many commanders, who, after an accidental victory, are so much at a loss what is next to be done, that while they are hesitating, the golden moments pass away unimproved; but Buonaparte knew as well how to use advantages, as to obtain them.

Upon the 10th day of May, attended by his best generals, and heading the choicest of his troops, Napoleon pressed forward towards Lodi. About a league from Casal, he encountered the Austrian rear-guard, who had been left, it would appear, at too great a distance from the main body. The French had no difficulty in driving these troops before them into the town of Lodi, which was but slightly defended by the few soldiers whom Beaulien had left on the western or right side of the Adda. He had also neglected to destroy the bridge, although he ought rather to have supported a defence on the right bank of the river, (for which the town afforded many facilities,) till the purpose of destruction was completed, than have allowed it to exist. If his rear-guard had been actually stationed in Lodi, instead of being so far in the rear of the main body, they might, by a protracted resistance from the old walls and houses, have given time for this necessary act of demolition.

But though the bridge was left standing, it was swept by twenty or thirty Austrian pieces of artillery, whose thunders menaced death to any who should attempt that pass of peril. The French, with great alertness, got as many guns in position on the left bank, and answered this tremendous fire with equal spirit. During this cannonade, Buonaparte threw himself personally amongst the fire, in order to station two guns loaded with grape-shot in such a position, as rendered it impossible for any one to approach for the purpose of undermining or destroying the bridge; and then calmly proceeded to make arrangements for a desperate attempt.

His cavalry was directed to cross, if possible, at a place where the Adda was said to be fordable,—a task which they accomplished with difficulty. Meantime, Napoleon observed that the Austrian line of infantry was thrown considerably behind the batteries of artillery which they supported, in order that they

might have the advantage of a bending slope of ground, which afforded them shelter from the French fire. He therefore drew up a close column of three thousand grenadiers, protected from the artillery of the Austrians by the walls and houses of the town,

Buonaparte expected. A single word of command wheeled the head of the column of grenadiers to the left, and placed it on the perilous bridge. The word was given to advance, and they rushed on with loud shouts of *Vive la République!* But their appearance upon the bridge was the signal for a redoubled shower of grape-shot, while from the windows of the houses on the left side of the river, the soldiers who occupied them poured volley after volley of musketry on the thick column as it endeavoured to force its way over the long bridge. At one time the French grenadiers, unable to sustain this dreadful storm, appeared for an instant to hesitate. But Berthier, the chief of Buonaparte's staff, with Massena, L'Allemande, and Corvini, hurried to the head of the column, and by their presence and gallantry renewed the resolution of the soldiers, who now poured across the bridge.

had been, as we have already noticed, withdrawn too far from the river; or because the soldiery, as happens when they repose too much confidence in a strong position, became panic-struck when they saw it unexpectedly carried. Or it may be, that General Beaulieu, so old and so unfortunate, had somewhat lost that energy and presence of mind which the critical moment

bayoneting them.

The Austrian army now completely gave way, and lost in their retreat, annoyed as it was by the French cavalry, upwards of twenty guns, a thousand prisoners, and perhaps two thousand more wounded and slain.¹

Such was the famous passage of the Bridge of Lodi; achieved with such skill and gallantry, as gave the victor the same cha-

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 173, Jomini, tom. viii., p. 126. Thibaudon, tom. i., p. 218.

acter for fearless intrepidity, and practical talent in actual battle, which the former part of the campaign had gained him as a most able tactician.

Yet this action, though successful, has been severely criticized by those who desire to derogate from Buonaparte's military talents. It has been said, that he might have passed over a body of infantry at the same ford where the cavalry had crossed; and that thus, by manœuvring on both sides of the river, he might have compelled the Austrians to evacuate their position on the left bank of the Adda, without hazarding an attack upon their front, which could not but cost the assailants very dearly.

Buonaparte had perhaps this objection in his recollection when he states, that the column of grenadiers was so judiciously sheltered from the fire until the moment when their wheel to the left brought them on the bridge, that they only lost two hundred men¹ during the storm of the passage. We cannot but suppose, that this is a very mitigated account of the actual loss of the French army. So slight a loss is not to be easily reconciled with the horrors of the battle, as he himself detailed them in his despatches; nor with the conclusion, in which he mentions, that of the sharp contests which the army of Italy had to sustain during the campaign, none was to be compared with that "terrible passage of the bridge of Lodi."²

In fact, as we may take occasion to prove hereafter, the Memoranda of the great general, dictated to his officers at Saint Helena, have a little too much the character of his original bulletins; and, while they show a considerable disposition to exaggerate the difficulties to be overcome, the fury of the conflict, and the exertions of courage by which the victory was attained, show a natural inconsistency, from the obvious wish to diminish the loss which was its unavoidable price.

But, admitting that the loss of the French had been greater on this occasion than their general cared to recollect or acknowledge, his military conduct seems not the less justifiable.

Buonaparte appears to have had two objects in view in this daring exploit. The first was, to improve and increase the terror into which his previous successes had thrown the Austrians, and to impress on them the conviction, that no position, however strong, was able to protect them against the audacity and talent of the French. This discouraging feeling, exemplified by so many defeats, and now by one in circumstances where the Austrians appeared to have every advantage, it was natural to suppose, would hurry Beaulieu's retreat, induce him to renounce all subsequent attempts to cover Milan, and rather to reunite the fragments of his army, particularly that part of Liptay's division, which, after being defeated at Fombio, had thrown them-

¹ "The loss of the French was only four hundred men."—THIBAUDEAU, tom. i., p. 218.

² *Moniteur*, No. 241, May 20.

selves into Pizzighitone. To have manœuvred slowly and cautiously, would not have struck that terror and confusion which was inspired by the desperate attack on the position at Lodi. Supposing these to have been his views, the victor perfectly succeeded; for Beaulieu, after his misadventure, drew off without any farther attempt to protect the ancient capital of Lombardy, and threw himself upon Mantua, with the intention of covering that strong fortress, and at the same time of sheltering under it the remains of his army, until he could form a junction with the forces which Wurmser was bringing to his assistance from the Rhine.

Buonaparte himself has pointed out a second object, in which he was less successful. He had hoped the rapid surprise of the bridge of Lodi might enable him to overtake or intercept the rest of Beaulieu's army, which, as we have said, had retreated by Cassano. He failed, indeed, in this object; for these forces also made their way into the Mantuan territory, and joined Beaulieu, who, by crossing the classical Mincio, placed another strong line of military defence betwixt him and his victor. But the prospect of intercepting and destroying so large a force, was worth the risk he encountered at Lodi,¹ especially taking into view the spirit which his army had acquired from a long train of victory, together with the discouragement which had crept into the Austrian ranks from a uniform series of defeats.

It should also be remembered, in considering the necessity of forcing the bridge of Lodi, that the ford over the Adda was crossed with difficulty even by the cavalry, and that when once separated by the river, the communication between the main army and the detachment of infantry, (which his censors say Napoleon should have sent across in the same manner,) being in a great degree interrupted, the latter might have been exposed to losses, from which Buonaparte, situated as he was on the right bank, could have had no means of protecting them.

Leaving the discussion of what might have been, to trace that which actually took place, the French cavalry pursued the retreating Austrians as far as Cremona, of which they took possession. Pizzighitone was obliged to capitulate, the garrison being cut off from all possibility of succour. About five hundred prisoners surrendered in that fortress; the rest of Liptay's division, and other Austrian corps, could no otherwise escape, than by throwing themselves into the Venetian territory.

It was at this time that Buonaparte had some conversation with an old Hungarian officer made prisoner in one of the actions, whom he met with at a bivouac by chance, and who did not know

¹ "Vandémiaire and Montenotte," said the Emperor, "never induced me to look upon myself as a man of a superior class. It was not till after Lodi that I was struck with the possibility of my becoming a decisive actor on the scene of political events. It was then that the first spark of my ambition was kindled."—*LAS CASES*, tom. I., p. 150.

him. The veteran's language was a curious commentary on the whole campaign; nay, upon Buonaparte's general system of warfare, which appeared so extraordinary to those who had long practised the art on more formal principles. "Things are going on as ill and as irregularly as possible," said the old martinet. "The French have got a young general, who knows nothing of the regular rules of war; he is sometimes on our front, sometimes on the flank, sometimes on the rear. There is no supporting such a gross violation of rules."¹ This somewhat resembles the charge which foreign tacticians have brought against the English, that they gained victories by continuing, with their insular ignorance and obstinacy, to fight on, long after the period when, if they had known the rules of war, they ought to have considered themselves as completely defeated.

A peculiar circumstance is worth mentioning. The French soldiers had a mode at that time of amusing themselves, by conferring an imaginary rank upon their generals, when they had done some remarkable exploit. They showed their sense of the bravery displayed by Buonaparte at the Battle of Lodi, by creating him a Corporal; and by this phrase, of the *Little Corporal*, he was distinguished in the intrigues formed against him, as well as those which were carried on in his favour; in the language of Georges Cadoudal, who laid a scheme for assassinating him, and in the secret consultation of the old soldiers and others, who arranged his return from Elba.²

We are now to turn for a time from war to its consequences, which possess an interest of a nature different from the military events we have been detailing.

The movements which had taken place since the King of Sardinia's defeat, had struck terror into the Government of Milan, and the Archduke Ferdinand, by whom Austrian Lombardy was governed. But while Beaulieu did his best to cover the capital by force of arms, the measures resorted to by the Government were rather of a devotional than warlike character. Processions were made, relics exposed, and rites resorted to, which the Catholic religion prescribes as an appeal to Heaven in great national calamities. But the saints they invoked were deaf or impotent; for the passage of the bridge of Lodi, and Beaulieu's subsequent retreat to Mantua, left no possibility of defending Milan. The archduke and his duchess immediately left Milan, followed by a small retinue, and leaving only a moderate force in the citadel, which was not in a very defensible condition. Their carriages passed through a large crowd which filled the streets. As they

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 178.

² "How subtle is the chain which unites the most trivial circumstances to the most important events! Perhaps this very nickname contributed to the Emperor's miraculous success on his return from Elba in 1815. While he was haranguing the first battalion he met, which he found it necessary to parley with, a voice from the ranks exclaimed, 'Vive notre petit Caporal!—We will never fight against him.'"—LAS CASES, tom. i., p. 170.

low whispers. They showed neither joy nor sorrow at the event which was passing—all thoughts were bent in anxious anticipation upon what was to happen next.¹

When the archduke had departed, the restraint which his presence had imposed from habit and sentiment, as much as from fear of his authority, was of course removed, and many of the Milanese citizens began, with real or affected zeal for republicanism, to prepare themselves for the reception of the French. The three-coloured cockade was at first timidly assumed; but the example being shown, it seemed as if these emblems had fallen like snow into the caps and hats of the multitude. The imperial arms were removed from the public buildings, and a placard was put on the palace of the government with an inscription—"This house is to be let—apply for the keys to the French Commissioner Salicetti." The nobles hastened to lay aside their

its head, was sent to the victorious general with offers of full submission, since there was no longer room for resistance, or for standing upon terms.

On the 15th of May, Buonaparte made his public entry into Milan, under a triumphal arch prepared for the occasion, which

fruit, roots or branches,) was erected with great form in the principal square. All this affectation of popular joy did not disarm the purpose of the French general, to make Milan contribute to the relief of his army. He imposed upon the place a requisition of twenty millions of livres, but offered to accept of goods of any sort in kind, and at a rateable valuation; for it may be easily supposed that specie, the representative of value, must be scarce in a city circumstanced as Milan was.² The public funds of every description, even those dedicated to the support of hospitals, went into the French military chest; the church-plate was seized as a part of the requisition; and, when all this was done, the citizens were burdened with the charge of finding rations for fifteen

¹ Thiers, tom. vii, p. 207.

² "It was in memory of this mission, that Napoleon, when King of Italy, created the duchy of Lodi, in favour of Melzi"—MOMMSEN, tom. iii, p. 179.

³ Botta, tom. i, p. 431; Jomini, tom. vii, p. 179, Thibaudeau, tom. i, p. 234 Thiers, tom. vii, p. 208.

thousand men daily, by which force the citadel, with its Austrian garrison, was instantly to be blockaded.¹

While Lombardy suffered much, the neighbouring countries were not spared. The reader must be aware, that for more than a century Italy had been silently declining into that state of inactivity which succeeds great exertion, as a rapid and furious blaze sinks down into exhaustion and ashes. The keen judgment of Napoleon had seen, that the geographical shape of Italy, though presenting in many respects advantages for a great and commercial nation, offered this main impediment to its separate existence as one independent state, that its length being too great in proportion to its breadth, there was no point sufficiently central to preserve the due influence of a metropolis in relation to its extreme northern and southern provinces; and that the inhabitants of Naples and Lombardy being locally so far divided, and differing in climate, habits, and the variety of temper which climate and habits produce, could hardly be united under the same government. From these causes Italy was, after the demolition of the great Roman Empire, early broken up into different subdivisions, which, more civilized than the rest of Europe at the time, attracted

¹ On the 20th, Buonaparte addressed the following remarkable order of the day to the army:—

"Soldiers! you have rushed like a torrent from the top of the Apennines: you have overthrown, dispersed, all that opposed your march. Piedmont, delivered from Austrian tyranny, indulges her natural sentiments of peace and friendship towards France. Milan is yours; and the republican flag waves throughout Lombardy. The Dukes of Parma and Modena are indebted for their political existence only to your generosity. The army which so proudly threatened you, can now find no barrier to protect it against your courage: neither the Po, the Ticino, nor the Adda, could stop you a single day: those vaunted bulwarks of Italy opposed you in vain; you passed them as rapidly as the Apennines. These great successes have filled the heart of your country with joy; your representatives have ordered a festival to commemorate your victories, which has been held in every commune of the republic. There your fathers, your mothers, your wives, sisters, and mistresses, rejoiced in your victories, and proudly boasted of belonging to you. Yes, soldiers! you have done much.—But remains there nothing more to perform? Shall it be said of us, that we know how to conquer, but not how to make use of victory? Shall posterity reproach us with having found our Capua in Lombardy?—But I see you already hasten to arms; an effeminate repose is tedious to you; the days which are lost to glory, are lost to your happiness. Well, then! let us set forth; we have still forced marches to make, enemies to subdue, laurels to gather, injuries to avenge! Let those who have sharpened the daggers of civil war in France, who have basely murdered our ministers, and burnt our ships at Tonlon, tremble! The hour of vengeance has struck. But let the people of all countries be free from apprehension; we are the friends of the people every where, and more particularly of the descendants of Brutus and Scipio, and the great men whom we have taken for our models. To restore the capitol, to replace there the statues of the heroes who rendered it illustrious, with suitable honours, to awaken the Roman people, stupified by several ages of slavery—such is the fruit of our victories. They will form an historical era for posterity: yours will be the immortal glory of having changed the face of the finest part of Europe. The French people, free, respected by the whole world, will give to Europe a glorious peace, which will indemnify her for the sacrifices of every kind, which, for the last six years, she has been making. You will then return to your homes; and your countrymen will say, as they point you out—'*He belonged to the army of Italy.*'"—*Moniteur*, No. 254, June 2.

On reading over this proclamation one day at St. Helena, the Emperor exclaimed—"And yet they have the folly to say I could not write!"—LAS CASES, tom. iii., p. 86.

in various degrees the attention of mankind; and at length, from the sacerdotal power of Rome, the wealth and extensive commerce of Venice and Genoa, the taste and splendour of Florence, and the ancient fame of the metropolis of the world, became of importance much over-proportioned to their actual extent of territory. But this time had passed away, and the Italian states, rich in remembrances, were now comparatively poor in point of immediate consequence in the scale of nations. They retained

weakness, their rulers had ceased, in a great measure, to exercise with severity the despotic powers with which they were in many cases invested, though they continued to be the cause of petty vexations, to which the natives had become callous. The

chastisement of her armies. Others might be termed neutral, and some perhaps deemed themselves of consequence sufficient

¹ Frederic, Duke of Parma, grandson of Philip V. of Spain, was born in 1731. On his death, in 1802, the duchy was united to France, in virtue of the convention of 1801.

wrath; and although neither an adherent of the coalition, nor at war with France, he found himself obliged to purchase an armistice by heavy sacrifices. He paid a tribute of two millions of livres, besides furnishing horses and provisions to a large amount, and agreeing to deliver up twenty of the finest paintings in his cabinet, to be chosen by the French general.¹

The next of these sufferers was the Duke of Modena.² This prince was a man of moderate abilities; his business was hoarding money, and his pleasure consisted in nailing up, with his own princely hands, the tapestry which ornamented churches on days of high holiday; from which he acquired the nickname of "the royal upholsterer." But his birth was illustrious as the descendant of that celebrated hero of Este, the patron of Tasso and of Ariosto; and his alliance was no less splendid, having married the sister of the unfortunate Marie Antoinette, and of Joseph the Second: then his daughter was married to the Archduke Ferdinand, the Governor of Milan. Notwithstanding his double connexion with the Imperial family, the principality of Modena was so small that he might have been passed over as scarce worthy of notice, but for the temptation of his treasures, in the works of art, as well as in specie. On the approach of a column of the French army to Modena, the duke fled from his capital, but sent his brother, the Chevalier d'Este, to capitulate with Napoleon, [May 20.]³

It might have been urged in his favour, that he was no avowed partner in the coalition; but Buonaparte took for granted his good-will towards his brother-in-law the Emperor of Austria, and esteemed it a crime deserving atonement.⁴ Indeed it was one which had not been proved by any open action, but neither could it admit of being disproved. The duke was therefore obliged to purchase the privilege of neutrality, and to expiate his supposed good inclination for the house of Austria. Five millions and a half of French livres, with large contributions in provisions and accoutrements, perhaps cost the Duke of Modena more anxious thoughts than he had bestowed on the misfortunes of his imperial relatives.

To levy on obnoxious states or princes the means of paying or accommodating troops, would have been only what has been practised by victors in all ages. But an exaction of a new kind was now for the first time imposed on these Italian Princes. The Duke of Modena, like the Duke of Parma, was compelled to

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 173; Laeretelle, tom. xiii., p. 172; Thibaudau, tom. ., p. 211. See the Treaty, Annual Register, vol. xxxviii., p. 233.

² Hercules III., Renaud d'Este, last Duke of Modena, was born in 1727, and died in 1797.

³ Laeretelle, tom. xiii., p. 187; Montholon, tom. iii., p. 187.

⁴ "The duke is avaricious. His only daughter and heiress is married to the Archduke of Milan. The more you squeeze from him, the more you take from the House of Austria."—LALLEMANT to BUONAPARTE, 14th May; *Correspondence Inédite*, tom. i., p. 169.

surrender twenty of his choicest pictures, to be selected at the choice of the French general, and the persons of taste with whom he might advise. This was the first time that a demand of this nature had been made in modern times in a public and avowed manner,¹ and we must pause to consider the motives and justice of such a requisition.²

Hitherto, works of art had been considered as sacred, even during the utmost extremities of war. They were judged to be the property, not so much of the nation or individuals who happened to possess them, as of the world in general, who were supposed to have a common interest in these productions, which, if exposed to become the ordinary spoils of war, could hardly escape damage or destruction. To take a strong example of forbearance, Frederick of Prussia was a passionate admirer of the fine arts, and no scrupulous investigator of the rights conferred by conquest, but rather disposed to stretch them to the uttermost. Yet, when he obtained possession of Dresden under circumstances of high irritation, Frederick respected the valuable gallery, cabinets, and museums of the capital of Saxony, and preserved their contents inviolate, as a species of property which could not, and ought not, to fall within the rights of a conqueror. He considered the collection as the property of the nation, and

and require to know why works of art, the value of which is created solely by the opinion of those who pretend to understand them, and is therefore to be regarded as merely imaginary, or, as it is called by lawyers, a mere *pretium affectionis*, should be exempted from that martial law which disposes at pleasure of the real property of the vanquished.

It might easily be shown in reply, that the respect due to

tion of victory.

But it is surely sufficient to say, that wherever the progress of civilisation has introduced rules to qualify and soften the extremities of war, these should be strictly adhered to. In the rudest

ages of society, man avails himself of the right of the strongest in the fullest extent. The victor of the Sandwich islands devours his enemy—the North American Indian tortures him to death—almost all savage tribes render their prisoners slaves, and sell them as such. As society advances, these inhumanities fall out of practice ; and it is unnecessary to add, that, as the victorious general deserves honourable mention in history, who, by his clemency, relaxes in any respect the rigorous laws of conquest, so he must be censured in proportion whose conduct tends to retrograde towards the brutal violence of primitive hostility.

Buonaparte cannot be exempted from this censure. He, as the willing agent of the Directory under whose commands he acted, had resolved to disregard the neutrality which had hitherto been considered as attaching to the productions of the fine arts, and, for the first time, had determined to view them as the spoils of conquest. The motive is more easily discovered than justified.

In the Reign of Terror and Equality, the fine arts, with every thing connected with cultivated feelings, had been regarded as inconsistent with the simplicity of the Republican character ; and, like the successful fanatics of England, and the first enthusiastic votaries of the Koran, the true Sans-Culottes were disposed to esteem a taste which could not generally exist without a previous superior education, as something aristocratic, and alien from the imaginary standard of equality, to which it was their purpose to lower all the exertions of intellect, as well as the possession of property. Palaces were therefore destroyed, and monuments broken to pieces.

But this brutal prejudice, with the other attempts of these frantic democrats to bring back the world to a state of barbarism, equally in moral and in general feeling, was discarded at the fall of the Jacobin authority. Those who succeeded to the government, exerted themselves laudably in endeavouring rather to excite men's minds to a love of those studies and tastes, which are ever found to humanize and soften the general tone of society, and which teach hostile nations that they have points of friendly union, even because they unite in admiring the same masterpieces of art. A museum was formed at Paris, for the purpose of collecting and exhibiting to public admiration paintings and statues, and whatever was excellent in art, for the amusement of the citizens, whose chief scene of pleasure hitherto had been a wild and ill-regulated civic festival, to vary the usual exhibition of the procession of a train of victims moving towards the guillotine. The substitution of such a better object of popular attention was honourable, virtuous, and politic in itself, and speedily led the French people, partly from taste, partly from national vanity, to attach consequence to the fine arts and their productions.

Unfortunately there were no ordinary measures by which the French, as purchasers, could greatly augment the contents of their Museum ; and more unfortunately for other nations, and ulti-

mately for themselves, they had the power and the will to increase their possessions of this kind, without research or expense, by means of the irresistible progress of their arms. We have no right to say that this peculiar species of spoliation originated with Buonaparte personally. He probably obeyed the orders of

which, though seldom avowed or defended, are not the less occasionally practised. But Napoleon was unquestionably the first and most active agent, who made such exactions a matter of course, and enforced them upon principle; and that he was

ferred to Paris as the legitimate spoils of war.

But before copying the terms in which Napoleon announces the transmission of masterpieces of art to the National Museum,

feelings of the young victor were of a character too elevated to stoop to the acquisition of wealth; nor was his career, at that or any other period, sullied by this particular and most degrading species of selfishness. When his officers would have persuaded him to accept the money, as more useful for the army, he replied, that the two millions of livres would soon be spent, but the Correggio¹ would remain an ornament of the city of Paris for

and impeded the transmission of the pictures, he has these remarkable expressions:—"You will receive the articles of the suspension of arms which I have granted to the Duke of Parma. I will send you as far as possible the finest pictures of the regalia, amongst others a Saint Jerome, which is said to be his master-piece. I must own that the saint takes an un lucky time to visit Parma, but I hope you will grant him the honours of the Museum."

The same system was followed at Milan, where several of the most valuable articles were taken from the Ambrosian collection. The articles were received in the spirit with which they were transmitted. The most able critics were despatched to assist the general in the selection of the monuments of the fine arts to be transferred to Paris, and the Secretary-general of the Lycæum, confounding the possession of the production of genius with the genius itself which created them, congratulated his countrymen on the noble dispositions which the victors had evinced. "It is no longer blood," said the orator, "which the French soldier thirsts for. He desires to lead no slaves in triumph behind his chariot—it is the glorious spoils of the arts and of industry with which he longs to decorate his victories. He cherishes that devouring passion of great souls, the love of glory, and the enthusiasm for high talents, to which the Greeks owed their astonishing successes. It was the defence of their temples, their monuments, their statues, their great artists, that stimulated their valour. It was from such motives they conquered at Salamis and at Marathon. It is thus that our armies advance, escorted by the love of arts, and followed by sweet peace, from Genoa to Milan, and soon to proceed from thence to the proud basilic of St. Peter's." The reasoning of the Secretary of the Lycæum is lost amidst his eloquence; but the speech, if it means any thing, signifies, that the seizing on those admired productions placed the nation which acquired the forcible possession of them, in the same condition as if she had produced the great men by whom they were achieved;—just as the ancient Scythians believed they became inspired with the talents and virtues of those whom they murdered. Or, according to another interpretation, it may mean that the French, who sought to deprive other nations of their property, had as praiseworthy motives of action as the Greeks, who made war in defence of that which was their own. But however their conduct might be regarded by themselves, it is very certain that they did by no means resemble those whose genius set the example of such splendid success in the fine arts. On the contrary, the classical prototype of Buonaparte in this transaction, was the Roman Con-

when their reign must pass into France to strengthen and embellish that of liberty. The National Museum must contain the most distinguished monuments of all the arts, and you will neglect no opportunity of enriching it with such as it expects from the present conquests of the army of Italy, and those which may follow." &c.—*Correspondence Inédite*, tom. i., p. 155.

¹ *Moniteur*, 25th Floreal, 16th May.

sul Mummius, who violently plundered Greece of those treasures of art, of which he himself and his countrymen were insensible to the real and proper value.

It is indeed little to the purpose, in a moral point of view, whether the motive for this species of rapine were or were not

ing, any more than the devotee who stole a shrine could shelter

palaces, for the decoration of which they had been expressly

designed, and which they had occupied for ages. The destruction of such edifices, and the removal of the objects which they contained, in many cases may considerably diminish its value.

We cannot, therefore, believe, that this system of spoliation was dictated by any sincere and manly love of the arts, though this was so much talked of in France at the time. It must, on the contrary, be ascribed to the art and ambition of the Direc-

doubtless with the proud anticipation, that in future ages the recollection of himself, and of his deeds, must be inseparably connected with the admiration which the Museum, ordained and enriched by him, was calculated to produce.

But art and ambition are apt to estimate the advantages of a favourite measure somewhat too hastily. By this breach of the law of nations, as hitherto acknowledged and acted upon, the French degraded their own character, and excited the strongest prejudice against their rapacity among the Italians, whose sense of injury was in proportion to the value which they set upon those splendid works, and to the dishonour which they felt at being forcibly deprived of them. Their lamentations were almost like those of Micah the Ephraimite, when robbed of "the graven image, and the Teraphim, and the Ephod, and the molten image," by the armed and overbearing Danites—"Ye have taken away my gods that I have made, and what have I more?"

Again, by this unjust proceeding, Buonaparte prepared for France and her capital the severe moral lesson inflicted upon her by the allies in 1815. Victory has wings as well as Riches; and the abuse of conquest, as of wealth, becomes frequently the source of bitter retribution. Had the paintings of Correggio, and other great masters, been left undisturbed in the custody of their true owners, there could not have been room, at an after period, when looking around the Louvre, for the reflection, "Here once were disposed the treasures of art, which, won by violence, were lost by defeat."¹

CHAPTER V.

Directory proposes to divide the Army of Italy betwixt Buonaparte and Kellermann—Buonaparte resigns, and the Directory give up the point—Insurrection against the French at Padua—crushed—and the Leaders shot—Also at the Imperial Fiefs, and Lugo, quelled and punished in the same way—Reflections—Austrians defeated at Borghetto, and retreat behind the Adige—Buonaparte narrowly escapes being made Prisoner at Valeggio—Mantua blockaded—Verona occupied by the French—King of Naples secedes from Austria—Armistice purchased by the Pope—The Neutrality of Tuscany violated, and Leghorn occupied by the French Troops—Views of Buonaparte respecting the Revolutionizing of Italy—He temporizes—Conduct of the Austrian Government at this Crisis—Beaulieu displaced, and succeeded by Wurmser—Buonaparte sits down before Mantua.

OCCUPYING Milan, and conqueror in so many battles, Buonaparte might be justly considered as in absolute possession of Lombardy, while the broken forces of Beaulieu had been com-

¹ See also Lacretelle's "Digression sur l'enlèvement de statues, tableaux, &c."—*Hist.*, tom. xiii., p. 172.

pelled to retreat under that sole remaining bulwark of the Austrian power, the strong fortress of Mantua, where they might await such support as should be detached to them through the Tyrol, but could undertake no offensive operations. To secure his position, the Austrian general had occupied the line formed by the Mincio, his left flank resting upon Mantua, his right upon Peschiera, a Venetian city and fortress, but of which he had taken possession, against the reclamation of the Venetian govern-

communication with Germany.

Buonaparte, in the meantime, permitted his forces only the repose of four or five days, ere he again summoned them to active exertion. He called on them to visit the Capitol, there to re-establish (he ought to have said to *carry away*) the statues of the great men of antiquity, and to change, or rather renovate, the destinies of the finest district of Europe. But while thus engaged, he received orders from Paris respecting his farther proceedings, which must have served to convince him that *all* his personal enemies, all who doubted and feared him, were not to be found in the Austrian ranks.

The Directory themselves had begun to suspect the prudence

army, should press the siege of Mantua, and make head against the Austrians.¹

This was taking Buonaparte's victory out of his grasp; and he

would be overwhelmed and destroyed. One bad general, he said,

¹ See Letter of the Directory to Buonaparte, May 7; Correspondence Inté-
dite, tom. i., p. 145, and Montholon, tom. iv., p. 447.

was better than two good ones.¹ The Directory must have perceived from such a reply, the firm and inflexible nature of the man they had made the leader of their armies, but they dared not, such was his reputation, proceed in the plan they had formed for the diminution of his power; and, perhaps for the first time since the Revolution, the executive government of France was compelled to give way to a successful general, and adopt his views instead of their own. The campaign was left to his sole management;² he obtained an ascendancy which he took admirable care not to relinquish, and it became the only task of the Directory, so far as Italy was concerned, to study phrases for intimating their approbation of the young general's measures.

Whatever were the ultimate designs of Buonaparte against Rome, he thought it prudent to suspend them until he should be free from all danger of the Austrians, by the final defeat of Beaulieu. For this object, he directed the divisions of his army towards the right bank of the Mincio, with a view of once more forcing Beaulieu's position, after having taken precautions for blockading the citadel of Milan, where the Austrians still held out, and for guarding Pavia and other points, which appeared necessary to secure his conquests.

Napoleon himself fixed his headquarters at Lodi, upon the 24th of May. But he was scarcely arrived there, when he received the alarming intelligence, that the city of Pavia, with all the surrounding districts, were in arms in his rear; that the tocsin was ringing in every village, and that news were circulated, that the Prince of Condé's army, united with a strong Austrian force, had descended from the Tyrol into Italy. Some commotions had shown themselves in Milan, and the Austrian garrison there made demonstrations towards favouring the insurrection in Pavia, where the insurgents were completely successful, and had made prisoners a French corps of three hundred men.

Buonaparte represents these disturbances as effected by Austrian agents;³ but he had formerly assured us, that the Italians took little interest in the fate of their German masters. The truth is, that, having entered Italy with the most flattering assurances of observing respect for public and private property, the French had alienated the inhabitants, by exacting the contributions which they had imposed on the country with great severity. As Catholics, the Italians were also disgusted with the open indig-

¹ "Je crois qu'il faut plutôt un mauvais général que deux bons. La guerre est comme le gouvernement—c'est une affaire de tact."—*Correspondence Inédite*, tom. i., p. 160.

² "You appear desirous, citizen-general, to continue to conduct the whole series of the military operations of the present campaign in Italy. The Directory have maturely reflected on this proposition, and the confidence they have in your talents and Republican zeal, has decided this question in the affirmative."—CARNOT to BUONAPARTE, 21st May; *Correspondence Inédite*, tom. i., p. 202.

³ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 196.

nities thrown on the places and objects of public worship, as well as on the persons and character of their priests.¹

The nobles and the clergy naturally saw their ruin in the success of the French; and the lower classes joined them for the time, from dislike to foreigners, love of national independence, resentment of the exactions made, and the acts of sacrilege committed by the ultramontane invaders. About thirty thousand insurgents were in arms; but having no regular forces on which to rest as a rallying point, they were ill calculated to endure the rapid assault of the disciplined French.

Buonaparte, anxious to extinguish a flame so formidable, instantly returned from Lodi to Milan, at the head of a strong division, took order for the safety of the capital of Lombardy, and then moved on to Pavia, where the insurgents had gathered, plundered and burnt. Napoleon himself arrived before Pavia, blew the gates open with his cannon, dispersed with ease the half-armed insurgents, and caused the leaders of the insurrection to be put to death, for having attempted to defend the independence of their country. He then seized on the persons of

commission, condemned, and shot. On the list, indeed, to revenge the defeat sustained by a squadron of French dragoons,

Lugo was taken by storm, pillaged, burnt, and the men put to the sword; while some credit seems to be taken by Buonaparte in his despatches, for the clemency of the French, which spared the women and children.¹

It is impossible to read the account of these barbarities, without contrasting them with the opinions professed on other occasions, both by the republican and imperial governments of France. The first of these exclaimed as at an unheard of cruelty, when the Duke of Brunswick, in his celebrated proclamation, threatened to treat as a brigand every Frenchman, not being a soldier, whom he should find under arms, and to destroy such villages as should offer resistance to the invading army. The French at that time considered with justice, that, if there is one duty more holy than another, it is that which calls on men to defend their native country against invasion. Napoleon, being emperor, was of the same opinion in the years 1813 and 1814, when the allies entered the French territories, and when, in various proclamations, he called on the inhabitants to rise against the invaders with the implements of their ordinary labour when they had no better arms, and "to shoot a foreigner as they would a wolf." It would be difficult to reconcile these invitations with the cruel vengeance taken on the town of Lugo,² for observing a line of conduct which, in similar circumstances, Buonaparte so keenly and earnestly recommended to those whom fortune had made his own subjects.

The brief insurrection of Pavia suppressed by these severities, Buonaparte once more turned his thoughts to the strong position of the Austrians, with the purpose of reducing Beaulieu to a more decided state of disability, before he executed the threatened vengeance of the Republic on the Sovereign Pontiff. For this purpose he advanced to Brescia, and manœuvred in such a manner as induced Beaulieu, whom repeated surprises of the same kind had not put upon his guard, to believe, that either the French general intended to attempt the passage of the Mincio at the small but strong town of Peschiera, where that river issues from the lago di Guarda, or else that, marching northward along the eastern bank, he designed to come round the head of the lake, and thus turn the right of the Austrian position. While Beaulieu disposed his forces as expecting an attack on the right of his line, Buonaparte, with his usual celerity, proposed to attack him on the centre, at Borghetto, a town situated on the Mincio, and commanding a bridge over it, above ten miles lower than Peschiera.

On the 30th May, the French general attacked with superior force, and repulsed across the Mincio, an Austrian corps who endeavoured to cover the town. The fugitives attempted to demo-

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 227.

² "The examples of the Imperial Fiefs and Lugo, though extremely severe, were indispensable, and authorised by the usage of war."—JOMINI, tom. viii., p. 156.

army drawn up behind it.

Napoleon trusted to the cavalry.

victory.

The French division which first crossed the Mincio had passed

employed only when the most desperate efforts of courage were necessary. Bessières, afterwards Duke of Istria, and Marshal of

France, was placed at the head of this chosen body, which gave rise to the formation of the celebrated Imperial Guards of Napoleon.¹

The passage of the Mincio obliged the Austrians to retire within the frontier of the Tyrol; and they might have been considered as completely expelled from Italy, had not Mantua and the citadel of Milan still continued to display the Imperial banners. The castle of Milan was a place of no extraordinary strength, the surrender of which might be calculated on so soon as the general fate of war had declared itself against the present possessors. But Mantua was by nature one of those almost impregnable fortresses, which may long, relying on its own resources, defy any compulsion but that of famine.

The town and fortress of Mantua are situated on a species of island, five or six leagues square, called the *seraglio*, formed by three lakes, which communicate with, or rather are formed by, the Mincio. This island has access to the land by five causeways, the most important of which was in 1796 defended by a regular citadel, called, from the vicinity of a ducal palace, *La Favoritâ*. Another was defended by an intrenched camp, extending between the fortress and the lake. The third was protected by a horn-work. The remaining two causeways were only defended by gates and draw-bridges. Mantua, low in situation, and surrounded by water, in a warm climate, is naturally unhealthy; but the air was likely to be still more destructive to a besieging army, (which necessarily lay in many respects more exposed to the elements, and were besides in greater numbers, and less habituated to the air of the place,) than to a garrison who had been seasoned to it, and were well accommodated within the fortress.

To surprise a place so strong by a *coup-de-main* was impossible, though Buonaparte represents his soldiers as murmuring that such a desperate feat was not attempted. But he blockaded Mantua [June 4] with a large force, and proceeded to take such other measures to improve his success, as might pave the way to future victories. The garrison was numerous, amounting to from twelve to fourteen thousand men; and the deficiencies of the fortifications, which the Austrians had neglected in over security, were made up for by the natural strength of the place. Yet of the five causeways, Buonaparte made himself master of four; and thus the enemy lost possession of all beyond the walls of the town and citadel, and had only the means of attaining the mainland through the citadel of *La Favoritâ*. Lines of circumvallation were formed, and Serrurier was left in blockade of the fortress, which the possession of four of the accesses enabled him to accomplish with a body of men inferior to the garrison.²

To complete the blockade, it was necessary to come to some arrangement with the ancient republic of Venice. With this vene-

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 206.

² Napoleon, *Memoirs*, tom. iii., p. 209.

nable government Napoleon had the power of working his own pleasure; for although the state might have raised a considerable army to assist the Austrians, to whom its senate, or aristocratic government, certainly bore good will, yet, having been in amity with the French Republic, they deemed the step too hazardous, and vainly trusting that their neutrality would be respected, they saw the Austrian power completely broken for the time, before they took any active measures either to stand in their defence, or to deprecate the wrath of the victor. But when the line of the Mincio was forced, and Buonaparte occupied the Venetian territory on the left bank, it was time to seek by concessions that deference to the rights of an independent country which the once haughty aristocracy of Venice had lost a favourable oppor-

the goodness of the intention, which leads us to regard the con-

resolved on—the Directory peremptorily demanded, and the

restored to his descendant.¹ Both demands were evaded, as might have been expected in the circumstances, and the future monarch of France left Verona on the 21st of April, 1796, for the army of the Prince of Condé, in whose ranks he proposed to

other countries

¹ Daru, Hist. de Venise, tom. v., p. 436. Thibaudan, tom. i., p. 257.

before his arrival, he would have burnt to the ground a town which, acknowledging him as King of France, assumed, in doing so, the air of being itself the capital of that republic.¹ This might, no doubt, sound gallant in Paris; but Buonaparte knew well that Louis of France was not received in the Venetian territory as the successor to his brother's throne, but only with the hospitality due to an unfortunate prince, who, sniting his claim and title to his situation, was content to shelter his head, as a private man might have done, from the evils which seemed to pursue him.

The neutrality of Venice was, however, for the time admitted, though not entirely from respect for the law of nations; for Buonaparte is at some pains to justify himself for not having seized without ceremony on the territories and resources of that republic, although a neutral power as far as her utmost exertions could preserve neutrality. He contented himself for the time with occupying Verona, and other dependencies of Venice upon the line of the Adige. "You are too weak," he said to the *Proveditore* Foscarelli, "to pretend to enforce neutrality, with a few hundred Slavonians, on two such nations as France and Austria. The Austrians have not respected your territory where it suited their purpose, and I must, in requital, occupy such part as falls within the line of the Adige."²

But he considered that the Venetian territories to the westward should in policy be allowed to retain the character of neutral ground, which The Government, as that of Venice was emphatically called, would not, for their own sakes, permit them to lose; while otherwise, if occupied by the French as conquerors, these timid neutrals might, upon any reverse, have resumed the character of fierce opponents. And, at all events, in order to secure a territory as a conquest, which, if respected as neutral, would secure itself, there would have been a necessity for dividing the French forces, which it was Buonaparte's wish to concentrate. From interested motives, therefore, if not from respect to justice, Buonaparte deferred seizing the territory of Venice when within his grasp, conscious that the total defeat of the Austrians in Italy would, when accomplished, leave the prey as attainable, and more defenceless than ever. Having disposed his army in its position, and prepared some of its divisions for the service which they were to perform as moveable columns, he returned to Milan to reap the harvest of his successes.

The first of these consisted in the defection of the King of Naples from the cause of Austria, to which, from family connexion, he had yet remained attached, though of late with less deep devotion. His cavalry had behaved better during the engagements on the Mincio, than has been of late the custom with Neapolitan troops, and had suffered accordingly. The King, dis-

¹ *Moniteur*, No. 267, June 17; *Montholon*, tom. iv., p. 121.

² *Thiers*, tom. viii., p. 225.

who might be dangerous, and who was not, as matters stood, under the immediate control of the French. A Neapolitan ambassador was sent to Rome to conclude a final peace in the mean-

place, four hundred of the Papal troops were made prisoners, with a cardinal who acted as their officer. The latter was dismissed on his parole. But when summoned to return to the

treat for an armistice. It was a remarkable part of Buonaparte's character, that he knew as well when to forbear as when to strike. Rome, it was true, was an enemy whom France, or at least its present rulers, both hated and despised; but the moment was then inopportune for the prosecution of their resentment. To have detached a sufficient force in that direction, would have weakened the French army in the north of Italy,

not of long duration. It was particularly stipulated, with republican ostentation, that the busts of the elder and younger Brutus were to be among the number of ceded articles, and it was in this manner that Buonaparte made good his vaunt, of establishing in the Roman capitol the statues of the illustrious and classical dead.¹

The Archduke of Tuscany was next to undergo the republican discipline. It is true, that prince had given no offence to the French Republic; on the contrary, he had claims of merit with them, from having been the very first power in Europe who acknowledged them as a legal government, and having ever since been in strict amity with them. It seemed also, that while justice required he should be spared, the interest of the French themselves did not oppose the conclusion. His country could have no influence on the fate of the impending war, being situated on the western side of the Apennines. In these circumstances, to have seized on his museum, however tempting, or made requisitions on his territories, would have appeared unjust towards the earliest ally of the French Republic; so Buonaparte contented himself with seizing on the grand duke's seaport of Leghorn [June 27,] confiscating the English goods which his subjects had imported, and entirely ruining the once flourishing commerce of the dukedom. It was a principal object with the French to seize the British merchant vessels, who, confiding in the respect due to a neutral power, were lying in great numbers in the harbour; but the English merchantmen had such early intelligence as enabled them to set sail for Corsica, although a very great quantity of valuable goods fell into the possession of the French.

While the French general was thus violating the neutrality of the grand duke, occupying by surprise his valuable seaport, and destroying the commerce of his state, the unhappy prince was compelled to receive him at Florence,² with all the respect due to a valued friend, and profess the utmost obligation to him for his lenity, while Manfredini, the Tuscan minister, endeavoured to throw a veil of decency over the transactions at Leghorn, by allowing that the English were more masters in that port than was the grand duke himself. Buonaparte disdained to have recourse to any paltry apologies. "The French flag," he said, "has been insulted in Leghorn—You are not strong enough to cause it to be respected. The Directory has commanded me to occupy the place."³ Shortly after, Buonaparte, during an entertainment given to him by the grand duke at Florence, received intelligence that the citadel of Milan had at length surrendered.

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 221; Thiers, tom. viii., p. 236.

² "Il parcourut avec le grand-duc la célèbre galerie et n'y remarqua que trop la Vénus de Médicis."—LACRETELLE, tom. xiii., p. 190.

³ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 226; Pommereuil, Campagnes de Buonaparte, p. 78.

He rubbed his hands with self-congratulation, and turning to the grand duke, observed, "that the Emperor, his brother, had now lost his last possession in Lombardy."

When we read of the exactions and indignities to which the strong reduce the weak, it is impossible not to remember the simile of Napoleon himself, who compared the alliance of France and an inferior state, to a giant embracing a dwarf. "The poor dwarf," he added, "may probably be suffocated in the arms of his friend; but the giant does not mean it, and cannot help it."

While Buonaparte made truce with several of the old states in Italy, or rather adjourned their destruction in consideration

must occur, as we have already repeatedly noticed, men used to

vided with materials for their edifice, the bayonets of the French army were of strength sufficient to prevent the task from being interrupted, and the French Republic had soon to greet sister states, under the government of men who held their offices by the pleasure of France, and who were obliged, therefore, to comply with all her requisitions, however unreasonable.

harvest. He mentions, no doubt, that the natives of Bologna and Reggio, and other districts, were impatient to unite with the French as allies, and intimate friends; but even these expressions are so limited as to make it plain that the feelings of the Italians in general were not as yet favourable to that revolution which the Directory desired, and which he endeavoured to forward.

He had, indeed, in all his proclamations, declared to the inhabitants of the invaded countries, that his war was not waged with them but with their governments, and had published the strictest orders for the discipline to be observed by his followers. But though this saved the inhabitants from immediate violence at the hand of the French soldiery, it did not diminish the weight of the requisitions with which the country at large was burdened, and to which poor and rich had to contribute their share. They were pillaged with regularity, and by order, but they were not the less pillaged; and Buonaparte himself has informed us, that the necessity of maintaining the French army at their expense very much retarded the march of French principles in Italy. "You cannot," he says, with much truth, "at the same moment strip a people of their substance, and persuade them, while doing so, that you are their friend and benefactor."

He mentions also in the St. Helena manuscripts,¹ the regret expressed by the wise and philosophical part of the community, that the revolution of Rome, the source and director of superstitious opinions, had not been commenced; but frankly admits that the time was not come for going to such extremities, and that he was contented with plundering the Roman See of its money and valuables, waiting until the fit moment should arrive of totally destroying that ancient hierarchy.

It was not without difficulty that Buonaparte could bring the Directory to understand and relish these temporizing measures. They had formed a false idea of the country, and of the state and temper of the people, and were desirous at once to revolutionize Rome, Naples, and Tuscany.

Napoleon, more prudently, left these extensive regions under the direction of their old and feeble governments, whom he compelled, in the interim, to supply him with money and contributions, in exchange for a protracted existence, which he intended to destroy so soon as the fit opportunity should offer itself. What may be thought of this policy in diplomacy, we pretend not to say; but in private life it would be justly branded as altogether infamous. In point of morality, it resembles the conduct of a robber, who, having exacted the surrender of the traveller's property, as a ransom for his life, concludes his violence by murder. It is alleged, and we have little doubt with truth, that the Pope was equally insincere, and struggled only, by immediate sub-

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 222.

mission, to prepare for the hour when the Austrians should strengthen their power in Italy. But it is the duty of the historian loudly to proclaim, that the bad faith of one party in a

tions. If the more powerful party judge otherwise, the means

falschoodⁱ and finesseⁱ are as thoroughly exploded in international communication, as they are among individuals in all civilized countries.

might possibly never come to pass. The final issue shall be told elsewhere. It may be just necessary to observe, that the conduct of the French towards the republicans whom they had formed no predetermination to support, was as uncandid as towards the ancient governments whom they treated with. They sold to the latter false hopes of security, and encouraged the former to express sentiments and opinions, which must have exposed them to ruin, in case of the restoration of Lombardy to its old rulers, an event which the Directory all along contemplated in secret. Such is, in almost all cases, the risk incurred by a domestic faction, who trust to carry their peculiar objects in the bosom of their own country by means of a foreign nation. Their too powerful auxiliaries are ever ready to sacrifice them to their own views of emolument.

Having noticed the effect of Buonaparte's short but brilliant campaign on other states, we must observe the effects which his victories produced on Austria herself. These were entirely consistent with her national character. The same tardiness which has long made the government of Austria slow in availing themselves of advantageous circumstances, cautious in their plans, and unwilling to adopt, or indeed to study to comprehend, a new system of tactics, even after having repeatedly experienced its terrible efficacies, is combined with the better qualities of firm determination, resolute endurance, and unquenchable spirit. The Austrian slowness and obstinacy, which have sometimes threatened them with ruin, have, on the other hand, often been compensated by their firm perseverance and courage in adversity.

Upon the present occasion, Austria showed ample demonstration of the various qualities we have ascribed to her. The rapid and successive victories of Buonaparte, appeared to her only the rash flight of an eaglet, whose juvenile audacity had over-estimated the strength of his pinion. The Imperial Council resolved to sustain their diminished force in Italy, with such reinforcements as might enable them to reassume the complete superiority over the French, though at the risk of weakening their armies on the Rhine. Fortune in that quarter, though of a various complexion, had been, on the whole, more advantageous to the Austrians than elsewhere, and seemed to authorise the detaching considerable reinforcements from the eastern frontier, on which they had been partially victorious, to Italy, where, since Buonaparte had descended from the Alps, they had been uniformly unfortunate.

Beaulieu, aged and unlucky, was no longer considered as a fit opponent to his inventive, young, and active adversary. He was as full of displeasure, it is said, against the Aulic Council, for the associates whom they had assigned him, as they could be with him for his bad success.¹ He was recalled, therefore, in that

¹ The following letter appears in the journals as an intercepted despatch from Beaulieu to the Aulic Council of War. It seems worthy of preservation,

climate out of which they had been so lately driven.

Aware of the storm which was gathering, Buonaparte made every possible effort to carry Mantua before arrival of the formidable Austrian army, whose first operation would doubtless be to raise the siege of that important place. A scheme to take the city and castle by surprise, by a detachment which should pass to the Seraglio, or islet on which Mantua is situated, by night and in boats, having totally failed, Buonaparte was compelled to open trenches, and proceed as by regular siege. The Austrian general, Canto D'Irles, when summoned to surrender, declined that his only course was to defend the place to extremity.

as expressing the irritated feelings with which the veteran general was certainly affected, whether he wrote the letter in question or not. It will be recollected,

CHAPTER VI.

Campaign on the Rhine—General Plan—Wartensleben and the Archduke Charles retire before Jourdan and Moreau—The Archduke forms a junction with Wartensleben, and defeats Jourdan, who retires—Moreau, also, makes his celebrated Retreat through the Black Forest—Buonaparte raises the Siege of Mantua, and defeats the Austrians at Salo and Lonato—Misbehaviour of the French General Valette, at Castiglione—Lonato taken, with the French Artillery, on 3d August—Retaken by Massena and Augereau—Singular escape of Buonaparte from being captured at Lonato—Wurmser defeated between Lonato and Castiglione, and retreats on Trent and Roveredo—Buonaparte resumes his position before Mantua—Effects of the French Victories on the different Italian States—Inferiority of Austria—Wurmser recruited—Battle of Roveredo—French victorious, and Massena occupies Trent—Buonaparte defeats Wurmser at Primolano—and at Bassano, 8th September—Wurmser flies to Vicenza—Battle of Saint-George—Wurmser finally shut up within the walls of Mantua.

THE reader must, of course, be aware, that Italy, through which we are following the victorious career of Napoleon, was not the only scene of war betwixt France and Austria, but that a field of equally strenuous and much more doubtful contest was opened upon the Rhine, where the high military talents of the Archduke Charles were opposed to those of Moreau and Jourdan.

The plan which the Directory had adopted for the campaign of 1796 was of a gigantic character, and menaced Austria, their most powerful enemy upon the continent, with nothing short of total destruction. It was worthy of the genius of Carnot, by whom it was formed, and of Napoleon and Moreau, by whom it had been revised and approved. Under sanction of this general plan, Buonaparte regulated the Italian campaign in which he had proved so successful; and it had been schemed, that to allow Austria no breathing space, Moreau, with the army of the Sambre and Meuse, should press forward on the eastern frontier of Germany, supported on the left by Jourdan, at the head of the army of the Rhine, and that both generals should continue to advance, until Moreau should be in a position to communicate with Buonaparte through the Tyrol. When this junction of the whole forces of France, in the centre of the Austrian dominions, was accomplished, it was Carnot's ultimate plan that they should advance upon Vienna, and dictate peace to the Emperor under the walls of his capital.¹

¹ See Correspondence Inédite, tom. i., p. 12; Montholon, tom. iv., p. 372, Jomini, tom. viii., p. 388.

Of this great project, the part intrusted to Buonaparte was

During this advance of two hostile armies, amounting each to seventy-five thousand men, which filled all Germany with consternation, the Austrian leader Wartensleben was driven from

purpose. But the archduke was an excellent and enterprising officer, and at this important period he saved the empire of

form a junction with Wartensleben, and overwhelm Jourdan with a local superiority of numbers, being the very principle on which the French themselves achieved so many victories. Jourdan was totally defeated, and compelled to make a hasty and disorderly retreat, which was rendered disastrous by the insurrection of the German peasantry around his fugitive army. Moreau, also unable to maintain himself in the heart of Germany, when Jourdan, with the army which covered his left flank, was defeated, was likewise under the necessity of retiring, but conducted his retrograde movement with such dexterity, that his retreat through the Black Forest, where the Austrians hoped to cut him off, has

¹ "That retreat was the greatest blunder that ever Moreau committed. If he had instead of retreating, made a *détour*, and marched in the rear of Prince Charles, he would have destroyed or taken the Austrian army. The Directory, jealous of me, wanted to divide, if possible, the stock of military reputation; and as they could not give Moreau credit for a victory, they caused his retreat to be extolled in the highest terms, although even the Austrian generals condemned him for it."—*Napoleon, Foirer, &c.*, vol. II, p. 40. See also Gougaud, tom. I, p. 157.

* Montholon, tom. III, pp. 222-207; Jomini, tom. vii, pp. 178-124.

As the divisions of Wurmser's army began to arrive on the Tyrolese district of Trent, where the Austrian general had fixed his head-quarters, Buonaparte became urgent, either that reinforcements should be despatched to him from France, or that the armies of the Rhine should make such a movement in advance towards the point where they might co-operate with him, as had been agreed upon at arranging the original plan of the campaign. But he obtained no succours; and though the campaign on the Rhine commenced, as we have seen, in the month of June, yet that period was too late to afford any diversion in favour of Napoleon, Wurmser and his whole reinforcements being already either by that time arrived, or on the point of arriving, at the place where they were to commence operations against the French army of Italy.¹

The thunder-cloud which had been so long blackening on the mountains of the Tyrol, seemed now about to discharge its fury. Wurmser, having under his command perhaps eighty thousand men, was about to march from Trent against the French, whose forces, amounting to scarce half so many, were partly engaged in the siege of Mantua, and partly dispersed in the towns and villages on the Adige and Chiese, for covering the division of Serrurier, which carried on the siege. The Austrian veteran, confident in his numbers, was only anxious so to regulate his advance, as to derive the most conclusive consequences from the victory which he doubted not to obtain. With an imprudence which the misfortunes of Beaulieu ought to have warned him against, he endeavoured to occupy with the divisions of his army so large an extent of country, as rendered it very difficult for them to maintain their communications with each other. This was particularly the case with his right wing under Quasdonowich, the Prince of Reuss, and General Oeskey, who were detached down the valley of the river Chiese, with orders to direct their march on Brescia. This division was destined to occupy Brescia, and cut off the retreat of the French in the direction of Milan. The left wing of Wurmser's army, under Melas, was to descend the Adige by both banks at once, and manœuvre on Verona, while the centre, commanded by the Austrian field-marshal in person, was to march southward by the left bank of the lago di Guarda, take possession of Peschiera, which the French occupied, and, descending the Mincio, relieve the siege of Mantua. There was this radical error in the Austrian plan, that, by sending the right wing by the valley of Chiese, Wurmser placed the broad lake of Guarda, occupied by a French flotilla, between that division and the rest of his army, and of course made it impossible for the centre and left to support Quasdonowich, or even to have intelligence of his motions or his fate.²

The active invention of Buonaparte, sure as he was to be

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 234.

² Montholon, tom. iii., p. 235; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 302.

seconded by the zeal and rapidity of the French army, speedily devised the means to draw advantage from this dislocation of the

the Austrian
 , and conceiv-
 on them from
 different points, was anxious in that respect towards the Tyrol,
 from which it had advanced with the expectation of turning

They received intelligence, however, which induced them to halt upon this counter-march. Both rear-guards had been compelled to retire from the line of the Mincio, of which river the Austrians had forced the passage. The rear-guard of Massena, under General Pigeon, had fallen back in good order, so as to occupy Lonato; that of Augereau fled with precipitation and confusion, and failed to make a stand at Castiglione, which was occupied by Austrians, who intrenched themselves there. Valette, the officer who commanded this body, was deprived of his commission in presence of his troops for misbehaviour, an example which the gallantry of the French generals rendered extremely infrequent in their service.

Wurmser became now seriously anxious about the fate of his right wing, and determined to force a communication with Quasdonowich at all risks. But he could only attain the valley of the Chiese, and the right bank of the lago di Garda, by breaking a passage through the divisions of Massena and Augereau. On the 3d of August, at break of day, two divisions of Austrians, who had crossed the Mincio in pursuit of Pigeon and Valette, now directed themselves, with the most determined resolution, on the French troops, in order to clear the way between the commander-in-chief and his right wing.

The late rear-guard of Massena, which, by his counter-march, had now become his advanced-guard, was defeated, and Lonato, the place which they occupied, was taken by the Austrians, with the French artillery, and the general officer who commanded them. But the Austrian general, thus far successful, fell into the great error of extending his line too much towards the right, in order, doubtless, if possible, to turn the French position on their left flank, thereby the sooner to open a communication with his own troops on the right bank of the lago di Garda, to force which had been his principal object in the attack. But, in thus manœuvring,² he weakened his centre, an error of which Massena instantly availed himself. He formed two strong columns under Augereau, with which he redeemed the victory, by breaking through and dividing the Austrian line, and retaking Lonato at the point of the bayonet. The manœuvre is indeed a simple one, and the same by which, ten years afterwards, Buonaparte gained the battle of Austerlitz; but it requires the utmost promptitude and presence of mind to seize the exact moment for executing such a daring measure to advantage. If it is but partially successful, and the enemy retains steadiness, it is very perilous; since the attacking column, instead of flanking the broken divisions of the opposite line, may be itself flanked by decided officers and determined troops, and thus experience the disaster which it

¹ Buonaparte to the Directory; *Moniteur*, No. 328; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 318 Botta, tom. ii., p. 64.

² "Sa manœuvre me parut un sûr garant de la victoire."—BUONAPARTE to the Directory, 6th August.

was their object to occasion to the enemy. On the present occasion, the attack on the centre completely succeeded. The Austrians, finding their line cut asunder, and their flanks pressed by the victorious columns of the French, fell into total disorder. Some, who were farthest to the right, pushed forward, in hopes

their centre.

Such was the fate of the Austrian right at the battle of Lonato, while that of the left was no less unfavourable. They were attacked by Augereau with the utmost bravery, and driven from Castiglione, of which they had become masters by the bad conduct of Valette. Augereau achieved this important result at the price of many brave men's lives;¹ but it was always remembered as an essential service by Buonaparte, who afterwards, when such dignities came in use, bestowed on Augereau the title of Duke of Castiglione.² After their defeat, there can be nothing imagined more confused or calamitous than the condition of the Austrian

broken the spirit of the Austrian soldiers. The reader can hardly

The present danger arose from the same cause, the confusion and want of combination of the enemy; and now, as in the former

country, that the French troops, having departed in every direction to improve their success, had only left a garrison of twelve hundred men in the town of Lonato. The commander of the division resolved instantly to take possession of the town, and thus to open his march to the Mincio, to join Wurmser. Now, it happened that Buonaparte himself, coming from Castiglione with only his staff for protection, had just entered Lonato. He was surprised when an Austrian officer was brought before him blindfolded, as is the custom on such occasions, who summoned the French commandant of Lonato to surrender to a superior force of Austrians, who, he stated, were already forming columns of attack to carry the place by irresistible force of numbers. Buonaparte, with admirable presence of mind, collected his numerous staff around him, caused the officer's eyes to be unlacquered, that he might see in whose presence he stood, and upbraided him with the insolence of which he had been guilty, in bringing a summons of surrender to the French commander-in-chief in the middle of his army.¹ The credulous officer, recognising the presence of Buonaparte, and believing it impossible that he could be there without at least a strong division of his army, stammered out an apology, and returned to persuade his dispirited commander to surrender himself, and the four thousand men and upwards whom he commanded, to the comparatively small force which occupied Lonato. They grounded their arms accordingly, to one-fourth of their number, and missed an inviting and easy opportunity of carrying Buonaparte prisoner to Wurmser's headquarters.

The Austrian general himself, whose splendid army was thus destroyed in detail, had been hitherto employed in revictualling Mantua, and throwing in supplies of every kind; besides which, a large portion of his army had been detached in the vain pursuit of Serrurier, and the troops lately engaged in the siege, who had retreated towards Marcara. When Wurmser learned the disasters of his right wing, and the destruction of the troops despatched to form a communication with it, he sent to recall the division which we have mentioned, and advanced against the French position between Lonato and Castiglione, with an army still numerous, notwithstanding the reverses which it had sustained. But Buonaparte had not left the interval unimproved. He had recalled Serrurier from Marcara, to assail the left wing and the flank of the Austrian field-marshal. The opening of Serrurier's fire was a signal for a general attack on all points of Wurmser's line. He was defeated, and nearly made prisoner; and it was not till after suffering great losses in the retreat and pursuit, that he gained with difficulty Trent and Roveredo, the

¹ "Go and tell your general," said Napoleon, "that I give him eight minutes to lay down his arms; he is in the midst of the French army; after that time there are no hopes for him."—MONTMOLON, tom. iii., p. 246; Jomini, tom. viii., p. 326. But see Botta, tom. I., p. 546.

positions adjacent to the Tyrol, from which he had so lately saluted with such confidence of victory. He had lost perhaps one half of his fine army, and the only consolation which remained was, that he had thrown supplies into the fortress of Mantua. His troops also no longer had the masculine confidence which is ne-

itself was fighting against them

days never laid aside his clothes, or took any regular repose, re-

was so strict as to retain the garrison within the walls of the place, and sent them off even from the walls called the General's

French, that Buonaparte, after the victory of Castiglione, returned them his thanks in name of the Republic.¹ But at Pavia, and

¹ "In the different engagements between the 20th July and the 12th August, the French army took 15,000 prisoners, 70 pieces of cannon, and nine stand of colours, and killed or wounded 25,000 men, the loss of the French army was 7000 men"—MONTMOLON, tom. iii., p. 251

² "Your people render themselves daily more worthy of liberty, and they will, no doubt, one day appear with glory on the stage of the world"—*Moniteur*, No. 331, Aug. 9

and despised, was permitted to escape, the conduct of his superior, the Pope, who had shown vacillation in his purposes of submission, when he heard of the temporary raising of the siege of Mantua, was carefully noted and remembered for animadversion, when a suitable moment should occur.

Nothing is more remarkable, during these campaigns, than the inflexibility of Austria, which, reduced to the extremity of distress by the advance of Moreau and Jourdan into her territories, stood nevertheless on the defensive at every point, and by extraordinary exertions again recruited Wurmser with fresh troops, to the amount of twenty thousand men; which reinforcement enabled that general, though under no more propitious star, again to resume the offensive, by advancing from the Tyrol. Wurmser, with less confidence than before, hoped now to relieve the siege of Mantua a second time, and at a less desperate cost, by moving from Trent towards Mantua, through the defiles formed by the river Brenta. This manœuvre he proposed to execute with thirty thousand men, while he left twenty thousand, under General Davidowich, in a strong position at or near Roveredo, for the purpose of covering the Tyrol; an invasion of which district, on the part of the French, must have added much to the general panic which already astounded Germany, from the apprehended advance of Moreau and Jourdan from the banks of the Rhine.

Buonaparte penetrated the design of the veteran general, and suffered him without disturbance to march towards Bassano upon the Brenta, in order to occupy the line of operations on which he intended to manœuvre, with the secret intention that he would himself assume the offensive, and overwhelm Davidowich as soon as the distance betwixt them precluded a communication betwixt that general and Wurmser. He left General Kilmaine, an officer of Irish extraction¹ in whom he reposed confidence, with about three thousand men, to cover the siege of Mantua, by posting himself under the walls of Verona, while, concentrating a strong body of forces, Napoleon marched upon the town of Roveredo, situated in the valley of the Adige, and having in its rear the strong position of Calliano. The town is situated on the high road to Trent, and Davidowich lay there with twenty-five thousand Austrians, intended to protect the Tyrol, while Wurmser moved down the Brenta, which runs in the same direction with the Adige, but at about thirty miles' distance, so that no communication for mutual support could take place betwixt Wurmser and his lieutenant-general. It was upon Davidowich that Buonaparte first meant to pour his thunder.

The battle of Roveredo, fought upon the 4th of September, was one of that great general's splendid days. Before he could approach the town, one of his divisions had to force the Sept. 4.

¹ Kilmaine was born at Dublin in 1754. He distinguished himself at Jemappes and in La Vendée, and was selected to command the "*Army of England*," but died at Paris in 1799.

strongly intrenched camp of Mori, where the enemy made a des-

first regiment of hussars.—he did so, and broke the enemy, but fell mortally wounded with three balls. “I die,” he said, “for

brought forward, under cover of which the infantry charged and carried this strong position; so little do natural advantages avail when the minds of the assailants are influenced with an opinion that they are irresistible, and those of the defenders are depressed by a uniform and uninterrupted course of defeat. Six or seven

a similar name, about three leagues to the northward of Trent, and situated in the principal road which communicates with Braxen and Inspruck. Buonaparte instantly pursued them with a divi-

Buonaparte, in consequence of his present condition, became desirous to conciliate the martial inhabitants of the Tyrol, and published a proclamation, in which he exhorted them to lay down

¹ Buonaparte to the Directory, 6th September

² Jomini, tom ix, p 107, Thibaudau, tom ii, p. 5; Montholon, tom. li.

P 259

³ Montholon, tom. li, p. 262.

That his conduct might appear to be of a piece with his reasoning, Napoleon issued an edict, disuniting the principality of Trent from the German empire, and annexing it in point of sovereignty to the French Republic, while he intrusted, or seemed to intrust, the inhabitants themselves with the power of administering their own laws and government.

Bounties which depended on the gift of an armed enemy, appeared very suspicious to the Tyrolese, who were aware that, in fact, the order of a French officer would be more effectual law, whenever that nation had the power, than that of any administrator of civil affairs whom they might themselves be permitted to choose. As for the proclamation, the French general might as well have wasted his eloquence on the rocks of the country. The Tyrol, one of the earliest possessions of the House of Austria, had been uniformly governed by those princes with strict respect to the privileges of the inhabitants, who were possessed already of complete personal freedom. Secured in all the immunities which were necessary for their comfort, these sagacious peasants saw nothing to expect from the hand of a stranger general, excepting what Buonaparte himself has termed, those vexations necessarily annexed to a country which becomes the seat of war, and which, in more full detail, include whatever the avarice of the general, the necessities of the soldiers, not to mention the more violent outrage of marauders and plunderers, may choose to exact from the inhabitants. But, besides this prudent calculation of consequences, the Tyrolese felt the generous spirit of national independence, and resolved that their mountains should not be dishonoured by the march of an armed enemy, if the unerring rifles of their children were able to protect their native soil from such indignity. Every mode of resistance was prepared; and it was then that those piles of rocks, stones, and trunks of trees, were collected on the verge of the precipices which line the valley of the Inn, and other passes of the Tyrol, but which remained in grim repose till rolled down, to the utter annihilation of the French and Bavarian invaders in 1809, under the direction of the valiant Hofer and his companions in arms.

More successful with the sword than the pen, Buonaparte had no sooner disposed of Davidowich and his army, than he began his operations against Wurmser himself, who had by this time learned the total defeat of his subordinate division, and that the French were possessed of Trent. The Austrian field-marshal immediately conceived that the French general, in consequence of his successes, would be disposed to leave Italy behind, and advance to Inspruck, in order to communicate with the armies of Moreau and Jourdan, which were now on the full advance into Germany. Instead, therefore, of renouncing his own scheme of relieving Mantua, Wurmser thought the time favourable for carrying it into execution; and in place of falling back with his army on Friuli, and thus keeping open his communication with

Vienna, he committed the great error of involving himself still

As soon as Buonaparte learned this new separation of Wurm-

as effectually to compromise its safety.

To execute this plan required the utmost rapidity of movement, for, should Wurmser learn that Buonaparte was advancing towards Bassano, in time to recall Mezaros, he might present a front too numerous to be attacked with hope of success. There are twenty leagues' distance betwixt Trent and Bassano, and that ground was to be traversed by means of very difficult

destroyed, and more than four thousand men laid down their arms.¹ From Primolano the French, dislodging whatever enemies they encountered, advanced to Cismone, a village, where a river of the same name unites with the Brenta. There they halted exhausted with fatigue; and on that evening no sentinel

¹ Buonaparte to the Directory, 8th September. Montholon, tom. iii. p. 261. Jomini, tom. ix., p. 114, estimates the prisoners at fully from twelve to fifteen hundred.

in the army endured more privations than Napoleon himself, who took up his quarters for the night without either staff-officers or baggage, and was glad to accept a share of a private soldier's ration of bread, of which the poor fellow lived to remind his general when he was become Emperor.¹

Cismone is only about four leagues from Bassano, and Wurmser heard with alarm, that the French leader, whom he conceived to be already deeply engaged in the Tyrolese passes, had destroyed his vanguard, and was menacing his own position. It was under this alarm that he despatched expresses, as already mentioned, to recall Mezaros and his division. But it was too late; for that general was under the walls of Verona, nigh fifteen leagues from Wurmser's position, on the night of the 7th September, when the French army was at Cismone, within a third part of that distance. The utmost exertions of Mezaros could only bring his division as far as Montebello, upon the 8th September, when the battle of Bassano seemed to decide the fate of his unfortunate commander-in-chief.

This victory was as decisive as any which Buonaparte had hitherto obtained. The village of Salagna was first carried by main force, and then the French army, continuing to descend the defiles of the Brenta, attacked Wurmser's main body, which still lay under his own command in the town of Bassano. Augereau penetrated into the town upon the right, Massena upon the left. They bore down all opposition, and seized the cannon by which the bridge was defended, in spite of the efforts of the Austrian grenadiers, charged with the duty of protecting Wurmser and his staff, who were now in absolute flight.

The field-marshal himself, with the military chest of his army, nearly fell into the hands of the French; and though he escaped for the time, it was after an almost general dispersion of his troops.² Six thousand Austrians surrendered to Buonaparte;³

¹ At the camp of Boulogne, in 1805.

² Napoleon the same night visited the field of battle, and he told this anecdote of it at St. Helena—"In the deep silence of a beautiful moonlight night," said the Emperor, "a dog leaping suddenly from beneath the clothes of his dead master, rushed upon us, and then immediately returned to his hiding-place, howling pitiously. He alternately licked his master's face, and again flew at us; thus at once soliciting aid and threatening revenge. Whether owing to my own particular mood of mind at the moment, the time, the place, or the action itself, I know not, but certainly no incident on any field of battle ever produced so deep an impression on me. I involuntarily stopped to contemplate the scene. This man, thought I, must have had among his comrades friends; and here he lies forsaken by all except his dog! What a strange being is man! and how mysterious are his impressions! I had, without emotion, ordered battles which were to decide the fate of the army; I had beheld with tearless eyes, the execution of those operations, in the course of which numbers of my countrymen were sacrificed; and here my feelings were roused by the mournful howling of a dog. Certainly at that moment I should have been easily moved by a suppliant enemy; I could very well imagine Achilles surrendering up the body of Hector at the sight of Priam's tears."—LAS CASES, tom. ii., p. 403. See also Arnault, *Hist. de Napoleon*; and Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 11.

³ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 266; Buonaparte, in his letter to the Directory, says 5000; Jomini, tom. ix., p. 116, reduces them to 2000.

Quasdonowich, with three or four thousand men, effected a retreat to the north-east, and gained Franh; while Wurmser himself, finding it impossible to escape otherwise, fled to Vicenza in the opposite direction, and there united the scattered forces which still followed him, with the division of Mezaros. When this junction was accomplished, the aged marshal had still the command of about sixteen thousand men, out of sixty thousand, with whom he had, scarce a week before, commenced the campaign. The material part of his army, guns, waggons, and baggage, was all lost—his retreat upon the hereditary states of Austria was entirely cut off—the flower of his army was destroyed—courage and confidence were gone—there seemed no remedy but that he should lay down his arms to the youthful conqueror by whose

him leave to gather some brief-dated laurels, as the priests of old were wont to garland their victims before the final sacrifice.

Surrounded by dangers, and cut off from any other retreat, Wurmser formed the gallant determination to throw himself and his remaining forces into Mantua, and share the fate of the beleaguered fortress which he had vainly striven to relieve. But to execute this purpose it was necessary to cross the Adige, nor was it easy to say how this was to be accomplished. Verona, one point of passage, was defended by Kilmaine, who had already repulsed Mezaros. Legnago, where there was a bridge, was also garrisoned by the French; and Wurmser had lost his bridge of pontoons at the battle of Bassano. At the village of Albarado, however, there was an established ferry, totally insufficient for passing over so considerable a force with the necessary despatch, but which Wurmser used for the purpose of sending across two squadrons of cavalry, in order to reconnoitre the blockade of Mantua, and the facilities which might present themselves for accomplishing a retreat on that fortress. This precaution proved for the time the salvation of Wurmser, and what remained of his army.

Fortune, which has such influence in warlike affairs, had so ordered it, that Kilmaine, apprehending that Wurmser would attempt to force a passage at Verona, and desirous to improve

should be detached from the blockade of Mantua, to supply their place on the Lower Adige. The former part of his command had been obeyed, and the garrison of Legnago were on their march for Verona. But the relief which was designed to occupy their post, though on their way to Legnago, had not yet arrived. The Austrian cavalry, who had passed over at Albarado, encoun-

tering this body on its march from the vicinity of Mantua, attacked them with spirit, and sabred a good many. The commander of the French battalion, confounded at this appearance, concluded that the whole Austrian army had gained the right bank of the Adige, and that he should necessarily be cut off if he prosecuted his march to Legnago. Thus the passage at that place was left altogether undefended; and Wurmser, apprised of this unhoped-for chance of escape, occupied the village, and took possession of the bridge.¹

Buonaparte, in the meantime, having moved from Bassano to Areola in pursuit of the defeated enemy, learned, at the latter place, that Wurmser still lingered at Legnago, perhaps to grant his troops some indispensable repose, perhaps to watch whether it might be even yet possible to give the slip to the French divisions by which he was surrounded, and, by a rapid march back upon Padua, to regain his communication with the Austrian territories, instead of enclosing himself in Mantua. Buonaparte hastened to avail himself of these moments of indecision. Angereau was ordered to march upon Legnago by the road from Padua, so as to cut off any possibility of Wurmser's retreat in that direction; while Massena's division was thrown across the Adige by a ferry at Ronco, to strengthen General Kilmaine, who had already occupied the line of a small river called the Molinella, which intersects the country between Legnago and Mantua. If this position could be made good, it was concluded that the Austrian general, unable to reach Mantua, or to maintain himself at Legnago, must even yet surrender himself and his army.

On the 12th September, Wurmser began his march. He was first opposed at Cerea, where Murat and Pigeon had united their forces. But Wurmser made his dispositions, and attacked with a fury which swept out of the way both the cavalry and infantry of the enemy, and obtained possession of the village. In the heat of the skirmish, and just when the French were giving way, Buonaparte himself entered Cerea, with the purpose of personally superintending the dispositions made for intercepting the retreat of Wurmser, when, but for the speed of his horse, he had nearly fallen as a prisoner into the hands of the general whose destruction he was labouring to ensure. Wurmser arrived on the spot a few minutes afterwards, and gave orders for a pursuit in every direction; commanding, however, that the French general should, if possible, be taken alive—a conjunction of circumstances worthy of remark, since it authorised the Austrian general for the moment to pronounce on the fate of him, who, before and after was the master of his destiny.

Having again missed this great prize, Wurmser continued his march all night, and turning aside from the great road, where

¹ Jomini, tom. ix., p. 116; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 54; Montholon, tom. iii., p. 267.

the blockading army had taken measures to intercept him, he surprised a small body of Austrians at Villa Impenta, by a rapid march from Kilmaine. A body of Austrians was cut to pieces by the French. The French then obtained a similar success at Duc Castelli, where his cuirassiers destroyed a body of French infantry; and having now forced himself into a communication with Mantua, he encamped at Duc Castelli, and the Austrians retired to the south.

healthy air of the lakes and marshes with which they were surrounded, had cut off the remainder. The French also had lost great numbers; but the conquerors could reckon up their victories, and forget the price at which they had been purchased.

the colours and standards taken from the enemy:—"In the course of a single campaign," he truly said, "Italy had been entirely conquered—three large armies had been entirely destroyed—more than fifty stand of colours had been taken by the victors—forty thousand Austrians had laid down their arms—and, what was not the least surprising part of the whole, these deeds had been ac-

complished by an army of only thirty thousand Frenchmen, commanded by a general scarce twenty-six years old."¹

CHAPTER VII.

Corsica reunited with France—Critical situation of Buonaparte in Italy at this period—The Austrian General Alvinzi placed at the head of a new Army—Various Contests, attended with no decisive result—Want of Concert among the Austrian Generals—French Army begin to murmur—First Battle of Arcola—Napoleon in personal danger—No decisive result—Second Battle of Arcola—The French victorious—Fresh want of concert among the Austrian Generals—General Views of Military and Political Affairs, after the conclusion of the fourth Italian Campaign—Austria commences a fifth Campaign—but has not profited by experience—Battle of Rivoli, and Victory of the French—Further successful at La Favorita—French regain their lost ground in Italy—Surrender of Mantua—Instances of Napoleon's Generosity.

ABOUT this period the reunion of Corsica with France took place. Buonaparte contributed to this change in the political relations of his native country indirectly, in part by the high pride which his countrymen must have originally taken in his splendid career; and he did so more immediately, by seizing the town and port of Leghorn, and assisting those Corsicans, who had been exiled by the English party, to return to their native island.² He intimated the event to the Directory, and stated that he had appointed Gentili, the principal partisan of the French, to govern the island provisionally; and that the Commissioner Salicetti was to set sail for the purpose of making other necessary arrangements.³ The communication is coldly made, nor does Buonaparte's love of his birth-place induce him to expatiate upon its importance, although the Directory afterwards made the acquisition of that island a great theme of exultation. But his destinies had called him to too high an elevation to permit his distinguishing the obscure islet which he had arisen from originally. He was like the young lion, who, while he is scattering the herds and destroying the hunters, thinks little of the forest-cave in which he first saw the light.⁴

¹ Moniteur, No. 12, October 4.

² Jomini, tom. ix., p. 153; Thibauteau, tom. ii., p. 32; Montgaillard, tom. iv., p. 468.

³ "Gentili and all the refugees landed in October, 1796, in spite of the English cruisers. The republicans took possession of Bastia and of all the fortresses. The English hastily embarked. The King of England wore the Corsican crown only two years. This which cost the British treasury five millions sterling. John Bull's riches could not have been worse employed."—NAPOLÉON, *Monthonon*, tom. iii., p. 58.

⁴ It is fair to add, however, that Buonaparte in his Memoirs, while at St.

Indeed, Buonaparte's situation, however brilliant, was at the same time critical, and required his undivided thoughts. Mantua still held out, and was likely to do so. Wurmser had caused about three-fourths of the horses belonging to his cavalry to be

danger of being over-reached and out-manœuvred by the new system of tactics, which occasioned his misfortunes in the open field.

While, therefore, the last pledge of Austria's dominions in

Tyrol They were to operate in conjunction, and both were placed under the command of Marshal Alvinzi, an officer of high

the
der,
and
were devotedly attached to the chief who had conducted them

the great work of the present-day legislation and history of France

Napoleon had also on his side the good wishes, if not of the Italians in general, of a considerable party, especially in Lombardy, and friends and enemies were alike impressed with belief in his predestined success. During the former attempts of Wurmser, a contrary opinion had prevailed, and the news that the Austrians were in motion, had given birth to insurrections against the French in many places, and to the publication of sentiments unfavourable to them almost every where. But now, when all predicted the certain success of Napoleon, the friends of Austria remained quiet, and the numerous party who desire in such cases to keep on the winning side, added weight to the actual friends of France, by expressing their opinions in her favour. It seems, however, that Victory, as if displeased that mortals should presume to calculate the motives of so fickle a deity, was, on this occasion, disposed to be more coy than formerly even to her greatest favourite, and to oblige him to toil harder than he had done even when the odds were more against him.¹

Davidowich commanded the body of the Austrians which was in the Tyrol, and which included the fine militia of that martial province. There was little difficulty in prevailing on them to advance into Italy, convinced as they were that there was small security for their national independence while the French remained in possession of Lombardy. Buonaparte, on the other hand, had placed Vaubois in the passes upon the river Lavis, above Trent, to cover that new possession of the French Republic, and check the advance of Davidowich. It was the plan of Alvinzi to descend from Friuli, and approach Vicenza, to which place he expected Davidowich might penetrate by a corresponding movement down the Adige. Having thus brought his united army into activity, his design was to advance on Mantua, the constant object of bloody contention. He commenced his march in the beginning of October, 1796.

As soon as Buonaparte heard that Alvinzi was in motion, he sent orders to Vaubois to attack Davidowich, and to Massena to advance to Bassano upon the Brenta, and make head against the Austrian commander-in-chief. Both measures failed in effect.

Vaubois indeed made his attack, but so unsuccessfully, that after two days' fighting he was compelled to retreat before the Austrians, to evacuate the city of Trent, and to retreat upon Calliano, already mentioned as a very strong position, in the previous account of the battle of Roveredo. A great part of his opponents being Tyrolese, and admirably calculated for mountain warfare, they forced Vaubois from a situation which was almost impregnable; and their army, descending the Adige upon the right bank, appeared to manœuvre with the purpose of marching on Montebaldo and Rivoli, and thus opening the communication with Alvinzi. Nov. 5.

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 345; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 52.

Buonaparte, therefore, himself saw the necessity of advancing with Augereau's division, determined to give battle to Alvinzi, and force him back on the Piave before the arrival of Davidovich. But he experienced unusual resistance; and it is amid complaints of the weather of *consequenza* on 2^d *novembre* of

French army retire through their town, as they had been witnesses of their victory on the preceding day.¹ No doubt there was room for astonishment if the Vicenzans had been as com-

plete as *l'armata*, having no body of men to interrupt their communication, should not instantly have adjusted their operations on a common basis.² But it was the bane of the Austrian tactics, through the whole war, to neglect that connexion and co-operation betwixt their separate divisions, which is essential to

to be driven from positions where a handful of brave men might have arrested the progress of a large army. You are no longer

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 343, Thibaudau, tom. ii., p. 109

² Jomini, tom. ix., p. 163

French soldiers.—Let it be written on their colours—‘They are not of the Army of Italy.’” Tears, and groans of sorrow and shame, answered this harangue—the rules of discipline could not stifle their sense of mortification, and several of the grenadiers, who had deserved and wore marks of distinction, called out from the ranks—“General, we have been misrepresented—Place us in the advance, and you may then judge whether we do not belong to the army of Italy.” Buonaparte having produced the necessary effect, spoke to them in a more conciliatory tone; and the regiments who had undergone so severe a rebuke, redeemed their character in the subsequent part of the campaign.¹

While Napoleon was indefatigable in concentrating his troops on the right bank of the Adige, and inspiring them with his own spirit of enterprise, Alvinzi had taken his position on the left bank, nearly opposite to Verona. His army occupied a range of heights called Caldiero, on the left of which, and somewhat in the rear, is the little village of Arcola, situated among marshes, which extend around the foot of that eminence. Here the Austrian general had stationed himself, with a view, it may be supposed, to wait until Davidowich and his division should descend the right bank of the Adige, disquiet the French leader’s position on that river, and give Alvinzi himself the opportunity of forcing a passage.

Buonaparte, with his usual rapidity of resolution, resolved to drive the Austrian from his position on Caldiero, before the arrival of Davidowich. But neither on this occasion was fortune propitious to him.² A strong French division, under Massena, attacked the heights amid a storm of rain; but their most strenuous exertions proved completely unsuccessful, and left to the general only his usual mode of concealing a check, by railing at the elements.³

The situation of the French became critical, and, what was worse, the soldiers perceived it; and complained that they had to sustain the whole burden of the war, had to encounter army after army, and must succumb at last under the renewed and unwearied efforts of Austria. Buonaparte parried these natural feelings as well as he could,⁴ promising that their conquest of Italy should be speedily sealed by the defeat of this Alvinzi; and he applied his whole genius to discover the means of bringing the war to an

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 349.

² Jomini, tom. ix., p. 170; Thibaudcau, tom. ii., p. 112.

³ “The rain fell in torrents; the ground was so completely soaked, that the French artillery could make no movement, whilst that of the Austrians, being in position, and advantageously placed, produced its full effect.”—MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 352.

⁴ “We have but one more effort to make, and Italy is our own. The enemy is, no doubt, more numerous than we are, but half his troops are recruits; when he is beaten, Mantua must fall, and we shall remain masters of all. From the smiling flowery bivouacs of Italy, you cannot return to the Alpine snows. Succours are on the road; only beat Alvinzi, and I will answer for your future welfare.”—MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 353.

the Adige, by the troops withdrawn to effect that purpose; and during his absence, Alvinzi would probably force the passage of the river at some point, and thus have it in his power to relieve Mantua. The heights of Caldiero, occupied by the Austrian main body, and lying in his front, had, by dire experiment, been proved impregnable.

were under arms; and leaving fifteen hundred men under Kil-

imply that his resolution was at length taken to resign the hopes of gaining Mantua, and perhaps to abandon Italy. The silence

There were three causeways by which the marsh of Arcola is traversed—each was occupied by a French column. Nov. 15. The central column moved on the causeway which led to the village so named. The dikes and causeways were not defended, but Arcola and its bridge were protected by two battalions of Croats with two pieces of cannon, which were placed in a position to enfilade the causeway. These received the French column with so heavy a fire on its flank, that it fell back in disorder. Augereau rushed forward upon the bridge with his chosen grenadiers; but enveloped as they were in a destructive fire, they were driven back on the main body.

Alvinzi, who conceived it only an affair of light troops, sent, however, forces into the marsh by means of the dikes which traversed them, to drive out the French. These were checked by finding that they were to oppose strong columns of infantry, yet the battle continued with unabated vigour. It was essential to Buonaparte's plan that Arcola should be carried; but the fire continued tremendous. At length, to animate his soldiers to a final exertion, he caught a stand of colours, rushed on the bridge, and planted them there with his own hand. A fresh body of Austrians arrived at that moment, and the fire on flank blazed more destructively than ever. The rear of the French column fell back; the leading files, finding themselves unsupported, gave way; but, still careful of their general, bore him back in their arms through the dead and dying, the fire and the smoke. In the confusion he was at length pushed into the marsh. The Austrians were already betwixt him and his own troops, and he must have perished or been taken, had not the grenadiers perceived his danger. The cry instantly arose, "Forward—forward—save the general!" Their love to Buonaparte's person did more than even his commands and example had been able to accomplish.¹ They returned to the charge, and at length pushed the Austrians out of the village; but not till the appearance of a French corps under General Guieux had turned the position, and he had thrown himself in the rear of it. These succours had passed at the ferry of Alborado, and the French remained in possession of the long-contested village. It was at the moment a place of the greatest importance; for the possession of it would have enabled Buonaparte, had the Austrians remained in their position, to operate on their communications with the Brenta, interpose between Alvinzi and his reserves, and destroy his park of artillery. But the risk was avoided by the timely caution of the Austrian field-marshal.²

Alvinzi was no sooner aware that a great division of the French army was in his rear than, without allowing them time for farther

¹ "This was the day of military devotedness. Lannes, who had been wounded at Governolo, had hastened from Milan; he was still suffering; he threw himself between the enemy and Napoleon, and received three wounds. Muiron, Napoleon's aide-de-camp, was killed in covering his general with his own body. Heroic and affecting death!"—*NAPOLEON, Memoirs*, tom. iii., p. 362.

² Jomini, tom. ix., p. 180; Thibaudeau, tom. li., p. 117.

operations, he instantly broke up his position on Caldiero, and evacuated these heights by a steady and orderly retreat. Buonaparte had the mortification to see the Austrians effect this manœuvre by crossing a bridge in their rear over the Alpon, and which could he have occupied, as was his purpose, he might have rendered their retreat impossible, or at least disastrous. As matters stood, however, the village of Arcola came to lose its consequence as a position, since, after Alvinzi's retreat, it was no

bank.

that he had no cause to be alarmed for Vauhaie's safety and might

and hastened therefore to overwhelm the rear-guard, whom he
 spared them the trouble
 on crossed to the left side,
 the dikes and causeways

On such ground, where
 it was impossible to assign to the columns more breadth than the
 causeways could accommodate, the victorious soldiers of France
 had great advantage over the recent levies of Austria; for though
 the latter might be superior in number on the whole, success
 must in such a case depend on the personal superiority of the

principal point of defence, and maintained it with the utmost
 obstinacy.

After having repeatedly failed when attacking in front a post
 so difficult of approach, Napoleon endeavoured to turn the posi-

tion by crossing the little river Alpon, near its union with the Adige. He attempted to effect a passage by means of fascines, but unsuccessfully; and the night approached without any thing effectual being decided. Both parties drew off, the French to Ronco, where they recrossed the Adige; the Austrians to a position behind the well-contested village of Arcola.

The battle of the 16th November was thus far favourable to the French, that they had driven back the Austrians, and made many prisoners in the commencement of the day; but they had also lost many men; and Napoleon, if he had gained ground in the day, was fain to return to his position at night, lest Davidowich, by the defeat of Vaubois, might either relieve Mantua, or move on Verona. The 17th was to be a day more decisive.

The field of battle, and the preliminary manœuvres, were much the same as on the preceding day; but those of the French were nearly disconcerted by the sinking of one Nov.-17. of the boats which constituted their bridge over the Adige. The Austrians instantly advanced on the demi-brigade which had been stationed on the left bank to defend the bridge. But the French having repaired the damage, advanced in their turn, and compelled the Austrians to retreat upon the marsh. Massena directed his attack on Poreil—General Robert pressed forward on Arcola. But it was at the point where he wished to cross the Alpon that Buonaparte chiefly desired to attain a decided superiority; and in order to win it, he added stratagem to audacity. Observing one of his columns repulsed, and retreating along the causeway, he placed the 32d regiment in ambuscade in a thicket of willows which bordered the rivulet, and saluting the pursuing enemy with a close, heavy, and unexpected fire, instantly rushed to close with the bayonet, and attacking the flank of a column of nearly three thousand Croats, forced them into the marsh, where most of them perished.

It was now that, after a calculation of the losses sustained by the enemy, Napoleon conceived their numerical superiority so far diminished, and their spirit so much broken, that he need no longer confine his operations to the dikes, but meet his enemy on the firm plain which extended beyond the Alpon. He passed the brook by means of a temporary bridge which had been prepared during night, and the battle raged as fiercely on the dry level, as it had done on the dikes and amongst the marshes.

The Austrians fought with resolution, the rather that their left, though stationed on dry ground, was secured by a marsh which Buonaparte had no means of turning. But though this was the case, Napoleon contrived to gain his point by impressing on the enemy an idea that he had actually accomplished that which he had no means of doing. This he effected by sending a daring officer, with about thirty of the guides, (his own body-guards they may be called,) with four trumpets; and directing these determined cavaliers to charge, and the trumpets to sound, as if a large

body of horse had crossed the marsh. Augereau attacked the Austrian left at the same moment; and a fresh body of troops advancing from Legnago, compelled them to retreat, but not to fly.

Alvinzi was now compelled to give way, and commence his retreat on Montebello. He disposed seven thousand men in echelon to cover this movement, which was accomplished without very much loss; but his ranks had been much thinned by the slaughter of the three battles of Arcola. Eight thousand men has been stated as the amount of his losses.¹ The French who made so many and so sanguinary assaults upon the villages, must also have suffered a great deal. Buonaparte acknowledges this in energetic terms. "Never," he writes to Carnot, "was field of battle so disputed. I have almost no generals remaining—I can assure you that the victory could not have been gained at a cheaper expense. The enemy were numerous, and desperately resolute."² The truth is, that Buonaparte's mode of striking ter-

ms. during those three weeks.

however, that Alvinzi had retreated, Davidowich followed the

¹ Jomini, tom ix, p. 194. Napoleon estimates the loss of Alvinzi, in the three days' engagements, at 12,000 men including 6000 prisoners. Montholon tom. iii., p. 370.

² Letter to the Directory, 19th November.

³ "The French army re-entered Verona in triumph by the Venice gate, three days after having quitted that city almost clandestinely by the Milan gate. It would be difficult to conceive the astonishment and enthusiasm of the inhabitants."—MONTMOLAY, tom iii., p. 370.

hood, made a vigorous sally on the 23d November; when his doing so was of little consequence, since he could not be supported.

Thus ended the fourth campaign undertaken for the Austrian possessions in Italy. The consequences were not so decidedly in Buonaparte's favour as those of the three former. Mantua, it is true, had received no relief; and so far the principal object of the Austrians had miscarried. But Wurmser was of a temper to continue the defence till the last moment, and had already provided for a longer defence than the French counted upon, by curtailing the rations of the garrison. The armies of Friuli and the Tyrol had also, since the last campaign, retained possession of Bassano and Trent, and removed the French from the mountains through which access is gained to the Austrian hereditary dominions. Neither had Alvinzi suffered any such heavy defeat as his predecessors Beaulieu or Wurmser; while Davidowich, on the contrary, was uniformly successful, had he known how to avail himself of his victories. Still the Austrians were not likely, till reinforced again, to interrupt Buonaparte's quiet possession of Lombardy.

During two months following the battle of Arcola and the retreat of the Austrians, the war which had been so vigorously maintained in Italy experienced a short suspension, and the attention of Buonaparte was turned towards civil matters—the arrangement of the French interests with the various powers of Italy, and with the congress of Lombardy, as well as the erection of the districts of Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio, and Modena, into what was called the Transpadane Republic. These we shall notice elsewhere, as it is not advisable to interrupt the course of our military annals, until we have recounted the last struggle of the Austrians for the relief of Mantua.

It must be in the first place observed, that whether from jealousy or from want of means, supplies and recruits were very slowly transmitted from France to their Italian army. About seven thousand men, who were actually sent to join Buonaparte, scarcely repaired the losses which he had sustained in the late bloody campaigns.¹ At the same time the treaty with the Pope being broken off, the supreme pontiff threatened to march a considerable army towards Lombardy. Buonaparte endeavoured to supply the want of reinforcements by raising a defensive legion among the Lombards, to which he united many Poles. This body was not fit to be brought into line against the Austrians, but was more than sufficient to hold at bay the troops of the papal see, who have never enjoyed of late years a high degree of military reputation.

¹ "You announce the arrival of 10,000 men from the Army of the Ocean, and a like number from that of the Rhine; but they have not arrived, and should they not come speedily, you will sacrifice an army ardently devoted to the Constitution."—BUONAPARTE to the Directory, 28th December.

purchase it, of the national honour. Vienna furnished four battalions, which were presented by the Empress with a banner, that she had wrought for them with her own hands. The Tyrolese also thronged once more to their sovereign's standard, undismayed by a proclamation made by Buonaparte after the retreat from Arcola, and which paid homage, though a painful one, to these brave marksmen. "Whatever Tyrolese," said this atrocious document, "is taken with arms in his hand, shall be put to instant death." Alvinzi sent abroad a counter proclamation, "that for every Tyrolese put to death as threatened, he would hang up a French officer." Buonaparte again replied, "that if the Austrian general should use the retaliation he threatened, he would execute in his turn officer for officer out of his prisoners, commencing with Alvinzi's own nephew, who was in his power." A little calmness on either side brought them to reflect on the cruelty of aggravating the laws of war, which are already too severe; so that the system of military execution was renounced on both sides.

But notwithstanding this display of zeal and loyalty on the part of the Austrian nation, its councils do not appear to have derived wisdom from experience. The losses sustained by Wurmser and by Alvinzi, proceeded in a great measure from the radical error of having divided their forces, and commenced the campaign on a double line of operation, which could not, or at least were not made to, correspond and communicate with each other. Yet they commenced this campaign on the same unhappy principles. One army descending from the Tyrol upon Montebaldo, the other was to march down by the Brenta on the Paduan territory, and then to operate on the lower Adige, the line of which, of course, they were expected to force, for the purpose of relieving Mantua. The Aulic Council ordered that these two armies were to direct their course so as to meet, if possible, upon the beleaguered fortress. Should they succeed in raising the siege, there was little doubt that the French must be driven out of Italy; but even were the scheme only partially successful, still it might allow Wurmser with his cavalry to escape

1 "The Austrian army amounted to from 63,000 to 70,000 fighting men, and 6000 Tyrolese, besides 24,000 men of the garrison of Mantua."—MONTMOLON, tom. iii., p. 404.

"After the battle of Arcola, the active French army amounted to 30,000; while 10,200 formed the blockade of Mantua."—JOMINI, tom. ix., p. 242.

from that besieged city, and retreat into the Romagna, where it was designed that he should, with the assistance of his staff and officers, organize and assume the command of the papal army. In the meantime, an intelligent agent was sent to communicate, if possible, with Wurmser.¹

This man fell into the hands of the besiegers. It was in vain that he swallowed his despatches, which were inclosed in a ball of wax; means were found to make the stomach render up its trust, and the document which the wax enclosed was found to be a letter, signed by the Emperor's own hand, directing Wurmser to enter into no capitulation, but to hold out as long as possible in expectation of relief, and if compelled to leave Mantua, to accept of no conditions, but to cut his way into the Romagna, and take upon himself the command of the papal army. Thus Buonaparte became acquainted with the storm which was approaching, and which was not long of breaking.²

Alvinzi, who commanded the principal army, advanced from Bassano to Roveredo upon the Adige. Provera, distinguished for his gallant defence of Cossaria, during the action of Millesimo,³ commanded the divisions which were to act upon the lower Adige. He marched as far as Bevi l'Acqua, while his advanced guard, under Prince Hohenzollern, compelled a body of French to cross to the right bank of the Adige.

Buonaparte, uncertain which of these attacks he was to consider as the main one, concentrated his army at Verona, which had been so important a place during all these campaigns as a central point, from which he might at pleasure march either up the Adige against Alvinzi, or descend the river to resist the attempts of Provera. He trusted that Joubert, whom he had placed in defence of La Corona, a little town which had been strongly fortified for the purpose, might be able to make a good temporary defence. He despatched troops for Joubert's support to Castel Nuovo, but hesitated to direct his principal force in that direction until ten in the evening of 13th January, when he received information that Joubert had been attacked at La Corona by an immense body, which he had resisted with difficulty during the day, and was now about to retreat, in order to Jan. 12. secure the important eminence at Rivoli, which was the key of his whole position.⁴

Judging from this account, that the principal danger occurred on the upper part of the Adige, Buonaparte left only Augereau's division to dispute with Provera the passage of that river on the lower part of its course. He was especially desirous to secure the elevated and commanding position of Rivoli, before the enemy had time to receive his cavalry and cannon, as he hoped to bring

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 405; Jomini, tom. ix., p. 263.

² Montholon, tom. iii., p. 406.

³ See *ante*, p. 54.

⁴ Jomini, tom. ix., p. 269.

on an engagement ere he was united with those important parts of his army. By forced marches Napoleon arrived at Rivoli at two in the morning of the 14th, and from that elevated situation, by the assistance of a clear moonlight, he was able to discover, that the bivouacs of the enemy was divided into five distinct and separate bodies, from which he inferred that their attack the next day would be made in the same number of columns.¹

The distance at which the bivouacs were stationed from the position of Joubert, made it evident to Napoleon that they did not mean to make their attack before ten in the morning, meaning probably to wait for their infantry and artillery. Joubert was at this time in the act of evacuating the position which he only occupied by a rear-guard. Buonaparte commanded him instantly to counter-march and resume possession of the important eminence of Rivoli.

A few Croats had already advanced so near the French line as to discover that Joubert's light troops had abandoned the chapel of Saint Marc, of which they took possession.

It was mistaken for the French and the attempt to recover and

which was commanded by Oeskey. The latter was repulsed, but the column of Kobler pressed forward to support them, and having gained the summit, attacked two regiments of the French who were stationed there, each protected by a battery of cannon. Notwithstanding this advantage, one of the regiments gave way, and Buonaparte himself galloped to bring up reinforcements. The nearest French were those of Massena's division, which, tired with the preceding night's march, had lain down to take some rest. They started up, however, at the command of Napoleon, and suddenly arriving on the field, in half an hour the column of Kobler was beaten and driven back. That of Liptay advanced

steep ascent on another point. The activity of the French brought

broken columns of the enemy—their cavalry made repeated

charges, and the whole Austrians who had been engaged fell into inextricable disorder. The columns which had advanced were irretrievably defeated; those who remained were in such a condition, that to attack would have been madness.

Amid this confusion, the division of Lusignan, which was the most remote of the Austrian columns, being intrusted with the charge of the artillery and baggage of the army, had, after depositing these according to order, mounted the heights of Rivoli, and assumed a position in rear of the French. Had this column attained the same ground while the engagement continued in front, there can be no doubt that it would have been decisive against Napoleon. Even as it was, their appearance in the rear would have startled troops, however brave, who had less confidence in their general; but those of Buonaparte only exclaimed, "There arrive farther supplies to our market," in full reliance that their commander could not be out-manœuvred. The Austrian division, on the other hand, arriving after the battle was lost, being without artillery or cavalry, and having been obliged to leave a proportion of their numbers to keep a check upon a French brigade, felt that, instead of being in a position to cut off the French, by attacking their rear while their front was engaged, they themselves were cut off by the intervention of the victorious French betwixt them and their defeated army. Lusignan's division was placed under a heavy fire of the artillery in reserve, and was soon obliged to lay down its arms. So critical are the events of war, that a military movement, which, executed at one particular period of time, would have ensured victory, is not unlikely, from the loss of a brief interval, to occasion only more general calamity.¹ The Austrians, on this, as on some other occasions, verified too much Napoleon's allegation, that they did not sufficiently consider the value of time in military affairs.

The field of Rivoli was one of the most desperate that Buonaparte ever won, and was gained entirely by superior military skill, and not by the overbearing system of mere force of numbers, to which he has been accused of being partial.² He himself had his horses repeatedly wounded in the course of the action, and exerted to the utmost his personal influence to bring up the troops into action where their presence was most required.³

Alvinzi's error, which was a very gross one, consisted in supposing that no more than Joubert's inconsiderable force was sta-

¹ It is represented in some military accounts, that the division which appeared in the rear of the French belonged to the army of Provera, and had been detached by him on crossing the Adige, as mentioned below. But Napoleon's Saint Helena manuscripts prove the contrary. Provera only crossed on the 14th January, and it was on the morning of the same day that Napoleon had seen the five divisions of Alvinzi, that of Lusignan which afterwards appeared in the rear of his army being one, lying around Joubert's position of Rivoli.—S.—See Montholon, tom. iii., p. 415, and Jomini, tom. ix., p. 284.

² Jomini, tom. ix., pp. 275, 287; Montholon, tom. iii., p. 408.

³ "This day the general-in-chief was several times surrounded by the enemy; he had several horses killed."—MONTHOLON, tom. iii., p. 415.

find a feeble force, he was enabled to resist and defeat a much superior army, brought to the field upon different points, without any just calculation on the means of resistance which were to be opposed; without the necessary assistance of cavalry and

to be opened without suspicion, when it occurred to a sagacious
 all gathering wood,
 he was fresher than
 for whom they were
 to a drummer who

¹ "The Roman legions are reported to have marched twenty four miles a day, but our brigades, though fighting at intervals, march thirty"—*DEOVARANTA* to the Directory

² "It was after the battle of Rivoli, that Massena received from Buonaparte and the army the title of 'enfant chéri de la victoire.'" &c.—*THIRAT DEAT*, tom. II., p. 123.

³ "At two o'clock in the afternoon, in the midst of the battle of Rivoli"—*MOVNOLOV*, tom. III., p. 416.

⁴ Montholon, tom. III., p. 416.

In the meanwhile, Provera communicated with the garrison of Mantua across the lake, and concerted the measures for its relief with Wurmser. On the 16th of January, being the morning after the battle of Rivoli, and the unsuccessful attempt to surprise the suburb of Saint George, the garrison of Mantua sallied from the place in strength, and took post at the causeway of La Favorita, being the only one which is defended by an enclosed citadel or independent fortress. Napoleon, returning at the head of his victorious forces, surrounded and attacked with fury the troops of Provera, while the blockading army compelled the garrison, at the bayonet's point, to re-enter the besieged city of Mantua. Provera, who had in vain, though with much decision and gallantry, attempted the relief of Mantua, which his Imperial master had so much at heart, was compelled to lay down his arms with a division of about five thousand men, whom he had still united under his person. The detached corps which he had left to protect his bridge, and other passes in his rear, sustained a similar fate. Thus one division of the army, which had commenced the campaign of January only on the 7th of that month, were the prisoners of the destined conqueror before ten days had elapsed. The larger army, commanded by Alvinzi, had no better fortune. They were closely pursued from the bloody field of Rivoli, and never were permitted to draw breath or to recover their disorder. Large bodies were intercepted and compelled to surrender, a practice now so frequent among the Austrian troops, that it ceased to be shameful.¹

Nevertheless, one example is so peculiar as to deserve commemoration, as a striking instance of the utter consternation and dispersion of the Austrians after this dreadful defeat, and of the confident and audacious promptitude which the French officers derived from their unvaried success. René, a young officer, was in possession of the village called Garda, on the lake of the same name, and, in visiting his advanced posts, he perceived some Austrians approaching, whom he caused his escort to surround and make prisoners. Advancing to the front to reconnoitre, he found himself close to the head of an imperial column of eighteen hundred men, which a turning in the road had concealed till he was within twenty yards of them. "Down with your arms!" said the Austrian commandant; to which René answered with the most ready boldness,—"*Do you lay down your arms! I have destroyed your advanced guard, as witness these prisoners—ground your arms or no quarter.*" And the French soldiers, catching the hint of their leader, joined in the cry of "Ground your arms." The Austrian officer hesitated, and proposed to enter into capitulation; the Frenchman would admit of no terms but instant and immediate surrender. The dispirited imperialist yielded up his sword, and commanded his soldiers to imitate his

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 417; Jomini, tom. ix., p. 293.

war—you have surrendered—you are therefore my prisoner, but I rely on your parole. Here, I return your sword—compel your

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nacy.

who commanded the blockade, to that of a soldier. He used the customary language on such occasions. He expatiated on the means which he said Mantua still possessed of holding

him.

A French officer of distinction was present, muffled in his cloak, and remaining apart from the two officers, but within hear-

1 "The trophies acquired in the course of January were 23,000 prisoners,

ing of what had passed. When their discussion was finished, this unknown person stepped forward, and taking a pen wrote down the conditions of surrender to which Wurmser was to be admitted—conditions more honourable and favourable by far than what his extremity could have exacted. “These,” said the unknown officer to Klenau, “are the terms which Wurmser may accept at present, and which will be equally tendered to him at any period when he finds farther resistance impossible. We are aware he is too much a man of honour to give up the fortress and city, so long and honourably defended, while the means of resistance remain in his power. If he delays accepting the conditions for a week, for a month, for two months, they shall be equally his when he chooses to accept them. To-morrow I pass the Po, and march upon Rome.” Klenau, perceiving that he spoke to the French commander-in-chief, frankly admitted that the garrison could not longer delay surrender, having scarce three days’ provisions un-consumed.¹

This trait of generosity towards a gallant but unfortunate enemy, was highly favourable to Buonaparte. The taste which dictated the stage-effect of the cloak may indeed be questioned; but the real current of his feeling towards the venerable object of his respect, and at the same time compassion, is ascertained otherwise. He wrote to the Directory on the subject, that he had afforded to Wurmser such conditions of surrender as became the generosity of the French nation towards an enemy, who, having lost his army by misfortune, was so little desirous to secure his personal safety, that he threw himself into Mantua, cutting his way through the blockading army; thus voluntarily undertaking the privations of a siege, which his gallantry protracted until almost the last morsel of provisions was exhausted.²

But the young victor paid still a more delicate and noble-minded compliment, in declining to be personally present when the veteran Wurmser had the mortification to surrender his sword, with his garrison of twenty thousand men, ten thousand of whom were fit for service. This self-denial did Napoleon as much credit nearly as his victory, and must not be omitted in a narrative, which, often called to stigmatize his ambition and its consequences, should not be the less ready to observe marks of dignified and honourable feeling. The history of this remarkable man more frequently reminds us of the romantic and improbable victories imputed to the heroes of the romantic ages, than of the spirit of chivalry attributed to them; but in this instance Napoleon’s conduct towards Wurmser may be justly compared to that of the Black Prince to his royal prisoner, King John of France.

Serrurier, who had conducted the leaguer, had the honour to receive the surrender of Wurmser, after the siege of Mantua had

¹ Montholon, tom. iii., p. 420.

² Buonaparte to the Directory, 15 Pluviose, 3d February.

of that haughty power.

The French, possessed of this grand object of their wishes,

CHAPTER VIII

Situation and Views of Buonaparte at this period—His political Conduct towards the Italians—Popularity—Severe terms of Peace proposed to the Pope—rejected—Napoleon differs from

Tuscany—Venice.

few months after he had been a mere soldier of fortune, rather seeking for subsistence than expecting honourable distinction.

hitherto unheard of in civilized Europe. The pre-eminence which he had suddenly obtained had, besides, been subjected to so many trials, as to afford every proof of its permanence. Napoleon stood aloft, like a cliff on which successive tempests had

expended their rage in vain. The means which raised him were equally competent to make good his greatness. He had infused into the armies which he commanded the firmest reliance on his genius, and the greatest love for his person; so that he could always find agents ready to execute his most difficult commands. He had even inspired them with a portion of his own indefatigable exertion and his commanding intelligence. The maxim which he inculcated upon them when practising those long and severe marches which formed one essential part of his system, was, "I would rather gain victory at the expense of your legs than at the price of your blood."¹ The French, under his training, seemed to become the very men he wanted, and to forget in the excitement of war and the hope of victory, even the feelings of weariness and exhaustion. The following description of the French soldier by Napoleon himself, occurs in his despatches to the Directory during his first campaign in Italy:—

"Were I to name all those who have been distinguished by acts of personal bravery, I must send the muster-roll of all the grenadiers and carabineers of the advanced-guard. They jest with danger, and laugh at death; and if any thing can equal their intrepidity, it is the gaiety with which, singing alternately songs of love and patriotism, they accomplish the most severe forced marches. When they arrive at their bivouacs, it is not to take their repose, as might be expected, but to tell each his story of the battle of the day, and produce his plan for that of to-morrow; and many of them think with great correctness on military subjects. The other day I was inspecting a demi-brigade, and as it filed past me, a common chasseur approached my horse, and said, 'General, you ought to do so and so.'—'Hold your peace, you rogue!' I replied. He disappeared immediately, nor have I since been able to find him out. But the manœuvre which he recommended was the very same which I had privately resolved to carry into execution."²

To command this active, intelligent, and intrepid soldiery, Buonaparte possessed officers entirely worthy of the charge; men young, or at least not advanced in years, to whose ambition the Revolution, and the wars which it had brought on, had opened an unlimited career, and whose genius was inspired by the plans of their leader, and the success which attended them. Buonaparte, who had his eye on every man, never neglected to distribute rewards and punishments, praise and censure with a liberal hand, or omitted to press for what latterly was rarely if ever denied to him—the promotion of such officers as particularly distinguished themselves. He willingly assumed the task of soothing the feelings of those whose relations had fallen under his banners. His letter of consolation to General Clarke upon the

¹ Louis Buonaparte, tom. ii., p. 60.

² Letter to the Directory, June 1; *Moniteur*, No. 264.

the sight of the triumphal car, seemed to remind him, that he was still a mortal man.

It should farther be remarked, that Napoleon withstood, instantly and boldly, all the numerous attempts made by commissaries, and that description of persons, to encroach upon the fund destined for the use of the army. Much of his public, and more of his private agents, these agents them, he dis- quently some fame made at defiance the enmity of such persons, who are generally as timid as they are sordid.

Towards the general officers there took place a gradual change of deportment, as the commander-in-chief began to feel gradually, more and more, the increasing sense of his own personal importance. We have been informed by an officer of the highest rank, that, during the earlier campaigns, Napoleon used to rejoice with, and embrace them as associates, nearly on the same footing, engaged in the same tasks. After a period, his language and carriage became those of a frank soldier, who, sensible of the merit of his subordinate assistants, yet makes them sensible, by his manner, that he is their commander-in-chief. When his infant fortunes began to come of age, his deportment to his generals was tinctured with that lofty courtesy which princes use towards their subjects, and which plainly intimated, that he held them as subjects in the war, not as brethren.*

Napoleon's conduct towards the Italians individually was, in most instances, in the highest degree prudent and political; while, at the same time, it coincided, as true policy usually does, with the rules of justice and moderation, and served, in a great measure, to counterbalance the odium which he incurred by despoiling Italy of the works of art, and even by his infringements on the religious system of the Catholics.

On the latter subject, the general became particularly cautious, and his dislike or contempt of the Church of Rome was no longer shown in that gross species of satire which he had at first given loose to. On the contrary, it was veiled under philosophical indifference; and, while relieving the clergy of their worldly possessions, Napoleon took care to avoid the error of the Jacobins; never proposing their tenets as an object of persecution, but protecting their persons, and declaring himself a decided friend to general toleration on all points of conscience.

In point of politics, as well as religion, the opinions of Buonaparte appear to have experienced a great change. It may be doubted, indeed, if he ever in his heart adopted those of the outrageous Jacobins.¹ At all events, his clear and sound good sense speedily made him aware, that such a violence on the established rules of reason and morality, as an attempt to make the brutal strength of the multitude the forcible controller of those possessed of the wisdom, property, and education of a country, is too unnatural to remain long, or to become the basis of a well-regulated state. Being at present a Republican of the Thermidorien party, Buonaparte, even though he made use of the established phrases, Liberty and Equality, acknowledged no dignity superior to citizen, and *thee'd* and *thou'd* whomsoever he addressed, was permitted to mix many grains of liberality with those democratic forms. Indeed, the republican creed of the day began to resemble the leathern apron of the brazier, who founded a dynasty in the East—his descendants continued to display it as their banner, but enriched it so much with gems and embroidery, that there was little of the original stuff to be discovered.

Jacobinism, for example, being founded on the principle of assimilating the national character to the gross ignorance of the lower classes, was the natural enemy of the fine arts and of literature, whose productions the Sans-Culottes could not comprehend, and which they destroyed for the same enlightened reasons that Jack Cade's followers hanged the clerk of Chatham, with his pen

¹ Even when before Toulon, he was not held by clear-sighted persons to be a very orthodox Jacobin. General Cartaux, the stupid Sans-Culotte under whom he first served, was talking of the young commandant of artillery with applause, when his wife, who was somewhat first in command at home, advised him not to reckon too much on that young man, "who had too much sense to be long a Sans-Culotte."—"Sense! Female-citizen Cartaux," said her offended husband, "do you take us for fools?"—"By no means," answered the lady; "but his sense is not of the same kind with yours."—S.—LAS CASES, vol. i., p. 144.

and inkhorn about his neck.¹ Buonaparte, on the contrary, saw

not enjoy the consideration to which they were entitled—they

asures as might occur, for giving a more brilliant existence to their ancient seminaries.

The interest which he thus took in the literature and literary institutions of Italy was shown by admitting men of science or

naparte, the only remaining branch of that Florentine family, of whom the Corsican line were cadets. He resided at San Miniato, of which he was canon, and was an old man, and said to be wealthy. The relationship was eagerly acknowledged, and the general, with his whole staff, dined with the Canon Gregorio. The whole mind of the old priest was wrapt up in a project of obtaining the honours of regular canonization for one of the family called Bonaventura, who had been a Capuchin in the seventeenth century, and was said to have died in the odour of sanctity, though his right to divine honours had never been acknowledged.¹ It must have been ludicrous enough to have heard the old man insist upon a topic so uninteresting to Napoleon, and press the French republican general to use his interest with the Pope. There can be little doubt that the holy father, to have escaped other demands, would have canonized a whole French regiment of Carmagnoles, and ranked them with the old militia of the calendar, the Theban Legion. But Napoleon was sensible that any request on such a subject coming from him, would be only ludicrous.²

The progress which Buonaparte made personally in the favour of the Italians, was, doubtless, a great assistance to the propagation of the new doctrines which were connected with the French Revolution, and was much aided by the trust which he seemed desirous to repose in the natives of the country. He retained, no doubt, in his own hands, the ultimate decision of every thing of consequence; but in matters of ordinary importance, he permitted and encouraged the Italians to act for themselves, in a manner they had not been accustomed to under their German masters. The internal government of their towns was intrusted to provisional governors, chosen without respect to rank, and the maintenance of police was committed to the armed burghers, or national guards. Conscious of the importance annexed to these privileges, they already became impatient for national liberty. Napoleon could hardly rein back the intense ardour of the large party among the Lombards who desired an immediate declaration of independence, and he had no other expedient left than to amuse them with procrastinating excuses, which enhanced their desire of such an event, while they delayed its gratification. Other towns of Italy,—for it was among the citizens of the towns that these sentiments were chiefly cultivated,—began to evince the same wish to new-model their governments on the revolutionary system; and this ardour was chiefly shown on the southern side of the Po.

¹ Antommarchi, tom i., p. 135.

² Las Cases says, that afterwards the Pope himself touched on the same topic, and was disposed to see the immediate guidance and protection afforded by the consanguinean Saint Bonaventura in the great deeds wrought by his relation. It was said of the church-endowing saint, David King of Scotland, that he was a sore saint for the Crown; certainly, Saint Bonaventura must have been a sore saint for the Papal See. The old abbé left Napoleon his fortune, which he conferred on some public institution.—S.

It must be remembered, that Napoleon had engaged in treaty with the Duke of Modena, and had agreed to guarantee his principality, on payment of immense contributions in money and

themselves a free state, under the protection of the French Republic. The ducal regency, with a view of protecting Modena from a similar attempt, mounted cannon on their ramparts, and took other defensive measures.

Buonaparte affected to consider these preparations as designed against the French; and marching a body of troops, took possession of the city without resistance, deprived the duke of all the

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their constituents in a perpetual union, under title of the Cispadane Republic, from their situation on the right of the river Po; thus assuming the character of independence, while in fact they remained under the authority of Buonaparte, like clay in the hands of the potter, who may ultimately model it into any shape he has a mind. In the meantime, he was careful to remind them, that the liberty which it was desirable to establish, ought to be consistent with due subjection to the laws. "Never forget," he said, in reply to their address announcing their new form of

you will be more fortunate than the people of France, for you will arrive at liberty without passing through the ordeal of revolution."¹

France.

Meanwhile the Lombards betrayed much uneasiness at seeing

¹ Montbelon, tom. iii., p. 322; tom. iv., p. 173.

their neighbours outstrip them in the path of revolution, and of nominal independence. The municipality of Milan proceeded to destroy all titles of honour, as a badge of feudal dependence, and became so impatient, that Buonaparte was obliged to pacify them by a solemn assurance that they should speedily enjoy the benefits of a Republican constitution; and, to tranquillize their irritation, placed them under the government of a provisional council, selected from all classes, labourers included.

This measure made it manifest, that the motives which had induced the delay of the French Government to re- Jan. 3.
cognise the independence (as they termed it) of Lombardy, were now of less force; and in a short time, the provisional council of Milan, after some modest doubts on their own powers, revolutionized their country, and assumed the title of the Transpadane Republic, which they afterwards laid aside, when, on their union with the Cispadane, both were united under the name of the Cisalpine Commonwealth. This decisive step was adopted 3d January, 1797. Decrees of a popular character had preceded the declaration of independence, but an air of moderation was observed in the revolution itself. The nobles, deprived of their feudal rights and titular dignities, were subjected to no incapacities; the reformation of the Church was touched upon gently, and without indicating any design of its destruction. In these particulars, the Italian commonwealth stopped short of their Gallic prototype.¹

If Buonaparte may be justly charged with want of faith, in destroying the authority of the Duke of Modena, after having accepted of a price for granting him peace and protection, we cannot object to him the same charge for acceding to the Transpadane Republic, in so far as it detached the legations of Ferrara and Bologna from the Roman See. These had been in a great measure reserved for the disposal of the French, as circumstances should dictate, when a final treaty should take place betwixt the Republic and the Sovereign Pontiff. But many circumstances had retarded this pacification, and seemed at length likely to break it off without hope of renewal.

If Buonaparte is correct in his statement, which we see no reason to doubt, the delay of a pacification with the Roman See was chiefly the fault of the Directory, whose avaricious and engrossing spirit was at this period its most distinguishing characteristic. An armistice, purchased by treasure, by contributions, by pictures and statues, and by the cession of the two legations of Bologna and Ferrara, having been mediated for his Holiness by the Spanish ambassador Azara, the Pope sent two plenipotentiaries to Paris to treat of a definitive peace. But the conditions proposed were so severe, that however desperate his condition, the Pope found them totally inadmissible. His Holiness was required to pay a large contribution in grain for ten years, a

¹ Montholon, tom. iv., p. 179.

regular tribute of six millions of Roman crowns for six years, to cede to France in perpetuity the ports of Ancona and Civita Vecchia, and to declare the independence of Ferrara, Bologna, and Ravenna. To add insult to oppression, the total cession of the Clementine Museum was required, and it was stipulated that France should have under management of her minister at Rome, a separate tribunal for judging her subjects, and a separate theatre for their amusement. Lastly, the secular sovereignty of the dominions of the Church was to be executed by a senate and a popular body.¹

from the dominion of the Holy See, and to raise the composition of the church-lands. Treasures might be expended, secular dignities resigned, and provinces ceded; but it was clear that the Sovereign Pontiff could not do what was expressly contrary to the doctrines of the Church which he represented. There were but few clergymen in France who had hesitated to prove their devotion to the Church of Rome, by submitting to expulsion, rather than take the constitutional oath. It was now for the Head of the Church to show in his own person a similar disin-

temporal.

¹ Montbelon, tom. III. p. 334.

² Montbelon, tom. III. p. 335.

rences broke up; and the Pope, in despair, resolved to make common cause with the House of Austria, and have recourse to the secular force, which the Roman See had disused for so many years.¹

It was a case of dire necessity; but the arming of the Pope's government, whose military force had been long the subject of ridicule,² against the victorious conqueror of five Austrian armies, reminds us of Priam, when, in extremity of years and despair, he buckled on his rusty armour, to oppose age and decrepitude to the youthful strength of Pyrrhus.³ Yet the measures of Sixtus indicated considerable energy. He brought back to Rome an instalment of sixteen millions of stipulated tribute, which was on the road to Buonaparte's military chest—took every measure to increase his army, and by the voluntary exertions of the noble families of Rome, he actually raised it to forty thousand men, and placed at its head the same General Colli, who had commanded with credit the troops of Sardinia during the campaign on the Alps. The utmost pains were taken by the clergy, both regular and secular, to give the expected war the character of a crusade, and to excite the fierce spirit of those peasantry who inhabit the Apennines, and were doubly disposed to be hostile to the French, as foreigners and as heretics. The Pope endeavoured also to form a close alliance with the King of the Two Sicilies, who promised in secret to cover Rome with an army of thirty thousand men. Little reliance was indeed to be placed in the good faith of the Court of Naples; but the Pope was compared, by the French envoy, Cacault,⁴ to a man who, in the act of falling, would grasp for support at a hook of red-hot iron.⁵

While the Court of Rome showed this hostile disposition, Napoleon reproached the French Government for having broken off the negotiation, which they ought to have protracted till the event of Alvinzi's march into Italy was known; at all events, until their general had obtained possession of the sixteen millions,

¹ Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 55; Letter de Cacault à Buonaparte, Correspondence Inédite, tom. ii., pp. 114-125; Montholon, tom. iii., p. 387.

² Voltaire, in one of his romances, terms the Pope an old gentleman, having a guard of one hundred men, who mount guard with umbrellas, and who make war on nobody.—S.

³ "Arma diu senior desueta trementibus ævo
Circumdat nequicquam humeris, et inutile ferrum
Cingitur"——

ENEID., Lib. II.

"He—when he saw his regal town on fire,
His ruin'd palace, and his entering foes,
On every side inevitable woes;
In arms disused invests his limbs, decay'd,
Like them, with age; a late and useless aid."

DRYDEN.

⁴ Cacault was born at Nantes in 1742. During the Consulate, he was chosen a member of the Senate. He published a translation of Lessing's Historical Sketch of the Drama. He died in 1805.

⁵ "La cour de Rome, au desespoir, saisirait un fer rouge: elle s'abandonne à l'impulsion bruyante des Napolitains."—*Correspondence Inédite*, tom. ii., p. 119.

so much wanted to pay his forces. In reply to his remonstrances, he received permission to renew the negotiations upon modified terms. But the Pope had gone too far to recede. Even the French victory of Arcola, and the instant threats of Buonaparte to march against him at the head of a flying column, were unable to move his resolution. "Let the French general march upon Rome," said the Papal minister; "the Pope, if necessary, will quit his capital. The farther the French are drawn from the Adige, the nearer they are to their ultimate destruction."¹ Napoleon was sensible, on receiving a hostile answer, that the Pope still relied on the last preparations which were made for the relief of Mantua, and it was not safe to attempt his chastisement until Alvinzi and Provera should be disposed of. But the decisive battles of Rivoli and La Favorita having ruined these armies, Napoleon was at leisure to execute his purpose of crushing the power, such as it was, of the Holy See. For this purpose he despatched Victor with a French division of four thousand men, and an Italian army of nearly the same force, supplied by Lombardy and by the Transpadane republic, to invade the Territories of the Church on the eastern side of Italy, by the route of Imola.

Meantime, the utmost exertions had been made by the clergy of Romagna, to raise the peasants in a mass, and a great many obeyed the sound of the tocsin. But an insurrectionary force is

and was taken by storm; but the soldiers were withheld from pillage by the generosity or prudence of Napoleon,² and he dismissed the prisoners of war³ to carry into the interior of the

¹ Montholon tom. iii. p. 377.

² "The French soldiers were not allowed to pillage, and the prisoners of war were dismissed to carry into the interior of the country the news of the French victory." — Montholon tom. iii. p. 377.

country the news of their own defeat, of the irresistible superiority of the French army, and of the clemency of their general.¹

Next day, three thousand of the Papal troops, occupying an advantageous position in front of Ancona, and commanded by Colli, were made prisoners without firing a shot; and Ancona was taken after slight resistance, though a place of some strength. A curious piece of priestcraft had been played off in this town, to encourage the people to resistance. A miraculous image was seen to shed tears, and the French artists could not discover the mode in which the trick was managed until the image was brought to headquarters, when a glass shrine, by which the illusion was managed, was removed. The Madonna was sent back to the church which owned her, but apparently had become reconciled to the foreign visitors, and dried her tears in consequence of her interview with Buonaparte.²

On the 10th of February, the French, moving with great celerity, entered Loretto, where the celebrated Santa Casa is the subject of the Catholic's devotional triumph, or secret scorn, according as his faith or his doubts predominate. The wealth which this celebrated shrine is once supposed to have possessed by gifts of the faithful, had been removed by Colli—if, indeed, it had not been transported to Rome long before the period of which we treat; yet, precious metal and gems to the amount of a million of livres, fell into the possession of the French, whose capture was also enriched by the holy image of our Lady of Loretto, with the sacred porringer, and a bedgown of dark-coloured camlet, warranted to have belonged to the Blessed Virgin.³ This image, said to have been of celestial workmanship, was sent to Paris, but was restored to the Pope in 1802. We are not informed that any of the treasures were given back along with the Madonna, to whom they had been devoted.

As the French army advanced upon the Roman territory, there was a menace of the interference of the King of Naples, worthy to be mentioned, both as expressing the character of that court, and showing Napoleon's readiness in anticipating and defeating the arts of indirect diplomacy.

The Prince of Belmonte-Pignatelli, who attended Buonaparte's headquarters, in the capacity, perhaps, of an observer, as much as of ambassador for Naples, came to the French general in secrecy, to show him, under strict confidence, a letter of the Queen of the Two Sicilies, proposing to march an army of thirty thousand

¹ Jomini, tom. ix., p. 307; Montholon, tom. iv., p. 7; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 220.

² "Monge was sent to the spot. He reported that the Madonna actually wept. The chapter received orders to bring her to headquarters. It was an optical illusion, ingeniously managed by means of a glass."—MONTHOLON, tom. iv., p. 12.

³ "It is a wooden statue clumsily carved; a proof of its antiquity. It was to be seen for some years at the National Library."—MONTHOLON, tom. iv., p. 13.

men towards Rome. "Your confidence shall be repaid," said Bu-

onaparte would not prevent my sending six thousand men to criss-cross the court of Rome; but as the Neapolitan army might march to their assistance, I will postpone this movement till after the surrender of Mantua; in which case, if the King of Naples should interfere, I shall be able to spare twenty-five thousand men to march against his capital, and drive him over to Sicily." Prince Pignatelli was quite satisfied with the result of this mutual confidence, and there was no more said of Neapolitan armed interference.¹

From Ancona, the division commanded by Victor turned westward to Foligno, to unite itself with another column of French which penetrated into the territories of the Church by Perugia, which they easily accomplished. Resistance seemed now unavailing. The Pope in vain solicited his subjects to rise against the second Alaric, who was approaching the Holy City. They remained deaf to his exhortations, though made in the names of the Blessed Virgin, and of the Apostles Peter and Paul, who had of old been the visible protectors of the metropolis of the Christian world in a similar emergency. All was dismay and confusion in the patrimony of Saint Peter's, which was now the sole territory remaining in possession of his representative.

But there was an unhappy class of persons, who had found

portunity to show once more that he was acting on principles different from the brutal and persecuting spirit of Jacobinism. He had a regulation in which he mentioned that the emperor

¹ Jomini, tom. ix., p. 311. ThibaudEAU, tom. III., p. 273.

penalty, the French soldiery, and all other persons, from doing any injury to these unfortunate exiles. The convents are directed to afford them lodging, nourishment, and fifteen French livres (twelve shillings and sixpence British) monthly, to each individual, for which the priest was to compensate by saying masses *ad valorem*;—thus assigning the Italian convents payment for their hospitality, in the same coin with which they themselves requited the laity.

Perhaps this liberality might have some weight with the Pope in inducing him to throw himself upon the mercy of France, as had been recommended to him by Buonaparte in a confidential communication through the superior of the monastic order of Camalduli, and more openly in a letter addressed to Cardinal Mattei. The King of Naples made no movement to his assistance. In fine, after hesitating what course to take, and having had at one time his equipage ready harnessed to leave Rome and fly to Naples, the Pontiff judged resistance and flight alike unavailing, and chose the humiliating alternative of entire submission to the will of the conqueror.

It was the object of the Directory entirely to destroy the secular authority of the Pope, and to deprive him of all his temporalities. But Buonaparte foresaw, that whether the Roman territories were united with the new Cispadane republic, or formed into a separate state, it would alike bring on prematurely a renewal of the war with Naples, ere the north of Italy was yet sufficiently secure to admit the marching a French force into the southern extremities of the Italian peninsula, exposed to descents of the English, and insurrections in the rear. These Napoleon foresaw would be the more dangerous and difficult to subdue, that, though he might strip the Pope of his temporalities, he could not deprive him of the supremacy assigned him in spiritual matters by each Catholic; which, on the contrary, was, according to the progress of human feeling, likely to be the more widely felt and recognised in favour of a wanderer and a sufferer for what would be accounted conscience-sake, than of one who, submitting to circumstances, retained as much of the goods of this world as the clemency of his conqueror would permit.¹

Influenced by these considerations, Buonaparte admitted the Pope to a treaty, which terminated in the peace of Tolentino, by which Sextus purchased such a political existence as was left to him, at the highest rate which he had the least chance of discharging. Napoleon mentions, as a curious instance of the crafty and unscrupulous character of the Neapolitans, that the same Pignatelli, whom we have already commemorated, attached himself closely to the plenipotentiaries during the whole treaty of Tolentino; and in his ardour to discover whether there existed any secret article betwixt the Pope and Buonaparte which might

¹ Montholon, tom. iv., p. 16.

compromise the interests of his master, was repeatedly discovered listening at the door of the apartment in which the discussions were carried on.¹

The articles which the Pope was obliged to accept at Tolentino,² included the cession of Avignon and its territories, Feb 19. the appropriation of which, by France, had never yet been recognised; the resigning the legations of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna; the occupation of Ancona, the only port excepting Venice, which Italy has in the Adriatic; the payment of thirty millions of livres, in specie or in valuable effects; the complete execution of the article in the armistice of Bologna respecting the delivery of paintings, manuscripts, and objects of art; and several other stipulations of similar severity.³

Buonaparte informs us, that it was a principal object in this treaty to compel the abolition of the Inquisition, from which he had only departed in consequence of receiving information, that it had ceased to be used as a religious tribunal, and subsisted only as a court of police. The conscience of the Pope seemed also so tenderly affected by the proposal, that he thought it safe to desist from it.

The same despatch, in which Buonaparte informs the Directory, that his committee of artist collectors "had made a good harvest of paintings in the Papal dominions, and which, with the objects of art ceded by the Pope, included almost all that was curious and valuable existing in the Vatican and Naples."

faithful, and expressing in his own name the perfect esteem and veneration which he entertained for the person of his Holiness, and the extreme desire which he had to afford him proofs to that effect.⁵

This letter furnished much amusement at the time, and seemed far less to intimate the sentiments of a sans-culotte general, than

those of a civilized highwayman of the old school of Macheath, who never dismissed the travellers whom he had plundered, without his sincere good wishes for the happy prosecution of their journey.

A more pleasing view of Buonaparte's character was exhibited about this time, in his conduct towards the little interesting republic of San Marino. That state, which only acknowledges the Pope as a protector, not as a sovereign, had maintained for very many years an independence, which conquerors had spared either in contempt or in respect. It consists of a single mountain and a single town, and boasts about seven thousand inhabitants, governed by their own laws. Citizen Monge, the chief of the committee of collecting artists, was sent deputy to San Marino to knit the bands of amity between the two republics,—which might well resemble a union between Lilliput and Brobdingnag. There were no pictures in the little republic, or they might have been a temptation to the citizen collector. The people of San Marino conducted themselves with much sagacity; and although more complimentary to Buonaparte than Diogenes to Alexander the Great, when he came to visit the philosopher in his tub, they showed the same judgment in eschewing too much courtesy.¹ They respectfully declined an accession of territory, which could but have involved them in subsequent quarrels with the sovereign from whom it was to be wrested, and only accepted as an honorary gift the present of four field pieces, being a train of artillery upon the scale of their military force, and of which, it is to be hoped, the Captain Regents of the little contented state will never have any occasion to make use.²

Rome might, for the present at least, be considered as completely subjugated. Naples was at peace, if the signature of a treaty can create peace. At any rate, so distant from Rome, and so controlled by the defeat of the Papal arms—by the fear that the English fleet might be driven from the Mediterranean—and by their distance from the scene of action—the King of the Two Sicilies, or rather his wife, the high-spirited daughter of Maria Theresa, dared not offer the least interference with the purposes of the French general. Tuscany had apparently consented to owe her political existence to any degree of clemency or contempt which Buonaparte might extend to her; and, entertaining hopes of some convention betwixt the French and English, by which the grand duke's port of Leghorn might be restored to him, remained passive as the dead. The republic of Venice alone, feeling still the stimulus arising from her ancient importance, and yet painfully conscious of her present want of power, strained every exertion to place herself in a respectable

¹ Botta, tom. ii., p. 199; Thibaudeau, tom. ii., p. 239.

² For an interesting sketch of the republic of San Marino, see Seward's *Anecdotes of Distinguished Persons*, vol. iii., p. 276.

attitude. That city of lofty remembrances, the Tyre of the mid-

to maintain such an aspect as might make their friendship to be courted, and their enmity to be feared. It was already evident

was reconnected that the mistress of the Adriatic had some thirty thousand men at her command, and those of a fierce and courageous description, chiefly consisting of Slavonians, Venice, even yet, was an enemy not to be lightly provoked. But the inhabitants were not unanimous, especially those of the Terra Firma, or mainland, who, not being enrolled in the golden book of the insular nobility of Venice, were discontented, and availed themselves of the encouragement and assistance of the new-created republics on the Po to throw off their allegiance. Brescia

neutral," said Napoleon; "I consent to it. I march upon Vienna, yet will leave enough of French troops in Italy to control your republic.—But dismiss these new levies; and remark, that if, Venice—she will

1 Holta, tom. II., p. 252; Daru, *Hist. de Venise*, tom. v., p. 544.

2 Montolon, tom. IV., p. 134.

Lest these threats should be forgotten while he was at a distance, he took the best precautions in his power, by garrisoning advantageous points on the line of the Adige; and trusting partly to this defence, partly to the insurgents of Bergamo and Brescia, who, for their own sakes, would oppose any invasion of the mainland by their Venetian masters, whose yoke they had cast aside, Napoleon again unfurled his banners, and marched to new triumphs over yet untried opponents.

CHAPTER IX.

Archduke Charles—Compared with Napoleon—Fettered by the Aulic Council—Napoleon, by a stratagem, passes the Tagliamento, and compels the Archduke to retreat—Gradisca carried by storm—Chusa-Veneta taken—Trieste and Fiume occupied—Venice breaks the Neutrality—Terrified on learning that an Armistice had taken place betwixt France and Austria—The Archduke retreats by hasty marches on Vienna—The Government irresolute—and the Treaty of Leoben signed—Venice makes humiliating submissions—Napoleon's Speech to her Envoys—He declares War against Venice, and evades obeying the orders of the Directory to spare it—The Great Council, on 31st May, concede every thing to Buonaparte—Terms granted.

THE victories of the Archduke Charles on the Rhine, and his high credit with the soldiery, seemed to point him out as the commander falling most naturally to be employed against the young general of the French republic, who, like a gifted hero of romance, had borne down successively all opponents who had presented themselves in the field. The opinions of Europe were suspended concerning the probable issue of the contest. Both generals were young, ambitious, enthusiastic in the military profession, and warmly beloved by their soldiers. The exploits of both had filled the trumpet of Fame; and although Buonaparte's success had been less uninterrupted, yet it could not be denied, that if the Archduke's plans were not equally brilliant and original with those of his great adversary, they were just and sound, and had been attended repeatedly with great results, and by the defeat of such men as Moreau and Jourdan. But there were two particulars in which the Austrian prince fell far short of Napoleon,—first, in that ready, decided, and vigorous confidence, which seizes the favourable instant for the execution of plans resolved upon,—and, secondly, in having the disadvantage to be subjected, notwithstanding his high rank, to the interference of the Aulic Council; who, sitting at Vienna, and ignorant of the changes and vicissitudes of the campaign, were yet, by the ancient and jealous laws of the Austrian empire, entitled to control his opinion, and prescribe beforehand the motions of the armies,

while the generals, intrusted with the execution of their schemes, had often no choice left but that of adherence to their instructions.

military career, and at no subsequent period of his life did he achieve the same wondrous victories against such immense odds, or with such comparatively inadequate means. It was also necessary, in the outset of his military history, to show, in minute detail, the character of his tactics, and illustrate that spirit of

movements, the audacious vivacity of his attack, having been so often described in individual cases, may now be passed over with general allusions; nor will we embarrass ourselves and our readers with minute details of positions, or encumber our pages

by the direction of the same Column, the Archduke Charles had taken up his position at Friuli, where it had been settled

ring some notable defeat.

While the Archduke was yet expecting those reinforcements which were to form the strength of his army, his active adversary had been joined by more than twenty thousand men, sent from the French armies on the Rhine, and which gave him at the moment a numerical superiority over the Austrian general. Instead, therefore, of waiting, as on former occasions, until the Imperialists should commence the war by descending into Italy, Napoleon resolved to anticipate the march of the succours expected by the

1 "The Aulic Council at Vienna, that pernicious tribunal which, in the Seven Years' War, called Laudon to account for taking Schweidnitz without orders, has destroyed the schemes of many an Austrian general, for though plans of offensive operations may succeed when concerted at home, it is impossible to frame orders for every possible contingency"—GUYER, on the Fall of Prussia.

Archduke, drive him from his position on the Italian frontiers, and follow him into Germany, even up to the walls of Vienna. No scheme appeared too bold for the general's imagination to form, or his genius to render practicable; and his soldiers, with the view before them of plunging into the midst of an immense empire, and placing chains of mountains betwixt them and every possibility of reinforcement or communication, were so confident in the talents of their leader, as to follow him under the most undoubting expectation of victory. The Directory had induced Buonaparte to expect a co-operation by a similar advance on the part of the armies of the Rhine, as had been attempted in the former campaign.

Buonaparte took the field in the beginning of March, advancing from Bassano.¹ The Austrians had an army of observation under Lusignan on the bank of the Piave, but their principal force was stationed upon the Tagliamento, a river whose course is nearly thirty miles more to the eastward, though collateral with the Piave. The plains on the Tagliamento afforded facilities to the Archduke to employ the noble cavalry who have always been the boast of the Austrian army; and to dislodge him from the strong country which he occupied, and which covered the road that penetrates between the mountains and the Adriatic, and forms the mode of communication in that quarter betwixt Vienna and Italy, through Carinthia, it was not only necessary that he should be pressed in front—a service which Buonaparte took upon himself—but also that a French division, occupying the mountains on the Prince's right, should precipitate his retreat, by maintaining the perpetual threat of turning him on that wing. With this view, Massena had Buonaparte's orders, which he executed with equal skill and gallantry. He crossed the Piave about the eleventh March, and ascending that river, directed his course into the mountains towards Belluno, driving before him Lusignan's little corps of observation, and finally compelling his rear-guard, to the number of five hundred men, to surrender.

The Archduke Charles, in the meantime, continued to maintain his position on the Tagliamento, and the French approached the right bank, with Napoleon at their head, determined appa-

¹ At Bassano, on the 9th of March, Buonaparte thus addressed the troops—"Soldiers! the taking of Mantua has put an end to the war of Italy. You have been victorious in fourteen pitched battles and seventy actions; you have taken 100,000 prisoners, 500 field-pieces, 2000 heavy cannon, and four pontoon trains. The contributions laid on the countries you have conquered have fed, maintained, and paid the army; besides which you have sent thirty millions to the minister of finance for the use of the public treasury. You have enriched the Museum of Paris with 300 masterpieces of the arts of ancient and modern Italy, which it had required thirty centuries to produce. You have conquered for the Republic the finest countries in Europe. The Kings of Sardinia and Naples, the Pope, and the Duke of Parma, are separated from the coalition. You have expelled the English from Leghorn, Genoa, and Corsica. Yet higher destinies await you! You will prove yourselves worthy of them! Of all the foes who combined to stifle the Republic in its birth, the Emperor alone remains before you," &c.

rently to force a passage. Artillery and sharpshooters were disposed in such a manner as to render this a very hazardous

their flank, but was prevented by the second line of the French, and by their reserve of cavalry. He was compelled to retreat, leaving prisoners and cannon in the hands of the enemy. Such was the first disastrous meeting between the Archduke Charles and his future relative.¹

The Austrian prince had the farther misfortune to learn, that March 16. Massena had, at the first sound of the cannonade, pushed across the Tagliamento, higher up than his

remove it. He brought up a fine column of grenadiers from

or twice narrowly escaping being made prisoner. It was in vain—all in vain. He charged successively and repeatedly, even with the reserve of the grenadiers, but no exertion could change the fortune of the day.²

¹ "The river is pretty deep, and a bridge would have been desirable; but the good-will of the soldiers supplied that deficiency. A drummer was the only person in danger, and he was saved by a woman who swam after him"—MONTMOLON, tom. iv., p. 73.

² Montmolon, tom. iv., p. 73; Jomini, tom. x., p. 31.

³ Jomini, tom. x., p. 31, Montmolon, tom. iv., p. 77.

Still the Archduke hoped to derive assistance from the natural or artificial defences of the strong country through which he was thus retreating, and in doing so was involuntarily introducing Buonaparte, after he should have surmounted the border frontier into the most fertile provinces of his brother's empire. The Lisonzo, usually a deep and furious torrent, closed in by a chain of impassable mountains, seemed to oppose an insurmountable barrier to his daring pursuers. But nature, as well as events, fought against the Austrians. The stream, reduced by frost, was fordable in several places. The river thus passed, the town of Gradisca, which had been covered with field-works to protect the line of the Lisonzo, was surprised and carried by storm, March 19. and its garrison of two thousand five hundred men made prisoners, by the divisions of Bernadotte and Serrurier.

Pushed in every direction, the Austrians sustained every day additional and more severe losses. The strong fort of Chiassi-Veneta was occupied by Massena, who continued his active and indefatigable operations on the right of the retreating army. This success caused the envelopment, and dispersion or surrender, of a whole division of Austrians, five thousand of whom remained prisoners, while their baggage, cannon, colours, and all that constituted them an army, fell into the hands of the French. Four generals were made prisoners on this occasion; and many of the mountaineers of Carniola and Croatia, who had joined the Austrian army from their natural love of war, seeing that success appeared to have abandoned the imperial cause, became despondent, broke up their corps, and retired as stragglers to their villages.

Buonaparte availed himself of their loss of courage, and had recourse to proclamations, a species of arms which he valued himself as much upon using to advantage, as he did upon his military fame. He assured them that the French did not come into their country to innovate on their rights, religious customs, and manners. He exhorted them not to meddle in a war with which they had on concern, but encouraged them to afford assistance and furnish supplies to the French army, in payment of which he proposed to assign the public taxes which they had been in the habit of paying to the Emperor.¹ His proposal seems to have reconciled the Carinthians to the presence of the French, or, more properly speaking, they submitted to the military exactions which they had no means of resisting.² In the meanwhile, the French took possession of Trieste and Fiume, the only seaports belonging to Austria, where they seized much English merchandise, which was always a welcome prize, and of the quicksilver mines of Idria, where they found a valuable deposit of that mineral.

¹ 1 Montholon, tom. iv., p. 81.

² "No extraordinary contribution was levied, and no occasion for complaint of any kind. The English was confiscated. Quicksilver, to the value of several 10 of Idria, was found in the imperial warehouses."—MONTHOLON, tom. iv., p. 82.

Napoleon repaired the fortifications of Klagenfurt, and converted it into a respectable place of arms, where he established his headquarters. In a space of scarce twenty days, he had defeated the Austrians in ten combats, in the course of which Prince Charles had lost at least one-fourth of his army. The French had surmounted the southern chain of the Julian Alps;

Menur, and seemed to be tottering without the means of covering Vienna.

There were, however, circumstances less favourable to the French, which require to be stated. When the campaign commenced, the French general Joubert was posted with his division in the gorge of the Tyrol above Trent, upon the same river Levisa, the line of which had been lost and won during the preceding winter. He was opposed by the Austrian general Kere-

which had been established during the earlier part of the campaign.

French armies from the Rhine, to co-operate in the assault upon Vienna. But the Directory, fearing perhaps to trust nearly the whole force of the Republic in the hands of a general so successful and so ambitious as Napoleon, had not fulfilled their promises in this respect. The army of Moreau had not as yet crossed the Rhine.

Joubert, thus disappointed of his promised object, began to find himself in an embarrassing situation. The whole country was in insurrection around him, and a retreat in the line by which he had advanced, might have exposed him to great loss, if not to destruction. He determined, therefore, to elude the

garrison; so that the rear of the French army seemed to be endangered.¹

The Venetians, at this crisis, fatally for their ancient republic, if indeed its doom had not, as is most likely, been long before sealed, received with eager ears the accounts, exaggerated as they were by rumour, that the French were driven from the Tyrol, and the Austrians about to descend the Adige, and resume their ancient empire in Italy. The Senate were aware that neither their government nor their persons were acceptable to the French general, and that they had offended him irreconcilably by declining the intimate alliance and contribution of troops which he had demanded. He had parted from them with such menaces as were not easily to be misunderstood. They believed, if his vengeance might not be instant, it was only the more sure; and conceiving him now deeply engaged in Germany, and surrounded by the Austrian levies en masse from the warlike countries of Hungary and Croatia, they imagined that throwing their own weight into the scale at so opportune a moment, must weigh it down for ever. To chastise their insurgent subjects of Bergamo and Brescia, was an additional temptation.

Their mode of making war savoured of the ancient vindictive temper ascribed to their countrymen. An insurrection was secretly organized through all the territories which Venice still possessed on the mainland, and broke out, like the celebrated Sicilian vespers, in blood and massacre. In Verona they assassinated more than a hundred Frenchmen, many of them sick soldiers in the hospitals²—an abominable cruelty April 16. which could not fail to bring a curse on their undertaking. Fioravante, a Venetian general, marched at the head of a body of Slavonians to besiege the forts of Verona, into which the remaining French had made their retreat, and where they defended themselves. Laudon made his appearance with his Austrians and Tyrolese, and it seemed as if the fortunes of Buonaparte had at length found a check.

But the awakening from this pleasing dream was equally sudden and dreadful. News arrived that preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon, and an armistice signed between France and Austria. Laudon, therefore, and the auxiliaries on whom the Venetians had so much relied, retired from Verona. The Lombards sent an army to the assistance of the French. The Slavonians, under Fioravante, after fighting vigorously, were compelled to surrender. The insurgent towns of Vicenza, Treviso, and Padua, were again occupied by the Republicans. Rumour proclaimed the terrible return of Napoleon and his army, and the ill-advised

¹ Jomini, tom. x., p. 56; Montholon, tom. iv., p. 83.

² See the report of the agents of the Venetian government.—DARU, tom. v., p. 584. Napoleon says, "the fury of the people carried them so far as to murder four hundred sick in the hospitals."—MONTHOLON, tom. iv., p. 133.

Senate of Venice were lost in stupor, and scarce had sense left to decide betwixt unreserved submission and hopeless defence.

opposite party expected. By doing this, he secured such immediate and undisputed fruits of his victory, as the treaty of peace contained; and he was sure of means to prosecute farther advantages at some future opportunity. He obtained moreover the

efforts.

With this purpose, and assuming for the first time that disregard for the usual ceremonial of courts, and etiquette of politics, which he afterwards seemed to have pleasure in displaying, he wrote a letter in person to the Archduke Charles on the subject of peace.

This composition affects that abrupt laconic severity of style, which cuts short argument, by laying down general maxims of philosophy of a trite character, and breaks through the usual laboured periphrastic introductions with which ordinary politicians preface their proposals, when desirous of entering upon a treaty. "It is the part of a brave soldier," he said, "to make war, but to wish for peace. The present strife has lasted six

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all, we must come to an agreement, for every thing must have an end at last, even the angry passions of men. The Executive Directory made known to the Emperor their desire to put a period to the war which desolates both countries, but the intervention of

to ravage. With respect to my own feelings, general, if this proposition should be the means of saving one single man's life, I should prefer a civic crown so merited, to the melancholy glory attending military success."

The whole tone of the letter is ingeniously calculated to give the proposition the character of moderation, and at the same time to avoid the appearance of too ready an advance towards his object. The Archduke, after a space of two days, returned this brief answer, in which he stripped Buonaparte's proposal of its gilding, and treated it upon the footing of an ordinary proposal for a treaty of peace, made by a party, who finds it convenient for his interest:—"Unquestionably, sir, in making war, and in following the road prescribed by honour and duty, I desire as much as you the attainment of peace for the happiness of the people, and of humanity. Considering, however, that in the situation which I hold, it is no part of my business to inquire into and determine the quarrel of the belligerent powers; and that I am not furnished on the part of the Emperor with any plenipotentiary powers for treating, you will excuse me, general, if I do not enter into negotiation with you touching a matter of the highest importance, but which does not lie within my department. Whatever shall happen, either respecting the future chances of the war, or the prospect of peace, I request you to be equally convinced of my distinguished esteem."¹

The Archduke would willingly have made some advantage of this proposal, by obtaining an armistice of five hours, sufficient to enable him to form a junction with the corps of Kerpen, which, having left the Tyrol to come to the assistance of the commander-in-chief, was now within a short distance. But Buonaparte took care not to permit himself to be hampered by any such ill-timed engagement, and, after some sharp fighting, in which the French, as usual, were successful, he was able to interpose such a force as to prevent the junction taking place.

Two encounters followed at Neumark and at Unzmark—both gave rise to fresh disasters, and the continued retreat of the Archduke Charles and the Imperial army. The French general then pressed forward on the road to Vienna, through mountain-passes and defiles, which could not have been opened otherwise than by turning them on the flank. But these natural fastnesses were no longer defences. Judenburg, the capital of Upper Styria, was abandoned to the French without a blow, and shortly after Buonaparte entered Gratz, the principal town of Lower Styria, with the same facility.

The Archduke now totally changed his plan of warfare. He no longer disputed the ground foot by foot, but began to retreat by hasty marches towards Vienna, determined to collect the last

¹ Montholon, tom. iv., p. 91.

and utmost strength which the extensive states of the Emperor could supply, and fight for the existence, it might be, of his brother's throne, under the walls of his capital. However perilous this resolution might appear, it was worthy of the high-spirited prince by whom it was adopted; and there were reasons, perhaps, besides those arising from soldierly pride and princely dignity, which seemed to recommend it.

The army with which the enterprising French general was now

the celebrated exclamation, "*Mourirais pour le tyrol, Maria Teresa!*" The Tyrol was in possession of its own warlike inhabitants, all in arms, and so far successful, as to have driven Joubert out of their mountains. Trieste and Fiume were retaken in the rear of the French army. Buonaparte had no line of com-

so many favourers of the old system, together with the influence of the Catholic clergy, that it seemed not unlikely this insurrection might spread fast and far. Italy, in that case, would have been no effectual place of refuge to Buonaparte or his army.

The Archduke enumerated all these advantages to the Cabinet of Vienna, and exhorted them to stand the last cast of the bloody die.

But the terror, grief, and confusion, natural in a great metropolis, whose peace for the first time for so many years was alarmed with the approach of the unconquered and apparently fated general, who having defeated and destroyed five of their choicest armies, was now driving under its walls the remnants of the last, though commanded by that prince whom they regarded as the hope and flower of Austrian warfare, opposed this daring resolution. The alarm was general, beginning with the court itself; and the most valuable property and treasure were packed up to be carried into Hungary, where the royal family determined to take refuge. It is worthy of mention, that among the fugitives of the Imperial House was the Archduchess Maria Louisa, then between five and six years old, whom our imagination may conceive agitated by every species of childish terror derived from the approach of the victorious general on whom she was, at a future and similar crisis, destined to bestow her hand.

The cries of the wealthy burghers were of course for peace. The enemy were within fourteen or fifteen days' march of their walls; nor had the city (perhaps fortunately) any fortifications, which in the modern state of war could have made it defensible even for a day. They were, moreover, seconded by a party in the Cabinet; and, in short, whether it chanced for good or for evil, the selfish principle of those who had much to lose, and were timid in proportion, predominated against that, which desired at all risks the continuance of a determined and obstinate defence. It required many lessons to convince both sovereign and people, that it is better to put all on the hazard—better even to lose all, than to sanction the being pillaged at different times, and by degrees, under pretence of friendship and amity. A bow which is forcibly strained back will regain its natural position; but if supple enough to yield of itself to the counter direction, it will never recover its elasticity.

The affairs, however, of the Austrians were in such a condition, that it could hardly be said whether the party who declared for peace, to obtain some respite from the distresses of the country, or those who wished to continue war with the chances of success which we have indicated, advised the least embarrassing course. The Court of Vienna finally adopted the alternative of treaty, and that of Leoben was set on foot.

Generals Bellegarde and Merfield, on the part of the Emperor, presented themselves at the headquarters of Buonaparte, 13th April, 1797, and announced the desire of their sovereign for peace. Buonaparte granted a suspension of arms, to endure for five days only; which was afterwards extended, when the probability of the definitive treaty of peace was evident.

It is affirmed, that in the whole discussions respecting this

most important armistice, Napoleon—as a conqueror, whose victories had been in a certain degree his own, whose army had been supported and paid from the resources of the country which he conquered, who had received reinforcements from France only late and reluctantly, and who had recruited his army by new levies among the republicanized Italians—maintained an appearance of independence of the Government of France. He had, even

bosom of his soldiers, becomes soon formidable to any species of government, where the soldier is not intimately interested in the liberties of the subject.

which was to be afforded by the eastern armies on the banks of the Rhine. Far from testifying such a feeling, his assertion of

quence, that his Imperial Majesty acknowledged the French Government in its present state. “Strike out that condition,” said Buonaparte sternly, “the French Republic is like the sun in heaven. The misfortune lies with those who are so blind as to be ignorant of the existence of either.”¹ It was gallantly spoken; but how strange to reflect, that the same individual, in three or

minaries of peace were proposed for signature on the 18th April. But General Clarke, to whom the Directory had committed full powers to act in the matter, was still at Turin. He was under-

¹ Montholon, tom iv, p 101

² Buonaparte first mentions this circumstance as having taken place at Leoben, afterwards at the definitive treaty of Campo Formio. The effect is the same, wherever the words were spoken—S

individual signature and warrantry, and these were readily admitted by the Austrian plenipotentiaries;—an ominous sign of the declension of the powers of the Directory, considering that a military general, without the support even of the commissioners from the government, or proconsuls, as they were called, was regarded as sufficient to ratify a treaty of such consequence. No doubt seems to have been entertained that he had the power to perform what he had guaranteed; and the part which he acted was the more remarkable, considering the high commission of General Clarke.

The articles in the treaty of Leoben remained long secret; the cause of which appears to have been, that the high contracting parties were not willing comparisons should be made between the preliminaries as they were originally settled, and the strange and violent altercations which occurred in the definitive treaty of Campo Formio. These two treaties of pacification differed, the one from the other, in relation to the degree and manner how a meditated partition of the territory of Venice, of the Cisalpine republic, and other smaller powers was to be accomplished, for the mutual benefit of France and Austria. It is melancholy to observe, but it is nevertheless an important truth, that there is no moment during which independent states of the second class have more occasion to be alarmed for their security, than when more powerful nations in their vicinity are about to conclude peace. It is so easy to accommodate these differences of the strong at the expense of such weaker states, as, if they are injured, have neither the power of making their complaints heard, nor of defending themselves by force, that, in the iron age in which it has been our fate to live, the injustice of such an arrangement has never been considered as offering any counterpoise to its great convenience, whatever the law of nations might teach to the contrary.

It is unnecessary to enter upon the subject of the preliminaries of Leoben, until we notice the treaty of Campo Formio, under which they were finally modified, and by which they were adjusted and controlled. It may be, however, the moment to state, that Buonaparte was considerably blamed, by the Directory and others, for stopping short in the career of conquest, and allowing the House of Austria terms which left her still formidable to France, when, said the censors, it would have cost him but another victory to blot the most constant and powerful enemy of

¹ "On the 27th of April, the Marquis de Gallo presented the preliminaries, ratified by the Emperor, to Napoleon at Gratz. It was in one of these conferences, that one of the plenipotentiaries, authorised by an autograph letter of the Emperor, offered Napoleon to procure him, on the conclusion of a peace, a sovereignty of 250,000 souls in Germany, for himself and his family, in order to place him beyond the reach of republican violence. He desired the plenipotentiary to thank the Emperor for the rest he took in his welfare, and said, that he would be satisfied unless conferred on him by the French people."—MONTMOLON, tom. iv., p. 103.

the French Republic out of the map of Europe; or, at least, to confine her to her hereditary states in Germany. To such criti-

advancing to Rome, I could never have secured Milan—and now, had I made an indispensable object of reaching Vienna, I might have destroyed the Republic.”¹

Such was his able and judicious defence of a conduct, which,

Moscow, there is no judging how much longer he might have held the empire of France.

The contents of the treaty of Leoben, so far as they were announced to the representatives of the French nation by the Di-

public in Italy, to be composed out of those which had been provisionally established. But shortly afterwards it transpired, that Mantua, the subject of so much and such bloody contest, and the very citadel of Italy, as had appeared from the events of these sanguinary campaigns, was to be resigned to Austria, from whose tenacious grasp it had been wrenched with so much difficulty. This measure was unpopular; and it will be found that Buonaparte had the ingenuity, in the definitive treaty of peace, to substitute an indemnification, which he ought not to have given, and which was certainly the last which the Austrians should have accepted.

It was now the time for Venice to tremble. She had declared against the French in their absence; her vindictive population had murdered
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¹ Correspondence Inédite, tom. ii., p. 564. See also Jomini, tom. ix., *Pièces Justificatives*, Nos 1 and 2.

purpose of enforcing it. By a letter to the doge, dated April 9. from the capital of Upper Styria, Napoleon, bitterly upbraiding the Senate for requiting his generosity with treachery and ingratitude, demanded that they should return by his aide-de-camp who bore the letter, their instant choice betwixt war and peace, and allowing them only four-and-twenty hours to disperse their insurgent peasantry, and submit to his clemency.¹

Junot, introduced into the Senate, made the threats of his master ring in the astounded ears of the members, and by the blunt and rough manner of a soldier, who had risen from the ranks, added to the dismay of the trembling nobles. The Senate returned a humble apology to Buonaparte, and despatched agents to deprecate his wrath. These envoys were doomed to experience one of those scenes of violence which were in some degree natural to this extraordinary man, but to which in certain cases he seems to have designedly given way, in order to strike consternation into those whom he addressed. "Are the prisoners at liberty?" he said, with a stern voice, and without replying to the humble greetings of the terrified envoys. They answered with hesitation that they had liberated the French, the Polish, and the Breseians, who had been made captive in the insurrectionary war. "I will have them all—all!" exclaimed Buonaparte—"all who are in prison on account of their political sentiments. I will go myself to destroy your dungeons on the Bridge of Tears—opinions shall be free—I will have no Inquisition. If all the prisoners are not set at instant liberty, the English envoy dismissed, the people disarmed, I declare instant war. I might have gone to Vienna if I had listed—I have concluded a peace with the Emperor—I have eighty thousand men, twenty gun-boats—I will hear of no Inquisition, and no Senate either—I will dictate the law to you—I will prove an Attila to Venice. If you cannot disarm your population, I will do it in your stead—your government is antiquated—it must crumble to pieces."²

While Buonaparte, in these disjointed yet significant threats, stood before the deputies like the Argantes of Italy's heroic poet, and gave them the choice of peace and war with the air of a superior being, capable at once to dictate their fate, he had not yet heard of the massacre of Verona, or of the batteries of a Venetian fort on the Lido having fired upon a French vessel, which had run into the port to escape the pursuit of two armed Austrian ships. The vessel was alleged to have been sunk, and the master and some of the crew to have been killed. The news of these fresh aggressions did not fail to aggravate his indignation to the highest pitch. The terrified deputies ventured to touch with delicacy on the subject of pecuniary atonement. Buonaparte's answer was worthy of a Roman. "If you could proffer me," he said, "the

¹ Daru, tom. v., p. 563; Montholon, tom. iv., p. 135.

² See, in Daru, tom. v., p. 605, the report of the two envoys, Dona and Justiniani.

Accordingly, on the 3d of May, Buonaparte declared war against
 May 3. Venice, and ordered the French minister to leave the
 city; the French troops, and those of the new Italian

It had been already acted upon by the French who were on
 the Venetian frontier, and by La Hotze, a remarkable character,
 who was then at the head of the army of the Italian republics of
 the new model, and the forces of the towns of Brescia and Ber-

trian banners.

transmitted from Venice in bills of exchange, sent to the general

Government, whom these documents would have convicted of
 speculation and bribery, were compelled to be silent; and Buona-
 parte, availing himself of some chicanery as to certain legal solemn-
 ities, took it on him totally to disregard the orders he had re-
 ceived.

were erecting fortifications on the low grounds contiguous to the lagoons or shallow channels which divide from the main-land and from each other the little isles on which the amphibious mistress of the Adriatic holds her foundation ; and proposing, in the blunt style of a gallant sailor, to batter them to pieces about their ears before the works could be completed.¹ Indeed, nothing would have been more easy than to defend the lagoons against an enemy, who, notwithstanding Napoleon's bravado, had not even a single boat. But the proposal, had it been made to an abbess and a convent of nuns, could scarce have appeared more extraordinary than it did to these degenerate nobles. Yet the sense of shame prevailed ; and though trembling for the consequences of the order which they issued, the Senate directed that the admiral should proceed to action.² Immediately after the order was received, their deliberations were interrupted by the thunder of the cannon on either side—the Venetian gun-boats pouring their fire on the van of the French army, which had begun to arrive at Fusini.

To interrupt these ominous sounds, two plenipotentiaries were despatched to make intercession with the French general ; and, to prevent delay, the doge himself undertook to report the result.

The Grand Council was convoked on the 1st of May, when the doge, pale in countenance, and disconcerted in demeanour, proposed, as the only means of safety, the admission of some democratic modifications into their forms, under the direction of General Buonaparte ; or, in other words, to lay their institutions at the feet of the conqueror, to be remodelled at his pleasure. Of six hundred and nineteen patricians, only twenty-one dissented from a vote which inferred the absolute surrender of their constitution. The conditions to be agreed on were, indeed, declared subject to the revision of the Council ; but this, in the circumstances, could only be considered as a clause intended to save appearances. The surrender must have been regarded as unconditional and total.³

Amidst the dejection and confusion which possessed the Government, some able intriguer (the secretary, it was said, of the French ambassador at Venice, whose principal had been recalled) contrived to induce the Venetian Government to commit an act of absolute suicide, so as to spare Buonaparte the trouble and small degree of scandal which might attach to totally destroying the existence of the republic.

On the 9th of May, as the committee of the Great Council were in close deliberation with the doge, two strangers intruded upon those councils, which heretofore—such was the jealous severity of the oligarchy—were like those of supernatural beings ; those who looked on them died. But now, affliction, confusion, and fear, had withdrawn the guards from these secret and mys-

¹ Daru, tom. vi., p. 9.

² Daru, tom. vi., p. 10.

³ Daru, tom. vi., p. 13.

with death even for too loud a foot-fall, far more for the fatal crime of having heard more than was designed to come to his knowledge. All this was now ended; and without check or rebuke the two strangers were permitted to communicate with the Senate by writing. Their advice, which had the terms of a command, was, to anticipate the intended reforms of the French—to dissolve the present Government—throw open their prisons—disband their Slavonian soldiers—plant the tree of liberty on the place of Saint Mark, and to take other popular measures of the same nature, the least of which, proposed but a few months before, would have been a signal of death to the individual who had dared to hint at it.¹

mended.

As the friendly advisers had hinted that the utmost speed was necessary, the committee scarce interposed an interval of three

plundering the citizens; some that the lower orders had risen on the nobility; others, that the French had entered Venice, and were proceeding to sack and pillage it. The terrified and timid counsellors did not wait to inquire what was the real cause of the disturbance, but hurried forward, like sheep, in the path which had been indicated to them. They hastened to despoil their ancient government of all authority, to sign in a manner its sentence of civil death—added every thing which could render the sacrifice more agreeable to Buonaparte—and separated in confusion, but under the impression that they had taken the best measure in their power for quelling the tumult, by meeting the wishes of the predominant party. But this was by no means the case. On the contrary, they had the misfortune to find that the insurrection, of which the firing was the signal, was directed not against the aristocrats, but against those who proposed the surrender of

¹ Paru, tom. vi., p. 32.

the national independence. Armed bands shouted, "Long live Saint Mark, and perish foreign domination!" Others indeed there were, who displayed in opposition three-coloured banners, with the war-cry of "Liberty for ever!" The disbanded and mutinous soldiers mixed among these hostile groups, and threatened the town with fire and pillage.¹

Amid this horrible confusion, and while the parties were firing on each other, a provisional government was hastily named. Boats were despatched to bring three thousand French soldiers into the city. These took possession of the place of Saint Mark,² while some of the inhabitants shouted; but the greater part, who were probably not the less sensible of the execrable tyranny of the old aristocracy, saw it fall in mournful silence, because there fell along with the ancient institutions of their country, however little some of these were to be regretted, the honour and independence of the state itself.

The terms which the French granted, or rather imposed, appeared sufficiently moderate, so far as they were made public. They announced, that the foreign troops would remain so long, and no longer, than might be necessary to protect the peace of Venice³—they undertook to guarantee the public debt, and the payment of the pensions allowed to the impoverished gentry. They required, indeed, the continuance of the prosecution against the commander of that sort of Luco who had fired on the French vessel; but all other offenders were pardoned, and Buonaparte afterwards suffered even this affair to pass into oblivion; which excited doubt whether the transaction had ever been so serious as had been alleged.

Five secret and less palatable articles attended these avowed conditions. One provided for the various exchanges of territory which had been already settled at the Venetian expense betwixt Austria and France. The second and third stipulated the payment of three millions of francs in specie, and as many in naval stores. Another prescribed the cession of three ships of war, and of two frigates, armed and equipped. A fifth ratified the exaction, in the usual style of French cupidity, of twenty pictures and five hundred manuscripts.⁴

It will be seen hereafter what advantages the Venetians purchased by all these unconscionable conditions. At the moment, they understood that the stipulations were to imply a guarantee

¹ Daru, tom. vi., p. 36. ² Daru, tom. vi., p. 40.

³ "The French troops entered Venice on the 16th of May. The partisans of liberty immediately met in a popular assembly. The aristocracy was destroyed for ever; the democratic constitution of twelve hundred was proclaimed. Dandolo was placed at the head of all the city. The Lion of St. Mark and the Corinthian horses were carried to Paris."—MONTMOLON, tom. iv., p. 142.

⁴ "General Bernadotte carried the colours taken from the Venetian troops to Paris. These frequent presentations of colours were, at this period, very useful to the government; for the disaffected were silenced and overawed by this display of the spirit of the armies."—MONTMOLON, tom. iv., p. 145.

of the independent existence of their country as a democratical state. In the meanwhile, the necessity for raising the supplies to gratify the rapacity of the French, obliged the provisional government to have recourse to forced loans; and in this manner they inhospitably plundered the Duke of Modena (who had fled to Venice for refuge when Buonaparte first entered Lombardy) of his remaining treasure, amounting to one hundred and ninety thousand sequins.

CHAPTER X.

Napoleon's Amatory Correspondence with Josephine—His Court at Montebello—Negotiations and Pleasure mingled there—Genoa—Revolutionary spirit of the Genoese—They rise in insurrection.

[illegible]

line united to Lombardy—Great improvement of Italy, and the Italian Character, from these changes—Difficulties in the way of Pacification between France and Austria—The Directory and Napoleon take different Views—Treaty of Campo Formio—Buonaparte takes leave of the Army of Italy, to act as French Plenipotentiary at Rastadt.

When peace returns, it brings back the domestic affections, and affords the means of indulging them. Buonaparte was yet a bridegroom, though he had now been two years married, and upwards. A part of his correspondence with his bride has been

however, that the attachment which these letters indicate was perfectly sincere, and on one occasion at least, it was chivalrously expressed;—"Wurmser shall buy dearly the tears which he makes you shed."¹

¹ For some curious extracts from this Correspondence, see Appendix, No. IV.

people, the banners and colours taken from Beaulieu. In December, 1796, Josephine was at Genoa, where she was received with studied magnificence, by those in that ancient state who adhered to the French interest, and where, to the scandal of the rigid Catholics, the company continued assembled, at a ball given by M. de Serva, till a late hour on Friday morning, despite the presence of a senator having in his pocket, but not venturing to enforce, a decree of the senate for the better observation of the fast day upon the occasion. These, however, were probably only occasional visits; but after the signature of the treaty of Leoben, and during the various negotiations which took place before it was finally adjusted, as ratified at Campo Formio, Josephine lived in domestic society with her husband, at the beautiful seat, or rather palace, of Montebello.

This villa, celebrated from the important negotiations of which it was the scene, is situated a few leagues from Milan, on a gently sloping hill, which commands an extensive prospect over the fertile plains of Lombardy. The ladies of the highest rank, as well as those celebrated for beauty and accomplishments,—all, in short, who could add charms to society,—were daily paying their homage to Josephine, who received them with a felicity of address which seemed as if she had been born for exercising the high courtesies that devolved upon the wife of so distinguished a person as Napoleon.

Negotiations proceeded amid gaiety and pleasure. The various ministers and envoys of Austria, of the Pope, of the Kings of Naples and Sardinia, of the Duke of Parma, of the Swiss Cantons, of several of the Princes of Germany,—the throng of generals, of persons in authority, of deputies of towns,—with the daily arrival and despatch of numerous couriers, the bustle of important business, mingled with fêtes and entertainments, with balls and with hunting parties,—gave the picture of a splendid court, and the assemblage was called accordingly, by the Italians, the Court of Montebello. It was such in point of importance; for the deliberations agitated there were to regulate the political relations of Germany, and decide the fate of the King of Sardinia, of Switzerland, of Venice, of Genoa: all destined to hear from the voice of Napoleon, the terms on which their national existence was to be prolonged or terminated.

Montebello was not less the abode of pleasure. The sovereigns of this diplomatic and military court made excursions to the lago Maggiore, to lago di Como, to the Borromean islands, and occupied at pleasure the villas which surround those delicious regions. Every town, every village, desired to distinguish itself by some peculiar mark of homage and respect to him, whom they then named the Liberator of Italy.¹ These expressions are in a great measure those of Napoleon himself, who seems to have

¹ Montholon, tom. iv., p. 147.

looked back on this period of his life with warmer recollections of pleasurable enjoyment than he had experienced on any other occasion.

It was probably the happiest time of his life. Honour, beyond that of a crowned head, was his own, and had the full relish of novelty to a mind which two or three years before was

alted dominion; and he had not yet become aware that possession brings satiety, and that all earthly desires and wishes ter-

lastly, and by far the most important of them, the definitive treaty with Austria, which involved the annihilation of Venice as an independent state.

randists, from a club so termed,¹ whose object it was to break down the oligarchy, and revolutionize the government. The nobles were naturally opposed to this, and a large body of the populace much employed by them, and strict Catholics, were, ready to second them in their defence.

The establishment of two Italian democracies upon the Po, made the Genoese revolutionists conceive the time was arrived when their own state ought to pass through a similar ordeal of

¹ The club held their meetings at the house of an apothecary, named *Morand*. Botta describes him as "un uomo precipitoso, e di estremi pensieri, e che credeva, che ogni cosa fosse lecita per arrivare a quella libertà, ch'ei si figurava in mente."—*Storia*, tom. ii., p. 361.

² Montholon, tom. iv., p. 132.

pulpit and the confessional as the means of warning good Catholics against the change demanded by the Morandists—they exposed the Holy Sacrament, and made processions and public prayers, as if threatened with a descent of the Algerines.

Meanwhile, the Morandists took up arms, displayed the French colours, and conceiving their enterprise was on the point of success, seized the gate of the arsenal and that of the harbour. But their triumph was short. Ten thousand armed labourers started as from out of the earth, under the command of their syndics, or municipal officers, with cries of “Viva Maria!” and declared for the aristocracy. The insurgents, totally defeated, were compelled to shut themselves up in their houses, where they were assailed by the stronger party, and finally routed. The French residing in Genoa were maltreated by the prevailing party, their houses pillaged, and they themselves dragged to prison. May 22.

The last circumstance gave Buonaparte an ostensible right to interfere, which he would probably have done even had no such violence been committed. He sent his aide-de-camp La Valette to Genoa, with the threat of instantly moving against the city a division of his army, unless the prisoners were set at liberty, the aristocratic party disarmed, and such alterations, or rather such a complete change of government adopted, as should be agreeable to the French commander-in-chief. Against this there was no appeal. The inquisitors were laid under arrest, for having defended, with the assistance of their fellow-citizens, the existing institutions of the state; and the doge, with two other magistrates of the first rank, went to learn at Montebello, the headquarters of Napoleon, what was to be the future fate of the City, proudly called of *Palaces*.¹ They received the outlines of such a democracy as Napoleon conceived suitable for them; and he appears to have been unusually favourable to the state, which, according to the French affectation of doing every thing upon a classical model, now underwent revolutionary baptism, and was called the Ligurian Republic. It was stipulated, that the French who had suffered should be indemnified; but no contributions were exacted for the use of the French army, nor did the collections and cabinets of Genoa pay any tribute to the Parisian Museum.²

Shortly after, the democratic party having gone so far as to exclude the nobles from the government, and from all offices of trust, called down by doing so a severe admonition from Buona-

¹ “On the 6th of June, the deputies from the Senate signed a convention at Montebello, which put an end to Doria’s constitution, and established the democratical government of Genoa. The people burned the Golden Book, and broke the statue of Doria to pieces. This outrage on the memory of that great man displeased Napoleon, who required the provisional government to restore it.”—MONTHOLON, tom. iv., p. 157.

² Montholon, tom. iv., p. 155; Jomini, tom. x., p. 169; Botta, tom. ii., p. 371.

Nov. 11. *parte. He discharged them to offend the prejudices, or insult the feelings of the more scrupulous Catholics, de-*

that he did so.

sand Sardinian or Piedmontese infantry, and five hundred cavalry; and he reckoned much on this contingent, in case of the war being renewed with Austria. But the Directory shifted and evaded his solicitations, and declined confirming this treaty, probably because they considered the army under his command as already sufficiently strong, being, as the soldiers were, so devoted to their leader. At length, however, the treaty was ratified, but too late to serve Buonaparte's object.

as many of them being united under one energetic and active government as should render them a power of some importance, instead of being divided as heretofore into petty states, which could not offer effectual resistance even to invasion on the part of a power of the second class, much more if attacked by France or Austria.

of the French at this time debating on a

The formation of a compact and independent state in the north of Italy, was what Napoleon had much at heart. But the Cispadane and Transpadane republics were alike averse to a union, and that of Romagna had declined on its part a junction with the Cispadane commonwealth, and set up for a puny and feeble independence, under the title of the Emilian Republic. Buonaparte was enabled to overcome these grudgings and heart-burnings, by pointing out to them the General Republic, which it was now his system to create, as being destined to form the kernel of a state which should be enlarged from time to time as opportunities offered, until it should include all Italy under one single government. This flattering prospect, in assigning to Italy, though at some distant date, the probability of forming one great country, united in itself, and independent of the rest of Europe, instead of being, as now, parcelled out into petty states, naturally overcame all the local dislikes and predilections which might have prevented the union of the Cispadane, Transpadane, and Emilian republics into one, and that important measure was resolved upon accordingly.

The Cisalpine republic was the name fixed upon to designate the united commonwealth. The French would more willingly have named it, with respect to Paris, the Transalpine republic; but that would have been innovating upon the ancient title which Rome has to be the central point, with reference to which, all other parts of Italy assume their local description. It would have destroyed all classical propriety, and have confused historical recollections, if, what had hitherto been called the Ultramontane side of the Alps, had, to gratify Parisian vanity, been termed the Hither side of the same chain of mountains.

The constitution assigned to the Cisalpine republic, was the same which the French had last of all adopted, in what they called the year five, having a Directory of executive administrators, and two Councils. They were installed upon the 30th of June, 1797. Four members of the Directory were named by Buonaparte, and the addition of a fifth was promised with all convenient speed. On the 14th of July following, a review was made of thirty thousand national guards. The fortresses of Lombardy, and the other districts, were delivered up to the local authorities, and the French army, retiring from the territories of the new republic, took up cantonments in the Venetian states. Proclamation had already been made, that the states belonging to the Cisalpine republic having been acquired by France by the right of conquest, she had used her privilege to form them into their present free and independent government, which, already recognised by the Emperor and the Directory, could not fail to be acknowledged within a short time by all the other powers of Europe.¹

¹ Thibaudeau, tom. iii., p. 121; Montholon, tom. iv., p. 179; Jomini, tom. x., p. 364.

Buonaparte soon after showed that he was serious in his design of enlarging the Cisalpine republic, as opportunity could be made to serve. There are three valleys, termed the Valteline districts, which run down from the Swiss mountains towards the lake of Como. The natives of the Valteline are about one hundred and sixty thousand souls. They speak Italian, and are chiefly of the Catholic persuasion. These valleys were at this period the sub-

share of their Italianness, in the character of a *domineering*. The moderation of the proposal may be admitted to excuse the

quaffed the waters of the Rhine. As they turned a deaf ear to his proposal, deserted his tribunal, and endeavoured to find sup-

trict, of the Valteline, in time coming, to belong to, and be part of, the Cisalpine republic. The Grisons in vain humbled themselves when it was too late, and protested their readiness to plead

before a mediator too powerful to be declined under any ground known in law ; and the Valteline territory was adjudged [October 10] inalienably annexed to and united with Lombardy ; of which, doubtless, it forms, from manners and contiguity, a natural portion.¹

The existence of a state having free institutions, however imperfect, seemed to work an almost instant amelioration on the character of the people of the north of Italy. The effeminaey and trifling habits which resigned all the period of youth to intrigue and amusement, began to give place to firmer and more manly virtues—to the desire of honourable minds to distinguish themselves in arts and arms.² Buonaparte had himself said, that twenty years would be necessary to work a radical change on the national character of the Italians ; but even already those seeds were sown, among a people hitherto frivolous because excluded from public business, and timorous because they were not permitted the use of arms, which afterwards made the Italians of the north equal the French themselves in braving the terrors of war, besides producing several civil characters of eminence.

Amid those subordinate discussions, as they might be termed, in comparison to the negotiations betwixt Austria and France, these two high contracting parties found great difficulty in agreeing as to the pacific superstructure which they should build upon the foundation which had been laid by the preliminaries exchanged at Leoben. Nay, it seemed as if some of the principal stipulations, which had been there agreed upon as the corner-stones of their treaty, were even already beginning to be unsettled.

It will be remembered, that, in exchange for the cession of Flanders, and of all the countries on the left side of the Rhine, including the strong city of Mayence, which she was to yield up to France in perpetuity, Austria stipulated an indemnification on some other frontier. The original project bore, that the Lombardic republic, since termed the Cisalpine, should have all the territories extending from Piedmont to the river Oglio. Those to the eastward of that river were to be ceded to Austria as an equivalent for the cession of Belgium, and the left bank of the Rhine. The Oglio, rising in the Alps, descends through the fertile districts of Breseia and Cremaseo, and falls into the Po near Borgo-forte, enclosing Mantua on its left bank, which strong fortress, the citadel of Italy, was, by this allocation, to be restored to Austria. There were farther compensations assigned to the

¹ Montholon, tom. iv., p. 185 ; Botta, tom. ii., p. 461.

² “ Instead of passing their time at the feet of women, the young Italians now frequented the riding and fencing schools, and fields of exercise. In the comedies and street farces, there had always been an Italian, represented as a very cowardly though witty fellow, and a kind of bullying captain,—sometimes a Frenchman, but more frequently a German—a very powerful, brave, and brutal character, who never failed to conclude with caning the Italian to the great satisfaction of the applauding spectators. But such allusions were now no longer endured by the populace ; authors now brought brave Italians on the stage, putting foreigners to flight, and defending their honour and their rights.” —NAPOLÉON, *Montholon*, tom. iv., p. 185.

Emperor, by the preliminaries of Leoben. Venice was to be deprived of her territories on the mainland, which were to be confiscated to augment the indemnity destined for the empire; and this, although Venice, as far as Buonaparte yet knew, had been faithful to the neutrality she had adopted. To redeem this piece of injustice, another was to be perpetrated. The state of Venice

These, however, with their population, which he had led to hope

treaty of Leoben, from which it appears that the negotiators of

the balance.

It is true, the infant Cispadane republic escaped the fate to which its patron and founder was about to resign it; for after this arrangement had been provisionally adjusted, news came of the insurrection of Venice, the attack upon the French through her whole territory, and the massacre at Verona. This aggression placed the ancient republic, so far as France was concerned, in the light of a hostile power, and entitled Buonaparte to deal with her as a conquered one, perhaps to divide, or altogether to annihilate her. But, on the other hand, he had received their sub-

on the other hand, was the more deeply bound to have protected the ancient republic, for it was in her cause that Venice so rashly assumed arms; but such is the gratitude of nations, such the faith of politicians, that she appears, from the beginning, to have had no scruple in profiting by the spoils of an ally, who had received a death-wound in her cause.

By the time the negotiators met for finally discussing the preliminaries, the Directory of France, either to thwart Buonaparte, whose superiority became too visible, or because they actually

became more so from the peculiar character of their new neighbour, the Cisalpine republic, whose example was likely to be so perilous to the adjacent dependence of an ancient monarchy. To get over this difficulty, the French general proposed that the remaining dominions of Venice should be also divided between Austria and France, the latter obtaining possession of the Albanian territories and the Ionian islands belonging to the republic, of which the high contracting powers signed the death-warrant; while Istria, Dalmatia, Venice herself, and all her other dominions, should be appropriated to Austria. The latter power, through her minister, consented to this arrangement with as little scruple, as to the former appropriation of her former ally's possessions on the Terra Firma.

But as fast as obstacles were removed on one side, they appeared to start up on another, and a sort of pause ensued in the deliberations, which neither party seemed to wish to push to a close. In fact, both Napoleon, plenipotentiary for France, and Count Cobentzel, a man of great diplomatic skill and address, who took the principal management on the part of Austria, were sufficiently aware that the French government, long dissatisfied, was in the act of approaching to a crisis. This accordingly took place, under circumstances to be hereafter noticed, on the eighteenth of Fructidor, creating, by a new revolutionary movement, a total change of administration. When this revolution was accomplished, the Directory, who accomplished it, feeling themselves more strong, appeared to lay aside the idea of peace, and showed a strong disposition to push their advantages to the utmost.

Buonaparte was opposed to this. He knew that if war was resumed, the difficulties of the campaign would be thrown on him, and the blame also, if the results were not happy. He was determined, therefore, in virtue of his full powers, to bring the matter to a conclusion, whether the Directory would or not. For this purpose he confronted Cobentzel, who still saw his game in gaining delay, with the sternness of a military envoy. On the 16th October, the conferences were renewed upon the former grounds, and Cobentzel went over the whole subject of the indemnifications—insisting that Mantua, and the line of the Adige, should be granted to the Emperor; threatening to bring down the Russians in case the war should be renewed; and insinuating that Buonaparte sacrificed the desire of peace to his military fame, and desired a renewal of the war. Napoleon, with stern but restrained indignation, took from a bracket an ornamental piece of china, on which Cobentzel set some value, as being a present

1 "Count Cobentzel was a native of Brussels; a very agreeable man in company, and distinguished by studied politeness; but positive and intractable in business. There was a want of propriety and precision in his mode of expressing himself, of which he was sensible; and he endeavoured to compensate for this by talking loud and using imperious gestures."—NAPOLÉON, *Mémoires*, tom. iv., p. 231.

the Empress Catherine. "The truce," he said, "is then
and wa
break
1 He
ew abr

Austrian plenipotentiaries no longer hesitated to submit to
Napoleon's demands, rather than again see him commence his
audacious career of irresistible invasion. The treaty of Campo

jarring factions seemed to await the influence of a charac-
distinguished and so determined.

fate of Venice, more from her ancient history than either
lue of her institutions, which were execrable, or the im-
ce of her late existence, still dwells somewhat on the me-

The ancient republic fell "as a fool dieth." The aris-
cursed the selfishness of Austria, by whom they were
wed up, though they had perilled themselves in her cause.
Republicans hastened to escape from Austrian domination,
as the teeth with men, and coming no less the egotistic
of their
tion, and
govern-

French secretary of legation, who had played a remark-
ative part during the Revolution, hazarded a remonstrance
Bonaparte on the surrender of Venice to Austria, instead of
ing formed into a free democracy, or united with the Cis-
republic.³ Buonaparte laughed to scorn a man, whose
were still fixed on diffusing and propagating the principles
robinnism. "I have received your letter," was the stern and
nptuous reply, "and cannot comprehend it. The Republic
ance is not bound by any treaty, to sacrifice its interests and
stages to the Committee of Public Safety in Venice, or to
other class of individuals. France does not make war in
f and for the benefit of others.⁴ I know it costs nothing for

¹ Montholon, tom. iv. p. 251

² See also the same work, p. 252.

FAIRFAX.

See this remonstrance in Thibaudeau, tom. iii. p. 333.
The language of injustice is alike in similar instances. When Edward I.

CHAPTER XI.

Retrospect—The Directory—they become unpopular—Causes of their unpopularity—Also at enmity among themselves—State of public feeling in France—In point of numbers, favourable to the Bourbons; but the Army and monied Interest against them—Pichegru, head of the Royalists, appointed President of the Council of Five Hundred—Barbé Marbois, another Royalist, President of the Council of Ancients—Directory throw themselves upon the succour of Hoche and Buonaparte—Buonaparte's personal Politics discussed—Pichegru's Correspondence with the Bourbons—known to Buonaparte—He despatches Augereau to Paris—Directory arrest their principal Opponents in the Councils on the 18th Fructidor, and Banish them to Guiana—Narrow and Impolitic Conduct of the Directory to Buonaparte—Projected Invasion of England.

WHILE the conqueror of Italy was pursuing his victories beyond the Alps, the French Directory, in whose name he achieved them, had become, to the conviction of all men, as unlikely to produce the benefits of a settled government, as any of their predecessors vested with the supreme rule.

It is with politics as with mechanics, ingenuity is not always combined with utility. Some one observed to the late celebrated Mr. Watt, that it was wonderful for what a number of useless inventions, illustrated by the most ingenious and apparently satisfactory models, patents were yearly issued: he replied, that he

useful." Some such imperfection seems to have attended the works of these speculative politicians who framed the various ephemeral constitutions of France. However well they looked upon paper, and however reasonable they sounded to the ear, no one ever thought of them as laws which required veneration and obedience. Did a constitutional rule preclude a favourite

Directory, which contained men of considerable talent, conducted themselves with great prudence. The difficulty and danger of their situation served to prevent their separating, as the weight put above an arch keeps the stones in their places. Their exertions in the attempt to redeem the finances, support the war, and re-establish the tranquillity of the country, were attended at first with success. The national factions also sunk before them for a season. They had defeated the aristocratic citizens of Paris on the 13th Vendemiaire; and when the original revolutionists, or democrats, attempted a conspiracy, under the conduct of Gracchus Babœuf,¹ their endeavours to seduce the troops totally failed, and their lives paid the forfeit of their rash attempt to bring back the Reign of Terror. Thus, the Directory, or executive power, under the constitution of the year Three, were for a season triumphant over the internal factions, and, belonging to neither, were in a situation to command both.

But they had few who were really, and on principle, attached to their government, and most endured it only as something better than a new revolutionary movement, and otherwise in no respect eligible. To have rendered their authority permanent, the Directory must have had great unanimity in their own body, and also brilliant success abroad, and they enjoyed neither one nor the other. The very concoction of their body included the principles of disunion. They were a sort of five kings, retiring from office by rotation, inhabiting each his separate class of apartments in the Luxembourg palace, having each his different establishments, classes of clients, circles of courtiers, flatterers, and instruments. The republican simplicity, of late so essential to a patriot, was laid aside entirely. New costumes of the most splendid kind were devised for the different office-bearers of the state. This change took its rise from the weakness and vanity of Barras, who loved show, and used to go a-hunting with all the formal attendance of a prince. But it was an indulgence of luxury, which gave scandal to both the great parties in the state;—the Republicans, who held it altogether in contempt;—and the Royalists, who considered it as an usurpation of the royal dress and appendages.²

The finances became continually more and more a subject of uneasiness. In the days of terror, money was easily raised, because it was demanded under pain of death, and assignats were

¹ An Italian, by name Buonarotti, and of the same family with the great Michael Angelo, has recently published a full account of the conspiracy of Babœuf,—to this writer the curious reader is referred. “*Les fruits sont à tous, la terre à personne,*” was his favourite text and that of his fellow-levellers, and the burden of their songs, which were to take place of *Ca Ira*, and *La Carmagnole*, was “*Le Soleil luit pour tout le monde.*” On being arrested, Babœuf wrote to the Directory—“Whatever may be my fate, my name will be placed with those of Barnevot and Sidney; whether conducted to death or to banishment, I am certain of arriving at immortality!” He was condemned to the guillotine in May, 1797, but stabbed himself in his prison.

² Montholon, tom. iv., p. 195.

indulged it, and the state whom they represented. They loaded with exactions the trade of the Batavian republic, whose freedom they had pretended to recognise, and treated with most haughty superiority the ambassadors of independent states. Some of

was, indeed, a great error in the constitution, that, though one hundred thousand livres were yearly allowed to each director while in office, yet he had no subsequent provision after he had retired from his fractional share of sovereignty. This penury, on the part of the public, opened a way to temptation, though of a kind to which mean minds only are obnoxious; and such men

and favourite objects, which led them in turn to tease the French people with unnecessary legislation. La Reveillere-Lepaux was that inconsistent yet not uncommon character, an intolerant philosopher and an enthusiastic deist. He established a priesthood, and hymns and ceremonies for deism; and, taking up the hopeful project of substituting a deistical worship for the Christian

harassed the
grades of their
ordinary trades

theory free-
thinkers laughed, and religious men shuddered; but all were equally annoyed by the legislative measures adopted on a subject so ridiculous as this new ritual of heathenism.⁴ Another

¹ A decree of the Directory, of the 25th January, 1797, fixed the current value of assignats at twenty sous for a hundred francs.—MONTGAILLARD, tom v, p. 4

cause of vexation was the philosophical arrangement of weights and measures upon a new principle, which had, in the meantime, the inconvenience of introducing doubt and uncertainty into all the arrangements of internal commerce, and deranging entirely such as France continued to hold with countries who were only acquainted with the ordinary standard.¹

It might have been thought that the distinguished success of the French arms under the auspices of the Directory would have dazzled the eyes of the French, attached as they have always been to military glory, and blinded them to other less agreeable measures of their government. But the public were well aware, that the most brilliant share of these laurels had been reaped by Buonaparte on his own account; that he had received but slender reinforcements from France—the magnitude of his achievements considered; and that in regard to the instructions of government, much of his success was owing to his departure from them, and following his own course. It was also whispered, that he was an object of suspicion to the directors, and on his part undervalued their talents, and despised their persons. On the Rhine, again, though nothing could have been more distinguished than the behaviour of the Republican armies, yet their successes had been checkered with many reverses, and, contrasted with the Italian campaigns, lost their impression on the imagination.

While they were thus becoming unpopular in the public opinion, the Directory had the great misfortune to be at enmity among themselves. From the time that Letourneur² retired from office in terms of the constitution, and Barthelemy was elected in his stead, there was a majority and an opposition in the Directory, the former consisting of Barras, Rewbel,³ and La Reveillere—the latter, of Carnot and Barthelemy. Of the two last, Carnot (who had been, it may be remembered, a member

well, but his intelligence was confined, and he had neither habits of business, nor knowledge of mankind. The Jardin des Plantes and the Theophilanthropy, a new sect of which he had the folly to become the founder, occupied all his time. He was an honest man—poor when he became a member of the Directory, and poor when he left it.”—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, tom. ii., p. 136.

¹ “The new system of weights and measures will be a source of embarrassment and difficulties for several generations; and it is probable that the first learned commission employed to verify the measure of the meridian, will find it necessary to make some corrections. Thus are nations tormented about trifles!”—NAPOLEON, *Montholon*, tom. iv., p. 203.

² “Letourneur de la Manche was born in Normandy. It is difficult to explain how he came to be appointed to the Directory; it can only be from one of those unaccountable caprices of which large assemblies so often give an example. He was a man of narrow capacity, little learning, and of a weak mind. He was, however, a man of strict probity, and left the Directory without any fortune.”—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, tom. ii., p. 142.

³ “Rewbel, born in Alsace, was one of the best lawyers in the town of Colmar. He possessed that kind of intelligence which denotes a man skilled in the practice of the law,—his influence was always felt in deliberations—he was easily inspired with prejudices, and had little faith in the existence of virtue. It is problematical whether he did or did not amass a fortune, during the time he was in the Directory.”—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, tom. ii., p. 138.

of the Committee of Public Safety under Robespierre) was a

thelemy of course dissented from the majority of the Directors, because secretly and warmly he desired the restoration of the Bourbons—an event which must have been fraught with danger

Buonaparte could neither be reinforced nor supported in case of a reverse. Barras's anger on the occasion was so great, that he told Carnot at the council-board, it was to him they owed

cil of Elders adhered to the Directory, many of that body belonging to the old republican partisans. But in the more popularly composed Council of Five Hundred, the opposition to the government possessed a great majority, all of whom were decidedly

city of the French people.

But, for reasons mentioned elsewhere, the military were the decided opponents of the Bourbons, and the purchasers of na-

tional domains, through every successive sale which might have taken place, were deeply interested against their restoration. Numbers might be on the side of the Royalists; but physical force, and the influence of wealth and of the monied interest, were decidedly against them.

Pichegru might now be regarded as chief of the Royal party. He was an able and successful general, to whom France owed the conquest of Holland. Like La Fayette and Dumouriez, he had been disgusted with the conduct of the Revolution; and like the last of the two generals named, had opened a communication with the Bourbons. He was accused of having suffered his army to be betrayed in a defeat by Clairfait; and the government, in 1796, removed him from the command of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, offering him in exchange the situation of ambassador to Sweden. He declined this species of honourable exile, and, retiring to Franche Comté, continued his correspondence with the Imperial generals.¹ The Royalists expected much from the countenance of a military man of a name so imposing; but we have seen more than once in the course of these memoirs, that a general without an army is like a hilt without the blade which it should wield and direct.

An opportunity, however, offered Pichegru the means of serving his party in a civil capacity, and that a most important one. The elections of May, 1797, made to replace that proportion of the councils which retired by rotation, terminated generally in favour of the Royalists, and served plainly to show on which side the balance of popular feeling now leaned. Pichegru, who had been returned as one of the deputies, was chosen by acclamation President of the Council of Five Hundred, and Barbé Marbois, another Royalist, was elected to the same office by the Council of Ancients, while, as we have already said, Barthelemy, likewise friendly to monarchy, was introduced into the Directory.

These elections were evil signs for the Directory, who did not fail soon to be attacked on every side, and upbraided with the continuance of the war and the financial distresses. Various journals were at the disposal of the party opposed to the majority of the directors, and hostilities were commenced between the parties, both in the assemblies, where the Royalists had the advantage, and in the public papers, where they were also favourably listened to. The French are of an impatient temper, and could not be long brought to carry on their warfare within the limits assigned by the constitution. Each party, without much regard to the state of the law, looked about for the means of physical force with which they might arm themselves. The Directory, (that is, the majority of that body,) sensible of their unpopularity, and the predominance of the opposite party, which seemed for a time to have succeeded to the boldness and audacity of the revo-

¹ Montholon, tom. iv., p. 210.

lutionary class, had, in their agony of extremity, recourse to the army, and threw themselves upon the succour of Hoche and of Buonaparte.

least hope of success. Augereau was of the same opinion, and mistook his man so much, that when Madame de Staël asked whether Buonaparte was not inclined to make himself King of

rectory, fell into a sort of rapture on the classical republican feelings by which Buonaparte was actuated, which they said rendered the hope of his return a pleasure pure and unmixed, and precluded the possibility of treachery or engrossing ideas on his side. "The factious of every class," they said, "cannot have an enemy more steady, or the government a friend more faithful, than he who, invested with the military power of which he has made so

III.

But though such were the ideas then entertained

1 "This singular answer was in exact conformity with the ideas of the time."

army had been led and commanded on that day. Besides, at the head of an army zealously republican, even his power over their minds required to be counteracted for some time at least, by an apparent correspondence in the feelings betwixt the troops and the general. But in the practical doctrines of government which he recommended to the Italian Republics, his ideas were studiously moderate, and he expressed the strongest fear of, and aversion to, revolutionary doctrines. He recommended the granting equal rights and equal privileges to the nobles, as well as to the indignant vassals and plebeians who had risen against them. In a word, he advocated a free set of institutions, without the intermediate purgatory of a revolution. He was, therefore, at this period, far from being a Jacobin.

But though Buonaparte's wishes were thus wisely moderated by practical views, he was not the less likely to be sensible that he was the object of fear, of hatred, and of course of satire and misrepresentation, to that side of the opposed parties in France which favoured royalty. Unhappily for himself, he was peculiarly accessible to every wound of this nature, and, anxiously jealous of his fame, suffered as much under the puny attacks of the journalists,¹ as a noble steer or a gallant horse does amid his rich pasture, under the persecutions of insects, which, in comparison to himself, are not only impotent, but nearly invisible. In several letters to the Directory, he exhibits feelings of this nature which would have been more gracefully concealed, and evinces an irritability against the opposition prints, which we think likely to have increased the zeal with which he came forward on the Republican side at this important crisis.²

Another circumstance, which, without determining Buonaparte's conduct, may have operated in increasing his good-will to the cause which he embraced, was his having obtained the clew of Pichegru's correspondence with the house of Bourbon.³ To have concealed this, would have been but a second rate merit with the exiled family, whose first thanks must have been due to the partisan whom he protected. This was no part for Buonaparte to play; not that we have a right to say he would have accepted the chief character had it been offered to him, but his ambition could never have stooped to any inferior place in the drama. In all probability, his ideas fluctuated betwixt the example of Cromwell and of Washington—to be the actual liberator, or the absolute governor of his country.

His particular information respecting Pichegru's negotiations, was derived from an incident at the capture of Venice.

¹ "All the journals were full of harangues against the General of the Army of Italy: They depreciated his successes, vilified his character, calumniated his administration, threw out suspicions respecting his fidelity to the Republic, and accused him of ambitious designs."—*NAPOLEON, Montholon*, tom. iv., p. 212.

² See especially his Letter to the Directory, 17th July.—*Correspondence Inédite*, tom. iv., p. 14.

³ *Montholon*, tom. iv., pp. 148, 211.

When the degenerate Venetians, more under the impulse of

already meditated to adopt.

Possessed of these documents, and sure that, in addressing a French army of the day, he would swim with the tide if he

of their country. They have set you an example; you owe your lives to thirty millions of Frenchmen, and to the national name, which has received new splendour from your victories. Soldiers! I am aware you are deeply affected by the dangers which threaten the country. But she can be subjected to none which are real. The same men who made France triumph over united Europe, still

for liberty—let us swear, too, on our standards—War to the enemies of the Republic, and of the Constitution of the year Three!”²

It is needless to remark, that, under the British constitution, or any other existing on fixed principles, the haranguing an armed body of soldiers, with the purpose of inducing them to interfere

² This sentiment was one of the great principles of the French Revolution.

by force in any constitutional question, would be in one point of view mutiny, in another high treason.

The hint so distinctly given by the general, was immediately adopted by the troops. Deep called to deep, and each division of the army, whatever its denomination, poured forth its menaces of military force and compulsion against the opposition party in the councils, who held opinions different from those of their military chief, but which they had, at least hitherto, only expressed and supported by those means of resistance which the constitution placed in their power. In other words, the soldiers' idea of a republic was, that the sword was to decide the constitutional debates, which give so much trouble to ministers in a mixed or settled government. The Pretorian bands, the Strelitzes, the Janissaries, have all in their turn entertained this primitive and simple idea of reforming abuses in a state, and changing, by the application of military force, an unpopular dynasty, or an obnoxious ministry.

It was not by distant menaces alone that Buonaparte served the Directory at this important crisis. He despatched Augereau to Paris, ostensibly for the purpose of presenting the standards taken at Mantua, but in reality to command the armed force which the majority of the Directory had determined to employ against their dissentient colleagues, and the opponents of their measures in the national councils. Augereau was a blunt, bold, stupid soldier, a devoted Jacobin, whose principles were sufficiently well known to warrant his standing upon no constitutional delicacies.¹ But in case the Directory failed, Buonaparte kept himself in readiness to march instantly to Lyons at the head of fifteen thousand men. There rallying the Republicans, and all who were attached to the Revolution, he would, according to his own well-chosen expression, like Cæsar, have crossed the Rubicon at the head of the popular party—and ended, doubtless, like Cæsar, by himself usurping the supreme command, which he pretended to assert in behalf of the people.²

But Buonaparte's presence was not so essentially necessary to the support of the Directory as he might have expected, or as he perhaps hoped. They had military aid nearer at hand. Disregarding a fundamental law of the Constitution, which declared that armed troops should not be brought within a certain distance of the Legislative Bodies, they moved towards Paris a part of General Hoëhe's army. The majority of the Councils becoming alarmed, prepared means of defence by summoning the national guards to arms. But Augereau allowed them no time. He marched to their place of meeting, at the head

Sept. 4.

¶ 1 "The Directory requested General Buonaparte to send one of his generals of brigade to Paris, to await their orders. He chose General Augereau, a man very decided in action, and not very capable of reasoning—two qualities which rendered him an excellent instrument of despotism, provided the despotism assumed the name of revolution."—MAD. DE STAËL, tom. ii., p. 180.

² Montholon, tom. iv., p. 216.

of a considerable armed force.¹ The guards stationed for their

Council of Ancients, Pichegru, President of that of the Five Hundred,² and above one hundred and fifty deputies, journalists, and other public characters. As an excuse for these arbitrary and illegal proceedings, the Directory made public the intercepted

Few would at first believe Pichegru's breach of faith; but it was suddenly confirmed by a proclamation of Moreau, who, in the course of the war, had intercepted a baggage waggon belonging to the Austrian general Klinglin, and became possessed of the whole secret correspondence, which, nevertheless, he had never mentioned, until it came out by the seizure of the Comte d'Entraigues' portfolio. Then, indeed, fearing perhaps the conse-

conspiracies formed in its behalf.

The Directory made a tyrannical use of the power which they obtained by their victory of the 18th Fructidor, as this epoch was called. They spilt, indeed, no blood, but otherwise their mea-

¹ "I spent the night of the 17th to behold on the ramparts the great

asures against the defeated party were of the most illegal and oppressive character. A law, passed in the heat of animosity, condemned two directors, fifty deputies, and a hundred and forty-eight individuals of different classes (most of whom were persons of some character and influence,) to be transported to the scorching and unhealthy deserts of Guiana, which, to many, was a sentence of lingering but certain death. They were barbarously treated, both on the passage to that dreadful place, and after they arrived there. It was a singular part of their fate, that they found several of the fiercest of their ancient enemies, the Jacobins, still cursing God and defying man, in the same land of wretchedness and exile.

Besides these sevcrities, various elections were arbitrarily dissolved, and other strong measures of public safety, as they were called, adopted, to render the power of the Directory more indisputable. During this whole revolution, the lower portion of the population, which used to be so much agitated upon like occasions, remained perfectly quiet; the struggle lay exclusively between the middle classes, who inclined to a government on the basis of royalty, and the Directory, who, without having any very tangible class of political principles, had become possessed of the supreme power, desired to retain it, and made their point good by the assistance of the military.

Buonaparte was much disappointed at the result of the 18th Fructidor, chiefly because, if less decisive, it would have added more to his consequence, and have given him an opportunity of crossing, as he termed it, the Rubicon. As it was, the majority of the directors,—three men of no particular talent, undistinguished alike by birth, by services to their country, or even by accidental popularity, and cast as it were by chance, upon supreme power,—remained by the issue of the struggle still the masters of the bold and ambitious conqueror, who probably already felt his own vocation to be for command rather than obedience.

Napoleon appears by his Memoirs to have regretted the violence with which the victorious directors prosecuted their personal revenge, which involved many for whom he had respect. He declares his own idea of punishment would have gone no farther than imprisoning some of the most dangerous conspirators, and placing others under the watchful superintendence of the police. He must have taken some painful interest in the fate of Carnot in particular, whom he seems to have regarded as one of his most effective patrons.¹ Indeed, it is said that he was so much displeased with the Directory even prior to the 18th Fructidor, that he refused to remit a sum of money with which

¹ In Carnot's Memoirs, the merit of discovering Buonaparte's talents and taking care of his promotion, is attributed to Carnot, rather than to Barras. However this may be, it is certain that Napoleon acknowledged great obligation to Carnot, and protested to him perpetual gratitude.—See *Moniteur*, No. 140, Feb. 1, 1797.—S.

he had promised to aid them for the purpose of forwarding that event.¹ Barras's secretary was sent to task him with this contumacy: which he did so unceremoniously, that the general, unused to contradiction, was about to order this agent to be shot; but, on consideration, put him off with some insignificant reply.

It followed, from the doubtful terms on which Buonaparte stood with the Directory, that they must have viewed his return to Paris with some apprehension, when they considered the impression likely to be made on any capital, but especially on that of Paris, by the appearance there of one who seemed to be the chosen favourite of Fortune, and to deserve her favours by the use which he made of them. The mediocrity of such men as Barras never gives them so much embarrassment, as when, being raised to an elevation above their desert, they find themselves placed in comparison with one to whom nature has given the talents which their situation requires in themselves. The higher their condition, their demeanour is the more awkward; for the factious advantages which they possess cannot raise

he had himself entirely neglected them. While he drew from the dominions which he possessed an augmented in Italy, France

¹ Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 153.

² Montholon, tom. iv., p. 267.

French general plundered the Italians as Cortez did the Mexicans, he did not reserve any considerable share of the spoil for his own use, though the opportunity was often in his power.

The commissary Salicetti, his countryman, recommended a less scrupulous line of conduct. Soon after the first successes in Italy, he acquainted Napoleon that the Chevalier d'Este, the Duke of Modena's brother and envoy, had four millions of francs, in gold, contained in four chests, prepared for his acceptance. "The Directory and the Legislative Bodies will never," he said, "acknowledge your services—your circumstances require the money, and the duke will gain a protector."

"I thank you," said Buonaparte; "but I will not for four millions place myself in the power of the Duke of Modena."

The Venetians, in the last agony of their terrors, offered the French general a present of seven millions, which was refused in the same manner. Austria also had made her proffers; and they were nothing less than a principality in the empire, to be established in Napoleon's favour, consisting of two hundred and fifty thousand inhabitants at least, a provision which would have put him out of danger of suffering by the proverbial ingratitude of a republic. The general transmitted his thanks to the Emperor for this proof of the interest which he took in his fortune, but added, he could accept of no wealth or preferment which did not proceed from the French people, and that he should be always satisfied with the amount of revenue which they might be disposed to afford him.¹

But however free from the wish to obtain wealth by any indirect means, Napoleon appears to have expected, that in return for public services of such an unusual magnitude, some provision ought to have been made for him. An attempt was made to procure a public grant of the domain of Chambord, and a large hotel in Paris, as an acknowledgment of the national gratitude for his brilliant successes; but the Directory thwarted the proposal.

The proposition respecting Chambord was not the only one of the kind. Malibran, a member of the Council of Five Hundred, made a motion that Buonaparte should be endow'd with a revenue at the public charge, of fifty thousand livres annually, with a reversion to his wife of one half of that sum.² It may be supposed that this motion had not been sufficiently considered and preconcerted, since it was very indifferently received, and was evaded by the swaggering declaration of a member,³ that such glorious deeds could not be rewarded by gold. So that the Assembly adopted the reasonable principle,

¹ Montholon, tom. iv., p. 103.

² Moniteur, Nov. 8; Thibaudeau, tom. iii., p. 423.

³ "Un grenadier Français avait fait une action très brillante; son général lui offre trois louis. Plus noble, plus généreux, le grenadier refuse, et lui dit: '*Mon général, on ne fait pas ces choses-là pour de l'argent.*' Irez-vous offrir de l'or à un homme courbé sous le poids des lauriers? Non non, l'ame de Buonaparte est trop grande," &c.—THIBAudeau, tom. iii., p. 423.

that because the debt of gratitude was too great to be paid in

to estimation.

have been deterred from more doubtful and ambitious projects, by a prospect of sure and direct advantage; but that marked ill-will and distrust must in every case render him dangerous, who has the power to be so.

Their plan, instead of resting on an attempt to conciliate the ambitious conqueror, and soothe him to the repose of a tranquil indulgence of independence and ease, seems to have been that of devising for him new labours, like the wife of Eurystheus for the juvenile Hercules. If he succeeded, they may have privately counted upon securing the advantages for themselves; if he failed, they were rid of a troublesome rival in the race of power and popularity. It was with these views that they proposed to Napoleon to crown his military glories, by assuming the command of the preparations made for the conquest of England.

CHAPTER XII.

View of the respective Situations of Great Britain and France, at the Period of Napoleon's return from Italy—Negotiations at Lisle—Broken off—Army of England decreed, and Buonaparte named to the Command—He takes up his Residence in Paris—Public Honours—The real Views of the Directory discovered to be the Expedition to Egypt—Armies of Italy and the Rhine, compared and contrasted—Napoleon's Climate and Mountains

arrives before Malta on 10th June—Proceeds on his course, and, escaping the British Squadron, lands at Alexandria on the 1st July—Description of the various Classes who inhabit

Egypt:—1. The Fellahs and Bedouins—2. The Cophits—3. The Mamelukes—Napoleon issues a Proclamation against the Mamelukes—Marches against them on the 7th July—Discontent of the French Troops—Battle of the Pyramids on 21st of July—Cairo surrenders.

It might have been thought, such was the success of the French arms on the land, and of the British upon the sea, that the war must now be near its natural and unavoidable termination, like a fire when there no longer remain any combustibles to be devoured. Wherever water could bear them, the British vessels of war had swept the seas of the enemy. The greater part of the foreign colonies belonging to France and her allies, among whom she now numbered Holland and Spain, were in the possession of the English, nor had France a chance of recovering them. On the contrary, not a musket was seen pointed against France on the continent; so that it seemed as if the great rival nations, fighting with different weapons, and on different elements, must at length give up a contest, in which it was almost impossible to come to a decisive struggle.

An attempt accordingly was made, by the negotiation of Lisle, to bring to a period the war, which appeared now to subsist entirely without an object. Lord Malmesbury, on that occasion, gave in, on the part of Britain, an offer to surrender all the conquests she had made from France and her allies; on condition of the cession of Trinidad, on the part of Spain, and of the Cape of Good Hope, Cochin, and Ceylon, on the part of Holland, with some stipulations in favour of the Prince of Orange and his adherents in the Netherlands. The French commissioners, in reply, declared, that their instructions required that the English should make a complete cession of their conquests, without any equivalent whatever; and they insisted, as indispensable preliminaries, that the King of Great Britain should lay aside his titular designation of King of France—that the Toulon fleet should be restored—and that the English should renounce their right to certain mortgages over the Netherlands, for money lent to the Emperor. Lord Malmesbury, of course, rejected a sweeping set of propositions, which decided every question against England even before the negotiation commenced, and solicited the French to offer some modified form of treaty.¹ The 18th Fructidor, however, had in the interim taken place, and the Republican party, being in possession of complete authority, broke off the negotiation, if it could be called such, abruptly, and ordered the English ambassador out of the dominions of the republic with very little ceremony. It was now proclaimed generally, that the existence of the English Carthage in the neighbourhood of the French Rome was altogether inadmissible; that England must be subdued once more, as in the times of William

¹ Annual Register, vol. xl., p. 6.

the Conqueror; and the hopes of a complete and final victory over their natural rival and enemy, as the two nations are but overapt to esteem each other, presented so flattering a prospect, that there was scarce a party in France, not even amongst the Royalists, which did not enter on what was expected to prove

ocean an army, to be called the Army of England, and that the Citizen-General Buonaparte was named to the command. The intelligence was received in every part of France with all the triumph which attends the anticipation of certain victory. The address of the Directory numbered all the conquests which France had won, and the efforts she had made, and prepared the French nation to expect the fruit of so many victories and sacrifices when they had punished England for her perfidy and maritime tyranny. "It is at London where the misfortunes of all Europe are forged and manufactured—It is in London that they must be terminated" In a solemn meeting held by the Directory, for the purpose of receiving the treaty of peace with Austria, which was presented to them by Berthier and Monge on the part of Buonaparte, the latter, who had been one of the commissioners for pillaging Italy of her pictures and statues, and who looked, doubtless, to a new harvest of rarities in England,

Dec 3 abode in the same modest house which he had occupied

Chantierme to rue de la victoire.

In a metropolis where all is welcome that can vary the tedium of human life, the arrival of any remarkable person is a species of holiday; but such an eminent character as Buonaparte—the conqueror—the sage—the politician—the undaunted braver of every difficulty—the invincible victor in every battle—who had carried the banners of the Republic from Genoa till their approach scared the Pontiff in Rome, and the emperor in Vienna, was no everyday wonder. His youth, too, added to the marvel, and still more the claim of general superiority over the society in which he mingled, though consisting of the most distinguished persons in France; a superiority cloaking itself with a species of reserve, which inferred, "You may look upon me, but you

cannot penetrate or see through me.”¹ Napoleon’s general manner in society, during this part of his life, has been described by an observer of first-rate power; according to whom, he was one for whom the admiration which could not be refused to him, was always mingled with a portion of fear. He was different in his manner from other men, and neither pleased nor angry, kind nor severe, after the common fashion of humanity. He appeared to live for the execution of his own plans, and to consider others only in so far as they were connected with, and could advance or oppose them. He estimated his fellow-mortals no otherwise than as they could be useful to his views; and, with a precision of intelligence which seemed intuitive from its rapidity, he penetrated the sentiments of those whom it was worth his while to study. Buonaparte did not then possess the ordinary tone of light conversation in society; probably his mind was too much burdened or too proud to stoop to adopt that mode of pleasing, and there was a stiffness and reserve of manner which was perhaps adopted for the purpose of keeping people at a distance. His look had the same character. When he thought himself closely observed, he had the power of discharging from his countenance all expression, save that of a vague and indefinite smile, and presenting to the curious investigator the fixed eyes and rigid features of a bust of marble.²

When he talked with the purpose of pleasing, Buonaparte often told anecdotes of his life in a very pleasing manner; when silent, he had something disdainful in the expression of his face; when disposed to be quite at ease, he was, in Madame de Staël’s opinion, rather vulgar. His natural tone of feeling seemed to be a sense of internal superiority, and of secret contempt for the world in which he lived, the men with whom he acted, and even the very objects which he pursued. His character and manners were upon the whole strongly calculated to attract the attention of the French nation, and to excite a perpetual interest even from the very mystery which attached to him, as well as from the splendour of his triumphs. The supreme power was residing in the Luxembourg ostensibly; but Paris was aware, that the means which had raised, and which must support and extend that power, were to be found in the humble mansion of the newly-christened Rue de la Victoire.

Some of these features are perhaps harshly designed, as being drawn *recentibus odiis*. The disagreement between Buonaparte and Madame de Staël, from whom we have chiefly described them, is well known. It originated about this time, when, as a first-rate woman of talent, she was naturally desirous to attract the notice of the Victor of Victors. They appear to have misunderstood each other; for the lady, who ought certainly to know best has informed us, “that far from feeling her fear of Buona-

¹ Thibaudeau, tom. iii., p. 413; Montholon, tom. iv., p. 266.

² Mad. de Staël, Consid. sur la Rév. Franç., tom. ii., p. 199.

parte removed by repeated meetings, it seemed to increase, and his best exertions to please could not overcome her invincible aversion for what she found in his character."¹ His ironical contempt of excellence of every kind, operated like the sword in romance, which froze while it wounded. Buonaparte seems

presses it, tormented him when present. In truth, to use an established French phrase, they stood in a false position with respect to each other. Madame de Staël might be pardoned for thinking that it would be difficult to resist her wit and her talent, when exerted with the purpose of pleasing; but Buonaparte was disposed to repel, rather than encourage the advances of one whose views were so shrewd, and her observations so keen, while her sex permitted her to push her inquiries farther than one man might have dared to do in conversing with another. She certainly did desire to look into him "with considerate eyes," and on one occasion put his abilities to the proof, by

peror was to enact the second Theodorick.

In the meantime, while popular feeling and the approbation of distinguished genius were thus seeking to pay court to the youthful conqueror,² the Directory found themselves obliged to

¹ Considerations, tom ii. p 197

² Las Cases, tom iii., p 191

³ Las Cases, tom iii., p 192, Montholon, tom iv., p 274; Thibaudenn, tom ni., p 429

⁴ "The leaders of all parties called upon him; but he refused to listen to them. The streets and squares through which he was expected to pass were constantly crowded, but Napoleon never showed himself. He had no habitual

render to him that semblance of homage which could not have been withheld without giving much offence to general opinion, and injuring those who omitted to pay it, much more than him who was entitled by the unanimous voice to receive it. On the 10th of December, the Directory received Buonaparte in public, with honours which the Republican government had not yet conferred on any subject, and which must have seemed incongruous to those who had any recollection of the liberty and equality, once so emphatically pronounced to be the talisman of French prosperity. The ceremony took place in the great court of the Luxembourg palace, where the Directory, surrounded by all that was officially important or distinguished by talent, received from Buonaparte's hand the confirmed treaty of Campo Fornio.¹ The delivery of this document was accompanied by a speech from Buonaparte, in which he told the Directory, that, in order to establish a constitution founded on reason, it was necessary that eighteen centuries of prejudices should be conquered—"The constitution of the year THREE, and you, have triumphed over all these obstacles."² The triumph lasted exactly until the year EIGHT, when the orator himself overthrew the constitution, destroyed the power of the rulers who had overcome the prejudices of eighteen centuries, and reigned in their stead.

The French, who had banished religion from their thoughts, and from their system of domestic policy, yet usually preserved some perverted ceremony connected with it, on public solemnities. They had disused the exercises of devotion, and expressly disowned the existence of an object of worship; yet they could not do without altars, and hymns, and rites, upon such occasions as the present. The general, conducted by Barras, the president of the Directory, approached an erection, termed the Altar of the Country, where they went through various appropriate ceremonies, and at length dismissed a numerous assembly, much edified with what they had seen. The two Councils, or Representative Bodies, also gave a splendid banquet in honour of Buonaparte. And what he appeared to receive with more particular satisfaction than these marks of distinction, the Institute admitted him a member of its body³ in the room of his friend

Dec. 28.

visitors, except a few men of science, such as Monge, Berthollet, Borda, Laplace, Prony, and Lagrange; several generals, as Berthier, Desaix, Lefebvre, Caffarelli, and Kleber; and a very few deputies."—MONTOLON, tom. iv, p. 269.

¹ "Buonaparte arrived, dressed very simply, followed by his aides-de-camp, all taller than himself, but nearly bent by the respect which they displayed to him. M. de Talleyrand, in presenting Buonaparte to the Directory, called him 'the Liberator of Italy, and the Pacifier of the Continent.' He assured them, that 'General Buonaparte detested luxury and splendour, the miserable ambition of vulgar souls, and that he loved the poems of Ossian particularly because they detach us from the earth.'"—MAD. DE STAEL, tom. ii., p. 203; MONTGAILLARD, tom. v., p. 83.

² Thibaudeau, tom. iii., p. 416.

³ For the class of arts and sciences. Upon the occasion, Buonaparte addressed this note to Camus, the president of the class. "The suffrage of the distinguished men who compose the Institute honours me. I feel sensibly, that

to
and
of

LIGHTING.

There is nothing less philosophical than to attach ridicule to the customs of other nations, merely because they differ from those

rious generals, in the number and more vulgar mode of conver-
ring on both large and princely domains

Meantime, the threat of invasion was maintained with unabated earnestness. But it made no impression on the British, or rather it stimulated men of all ranks to bury temporary and party dissensions about politics, and bend themselves, with the whole

often inflicted the deepest wounds upon France, and was not now likely to give up to any thing short of the most dire necessity. The benefits were then seen of a free constitution, which permits the venom of party spirit to evaporate in open debate. Those who had differed on the question of peace or war, were unanimous in that of national defence, and resistance to the common enemy ;

approach of robbers.

Buonaparte in the meanwhile made a complete survey of the coast of the British channel, pausing at each remarkable point, and making those remarks and calculations which induced him to adopt, at an after period, the renewal of the project for a descent upon England.² The result of his observations decided his opi-

nion, that in the present case the undertaking ought to be abandoned. The immense preparations and violent threats of invasion were carried into no more serious effect than the landing of about twelve or fourteen hundred Frenchmen, under a General Tate, at Fishguard, in South Wales. They were without artillery, and behaved rather like men whom a shipwreck had cast on a hostile shore, than like an invading enemy, as they gave themselves up as prisoners without even a show of defence to Lord Cawdor, who had marched against them at the head of a body of the Welsh militia, hastily drawn together on the alarm. The measure was probably only to be considered as experimental, and as such must have been regarded as an entire failure.¹

The demonstrations of invasion, however, were ostensibly continued, and every thing seemed arranged on either side for a desperate collision betwixt the two most powerful nations in Europe. But the proceedings of politicians resemble those of the Indian traders called Banians, who seem engaged in talking about ordinary and trifling affairs, while, with their hands concealed beneath a shawl that is spread between them, they are secretly debating and adjusting, by signs, bargains of the utmost importance. While all France and England had their eyes fixed on the fleets and armies destined against the latter country, the Directory and their general had no intention of using these preparations, except as a blind to cover their real object, which was the celebrated expedition to Egypt.

While yet in Italy, Buonaparte had suggested to the Directory (13th September, 1797,) the advantage which might be derived from seizing upon Malta, which he represented as an easy prize. The knights, he said, were odious to the Maltese inhabitants, and were almost starving; to augment which state of distress, and increase that incapacity of defence, he had already confiscated their Italian property. He then proceeded to intimate, that being possessed of Corfu and Malta, it was natural to take possession of Egypt. Twenty-five thousand men, with eight or ten ships of the line, would be sufficient for the expedition, which he suggested might depart from the coasts of Italy.²

Talleyrand, then minister for foreign affairs, (in his answer of 23d September,) saw the utmost advantage in the design upon Egypt, which, as a colony, would attract the commerce of India to Europe, in preference to the circuitous route by the Cape of Good Hope. This correspondence proves, that even before Buonaparte left Italy he had conceived the idea of the Egyptian expe-

possessed in so eminent a degree. He examined till midnight, sailors, pilots, smugglers, fishermen,—making objections, and listening with attention to their replies."

¹ For some curious particulars respecting the Descent of the French in South Wales, see Appendix, No. V.

² Correspondence Inédite, tom. iv., p. 176. So early as the 10th of August, Buonaparte had written to the Directory,—"*Les temps ne sont pas éloignés où nous sentirons que, pour détruire véritablement Angleterre, il faut nous emparer de l'Egypte.*"—*Ibid.*, tom. iv., p. 77.—See also JOMINI, tom. x., p. 512.

dition, though probably only as one of the vast and vague schemes of ambition which success in so many perilous enterprises had

and perhaps founding an empire, in a country long considered as the cradle of laws, letters, and celebrated in ancient and modern

of early art also were to be found among the gigantic ruins of

doubting, not unreasonably, whether the conquerors in that struggle could so far avail themselves of the victory which they had obtained over the majority of the national representatives, as to

and disliked them; the violent Republicans remembered their

publicans, the Directorial government appeared to remain standing, only because the factions to whom it was unacceptable were afraid of each other's attaining a superiority in the struggle, which must attend its downfall.¹

Thus crisis of public affairs was a tempting opportunity for such a character as Buonaparte; whose almost incredible successes, unvaried by a single reverse which deserved that name, naturally fixed the eyes of the multitude, and indeed of the nation at large, upon him, as upon one who seemed destined to play the

¹ Montholon, tom iv, p. 231.

most distinguished part in any of those new changes, which the mutable state of the French Government seemed rapidly preparing.

The people, naturally partial to a victor, followed him every where with acclamations, and his soldiers, in their camp-songs, spoke of pulling the *attorneys* out of the seat of government, and installing their victorious general. Even already, for the first time since the commencement of the Revolution, the French, losing their recent habits of thinking and speaking of the nation as a body, began to interest themselves in Napoleon as an individual; and that exclusive esteem of his person had already taken root in the public mind, which afterwards formed the foundation of his throne.

Yet, in spite of these promising appearances, Napoleon, cautious as well as enterprising, saw that the time was not arrived when he could, without great risk, attempt to possess himself of the supreme government in France. The soldiers of Italy were indeed at his devotion, but there was another great and rival army belonging to the Republic, that of the Rhine, which had never been under his command, never had partaken his triumphs, and which naturally looked rather to Moreau than to Buonaparte as their general and hero.

Madame de Staël describes the soldiers from these two armies, as resembling each other in nothing, save the valour which was common to both.¹ The troops of the Rhine, returning from hard-fought fields, which, if followed by victory, had afforded but little plunder, exhibited still the severe simplicity which had been affected under the republican model; whereas the army of Italy had reaped richer spoils than barren laurels alone, and made a display of wealth and enjoyment which showed they had not neglected their own interest while advancing the banners of France.

It was not likely, while such an army as that of the Rhine existed, opposed by rivalry and the jealousy of fame to the troops of Buonaparte, that the latter should have succeeded in placing himself at the head of affairs. Besides, the forces on which he could depend were distant. Fortune had not afforded him the necessary pretext for crossing, as he termed it, the Rubicon, and bringing twenty thousand men to Lyons. Moreau, Jourdan, Kleber, had all high reputations, scarce inferior to his own; and the troops who had served under them were disposed to elevate them, even to an equality with the Conqueror of Italy. Buonaparte also knew that his popularity, though great, was not universal. He was disliked by the middle classes, from recollection of his commanding during the affair of the Sections of Paris; and many of the Republicans exclaimed against him, for his surrendering Venice to the Austrians. In a word, he was too much elbowed and in-

¹ Considerations sur la Rév. Franç., tom. ii., p. 173.

commoded by others to permit his taking with full vigour the perilous spring necessary to place him in the seat of supreme authority, though there were not wanting those who would fain have persuaded him to venture on a course so daring¹. To such counsellors he answered, that "*the pear was not ripe*,"—a hint which implied that appetite was not wanting, though prudence forbade the banquet

fitted out on a scale of stupendous magnitude, should be at leisure to resume the conquest of Britain.

But Buonaparte did not limit his views to those of armed conquest—he meant that these should be softened, by mingling with them schemes of a literary and scientific character, as if he had

expedition.

¹ Montholon &c.

The public observed with astonishment a detachment of no less than one hundred men,¹ who had cultivated the arts and sciences, or, to use the French phrase, *Savans*, selected for the purpose of joining this mysterious expedition, of which the object still remained a secret; while all classes of people asked each other what new quarter of the world France had determined to colonize, since she seemed preparing at once to subdue it by her arms, and to enrich it with the treasures of her science and literature. This singular department of the expedition, the first of the kind which ever accompanied an invading army, was liberally supplied with books, philosophical instruments, and all means of prosecuting the several departments of knowledge.²

Buonaparte did not, however, trust to the superiority of science to ensure the conquest of Egypt. He was fully provided with more effectual means. The land forces belonging to the expedition were of the most formidable description. Twenty-five thousand men, chiefly veterans selected from his own Italian army, had in their list of generals subordinate to Buonaparte the names of Kleber,³ Desaix,⁴ Berthier, Regnier, Murat, Lannes, Andréossi, Menou,⁵ Belliard, and others well known in the revolutionary wars. Four hundred transports were assembled for the conveyance of the troops. Thirteen ships of the line, and four frigates, commanded by Admiral Brueyes, an experienced and gallant officer, formed the escort of the expedition; a finer and more formidable one than which never sailed on so bold an adventure.

We have already touched upon the secret objects of this armament. The Directory were desirous to be rid of Buonaparte, who might become a dangerous competitor in the present unsettled state of the French Government. Buonaparte, on his side, accepted the command, because it opened a scene of conquest worthy of his ambition. A separate and uncontrolled command over so gallant an army seemed to promise him the conquest and the sovereignty, not of Egypt only, but of Syria, Turkey, perhaps Constantinople, the Queen of the East; and he himself afterwards more than hinted, that but for controlling circumstances, he would have bent his whole mind to the establishment of an

¹ For a "List of the one hundred and two members of the Commission of the Arts and Sciences attached to the army of the East," see Thibaudeau, tom. iv., p. 424.

² "The following list of books, for a camp library, I copy from a paper in his own hand. The volumes were in 18mo, and will show what he preferred in science and literature."—BOURRIENNE, tom. ii., p. 49. See the List in Appendix, No. VI.

³ "Napoleon offered to leave Desaix and Kleber, whose talents might, he thought, prove serviceable to France. The Directory knew not their value, and refused them. 'The Republic,' said they, 'is not reduced to these two generals.'"—MONTHOLON, tom. iv., p. 202.

⁴ "I have beheld, with deep interest, the fleet at Corfu. If ever it sails upon those great enterprises of which you have spoken, in pity do not forget me."—DESAIX to BUONAPARTE.

⁵ "Menou, anxious to justify his conduct at Paris on the 13th Vendémiaire, entreated to be allowed to join the army of the East."—THIBAudeau, tom. iv., p. 42.

Oriental despotism, and left France to her own destinies. When

or of a Caliph of Egypt at the least, was a more commensurate object of ambition.

The private motives of the government and of the general are therefore easily estimated. But it is not so easy to justify the Egyptian expedition upon any views of sound national policy.

very doubtful utility. The immense fertility of the alluvial pro-

ter. The climate, too, is insalubrious to strangers, and must have been a constant cause of loss, until, in process of time, the colonists had become habituated to its peculiarities. It is farther to be considered, that the most perfect and absolute success in the undertaking must have ended, not in giving a province to the French, but in making a separate and independent kingdom to her

and her new possessions, or by her land forces from India and

Egypt as the forerunner of that of universal Asia. His eye, which, like that of the eagle, saw far and wide, overlooking, however, obstacles which distance rendered diminutive, beheld little more necessary than the toilsome marches of a few weeks, to achieve the conquests of Alexander the Great. He had already counted the steps by which he was to ascend to Oriental Monarchy, and has laid before the world a singular reverie on the probabilities of success. "If Saint John d'Acre had yielded to the French arms," said he, "a great revolution would have been accomplished in the East; the general-in-chief would have founded an empire there, and the destinies of France would have undergone different combinations from those to which they were subjected."¹

In this declaration we recognise one of the peculiarities of Buonaparte's disposition, which refused to allow of any difficulties or dangers save those, of which, having actually happened, the existence could not be disputed. The small British force before Acre was sufficient to destroy his whole plans of conquest; but how many other means of destruction might Providence have employed for the same purpose! The plague—the desert—mutiny among his soldiers—courage and enterprise, inspired by favourable circumstances into the tribes by whom his progress was opposed—the computation of these, and other chances, ought to have taught him to acknowledge, that he had not been discomfited by the only hazard which could have disconcerted his enterprise; but that, had such been the will of God, the sands of Syria might have proved as fatal as the snows of Russia, and the scimitars of the Turks as the lances of the Cossacks. In words, a march from Egypt to India is easily described, and still more easily measured off with compasses upon the map of the world. But in practice, and with an army opposed, as the French would probably have been, at every step, if it had been only from motives of religious antipathy, when the French general arrived at the skirts of British India, with forces thus diminished, he would have had in front the whole British army, commanded by officers accustomed to make war upon a scale almost as enlarged as he himself practised, and accustomed to victories not less decisive.²

We should fall into the same error which we censure, did we anticipate what might have been the result of such a meeting. Even while we elaim the probability of advantage for the army most numerous, and best provided with guns and stores, we

¹ Las Cases, tom. v., p. 58.

² "All that Sir Walter Scott says about the expedition to India is not only exaggerated, but wide of the truth. It is not by the mere march of an army across Egypt and Arabia that British India is likely to be conquered, but by establishing and consolidating a French force in Egypt, by opening the ancient communications by ~~the Red Sea~~ ^{relations between Egypt and} the English squadrons."—
India; and, in fine, by so
that this sea shall become
LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 31.

allow the strife must have been dreadful and dubious. But, if Napoleon really thought he had only to show himself in India, to ensure the destruction of the British empire there, he had not calculated the opposing strength with the caution to have been expected from so great a general. He has been represented, indeed, as boasting of the additions which he would have made to his army, by the co-operation of natives trained after the French discipline. But can it be supposed that these hasty levies could be brought into such complete order as to face the

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to run down to Sardinia. The first and most obvious obstacle to the expedition was thus removed. The various squadrons from Genoa, Civita Vecchia, and Bastia, set sail and united with that which already lay at Toulon.

Yet it is said, though upon slender authority, that even at this latest moment Buonaparte showed some inclination to abandon the command of so doubtful and almost desperate an expedition, and wished to take the advantage of a recent dispute between France and Austria, to remain in Europe. The misunderstanding arose from the conduct of Bernadotte, ambassador for the republic at Vienna, who incautiously displayed the national colours before his hotel, in consequence of which a popular tumult arose, and the ambassador was insulted. In their first alarm, lest his incident should occasion a renewal of the war, the Directory hastily determined to suspend Buonaparte's departure, and despatch him to Rastadt, where the congress was still sitting, with full powers to adjust the difference. Buonaparte accepted the

the execution of
away. The tenor

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Directory, and it appearing to them that Buonaparte designed to make that mission a pretext for interesting Cobentzel in some change of government in France, in which he deemed it advisable to obtain the concurrence of Austria, they instantly resolved, it is said, to compel him to set sail on the expedition to Egypt.

Barras, charged with the commission of notifying to the general this second alteration of his destination, had an interview with Buonaparte in private, and at his own house. The mien of the director was clouded, and, contrary to his custom, he scarcely spoke to Madame Buonaparte. When he retired, Buonaparte shut himself up in his own apartment for a short time, then gave directions for his instant departure from Paris for Toulon. These particulars are given as certain by Miot;¹ but he alleges no authority for this piece of secret history.² There seems, however, little doubt, that the command of the Egyptian expedition was bestowed on Buonaparte by the Directory as a species of ostracism, or honourable banishment from France.

At the moment of departure, Buonaparte made one of those singular harangues which evince such a mixture of talent and energy with bad taste and bombast. He promised to introduce those who had warred on the mountains and in the plains, to maritime combat; and to a great part of the expedition he kept his word too truly, as Aboukir could witness. He reminded them that the Romans combated Carthage by sea as well as by land—he proposed to conduct them, in the name of the Goddess of Liberty, to the most distant regions and oceans, and he concluded by promising to each individual of his army seven acres of land.³ Whether this distribution of property was to take place on the banks of the Nile, of the Bosphorus, or the Ganges, the soldiers had not the most distant guess, and the commander-in-chief himself would have had difficulty in informing them.

On the 19th of May, 1798, this magnificent armament set sail from Toulon, illuminated by a splendid sunrise, one of those which were afterwards popularly termed the suns of Napoleon. The line-of-battle ships extended for a league, and the semi-circle formed by the convoy was at least six leagues in extent. They were joined on the 8th June, as they swept along the Mediterranean, by a large fleet of transports, having on board the division of General Desaix.

The 10th June brought the armament before Malta, once the citadel of Christendom, and garrisoned by those intrepid knights, who, half warriors and half priests, opposed the infidels with the

¹ Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire des Expéditions en Egypte et en Syrie.—INTRODUCTION, p. 20.

² "It is an error to state, that the affair at Vienna inspired the idea of abandoning the expedition. The contrary is proved by Buonaparte's letters to Baraguay d'Hilliers, Desaix, and Admiral Brueyes; to whom, on the 20th of April, he wrote: 'Some disturbances, which have just happened at Vienna, require my presence for a few days at Paris. This will in no way affect the expedition. I send an order, by the present courier, for the troops at Marseilles to embark and repair to Toulon. On the evening of the 30th I will send you instructions to get on board, and depart with the squadron for Genoa, where I will join you.'—*Correspondence Inédite*, tom. v., p. 3; Thibaudeau, tom. iv., p. 43.

³ "Je promets à chaque soldat qu'au retour de cette expédition, il aura à sa disposition de quoi acheter six arpens de terre."—*Moniteur*, No. 242, May 21.

enthusiasm at once of religion and of chivalry. But those by whom the order was now maintained were disunited among themselves, lazy and debauched voluptuaries, who consumed the reve-

suited to their present condition. Secure of a party among the French knights, with whom he had been tampering, he landed troops, and took possession of these almost impregnable fortresses

This was the English squadron.

Nelson, to the end as unconquerable on his own element as Buonaparte had hitherto shown himself upon shore, was now in full and anxious pursuit of his renowned contemporary. Reinforced by a squadron of ten ships of the line, a meeting with Napoleon was the utmost wish of his heart, and was echoed back by the meanest sailor on board his numerous fleet. The French had been heard of at Malta, but as the British admiral was about

to proceed thither, he received news of their departure; and concluding that Egypt must be unquestionably the object of their expedition, he made sail for Egypt. It singularly happened, that although Nelson anticipated the arrival of the French at Alexandria, and accordingly directed his course thither, yet, keeping a more direct path than Brueyes, when he arrived there on the 28th June, he heard nothing of the enemy, who, in the meanwhile, were proceeding to the very same port. The English admiral set sail, therefore, for Rhodes and Syraeuse; and thus were the two large and hostile fleets traversing the same narrow sea, without being able to attain any certain tidings of each other's movements. This was in part owing to the English admiral having no frigates with him, which might have been detached to cruise for intelligence; partly to a continuance of thick misty weather, which at once concealed the French fleet from their adversaries, and, obliging them to keep close together, diminished the chance of discovery, which might otherwise have taken place by the occupation of a larger space. On the 26th, according to Denon, Nelson's fleet was actually seen by the French standing to the westward, although the haze prevented the English from observing their enemy, whose squadron held an opposite direction.¹

Escaped from the risk of an encounter so perilous, Buonaparte's greatest danger seemed to be over on the 1st July, when the French fleet came in sight of Alexandria, and saw before them the city of the Ptolemies and of Cleopatra, with its double harbour, its Pharos, and its ancient and gigantic monuments of grandeur. Yet at this critical moment, and while Buonaparte contemplated his meditated conquest, a signal announced the appearance of a strange sail, which was construed to be an English frigate, the precursor of the British fleet. "What!" said Napoleon, "I ask but six hours—and, Fortune, wilt thou abandon me?"² The fickle goddess was then and for many a succeeding year, true to her votary. The vessel proved friendly.³

¹ "During the whole voyage, Buonaparte passed the greater part of his time below, in his cabin, reclining upon a couch, which, by a hall-and-socket joint at each foot, rendered the ship's pitching less perceptible, and consequently relieved the sickness from which he was scarcely ever free. His remarkable saying to the pupils of a school which he had one day visited, 'Young people, every hour of time lost is a chance of misfortune for future life,' may be considered, in some measure, as forming the rule of his own conduct. Perhaps no man ever better understood the value of time. If the activity of his mind found not wherewithal to exercise itself in reality, he supplied the defect by giving free scope to imagination, or in listening to the conversation of the learned men attached to the expedition. He delighted in discoursing with Monge and Berthollet, when the discussion mostly ran upon chemistry, mathematics, and religion, as also with Caffarelli, whose conversation, rich in facts, was, at the same time, lively, intellectual, and cheerful. At other times, he conversed with the admiral, when the subject always related to naval manœuvres, of which he showed great desire to obtain knowledge; and nothing more astonished Brueyes, than the sagacity of his questions."—BOURRIENNE, tom. ii., p. 69.

² Miot, p. 16.

³ "On the 30th of June, Buonaparte had the following proclamation printed on board the *L'Orient*, and issued it to the army:—'Soldiers! You are going

The disembarkation of the French army took place [July 2] about a league and a half from Alexandria, at an anchorage called M
and men
great joy
board

naparte marched towards Alexandria, when the Turks, incensed at this hostile invasion on the part of a nation with whom they were at profound peace, shut the gates, and manned the walls against their reception. But the walls were ruinous, and presented breaches in many places, and the chief weapons of resistance were musketry and stones. The conquerors of Italy forced their passage over such obstacles, but not easily or with impunity.¹ Two hundred French were killed. There was severe military

was Napoleon's object to impress the highest idea of his power upon the various classes of natives, who, differing widely from each other in manners and condition, inhabit Egypt as their common home.²

These classes are, 1st, the Arab race, divided into Fellahs and Bedouins, the most numerous and least esteemed of the population.

The Bedouins, retaining the manners of Arabia Proper, rove through the Desert, and subsist by means of their flocks and herds. The Fellahs cultivate the earth, and are the ordinary peasants of the country.

The class next above the Arabs in consideration are the Coptits, supposed to be descended from the pristine Egyptians. They profess Christianity, are timid and unwarlike, but artful and supple. They are employed in the revenue, and in almost all civil offices, and transact the commerce and the business of the country.

The third class in elevation were the formidable Mamelukes who held both Coptits and Arabs in profound subjection. These are, or we may say *were*, a corps of professed soldiers, having no trade excepting war. In this they resemble the Janissaries, the Sterlitzes, the Prætorian bands, or similar military bodies, which, constituting a standing army under a despotic government, are alternately the protectors and the terror of the sovereign who is their nominal commander. But the peculiar feature of the constitution of the Mamelukes, was, that their corps was recruited only by the adoption of foreign slaves, particularly Georgians and Circassians. These were purchased when children by the several Beys or Mameluke leaders, who, twenty-four in number, occupied, each, one of the twenty-four departments into which they had divided Egypt. The youthful slave, purchased with a heedful reference to his strength and personal appearance, was carefully trained to arms in the family of his master. When created a Mameluke, he was received into the troop of the Bey, and rendered capable of succeeding to him at his death; for these chiefs despised the ordinary connexions of blood, and their authority was, upon military principles, transferred at their death to him amongst the band who was accounted the best soldier. They fought always on horseback; and in their peculiar mode of warfare, they might be termed, individually considered, the finest cavalry in the world. Completely armed, and unboundedly confident in their own prowess, they were intrepid, skilful, and formidable in battle; but with their military bravery began and ended the catalogue of their virtues. Their vices were, un pitying cruelty, habitual oppression, and the unlimited exercise of the most gross and disgusting sensuality. Such were the actual lords of Egypt.¹

¹ "The Mameloues are an invincible race, inhabiting a burning desert, mounted on the fleetest horses in the world, and full of courage. They live with their wives and children in flying camps, which are never pitched two nights together in the same place. They are horrible savages, and yet they have some notion of gold and silver! a small quantity of it serves to excite their admiration. Yes, my dear brother, they love gold; they pass their lives in extorting it from such Europeans as fall into their hands;—and for what purpose?—for continuing the course of life which I have described, and for teaching it to their children. O, Jean Jacques! why was it not thy fate to see these men, whom thou call'st '*the men of nature*'?—thou wouldst sink with shame, thou wouldst startle with horror at the thought of having once admired them! Adieu, my dear brother. This climate kills me; we shall be so altered,

object of squeezing out of the country as much more as he could by any means secure, for the filling of his own coffers. The pacha maintained his authority sometimes by the assistance of Turkish troops, sometimes by exciting the jealousy of one bey against another. Thus this fertile country was subjected to the oppression of twenty-four pretors, who, whether they agreed among themselves, or with the pacha, or declared war against the representative of the Sultan, and against each other, were alike the terror and the scourge of the unhappy Arabs and Cophts, the right of oppressing whom, by every species of exaction, these haughty slaves regarded as their noblest and most undeniable privilege.

From the moment that Buonaparte conceived the idea of invading Egypt, the destruction of the power of the Mamelukes

against the Mamelukes. Their course was up the Nile, and a small flotilla of gun-boats ascended the river to protect their right flank, while the infantry traversed a desert of burning sands, at a distance from the stream, and without a drop of water

that you will discover the change at a league's distance. Remember me to the legislator Lucien. He might have sailed with us to advantage; we see more in two days than common travellers in two years."—LOUIS BUONAPARTE to his brother JOSEPH, dated Alexandria, July 6th, *Intercepted Correspondence*, part 1, p. 8.

¹ See it in the Appendix to this volume, No. VII.

p. 31

"I send you the proclamation to the inhabitants of the country. It has produced an effect altogether astonishing. The Bedouins, enemies of the Mameloucs, and who, properly speaking, are neither more nor less than intrepid robbers, sent us back, as soon as they had read it, thirty of our people whom they had made prisoners, with an offer of their services against the Mameloucs."—LOUIS BUONAPARTE; *Intercepted Correspondence*, part 1, p. 7.

to relieve their tormenting thirst. The army of Italy, accustomed to the enjoyments of that delicious country, were astonished at the desolation they saw around them. "Is this," they said, "the country in which we are to receive our farms of seven acres each? The general might have allowed us to take as much as we chose—no one would have abused the privilege." Their officers, too, expressed horror and disgust; and even generals of such celebrity as Murat and Lannes threw their hats on the sand, and trode on their cockades. It required all Buonaparte's authority to maintain order, so much were the French disgusted with the commencement of the expedition.¹

To add to their embarrassment, the enemy began to appear around them. Mamelukes and Arabs, concealed behind the hillocks of sand, interrupted their march at every opportunity, and woe to the soldier who straggled from the ranks, were it but fifty yards! Some of these horsemen were sure to dash at him, slay him on the spot, and make off before a musket could be discharged at them. At length, however, the audacity of these incursions was checked by a skirmish of some little importance near a place called Chebreis, in which the French asserted their military superiority.²

An encounter also took place on the river, between the French flotilla and a number of armed vessels belonging to the Mamelukes. Victory first inclined to the latter, but at length determined in favour of the French, who took, however, only a single galliot.

Meanwhile, the French were obliged to march with the utmost precaution. The whole plain was now covered with Mamelukes, mounted on the finest Arabian horses, and armed with pistols, carabines, and blunderbusses, of the best English workmanship—their plumed turbans waving in the air, and their rich dresses and arms glittering in the sun. Entertaining a high contempt for the French force, as consisting almost entirely of infantry, this splendid barbaric chivalry watched every opportunity for charging them, nor did a single straggler escape the unrelenting edge of their sabres. Their charge was almost as swift as the wind, and as their severe bits enabled them to halt, or wheel their horses at full gallop, their retreat was as rapid as their advance. Even the practised veterans of Italy were at first embarrassed by this new mode of fighting, and lost several men; especially when fatigue caused any one to fall out of the ranks, in which case his fate became certain. But they were soon re-

¹ "It would be difficult to describe the disgust, the discontent, the melancholy, the despair of the army, on its first arrival in Egypt: Napoleon himself saw two dragoons throw themselves into the Nile.—One day, losing his temper, he rushed among a group of discontented generals, and addressing himself to the tallest, 'You have held mutinous language,' said he, with vehemence; 'it is not your being six feet high that should save you from being shot in a couple of hours.'"—LAS CASES, tom. i., p. 206.

² Jomini, tom. x., p. 407.

conciled to fighting the Mamelukes, when they discovered that

importance in the eyes of the military, loud shouts of laughter used to hurst from the ranks, while forming to receive the Mamelukes, as the general of division called out, with military precision, "Let the asses and the *Sarans* enter within the square." The soldiers also amused themselves, by calling the asses *demi-sarans*¹. In times of discontent, these unlucky servants of science had their full share of the soldiers' reproaches, who imagined, that this unpopular expedition had been undertaken to gratify their passion for researches, in which the military took very slender interest.

Under such circumstances, it may be doubted whether even the literati themselves were greatly delighted, when, after fourteen days of such marches as we have described, they arrived, indeed, within six leagues of Cairo, and beheld at a distance the celebrated Pyramids, but learned, at the same time, that Murad Bey, with twenty-two of his brethren, at the head of their Mamelukes, had formed an intrenched camp at a place called

of the camp were but commenced, and presented no formidable opposition. Buonaparte made his dispositions. He extended his line to the right, in such a manner as to keep out of gunshot of the intrenched camp, and have only to encounter the line of cavalry.²

¹ Las Cases, tom. I., p. 210.

² Gourgaud, tom. II., p. 243.

³ "Pour toute harangue, Buonaparte leur adresse ces mots, qu'on peut

speed, and corresponding fury, and charged with horrible yells. They disordered one of the French squares of infantry, which would have been sabred in an instant, but that the mass of this fiery militia was a little behind the advanced guard. The French had a moment to restore order, and used it. The combat then in some degree resembled that which, nearly twenty years afterwards, took place at Waterloo; the hostile cavalry furiously charging the squares of infantry, and trying, by the most undaunted efforts of courage, to break in upon them at every practicable point, while a tremendous fire of musketry, grape-shot, and shells, crossing in various directions, repaid their audacity. Nothing in war was ever seen more desperate than the exertions of the Mamelukes. Failing to force their horses through the French squares, individuals were seen to wheel them round, and rein them back on the ranks, that they might disorder them by kicking. As they became frantic with despair, they hurled at the immoveable phalanxes, which they could not break, their pistols, their poniards, and their carabines. Those who fell wounded to the ground, dragged themselves on, to cut at the legs of the French with their crooked sabres. But their efforts were all vain.

The Mamelukes, after the most courageous efforts to accomplish their purpose, were finally beaten off with great slaughter; and as they could not form or act in squadron, their retreat became a confused flight. The greater part attempted to return to their camp, from that sort of instinct, as Napoleon termed it, which leads fugitives to retire in the same direction in which they had advanced. By taking this route they placed themselves betwixt the French and the Nile; and the sustained and insupportable fire of the former soon obliged them to plunge into the river, in hopes to escape by swimming to the opposite bank—a desperate effort, in which few succeeded. Their infantry at the same time evacuated their camp without a show of resistance, precipitated themselves into the boats, and endeavoured to cross the Nile. Very many of these also were destroyed. The French soldiers long afterwards occupied themselves in fishing for the drowned Mamelukes, and failed not to find money and valuables upon all whom they could recover.¹ Murad Bey, with a part of his best Mamelukes, escaped the slaughter by a more regular movement to the left, and retreated by Gizeh into Upper Egypt.²

regarder comme le sublime de l'éloquence militaire.—'Soldats! vous allez combattre aujourd'hui les dominateurs de l'Egypt; songez que du haut de ces Pyramides, quarante siècles vous contemplent!'"—LACRETELLE, tom. xiv., p. 267.

¹ Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 245; Miot, p. 50; Jomini, tom. x., p. 408; Thibaudau, tom. iv., p. 184; Larrey, p. 13.

² "About nine in the evening, Napoleon entered the country house of Murad Bey at Gizeh. Such habitations bear no resemblance to our *chateaux*. We found it difficult to make it serve for our lodging, and to understand the distribution of the different apartments. But what struck the officers, was a great quantity of cushions and divans covered with the finest damasks and silks of Lyons, and ornamented with gold fringe. The gardens were full of magnificent

Parisians, Buonaparte termed the "Battle of the Pyramids," Cairo surrendered without resistance. The shattered remains of the Mamelukes who had swam the Nile and united under Ibrahim Bey, were compelled to retreat into Syria. A party of three hundred French cavalry ventured to attack them at Salabieh, but were severely handled by Ibrahim Bey and his followers, who, having cut many of them to pieces, pursued their retreat without farther interruption. Lower Egypt was completely in the hands of the French, and thus far the expedition of Buonaparte had been perfectly successful. But it was not the will of Heaven, that even the most fortunate of men should escape reverses; and a severe one awaited Napoleon.

CHAPTER XIII.

French Fleet—Conflicting Statements of Buonaparte and Admiral Gantheaume—BATTLE OF ABOUKIR on 1st August, 1798—The

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trees, but without alleys. What most delighted the soldiers (for every one came to see the place) were great arbours of vine covered with the finest bunches of

Acre—French arrive before Acre on 17th March, 1799, and effect a breach on the 28th, but are driven back—Assaulted by an Army of Moslems assembled without the Walls of Acre, whom they defeat and disperse—Personal Misunderstanding and Hostility betwixt Napoleon and Sir Sidney Smith—Explained—Bonaparte is finally compelled to raise the Siege.

WHEN Bonaparte and his army were safely landed in Egypt, policy seemed to demand that the naval squadron, by which they had been escorted, should have been sent back to France as soon as possible. The French leader accordingly repeatedly asserts, that he had positively commanded Admiral Brueyes, an excellent officer, for whom he himself entertained particular respect,¹ either to carry his squadron of men-of-war into the harbour of Alexandria, or, that being found impossible, instantly to set sail for Corfu. The harbour, by report of the Turkish pilots, was greatly too shallow to admit without danger vessels of such a deep draught of water; and it scarce can be questioned that Admiral Brueyes would have embraced the alternative of setting sail for Corfu, had such been in reality permitted by his orders. But the assertion of Bonaparte is pointedly contradicted by the report of Vice-Admiral Gantheaume, who was himself in the battle of Aboukir, escaped from the slaughter with difficulty, and was intrusted by Bonaparte with drawing up the account of the disaster, which he transmitted to the minister of war. "Perhaps it may be said," so the despatch bears, "that it would have been advisable to have quitted the coast as soon as the disembarkation had taken place. But, *considering the orders of the commander-in-chief*, and the incalculable force afforded to the land-army by the presence of the squadron, the admiral thought it was his duty not to quit these seas."²

Looking at the matter more closely—considering the probability of Nelson's return, and the consequent danger of the fleet—considering, too, the especial interest which naval and military officers attach each to their peculiar service, and the relative disregard with which they contemplate the other, we can see several reasons why Bonaparte might have wished, even at some risk, to detain the fleet on the coast of Egypt, but not one which could induce Brueyes to continue there, not only without the consent of the commander-in-chief, but, as Napoleon afterwards alleged, against his express orders. It is one of the cases in which no degree of liberality can enable us to receive the testimony of Bonaparte, contradicted at once by circumstances, and by the positive testimony of Gantheaume.

¹ In a letter published in the *Moniteur*, No. 90, December 20, 1797, Bonaparte expresses the highest sense of Admiral Brueyes' firmness and talent, as well as of the high order in which he kept the squadron under his command; and concludes by saying, he had bestowed on him, in the name of the Directory, a spy-glass of the best construction which Italy afforded.—S.

² Intercepted Letters, part i., p. 219.

semicircular form, anchored so close to the shoal-water and surf,

seventy-four. The van of the English fleet, six in number, rounded successively the French line, and dropping anchor betwixt them and the shore, opened a tremendous fire. Nelson himself, and his other vessels, ranged along the same French ships on the outer side, and thus placed them betwixt two fires; while the rest of the French line remained for a time unable to take a share in the combat. The battle commenced with the

this time hatched by a cannon-shot. The names soon registered the

immense vessel, where the carnage was so terrible as to prevent all attempts to extinguish them; and the *L'Orient* remained blazing like a volcano in the middle of the combat, rendering for a time the dreadful spectacle visible.

At length, and while the battle continued as furious as ever, the burning vessel blew up with so tremendous an explosion, that for a while it silenced the fire on both sides, and made an awful pause in the midst of what had been but lately so horrible a tumult.¹ The cannonade was at first slowly and partially resumed, but ere midnight it raged with all its original fury. In the morning, the only two French ships who had their colours flying, cut their cables and put to sea, accompanied by two frigates; being all that remained undestroyed and uncaptured, of the gallant navy that so lately escorted Buonaparte and his fortunes in triumph across the Mediterranean.

Such was the Victory of Aboukir, for which he who achieved it felt that word was inadequate. He called it a conquest. The advantages of the day, great as they were, might have been pushed much farther, if Nelson had been possessed of frigates and small craft. The store-ships and transports in the harbour of Alexandria would then have been infallibly destroyed. As it was, the results were of the utmost importance, and the destinies of the French army were altered in proportion. They had no longer any means of communicating with the mother-country, but became the inhabitants of an insulated province, obliged to rely exclusively on the resources which they had brought with them, joined to those which Egypt might afford.

Buonaparte, however surprised by this reverse, exhibited great

by soldiers most enviable. I am keenly sensible to your grief. The moment which severs us from the object we love is terrible; it insulates us from all the earth; it inflicts on the body the agonies of death; the faculties of the soul are annihilated, and its relations with the universe subsist only through the medium of a horrible dream, which alters every thing. Mankind appear colder and more selfish than they really are. In this situation we feel that, if nothing obliged us to live, it would be much best to die; but when, after this first thought, we press our children to our hearts, tears and tender feelings revive the sentiments of our nature, and we live for our offspring; yes, madam, see in this very moment, how they open your heart to melancholy: you will weep with them, you will bring them up from infancy—you will talk to them of their father, of your sorrow, of the loss which you and the Republic have sustained. After having once more attached your mind to the world by filial and maternal love, set some value on the friendship and lively regard which I shall always feel for the wife of my friend. Believe that there are a few men who deserve to be the hope of the afflicted, because they understand the poignancy of mental sufferings."

¹ "At ten o'clock a vessel which was burning, blew up with a tremendous noise, which was heard as plainly at Rosetta as the explosion of Grenelle at Paris. This accident was succeeded by a pitchy darkness, and a most profound silence, which continued for about ten minutes."—*POUSSIELQUE to his Wife; Intercepted Letters*, part i., p. 208.

"*L'Orient* blew up about eleven in the evening. The whole horizon seemed on fire, the earth shook, and the smoke which proceeded from the vessel ascended heavily in a mass, like an immense black balloon. It then brightened up, and exhibited the objects of all descriptions, which had been precipitated on the scene of conflict. What a terrible moment of fear and desolation for the French, who witnessed this awful catastrophe!"—*LOUIS BUONAPARTE*.

equanimity. Three thousand French seamen, the remainder of nearly six thousand engaged in that dreadful battle, were sent ashore by cartel, and formed a valuable addition to his forces. Nelson, more grieved almost at being frustrated of his complete purpose, than rejoiced at his victory, left the coast after establishing a blockade on the port of Alexandria.

We are now to trace the means by which Napoleon proposed to establish and consolidate his government in Egypt; and in

extraordinary man ¹

His first care was to gather up the reins of government, such as they were, which had dropt from the hands of the defeated beys. With two classes of the Egyptian nation it was easy to establish his authority. The Fellahs, or peasantry, sure to be squeezed to the last penny by one party or other, willingly submitted to the invaders as the strongest, and the most able to protect them. The Cophts, or men of business, were equally ready to serve the party which was in possession of the country. So that the French became the masters of both, as a natural consequence of the power which they had obtained.

But the Turks were to be attached to the conqueror by other means, since their haughty national character, and the intolerance of the Mahometan religion rendered them alike inaccessible to profit, the hope of which swayed the Cophts, and to fear, which was the prevailing argument with the Fellahs. To gratify their vanity, and soothe their prejudices, seemed the only mode by which Napoleon could insinuate himself into the favour of this part of the population. With this view, Buonaparte was far from assuming a title of conquest in Egypt, though he left few of its rights unexercised. On the contrary, he wisely continued to admit the pacha to that ostensible share of authority which was yielded to him by the beys, and spoke with as much seeming respect of the Sublime Porte, as if it had been his intention ever again to permit their having any effective power in Egypt. Their imams, or priests; their ulemats, or men of law; their cadis, or judges; their sheiks, or chiefs; their Janissaries, or privileged soldiers, were all treated by Napoleon with a certain degree of

Napoleon affected to consult the superior council, and act in many cases according to their report of the law of the Prophet. On one occasion, he gave them a moral lesson which it would be great injustice to suppress. A tribe of roving Arabs had slain a peasant, and Buonaparte had given directions to search out and punish the murderers. One of his Oriental counsellors laughed at the zeal which the general manifested on so slight a cause.

"What have you to do with the death of this Fellah, Sultan Kebir?" said he, ironically; "was he your kinsman?"

"He was more," said Napoleon; "he was one for whose safety I am accountable to God, who placed him under my government."

"He speaks like an inspired person!" exclaimed the sheiks; who can admire the beauty of a just sentiment, though incapable, from the scope they allow their passions, to act up to the precepts of moral rectitude.

Thus far the conduct of Buonaparte was admirable. He protected the people who were placed under his power, he respected their religious opinions, he administered justice to them according to their own laws, until they should be supplied with a better system of legislation. Unquestionably, his good administration did not amend the radical deficiency of his title; it was still chargeable against him, that he had invaded the dominions of the most ancient ally of France, at a time when there was the most profound peace between the countries. Yet in delivering Egypt from the tyrannical sway of the Mamelukes, and administering the government of the country with wisdom and comparative humanity, the mode in which he used the power which he had acquired, might be admitted in some measure to atone for his usurpation. Not contented with directing his soldiers to hold in respect the religious observances of the country, he showed equal justice and policy in collecting and protecting the scattered remains of the great caravan of the Mecca pilgrimage, which had been plundered by the Mamelukes on their retreat. So satisfactory was his conduct to the Moslem divines, that he contrived to obtain from the clergy of the Mosque an opinion, declaring that it was lawful to pay tribute to the French, though such a doctrine is diametrically inconsistent with the Koran. Thus far Napoleon's measures had proved rational and successful. But with this laudable course of conduct was mixed a species of artifice, which, while we are compelled to term it impious, has in it, at the same time, something ludicrous, and almost childish.

Buonaparte entertained the strange idea of persuading the Moslems that he himself pertained in some sort to their religion, being an envoy of the Deity, sent on earth, not to take away, but to confirm and complete, the doctrines of the Koran, and the mission of Mahomet.¹ He used, in executing this purpose, the in-

¹ "It is not true that in Egypt Napoleon showed himself almost persuaded

flated language of the East, the more easily that it corresponded,

joined in the litanies and worship enjoined by the Koran. He affected, too, the language of an inspired follower of the faith of

is in itself a declaration of Islamism.

"Thou hast spoken like the most learned of the prophets," said the mufti, who accompanied him.

"I can command a car of fire to descend from heaven," continued the French general, "and I can guide and direct its course upon earth."

"Thou art the great chief to whom Mahomet gives power and victory," said the mufti.

Napoleon closed the conversation with this not very pertinent Oriental proverb, "The bread which the wicked seizes upon by force, shall be turned to dust in his mouth" ¹

Though the mufti played his part in the above scene with becoming gravity, Buonaparte over-estimated his own theatrical powers, and did too little justice to the shrewdness of the Turks, if he supposed them really edified by his pretended proselytism. With them as with us, a renegade from the religious faith in which he was brought up, is like a deserter from the standard of

his country ; and though the services of either may be accepted and used, they remain objects of disregard and contempt, as well with those to whose service they have deserted, as with the party whom they have abandoned.

The Turks and Arabs of Cairo soon afterwards showed Buonaparte, by a general and unexpected insurrection, [October 22,] in which many Frenchmen were slain, how little they were moved by his pretended attachment to their faith, and how cordially they considered him as their enemy. Yet, when the insurgents had been quelled by force, and the blood of five thousand Moslems had atoned for that of three hundred Frenchmen, Napoleon, in an address to the inhabitants of Cairo, new-modelling the general council or divan, held still the same language as before of himself and his destinies. " Sheriffs," he said, " Ulemats, Orators of the Mosque, teach the people that those who become my enemies shall have no refuge in this world or the next. Is there any one not blind enough to see, that I am the agent of Destiny, or incredulous enough to call in question the power of Destiny over human affairs? Make the people understand, that since the world was a world, it was ordained, that having destroyed the enemies of Islamism, and broken down the Cross,¹ I should come from the West to accomplish the task designed for me—show them, that in more than twenty passages of the Koran my coming is foretold. I could demand a reckoning from each of you for the most secret thoughts of his soul, since to me everything is known ; but the day will come when all shall know from whom I have my commission, and that human efforts cannot prevail against me."

It is plain from this strange proclamation, that Buonaparte was willing to be worshipped as a superior being, as soon as altars could be built, and worshippers collected together. But the Turks and Arabs were wiser than the Persians in the case of young Ammon. The Sheik of Alexandria, who affected much devotion to Buonaparte's person, came roundly to the point with him. He remarked the French observed no religious worship. " Why not, therefore," he said, " declare yourself Moslem at once, and remove the only obstacle betwixt you and the throne of the East?" Buonaparte objected the prohibition of wine, and the external rite which Mahomet adopted from the Jewish religion. The officious sheik proposed to call a council of the Moslem sages, and procure for the new proselytes some relaxation of these fundamental laws of the Prophet's faith. According to this hopeful plan, the Moslems must have ceased to be such in two principal articles of their ritual, in order to induce the French to become a kind of imperfect renegades, rejecting, in the prohibition of wine, the only peculiar guard which Mahomet assigned to the

¹ Alluding to the capture of the island of Malta, and subjection of the Pope, on which he was wont to found as services rendered to the religion of Mahomet.—S.

moral virtue of his followers, while they embraced the degrading doctrine of fatality, the licentious practice of polygamy, and the absurd chimeras of the Koran.

of Mahomet, and for the Prophet of Mecca himself he had a

sonage, who was not, to a certain degree, the dupe of his own imposture; and Napoleon's calculating and reflecting mind was totally devoid of the enthusiasm which enables a man to cheat himself into at least a partial belief of the deceit which he would impose on others. The French soldiers, on the other hand, bred in scorn of religion of every description, would have seen nothing but ridicule in the pretensions of their leader to a supernatural mission; and in playing the character which Alexander ventured to personate, Buonaparte would have found in his own army many a Clitus, who would have considered his pretensions as

Africans and Asiatics, whose persons they despised, and whose

speedily assumed a character, which his taking the turban and professing himself a Moslem in all the forms, could not have altered to his advantage.

It had been promised to Buonaparte, that the abilities of Talleyrand, as minister of foreign affairs, should be employed to reconcile the Grand Signior and his counsellors to the occupation of Egypt.¹ But the efforts of that able negotiator had totally failed in a case so evidently hopeless; and if Talleyrand had even proceeded to Constantinople, as Napoleon alleged the Directory had promised, it could only have been to be confined in the Seven Towers. The Porte had long since declared, that any attack upon Egypt, the road to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, would be considered as a declaration of war, whatever pretexts might be alleged. They regarded, therefore, Buonaparte's invasion as an injury equally unprovoked and unjustifiable. They declared war against France, called upon every follower of the Prophet to take the part of his vicegerent upon earth, collected forces, and threatened an immediate expedition, for the purpose of expelling the infidels from Egypt. The success of the British at Aboukir increased their confidence. Nelson was loaded with every mark of honour which the Sultan could bestow, and the most active preparations were made to act against Buonaparte, equally considered as enemy to the Porte, whether he professed himself Christian, infidel, or renegade.

Meantime, that adventurous and active chief was busied in augmenting his means of defence or conquest, and in acquiring the information necessary to protect what he had gained, and to extend his dominions. For the former purpose, corps were raised from among the Egyptians, and some were mounted upon dromedaries, the better to encounter the perils of the desert. For the latter, Buonaparte undertook a journey to the Isthmus of Suez, the well-known interval which connects Asia with Africa. He subscribed the charter, or protection, granted to the Maronite Monks of Sinai, with the greater pleasure, that the signature of Mahomet had already sanctioned that ancient document. He visited the celebrated fountains of Moses, and, misled by a guide, had nearly been drowned in the advancing tides of the Red Sea.² This, he observes, would have furnished a splendid text to all the preachers in Europe.³ But the same Deity, who had rendered the gulf fatal to Pharaoh, had reserved for one, who equally defied and disowned his power, the rocks of an island in the midst of the Atlantic.

¹ Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 363.

² "The night overtook us, the waters began to rise around us, when the horsemen a-head cried out that their horses were swimming. General Buonaparte rescued the whole party by one of those simple expedients which occur to an imperturbable mind. Placing himself in the centre, he bade all the rest form a circle round him, and then ride out each man in a separate direction, and each to halt as soon as he found his horse swimming. The man whose horse continued to march the last, was sure, he said, to be in the right direction; him, accordingly we all followed, and reached Suez, at midnight, in safety; though so rapidly had the tide advanced, that the horses were more than breast-high in the water."—*Memoirs of Savary*, vol. i., p. 97.

³ Las Cases, tom. i., p. 211.

When Napoleon was engaged in this expedition, or speedily on his return, he learned that two Turkish armies had assembled, one at Rhodes, and the other in Syria, with the purpose of recovering Egypt. The daring genius, which always desired to

Turkish armies at the same time, his commencement was as

Liou of the Desert.

Upon his entering the Holy Land, Buonaparte again drove before him a body of the Mamelukes, belonging to those who, after the battles of the Pyramids and of Salahieh, had retreated into Syria; and his army occupied without resistance Gaza, anciently a city of the Philistines, in which they found supplies of provisions. Jaffa, a celebrated city during the time of the Crusades, was the next object of attack. It was bravely assaulted, and fiercely defended. But the French valour and discipline prevailed—the place was carried by storm—three thousand Turks were cut to the ground and the town was abandoned to the French.

¹ "While the army was passing through Syria, there was scarcely a soldier but was heard to repeat these lines from Zaire.—

*'Les Français sont las de chercher désormais
Des climats que pour eux le destin n'a point faits,
Ils n'abandonnent point leur fertile patrie
Pour languir aux déserts de l'aride Arabie.'*

When the men found themselves in the midst of the Desert, surrounded by the boundless ocean of sand, they began to question the generosity of their general; they thought he had observed singular moderation in having promised each of them only "even acres." The rogue," said they, "might with safety give us as much as he pleases, we should not abuse his good-nature."—LAS CASES, tom. i., p. 219.

² See his despatch to the Directory, on the Syrian campaign.—GOURGARD, tom. ii., p. 374.

in the natural exclamation of the Maréchal de Montlue, "Certes, we soldiers stand in more need of the Divine mercy than other men, seeing that our profession compels us to command and to witness deeds of such cruelty." It was not, however, to the ordinary horrors attending the storm of a town, that the charge against Buonaparte is on this occasion limited. He is accused of having been guilty of an action of great injustice, as well as of especial barbarity. Concerning this we shall endeavour to state, stripped of colouring and exaggeration, first the charge, and then the reply, of Napoleon himself.

After the breach had been stormed, a large part of the garrison, estimated by Buonaparte himself at twelve hundred men, which Miot¹ raises to betwixt two and three thousand, and others exaggerate still more, remained on the defensive, and held out in the mosques, and a sort of citadel to which they had retreated, till, at length, despairing of succour, they surrendered their arms, and were in appearance admitted to quarter. Of this body, the Egyptians were carefully separated from the Turks, Maugrabins, and Arnauts; and while the first were restored to liberty, and sent back to their country, these last were placed under a strong guard. Provisions were distributed to them, and they were permitted to go by detachments in quest of water. According to all appearance they were considered and treated as prisoners of war. This was on the 7th of March. On the 9th, two days afterwards, this body of prisoners were marched out of Jaffa, in the centre of a large square battalion, commanded by General Bon. Miot assures us, that he himself mounted his horse, accompanied the melancholy column, and witnessed the event. The Turks foresaw their fate, but used neither entreaties nor complaints to avert it. They marched on, silent and composed. Some of them, of higher rank, seemed to exhort the others to submit, like servants of the Prophet, to the decree, which, according to their belief, was written on their forehead. They were escorted to the sand-hills to the south-east of Jaffa, divided there into small bodies, and put to death by musketry. The execution lasted a considerable time, and the wounded, as in the *fusillades* of the Revolution, were despatched with the bayonet. Their bodies were heaped together, and formed a pyramid which is still visible, consisting now of human bones as originally of bloody corpses.

The cruelty of this execution occasioned the fact itself to be doubted, though coming with strong evidence, and never denied by the French themselves. Napoleon, however, frankly admitted the truth of the statement both to Lord Ebrington and to Dr. O'Meara.² Well might the author of this cruelty write to the

¹ Expédition en Egypte et Syrie, p. 148.

² "I asked him about the massacre of the Turks at Jaffa: he answered, 'C'est vrai; J'en fis fusiller à peu près deux mille.'"—Memorandum of Two

Directory, that the storming of Jaffa was marked by horrors which he had never elsewhere witnessed. Buonaparte's defence was, that the massacre was justified by the laws of war—that the head of his messenger had been cut off by the governor of Jaffa, when sent to summon him to surrender—that these Turks were a part of the garrison of El Arish, who had engaged not to serve against the French, and were found immediately afterwards defending Jaffa, in breach of the terms of their capitulation. They had incurred the doom of death, therefore, by the rules of war—Wellington, he said, would have, in his place, acted in the same manner.

storm and plunder of the town, with which his revenge ought, in all reason, to have been satisfied. If some of these unhappy Turks had broken their faith to Buonaparte, and were found again in the ranks which they had sworn to abandon, it could not, according to the most severe construction of the rules of war, authorise the dreadful retaliation of indiscriminate massacre

had given up the mean of defence, on condition of safety for life at least.¹

This bloody deed must always remain a deep stain on the character of Napoleon. Yet we do not view it as the indulgence of an innate love of cruelty; for nothing in Buonaparte's history shows the existence of that vice, and there are many things which intimate his disposition to have been naturally humane. But he was ambitious, aimed at immense and gigantic undertakings, and easily learned to overlook the waste of human life, which the execution of his projects necessarily involved. He seems to have argued, not on the character of the action, but solely on the effect which it was to produce upon his own combinations. His army was small; it was his business to strike terror into his numerous enemies, and the measure to be adopted seemed capa-

Conversations between the Emperor Napoleon and Viscount Ebrington at Porto-Ferrajo, p. 12.

¹ See Jomini, tom. xi., p. 403. Thibaudau, tom. ii., p. 172; Savary, tom. i., p. 180; Bourrienne, tom. ii., p. 26; Marlin, Hist. de l'Expédition d'Égypte, tom. i., p. 232.

ble of making a deep impression on all who should hear of it. Besides, these men, if dismissed, would immediately rejoin his enemies. He had experienced their courage, and to disarm them would have been almost an unavailing precaution, where their national weapon, the sabre, was so easily attained. To detain them prisoners would have required a stronger force than Napoleon could afford, would have added difficulty and delay to the movement of his troops, and tended to exhaust his supplies. That sort of necessity, therefore, which men fancy to themselves when they are unwilling to forego a favourite object for the sake of obeying a moral precept—that necessity which might be more properly termed a temptation difficult to be resisted—that necessity which has been called the tyrant's plea, was the cause of the massacre at Jaffa, and must remain its sole apology.

It might almost seem that Heaven set its vindictive brand upon this deed of butchery; for about the time it was committed the plague broke out in the army. Buonaparte, with a moral courage deserving as much praise as his late cruelty deserved reprobation, went into the hospitals in person, and while exposing himself, without hesitation, to the infection, diminished the terror of the disease in the opinion of the soldiers generally, and even of the patients themselves, who were thus enabled to keep up their spirits, and gained by doing so the fairest chance of recovery.¹

Meanwhile, determined to prosecute the conquest of Syria, Buonaparte resolved to advance to Saint Jean d'Acre, so celebrated in the wars of Palestine. The Turkish Pacha, or governor of Syria, who, like others in his situation, accounted himself almost an independent sovereign, was Achmet; who, by his unrelenting cruelties and executions, had procured the terrible distinction of Djezzar, or the Butcher. Buonaparte addressed this formidable chief in two letters, offering his alliance, and threatening him with his vengeance if it should be rejected.² To neither did the pacha return any answer; in the second instance he put to death the messenger. The French general advanced against Acre, vowing revenge. There were, however, obstacles to the success of his enterprise, on which he had not calculated.

The pacha had communicated the approach of Napoleon to Sir Sidney Smith, to whom had been committed the charge of assisting the Turks in their proposed expedition to Egypt, and who, for that purpose, was cruising in the Levant. He hastened to sail for Acre with the *Tigre* and *Thesus*, ships of the line; and arriving there two days ere the French made their appearance, contributed greatly to place the town, the fortifications of which were on the old Gothic plan, in a respectable state of defence.

¹ O'Meara, vol. ii., p. 123.

² See Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 372.

Sir Sidney Smith, who so highly distinguished himself on this occasion, had been long celebrated for the most intrepid courage, and spirit of enterprise. His character was, besides, marked by

quently intrusted with the charge of alarming the French coast, had been taken on one occasion, and, contrary to the laws of nations, and out of a mean spirit of revenge, was imprisoned in the Temple, from which he was delivered by a daring stratagem, effected by the French Royalist party. He had not been many hours at Acre, when Providence afforded him a distinguished mark of favour. The *Theseus*, which had been detached to intercept any French vessels that might be attending on Buonaparte's march, detected a small flotilla stealing under Mount Carmel, and had the good fortune to make prize of seven out of nine of them. They were a convoy from Damietta, bound for Acre, having on board heavy cannon, platforms, ammunition, and other necessary articles. These cannon and military stores, destined to form the siege of Acre, became eminently useful in its defence, and the consequence of their capture was eventually decisive of the struggle. General Philippeaux, a French royalist, and officer of engineers, immediately applied himself to place the cannon thus acquired, to the amount of betwixt thirty and forty, upon the walls which they had been intended to destroy. This officer, who had been Buonaparte's school-fellow, and the

peaux,¹ and about to become almost the personal enemy of Smith.

On the 17th March, the French came in sight of Acre, which is built on a peninsula advancing into the sea, and so conveniently situated that vessels can lie near the shore, and annoy with their fire whatever advances to assault the fortification.

¹ Philippeaux died during the siege, of a fever brought on by fatigue. Buonaparte spoke of him with more respect than he usually showed to those who

Notwithstanding the presence of two British ships of war, and the disappointment concerning his battering cannon, which were now pointed against him from the ramparts, Buonaparte, with a characteristic perseverance, which, on such an occasion, was pushed into obstinacy, refused to abandon his purpose, and proceeded to open trenches, although the guns which he had to place in them were only twelve pounders. The point of attack was a large tower which predominated over the rest of the fortifications. A mine at the same time was run under the extreme defences.

By the 28th March a breach was effected, the mine was sprung, and the French proceeded to the assault upon that day. They advanced at the charging step, under a murderous fire from the walls, but had the mortification to find a deep ditch betwixt them and the tower. They crossed it, nevertheless, by help of the scaling-ladders which they carried with them, and forced their way as far as the tower, from which it is said that the defenders, impressed by the fate of Jaffa, were beginning to fly. They were checked by the example of Djezzar himself, who fired his own pistols at the French, and upbraided the Moslems who were retreating from the walls. The defences were again manned; the French, unable to support the renewed fire, were checked and forced back; and the Turks falling upon them in their retreat with sabre in hand, killed a number of their best men, and Mailly, who commanded the party. Sorties were made from the place to destroy the French works; and although the cries with which the Turks carry on their military manoeuvres gave the alarm to the enemy, yet, assisted by a detachment of British seamen, they did the French considerable damage, reconnoitred the mine which they were forming anew, and obtained the knowledge of its direction necessary to prepare a counter-mine.

While the strife was thus fiercely maintained on both sides, with mutual loss and increased animosity, the besiegers were threatened with other dangers. An army of Moslem troops of various nations, but all actuated by the same religious zeal, had formed themselves in the mountains of Samaria, and uniting with them the warlike inhabitants of that country, now called Naplous, formed the plan of attacking the French army lying before Acre on one side, while Djezzar and his allies should assail them upon the other. Kleber, with his division, was despatched by Buonaparte to disperse this assemblage. But though he obtained considerable advantages over detached parties of the Syrian army, their strength was so disproportioned, that at last, while he held a position near Mount Tabor, with two or three thousand men, he was surrounded by about ten times his own number. But his general-in-chief was hastening to his assistance. Buonaparte left two divisions to keep the trenches before Acre, and penetrated into the country in three columns. Murat, at the head of a fourth, occupied the pass called Jacob's Bridge. The attack, made on various points, was every where successful. The camp of the Sy-

rian army was taken; their defeat, almost their dispersion, was accomplished, while their scattered remains fled to Damascus. Buonaparte returned, crowned with laurels, to the siege of Acre.

Here, too, the arrival of thirty heavy pieces of cannon from Jaffa seemed to promise that success, which the French had as yet been unable to attain. It was about this time that, walking on the Mount which still retains the name of Richard Cœur de Lion, Buonaparte expressed himself to Murat in these terms, as he pointed to Saint Jean D'Acre:—"The fate of the East depends upon yonder petty town. Its conquest will ensure the main object of my expedition, and Damascus will be the first fruit of it."¹ Thus it would seem, that, while engaged in the enterprise, Buonaparte held the same language, which he did many years after its failure when at St. Helena.

Repeated and desperate assaults proved, that the consequence which he attached to taking Acre was as great as his words expressed. The assailants suffered severely on these occasions, for they were exposed to the fire of two revelins, or external fortifications, which had been constructed under Philippeaux's directions, and at the same time enfiladed by the fire of the British shipping. At length, employing to the uttermost the heavy artillery now in his possession, Buonaparte, in spite of a bloody and obstinate opposition, forced his way to the disputed tower, and made a lodgment on the second story. It afforded, however, no access to the town; and the troops remained there as in a cul-

hoped for and much needed, appeared in view of the garrison. They contained Turkish troops under the command of Haasan Bey. Yet near as they were, the danger was imminent that Acre might be taken ere they could land. To prevent such a misfortune, Sir Sidney Smith in person proceeded to the disputed tower, at the head of a body of British seamen, armed with pikes,

each other, and the spear-heads of the standards were locked

¹ Related by Miot as communicated to him by Murat—"S—" *Le sort de l'Orient est dans cette bicoque; la chute de cette ville est le but de mon expédition, Damas doit en être le fruit.*—Miot, p. 181.

siderable breach that had been effected in the curtain, and which promised a more easy entrance. It proved, indeed, but too easy; for Djezzar Pacha opposed to the assault on this occasion a new mode of tactics. Confiding in his superior numbers, he suffered the French, who were commanded by the intrepid General Lannes, to surmount the breach without opposition, by which they penetrated into the body of the place. They had no sooner entered, than a numerous body of Turks mingled among them with loud shouts; and ere they had time or room to avail themselves of their discipline, brought them into that state of close fighting, where strength and agility are superior to every other acquirement. The Turks, wielding the sabre in one hand, and the poniard in the other, cut to pieces almost all the French who had entered. General Rambaud lay a headless corpse in the breach—Lannes was with difficulty brought off severely wounded. The Turks gave no quarter; and instantly cutting the heads off of those whom they slew, carried them to the pacha, who sat in public distributing money to those who brought him these bloody trophies, which now lay piled in heaps around him. This was the sixth assault upon these tottering and blood-stained ramparts. "Victory," said Napoleon, "is to the most persevering;"¹ and contrary to the advice of Kleber, he resolved upon another and yet more desperate attack.

On the 21st May the final effort was made. The attack of the morning failed, and Colonel Veneux renewed it at mid-day. "Be assured," said he to Buonaparte, "Acre shall be yours to-night, or Veneux will die on the breach."² He kept his word at the cost of his life. Bon was also slain, whose division had been the executioners of the garrison of Jaffa. The French now retreated, dispirited and despairing of success. The contest had been carried on at half a musket shot distance; and the bodies of the dead lying around, putrified under the burning sun, spread disease among the survivors. An attempt was made to establish a suspension of arms for removing this horrible annoyance. Miot says that the pacha returned no answer to the proposal of the French. According to Sir Sidney Smith's official reports, the armistice for this humane purpose was actually agreed on, but broken off by the French firing upon those who were engaged in the melancholy office, and then rushing on to make their last unsuccessful charge and assault upon the breach. This would have been a crime so useless, and would have tended so much to the inconvenience of the French themselves, that we cannot help suspecting some misunderstanding had occurred, and that the interruption was under a wrong conception of the purpose of the working party.

This is the more probable, as Sir Sidney Smith, who reports

¹ "La victoire est au plus opiniâtre."—Miot, p. 199.

² Miot, p. 199.

the circumstance, was not at this time disposed to put the best construction on any action of Buonaparte's, who, on the other

pachalik, in terms inviting them to revolt, and join the French; yet was much offended when, imitating his own policy, the pacha and Sir Sidney Smith caused letters to be sent into his camp before Acre, urging his soldiers to mutiny and desertion. Sir Sidney also published a proclamation to the Druses, and other

the first time, to an inglorious retreat.

Another calumny, circulated by Buonaparte against the English commodore, was, that Sir Sidney Smith had endeavoured to expose his French prisoners to the infection of the plague, by

After the heat excited by their angry collision had long subsided, it is amusing to find Napoleon, when in the island of Saint Helena, declaring, that his opinion of Sir Sidney Smith was altered for the better, since he had become acquainted with the rest of his countrymen, and that he now considered him as a worthy sort of man—for an Englishman.

The siege of Acre had now continued sixty days since the opening of the trenches. The besiegers had marched no less than eight times to the assault, while eleven desperate sallies were evidence of the obstinacy of the defence. Several of the best French generals were killed; among the rest Caffarelli,¹ for

¹ Caffarelli was shot in the elbow, and died of the amputation of the limb.

whom Buonaparte had particular esteem; and the army was greatly reduced by the sword and the plague, which raged at once among their devoted bands. Retreat became inevitable. Yet Buonaparte endeavoured to give it such a colouring as might make the measure seem voluntary. Sometimes he announced, that his purpose of going to Acre was sufficiently accomplished when he had battered down the palace of the pacha; at other times he affirmed he had left the whole town a heap of ruins; and finally, he informed the Directory that he could easily have taken the place, but the plague being raging within its walls, and it being impossible to prevent the troops from seizing on infected clothes for part of their booty, he had rather declined the capture of Acre, than run the risk of introducing this horrid malady among his soldiers. What his real feelings must have been, while covering his chagrin with such flimsy pretexts, may be conjectured from the following frank avowal to his attendants in Saint Helena. Speaking of the dependence of the most important affairs on the most trivial, he remarks, that the mistake of the captain of a frigate, who bore away, instead of forcing his passage to the place of his destination, had prevented the face of the world from being totally changed. "Acre," he said, "would otherwise have been taken—the French army would have flown to Damascus and Aleppo—in a twinkling of an eye they would have been on the Euphrates—the Syrian Christians would have joined us—the Druses, the Armenians would have united with us."—Some one replied, "We might have been reinforced to the number of a hundred thousand men."—"Say six hundred thousand," said the Emperor; "who can calculate the amount? I would have reached Constantinople and the Indies—I would have changed the face of the world."¹

ings of the patient's spirit, and that this phenomenon was renewed so often as the general made him a visit.—S.

¹ Las Cases, tom. i., partie seconde, p. 384. The extravagance of Napoleon's plan unavoidably reminds us of the vanity of human wishes. The cause to which he ascribes it is the *mistake* of a captain of a frigate, who, instead of forcing his way to Acre, against the opposition of two ships of the line, was unfortunately taken by them. This is a mode of reasoning which Napoleon was very ready to adopt. The misarrangement of his plans was seldom imputed by him to the successful wisdom or valour of an enemy, but to some accidental circumstance, or blunder, which deranged the scheme which must otherwise have been infallible. Some of his best generals were of a different opinion, and considered the rashness of the attack upon Acre, as involving the certainty of failure. Kleber is reported to have said, that the Turks defended themselves with the skill of Christians, and that the French attacked like Turks.—S.

CHAPTER XIV.

Discussion concerning the alleged Poisoning of the Sick in the Hospitals at Jaffa—Napoleon acquitted of the charge—French Army re-enter Cairo on the 14th June—Retrospect of what had taken place in Upper and Lower Egypt during Napoleon's Absence—Incursion of Murad Bey—18,000 Turks occupy Aboukir—Attacked and defeated—This Victory terminates Napoleon's Career in Egypt—Admiral Gantheleme receives Orders to make ready for Sea—On the 22d August Napoleon embarks for France—Arrives in Ajaccio on the 30th September—and lands at Frejus on the 9th October.

THE retreat from before Acre was conducted with equal skill and secrecy, though Buonaparte was compelled to leave behind his heavy cannon, which he either buried or threw into the sea. But, by a rumour which long prevailed in the French army, he was alleged to have taken a far more extraordinary measure of

lescent were sent forward on the road to Egypt, under the necessary precautions for their safety. There remained an indefinite number, reaching at the greatest computation to betwixt twenty and thirty, but stated by Buonaparte himself to be only seven, whose condition was desperate. Their disease was the plague,

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men, not to kill them.¹

The proposal was agreeable to Buonaparte's principles, who advocating the legality of suicide, naturally might believe, that if a man has a right to relieve himself of intolerable evils by depriving himself of life, a general or a monarch may deal forth that measure to his soldiers or subjects, which he would think it advisable to act upon in his own case. It was consistent, also,

¹ O'Meara, vol. I., p. 331.

with his character, rather to look at results than at the measures which were to produce them, and to consider in many cases the end as an excuse for the means. "I would have desired such a relief for myself in the same circumstances," he said to Mr. Warden.¹ To O'Meara he affirmed, "that he would have taken such a step even with respect to his own son."² The fallacy of this reasoning is demonstrable; but Buonaparte was saved from acting on it by the resistance of Desgenettes. A rear-guard was left to protect these unhappy men; and the English found some of them alive, who, if Desgenettes had been more compliant, would have been poisoned by their physician. If Buonaparte was guilty of entertaining such a purpose, whether entertained from indifference to human life, or from wild and misdirected ideas of humanity, he met an appropriate punishment in the general belief which long subsisted, that the deed had been actually carried into execution, not in the persons of a few expiring wretches only, but upon several hundred men. Miot says the report was current in the French army,—Sir Robert Wilson found it credited among their officers, when they became the English prisoners,—and Count Las Cases admits it was generally believed by the soldiers. But though popular credulity eagerly receives whatever stories are marked by the horrible and wonderful, history, on the contrary, demands direct evidence, and the existence of powerful motives,³ for whatever is beyond the ordinary bounds of credibility. The poisoning of five or six hundred men is neither easily managed nor easily concealed; and why should the French leader have had recourse to it, since, like many a retreating general before him, he had only to leave the patients for whom he had not the means of transportation? To poison the sick and helpless, must have destroyed his interest with the remainder of his soldiers; whereas, to have left them to their fate, was a matter too customary, and too much considered as a point of necessity, to create any discontent⁴ among those, whose interest, as well as that of their general, consisted in

¹ Warden's Letters, p. 156.

² Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii., p. 333.

³ History of the British Expedition to Egypt, vol. i., p. 127.

⁴ Miot gives a melancholy, but too true a picture, of the indifference with which soldiers, when on a retreat, regard the sufferings of those whose strength does not enable them to keep up with the march. He describes a man, affected by the fear of being left to the cruelties of the Turks, snatching up his knapsack, and staggering after the column to which he belonged, while his glazed eye, uncertain motion, and stumbling pace, excited the fear of some, and the ridicule of others. "His account is made up," said one of his comrades, as he reeled about amongst them like a drunkard. "He will not make a long march of it," said another. And when, after more than one fall, he at length became unable to rise, the observation that "he had taken up his quarters," was all the moan which it was thought necessary to make. It is in these cases, as Miot justly observes, that indifference and selfishness become universal; and he that would be comfortable must manage to rely on his own exertions, and, above all, to remain in good health.—S.

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parte's fall, who could give the least evidence to authenticate the report otherwise than as a rumour, that had sprung out of the unjustifiable proposal which had indeed been made by Buonaparte to Desgenettes, but never acted upon. The same patient and impartial investigation, therefore, which compels us to record that the massacre of the Turkish prisoners in cold blood is fully proved, induces us to declare, that the poisoning of the sick at Jaffa has been affirmed without sufficient evidence.¹

Buonaparte continued his retreat from Syria, annoyed by the natives, who harassed his march, and retaliating the injuries which he received, by plundering and burning the villages which lay in the course of his march. He left Jaffa on the 28th May, and upon the 14th June re-entered Cairo, with a reputation not so much increased by the victory at Mount Tabor, as diminished and sullied, for the time, by the retreat from Acre.

Lower Egypt, during the absence of Buonaparte, had remained undisturbed, unless by partial insurrections. In one of these an impostor personated that mysterious individual, the Imaum Mohadi, of whom the Orientals believe that he is not dead, but is destined to return and combat Antichrist, before the consummation of all things takes place. This pretender to supernatural power, as well as others who placed themselves at the head of in-

surrections without such high pretensions, was completely defeated; and the French showed the greatest severity in punishing their followers, and the country which had furnished them with partisans.¹

In Upper Egypt there had been more obstinate contention. Murad Bey, already mentioned as the ablest chief of the Mamelukes, had maintained himself in that country with a degree of boldness and sagacity, which gave the French much trouble. His fine force of cavalry enabled him to advance or retreat at pleasure, and his perfect acquaintance with the country added much to his advantage.

Desaix, sent against Murad after the battle of the Pyramids, had again defeated the Mameluke chief at Sedinan, where was once more made evident the superiority of European discipline over the valour of the irregular cavalry of the East. Still the destruction of the enterprising bey was far from complete. Reinforced by a body of cavalry, Desaix,² in the month of December, 1798, again attacked him, and, after a number of encounters, terminating generally to the advantage of the French, the remaining Mamelukes, with their allies the Arabs, were at length compelled to take shelter in the Desert. Egypt seemed entirely at the command of the French; and Cosseir, a seaport on the Red Sea, had been taken possession of by a flotilla, fitted out to command that gulf.³

Three or four weeks after Buonaparte's return from Syria, this flattering state of tranquillity seemed on the point of being disturbed. Murad Bey, re-entering Upper Egypt with his Mamelukes and allies, descended the Nile in two bodies, one occupying each bank of the river. Ibrahim Bey, formerly his partner in the government of Egypt, made a corresponding movement towards the frontiers of Syria, as if to communicate with the right-hand division of Murad's army. La Grange was despatched against the Mamelukes who occupied the right bank, while Murat marched against those who, under the bey himself, were descending the Nile. The French were entertained at the idea of the two Murats, as they termed them, from the similarity of their names, meeting and encountering each other; but the Mameluke Murad retreated before *Le Beau Sabreur*—the handsome swordsman—of the French army.⁴

Meantime, the cause of this incursion was explained by the appearance of a Turkish fleet off Alexandria, who disembarked eighteen thousand men at Aboukir. This Turkish army pos-

¹ Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 323.

² "Brave Desaix! He would have conquered any where. He was skilful, vigilant, daring—little regarding fatigue, and death still less. He would have gone to the end of the world in quest of victory."—NAPOLÉON, *Antommarchi*, vol. i., p. 376.

³ Jomini, tom. xi., p. 420; Thibaudreau, tom. ii., p. 297; Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 320.

⁴ Gourgaud, tom. iii., p. 328.

essed themselves of the fort, and proceeded to fortify themselves, expecting the arrival of the Mamelukes, according to the plan which had previously been adjusted for expelling the French from Egypt. This news reached Buonaparte near the Pyramids, to which he had advanced, in order to ensure the destruction of Murad Bey. The arrival of the Turks instantly recalled him to Alexandria, whence he marched to Aboukir to repel the inva-

the will decide the fate of the world."

expected return, which must have been prevented had he not succeeded in obtaining the most complete triumph over the Turks. The leaving his Egyptian army, a dubious step at best, would have been altogether indefensible had there remained an enemy in their front.

Next morning, being the 25th July, Buonaparte commenced an attack on the advanced posts of the enemy, and succeeded in driving them in upon the main body, which was commanded by Seid Mustapha Pacha. In their first attack the French were eminently successful, and pursued the fugitive Turks to their intrenchments, doing great execution. But when the batteries opened upon them from the trenches, while they were at the same time exposed to the fire from the gun-boats in the bay, their impetuosity was checked, and the Turks, sallying out upon them with their muskets aimed at their backs, made such large

They threw themselves confusedly out of the intrenchments to obtain these bloody testimonials, and were in considerable dis-

¹ *Miot*, p. 240

² "Les Turcs maintenaient le combat avec succès; mais Murat, par un mouvement rapide comme la pensée, dirigea sa gauche sur les derrières de leur droit," &c.—BUONAPARTE to the Directory.

had surmounted the intrenchments, he formed a column which reversed the position of the Turks, and pressing them with the bayonet, threw them into utter and inextricable confusion. Fired upon and attacked on every point, they became, instead of an army, a confused rabble, who, in the impetuosity of animal terror, threw themselves by hundreds and by thousands into the sea, which at once seemed covered with turbans.¹ It was no longer a battle, but a massacre; and it was only when wearied with slaughter that quarter was given to about six thousand men; the rest of the Turkish army, originally consisting of eighteen thousand, perished on the field or in the waves. Mustapha Pacha was taken, and carried in triumph before Buonaparte. The haughty Turk had not lost his pride with his fortunes. "I will take care to inform the Sultan," said the victor, meaning to be courteous, "of the courage you displayed in this battle, though it has been your mis-hap to lose it."—"Thou mayest save thyself the trouble," answered the prisoner haughtily; "my master knows me better than thou canst."

Buonaparte returned in triumph to Cairo on the 9th August; having, however, as he continued to represent himself friendly to the Porte, previously set on foot a negotiation for liberation of the Turkish prisoners.

This splendid and most decisive victory of Aboukir² concluded Napoleon's career in the East. It was imperiously necessary, ere he could have ventured to quit the command of his army, with the hope of preserving his credit with the public; and it enabled him to plead that he left Egypt for the time in absolute security. His military views had, indeed, been uniformly successful; and Egypt was under the dominion of France as completely as the sword could subject it. For two years afterwards, like the strong man in the parable, they kept the house which they had won, until in there came a stronger, by whom they were finally and forcibly expelled.

But, though the victory over the Turks afforded the French for the time undisturbed possession of Egypt, the situation of Buonaparte no longer permitted him those brilliant and immense prospects, in which his imagination loved to luxuriate. His troops were considerably weakened, and the miscarriage at Acre dwelt on the recollection of the survivors. The march upon Constantinople was now an impossibility,—that to India an empty dream. To establish a French colony in Egypt, of which Buonaparte

¹ Gourgaud states, that from three to four thousand Turks were driven into the sea. Berthier calculates the number at ten thousand: "L'ennemi ne croit avoir de ressource que dans la mer; dix mille hommes s'y précipitent; ils y sont fusilés et mitraillés. Jamais spectacle aussi terrible ne s'est présenté."

² "This is probably the only instance, in the history of warfare, in which an army has been entirely destroyed. It was upon this occasion that Kleber, clasping Buonaparte round the waist, exclaimed, '*General, vous êtes grand comme le monde!*'"—THIERES, tom. x., p. 323.

sometimes talked, and to restore the Indian traffic to the shores of the Red Sea, thus sapping the sources of British prosperity in India, was a work for the time of peace, when the necessary communication was not impeded by the naval superiority of England. The French general had established, indeed, a chamber of commerce; but what commerce could take place from a closely blockaded harbour? Indeed, even in a more propitious season, the establishment of a pacific colony was no task for the ardent and warlike Napoleon; who, although his active spirit was prompt in striking out commercial schemes, was not possessed of the patience or steadiness necessary to carry them to success. It follows, that if he remained in Egypt, his residence there must have resembled the situation of a governor in a large city, threatened indeed, but as yet in no danger of being besieged, where the only fame which can be acquired is that due to prudent and patient vigilance. This would be a post which no young or ambitious soldier would covet, providing he had the choice of being engaged in more active service. On the other hand, from events which we shall endeavour to trace in the next chapter, there opened a scene of ambition in France, which permitted an almost boundless extent of hopes and wishes. Thus, Napoleon had the choice either of becoming a candidate for one of the greatest prizes which the world afforded—the supreme authority in that fine country—or of remaining the governor of a defensive army in Egypt, waiting the arrival of some new invaders—English, Russians, or Turks, to dispute his conquest with him. Had he chosen this latter line of conduct, he might have soon found himself the vassal of Morocco, or some other military adventurer, (perhaps from his own Italian army,) who, venturing on the course from which he had himself withdrawn, had attained to the government of France, and might soon have been issuing orders from the Luxembourg or the Tuilleries to General Buonaparte, in the style of a sovereign to his subject.

There remained to be separated those strong ties, which were formed betwixt Napoleon and the army which he had so often led to victory, and who unquestionably thought he had cast his lot to live or die with them. But, undoubtedly, he might palliate his departure by the consideration, that he left them victorious over

ving his country, as well as of advancing his own interest. Nor should it be forgotten, that the welfare even of the Egyptian army, as well as his own ambitious views, required that he should try his fortune at Paris. If he did not personally exert himself there, it seemed highly probable some revolution might take place, in which one of the consequences might be, that the victors of Egypt, deserted by their countrymen, should be compelled to lay down their arms.

The circumstances in which Buonaparte's resolution is said to have originated, as related by himself, were singularly fortuitous. Some intercourse took place with the Turkish fleet, in consequence of his sending the wounded Turks on board, and Sir Sidney Smith,¹ by way of taunting the French general with the successes of the Russians in Italy, sent him a set of newspapers containing an account of Suwarrow's victories, and a deplorable view of the French affairs on the continent.² If we may trust other authorities, however, to be quoted in their proper place, he already knew the state of affairs, both in Italy and France, by his own secret correspondence with Paris,³ informing him, not only of the military reverses which the armies of the latter country had sustained, but of the state of parties, and of the public mind,—intelligence of greater utility and accuracy than could have been communicated by the English newspapers.

However his information was derived, Buonaparte lost no time in acting upon it, with all the secrecy which a matter of such importance required. Admiral Ganteaume, who had been with the army ever since the destruction of the fleet, received the general's orders to make ready for sea, with all possible despatch, two frigates then lying in the harbour of Alexandria.

Meantime, determined to preserve his credit with the Institute, and to bring evidence of what he had done for the cause of science, Buonaparte commanded Monge, who is said to have suggested the expedition, and the accomplished Denon, who became its historian, with Berthollet, to prepare to accompany him to Alexandria. Of military chiefs, he selected the Generals Berthier, Murat, Lannes, Marmont, Desaix, Andréossy, and Bessières, the best and most attached of his officers. He left Cairo as soon as he heard the frigates were ready and the sea open, making a visit to the Delta the pretext of his tour. Kleber and Menou, whom he meant to leave first and second in command, were appointed to meet him at Alexandria. But he had an interview with the latter only.

¹ "Notwithstanding his unheard-of destiny, Napoleon has often been heard to say, in speaking of Sir Sidney Smith, '*Cet homme m'a fait manquer ma fortune.*'"—THIERS, tom. x., p. 314.

² See Las Cases, vol. iil., p. 11; Savary's Memoirs, vol. i., p. 112; and Miot, p. 265.

³ "There existed no secret correspondence, whether private or official. Ten months had already elapsed, and we were still without news from Egypt."—BOURRIENNE, tom. ii., p. 309.

Kleber, an excellent soldier, and a man, of considerable parts, was much displeased at the hasty and disordered manner in which the command of an important province and a diminished army were thrust upon him, and remonstrated in a letter to the Directory, upon the several points of the public service, which, by his conduct on this occasion, Buonaparte had neglected or endangered.¹ Napoleon afterwards laboured hard to answer the accusations which these remonstrances implied, and to prove, that, in leaving the Egyptian army, he had no intention of abandoning it; on the contrary, that he intended either to return in person, or to send powerful succours. He blamed Gantheaume, at a later period, for not having made his way from Toulon to Alexandria, with reinforcements and supplies. But Buonaparte, slow to see what contradicted a favourite project, could never be made to believe, unless when in the very act of experiencing it, that the superiority of the British naval power depends upon circumstances totally different from those which can be removed by equal courage, or even equal skill, on the part of the French naval officers; and that, until it be removed, it will be at great hazard that France shall ever attempt to retain a province so distant as Egypt.²

Napoleon left behind him a short proclamation,³ apprising the army, that news of importance from France had recalled him to Europe, but that they should soon hear tidings of him. He exhorted them, in the meantime, to have confidence in their new commander; who possessed, he said, his good opinion, and that of the government; and in these terms he bade them farewell. Two frigates, *La Muiron* and *La Carère*, being ready for sea, the general embarked, from an unfrequented part of the beach, on the 22d August. Menou, who had met him there, came to Denon and others, who had attended the rendezvous without knowing exactly its purpose, as they were gazing in surprise at the unusual sight of two French frigates ready to put to sea, and informed them with agitation, that Buonaparte waited for them. They followed, as in a dream; but Denon had already secured that mass of measurements, drawings, manuscripts, and objects of antiquarian and scientific curiosity, which afterwards enabled him to complete the splendid work, which now contains almost the only permanent or useful fruits of the memorable expedition to Egypt.

¹ Intercepted Letters, part iii., p. 32.

² General Menou was the last person to whom Napoleon spoke on shore.

CHAPTER XV.

Re of Napoleon

the United States of America—Russia comes forward in the general Cause—Her Strength and Resources—Reverses of the

Suwarrow retreats before Lecourbe.

WHEN Napoleon accepted what was to be considered as a doom of honourable banishment, in the command of the Egyptian expedition, he answered to those friends who advised him rather to stay and assert a pre-eminent station in the government at home, "that the fruit was not ripe." The seventeen months, or thereabouts, of his absence, had done much to complete the maturity which was formerly imperfect. The French Government had ceased to be invariably victorious, and at times had suffered internal changes, which, instead of restoring the national confidence, had only induced a general expectation of some farther and decisive revolution, that should for ever overthrow the Directorial system.

When Buonaparte sailed for Egypt, he left France at peace with Austria, and those negotiations proceeding at Radstadt,

Under the most flimsy and injurious pretexts, they attacked the neutral States of Switzerland, so eminent for their modera-

mined on. Expelled from his dominions, the aged Pius VI. retired to Sienna, more the object of respect and veneration in his condition of a dethroned exile, than when holding the semblance of authority by permission of France. In place of the Pontiff's government arose the shadow of a mighty name, The Roman Republic. But the Gauls were in possession of the Capitol, nor did the ancient recollections, connected with the title of the new commonwealth, procure for the Romans more independent authority than was possessed by any of the other ephemeral republican governments.¹

In the fall of the Pope, and the occupation of the Roman territories by a French army, the King of Naples saw the nation whom he feared and hated, and by whom he knew he was considered as a desirable subject of plunder, approach his frontiers,

once. "General Mack," said he, "cannot move without five carriages—I have formed my opinion—I heartily pray I may be mistaken." He was *not* mistaken. The Neapolitan army marched to Rome, was encountered by the French, fought just long enough to lose about forty men, then fled, abandoning guns, baggage, arms, and every thing besides. "The Neapolitan officers did not lose much honour," said Nelson, "for God knows they had little to lose—but they lost what they had."² The prescient eye, which was as accurate by land as by sea, had also foreseen the instant advance of the French to Naples. It took place accordingly, but not unresisted. The naked rabble, called Lazzaroni, showed the most desperate courage. They attacked the French ere they came to the city; and notwithstanding a murderous defeat, they held out Naples for two days with their irregular musketry only, against regular forces amply supplied with artillery. What can we say of a country, where the rabble are courageous and the soldiers cowards! what, unless that the higher classes, from whom the officers are chosen, must be the parties to be censured.³

The royal family fled to Sicily; and in Naples a new classical-sounding government was created at the command of the French general—The Parthenopean Republic. The French were now

¹ Botta, tom. II., p. 371. Lacretelle, tom. xiv., p. 143; Thiers, tom. x., p. 26; Annual Register, vol. xi., p. 31.

² See Southey's Life of Nelson.

³ Jomard, tom. xiv., p. 216; Lacretelle, tom. xiv., p. 211.

the statement of the American envoys was a weak invention,

many of their generals and agents, made them lose interest almost as fast as they could acquire territory. Their fair prettexts

merated rather endangered than strengthened the empire of France, as they rendered her ambition the object of fear and suspicion to all Europe. The Catholic nations beheld the degradation of the sup
Europe feared a
Naples—and, after
upon a peaceful

use co-operator.

The troops of this powerful empire were

Russians, while they understood the modern system of tactics,

Jeuneur. These peculiarities, which would not have succeeded with a French or English army, gained for him an undoubted confidence among his countrymen, who considered his eccentric conduct, followed, as it almost always was, by brilliant success, as the result of something which approached to inspiration.¹

The united forces of Austria and Russia, chiefly under the command of this singular character, succeeded, in a long train of bloody battles, to retake and re-occupy those states in the north of Italy, which had been conquered in Bonaparte's first campaigns. It was in vain that Macdonald, whose name stood as high among the Republican generals, as his character for honour and rectitude among French statesmen, marched from Naples, traversing the whole length of Italy, to arrest the victorious progress of the allies. After a train of stubborn fighting, it was only by displaying great military talent that he could extricate the remains of his army. At length the decisive and desperate battle of Novara seemed to exclude the French from the possession of those fair Italian provinces, which had been acquired by such expense of life.

On the Rhine, though her defeats were not of such a decided character, France also lost reputation and territory. Jourdan proved no match for the Archduke Charles, who having no longer Bonaparte to encounter, asserted his former superiority over inferior French generals. His royal highness finally compelled the French to reserve the Rhine, while the Austrian general Bellegarde and Hotze, supported by a Russian division under Korsakow, advanced to the line of the Limmat, near Zurich, and waited the junction of Suwarrow to occupy Switzerland, and even to menace France, who, in a great measure despoiled of her foreign conquests, had now reason to apprehend the invasion of her own territory.

In the Netherlands, the French interest seemed equally insecure. Insurrections had already taken place in what they called Belgium, and it seemed that the natives of these populous districts desired but opportunity and encouragement for a general revolt. Holland, through all its provinces, was equally disaffected; and the reports from that country encouraged England to send to the coast an expedition, consisting of British and Russian forces, to which two divisions of the Dutch fleet delivered up their vessels, hoisting at the same time the colours of the Stadtholder. Here

¹ "Suwarrow is a most extraordinary man. He dines every morning about nine. He sleeps almost naked: he affects a perfect indifference to heat and cold; and quits his chamber, which approaches to suffocation, in order to review his troops, in a thin linen jacket, while the thermometer is at ten degrees below freezing. A great deal of his whimsical manner is affected: He finds that it suits his troops, and the people he has to deal with. I dined with him this morning. He cried to me across the table, 'Tweddell, the French have taken Portsmouth. I have just received a courier from England. The king is in the tower, and Sheridan protector!'"—*Tweddell's Remains*, p. 135.

² Jomini, tom. xi., p. 275. Thiers, tom. x., p. 279.

was another risk of an imminent and pressing description, which menaced France and its Directorial government.

ciently brave and well commanded, to become extremely formidable, and threaten a renewal of all the evils which had been occasioned by the former civil war.

Amidst these lowering appearances, the dislike and disrespect with which the directors were regarded, occasioned their being loaded with every species of accusation by the public. It was not forgotten that it was the jealousy of Barras, Rewbel, and the other directors, which had banished from France the most successful of her generals, at the head of a gallant army, who were now needed to defend the provinces which their valour had gained. The battle of Aboukir, while it annihilated their fleet, had insulated the land forces, who, now cut off from all communication with their mother country, and shut up in an insalubrious province, daily wasted in encounters with the barbarous tribes that valour, and those lives, which, hazarded on the frontiers of France, might have restored victory to their standards.

gone, as we shall presently show, various changes in their own

and temporizing policy, which is always that of weak minds, the measures of the government were considered, not with reference to the general welfare of the state, but as they should have effect upon one or other of the parties by which it was divided. It followed also, that having no certain path and plan, but regulating their movements upon the wish to maintain an equality between the factions, in order that they might preserve their authority over both, the directors had no personal followers or supporters, save that most sordid class, who regulate their politics on their interest, and who, though faithful adherents of every settled ad-

¹ The term, it is scarcely necessary to say, is derived from the childish amusement, where two boys swing at the opposite ends of a plank, moving up and down, in what Dr Johnson calls "a reciprocating motion," while a third urchin, placed in the centre of motion, regulates their movements.—S.

manifestation, perceptive, by instinctive sagacity, the moment that their patrons are about to lose their offices, and desert their cause on such occasions with all convenient speed.

Yet the directors, had they been men of talent, integrity, and character—above all, had they been united among themselves, and agreed on one steady course of policy, might have governed France with little difficulty. The great body of the nation were exhausted by the previous fury of the revolutionary movements, had suffered full with politics, and were much disposed to sit down contented under any government which promised protection for life and property. Even the factious had lost their energy. Those who inclined to a monarchical form, were many of them become indifferent by whom the sceptre was wielded, providing that species of government, suggested by them most suitable to the habits and character of the French, should be again adopted. Many who were of this opinion saw great objection to the restoration of the Bourbons, for fear that, along with their right, might revive all those oppressive feudal claims which the Revolution had swept away, as well as the pretensions of the emigrants to resume their property. Those who entertained such sentiments were called *Moderés*. The ancient blood-red Jacobins could hardly be said to exist. The nation had had a surfeit of blood, and all parties looked back with disgust on the days of Robespierre. But there existed a kind of white Jacobins; men who were desirous to retain a large proportion of democratical principle in the constitution, either that they might not renounce the classical name of a Republic, or because they confided in their own talents, to "wield at will the fierce democracy;" or because they really believed that a potent infusion of such a spirit in the forms of government was necessary for the preservation of liberty. This party was greatly inferior in numbers to the others; and they had lost their authority over the populace, by means of which they had achieved such changes during the early periods of the Revolution. But they were bold, enterprising, active; and their chiefs, assuming at first the name of the Pantheon, afterwards of the Manège Club, formed a party in the state which, from the character of the leaders, gave great subject of jealousy to the Directory.¹

The rapacity and insolent bearing of the French Government having, as we have seen, provoked a new war with Austria and Russia, the means to which the directors had recourse for maintaining it were a forced loan imposed on the wealthy, which gave alarm to property, and a conscription of two hundred thousand men, which was alike distressing to poor and rich. Both measures had been submitted to during the Reign of Terror; but then a murmur cost the complainer his head. The Directory had no such summary mode of settling grievances. These two last in-

¹ Gourgaud, tom. I., p. 53. 1

fiction greatly inflamed the public discontent. To meet the general tendency to insurrection, they had recourse to a measure equally harsh and unpopular. It was called the Law of Hostages, by which the unoffending relatives of emigrants, or royalists, supposed to be in arms, were thrown into prison, and rendered responsible for the acts of their connexions. This unjust law filled the prisons with women, old men, and children,—victims of a government which, because it was not strong enough to subdue insurrection by direct force, visited the consequences of its own

François, and other men of talent leading the way, that at length the directors appear to have become afraid of being made personally responsible, by impeachment, for the peculations of their agents, as well as for the result of the insolences by which they had exasperated the friends and allies of France. Rewbel, he

Siéyes.

This remarkable statesman had acquired a high reputation, not only by the acuteness of his metaphysical talent, but by a species of mystery in which he involved himself and his opinions. He was certainly possessed of great force and energy in the

the unfortunate Louis; and, as was reported, with brutal levity,

¹ Thiers, tom. x. p. 269, Lacretelle, tom. xiv. p. 307.

² See *anti*, vol. I., p. 26.

using the celebrated expression, "*Mort sans phrase*." He was no less distinguished for bringing forward the important measure for dividing France into departments, and thus blending together and confounding all the ancient distinctions of provinces.¹ After this period he became passive, and was little heard of during the Reign of Terror; for he followed the maxim of Pythagoras, and worshipped the Echo (only found in secret and solitary places) when he heard the tempest blow hard.

After the revolution of 9th Thermidor, Siéyes came in with the moderate party, and had the merit to propose the recall of the members who had been forcibly expelled by the Jacobin faction on the fall of the Girondists. He was one of the committee of eleven, to whom was given the charge of forming the new constitution, afterwards called that of the year Three. This great metaphysical philosopher and politician showed little desire to share with any colleagues the toil and honour of a task to which he esteemed himself exclusively competent; and he produced, accordingly, a model entirely of his own composition, very ingenious, and evincing a wonderfully intimate acquaintance with political doctrines, together with a multitude of nice balances, capacities, and disqualifications, so constituted as to be checks on each other. As strongly characteristic of the genius of the man, we shall here give an account of his great work.

His plan provided that the constitution, with its powers of judicature and of administration, should emanate from the people; but lest, like that unnatural parent the sow, the people should devour their own nine farrow, the functionaries thus invested with power were to be placed, when created, out of the reach of the parents who had given them birth. The mode in which it was proposed to effect this, was both singular and ingenious. The office-bearers were thus to be selected out of three orders of the state, forming a triple hierarchy. 1. The citizens of each commune were to name one-tenth of their number, to be called the Communal Notables. From these were to be selected the magistrates of the communes, and the justices of peace. 2. The Communal Notables were again to choose a tenth part of their number, who were called the Departmental Notables. The prefects, judges, and provincial administrators, were selected from this second body. 3. The Departmental Notables, in like manner, were to elect a tenth of their number, computed to amount to about six thousand persons; and from this highest class of citizens were to be filled the most dignified and important situations in the state,—the ministers and members of government, the legislature, the senate, or grand jury, the principal judges, ambassadors, and the like. By this system it will be perceived, that instead of equality, three ranks of privileged citizens were to be established, from whose ranks alone certain offices could be filled.

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 61

But this species of nobility, or, as it was called, Notability, was dependent not on birth, but on the choice of the people, from whom, though more or less directly, all officers without exception received their commissions. The elections were to take place every five years.

the royal authority, except the right of naming two consuls, one for peace, and the other for war; and the farther right of selecting, from lists of candidates to be supplied by the three ranks of the hierarchy, the individuals who were to fill official situations as they should become vacant. But having exercised this

were to act each in their own exclusive department of peace or war; and the other functionaries were alike independent of the grand proclaimer, or elector, so soon as he had appointed them.

The government being thus provided for, the Abbé Siéyès's system of legislature was something like that of France in the time of the Parliament. There was to be a Legislative Body of two hundred and fifty deputies; but they were to form rather a tribunal of judges, than a popular and deliberative assembly. Two other bodies, a Council of State on the part of the Government, and a Tribunate of one hundred deputies, on the part of

to the Convoca-
ill-chosen mea-
them worthy of

liable to this fate of *absorption*, as it was called, although he held his crown of Cogaïn in the common case for life. Any exertion on his part of what might seem to the Senate an act of arbitrary authority, entitled them to adopt him a member of their own body. He was thus removed from his palace, guards, and income, and made for ever incapable of any other office than that of a senator. This high point of policy was carrying the system of checks and balances as far as it could well go.

The first glance of this curious model must have convinced a practical politician that it was greatly too complicated and technical to be carried into effect. The utility of laws consists in their being of a character which compels the respect and obedience of those to whom they relate. The very delicacy of such an ingenious scheme rendered it incapable of obtaining general regard, since it was too refined to be understood save by profound philosophers. To the rest of the nation it must have been like a watch to a savage, who, being commanded to regulate his time by it, will probably prefer to make the machine correspond with his inclinations, by putting backward and forward the index at pleasure. A man of ordinary talent and honest disposition might have been disqualified for public life by this doctrine of absorption, just as a man ignorant of swimming would perish if flung into a lake. But a stout swimmer would easily gain the shore, and an individual like Buonaparte would set at defiance the new species of ostracism, and decline to be neutralized by the absorption of the Senate. Above all, the plan of the abbé destroyed the true principle of national representation, by introducing a metaphysical election of members of legislation, instead of one immediately derived from the direct vote of the people themselves. In the abbé's alembic, the real and invaluable principle of popular representation was subtilized into smoke.

For these, or other reasons, the commissioners of the year Three did not approve of the plan proposed by Siéyes; and, equally dissatisfied with the constitution which they adopted, he withdrew himself from their deliberations, and accepted the situation of ambassador to Prussia, where he discharged with great ability the task of a diplomatist.

In 1799, Siéyes returned from Berlin to Paris, full of hope to establish his own favourite model on the ruins of the Directorial Constitution, and, as a preliminary, obtained, as we have said, Rewbel's seat in the Directory. Merlin and Lepaux, menaced with impeachments, were induced to send in their resignation. Treillard had been previously displaced, on pretext of an informality in the choice. Instead of them were introduced into the Directory Roger Ducos, a Modéré, or rather a Royalist, with Gohier and Moulins, men of talents too ordinary to throw any opposition in the path of Siéyes.¹ Barras, by his expenses and

¹ "Ducos was a man of narrow mind, and easy disposition. Moulins, a general of division, had never served in war: he was originally in the French
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self to, Siéyes, who saw the time approaching when the constitution of the year Three must fall, and hoped to establish his own rejected model in its stead. But the revolution which he meditated could only be executed by force.

The chance in the projected destruction of the government lay

Manège, Republicans if not Jacobins, had obtained, at the last

without some external support. To call upon the people was no

shortly after was sent to Italy with hopes that, acquiring a new fund of glory by checking the progress of Suwarrow, he might be yet more fitted to fill the public eye, and influence the general mind, in the crisis when Siéyes looked for his assistance. Joubert lost his life, however, at the great battle of Novi, fought betwixt him and Suwarrow; and so opportunely did his death

Joubert.

guards, and had been advanced in the army of the interior. He was a worthy man, and a warm and upright patriot. Gobier was an advocate of considerable reputation, and exalted patriotism—an eminent lawyer, and a man of great integrity and candour."—*NAROKOV, Gourpaul*, tom. i, p. 60

Meanwhile, the family of Napoleon omitted no mode of keeping his merits in public remembrance. Reports from time to time appeared in the papers to this purpose, as when, to give him consequence doubtless, they pretended that the Tower guns of London were fired, and public rejoicings made, upon a report that Napoleon had been assassinated. Madame Buonaparte, in the meanwhile, lived at great expense, and with much elegance, collecting around her whoever was remarkable for talent and accomplishment, and many of the women of Paris who were best accustomed to the management of political intrigue. Lucien Buonaparte distinguished himself as an orator in the Council of Five Hundred, and although he had hitherto affected Republican zeal, he now opposed, with much ability, the reviving influence of the democrats. Joseph Buonaparte, also a man of talent, and of an excellent character, though much aspersed afterwards, in consequence of the part in Spain assigned him by his brother, lived hospitably, saw much company, and maintained an ascendance in Parisian society. We cannot doubt that these near relatives of Buonaparte found means of communicating to him the state of affairs in Paris, and the opening which it afforded for the exercise of his distinguished talents.

The communication betwixt Toulon and Alexandria was, indeed, interrupted, but not altogether broken off, and we have no doubt that the struggle of parties in the interior, as well as the great disasters on the frontier, had their full influence in determining Buonaparte to his sudden return. Miot, though in no very positive strain, has named a Greek called Bambuki, as the bearer of a letter from Joseph to his brother, conveying this important intelligence. The private memoirs of Fouché pretend that that minister purchased the secret of Napoleon's return being expected, from Josephine herself, for the sum of a thousand louis, and that the landing at Fréjus was no surprise to him. Both these pieces of private history may be safely doubted; but it would be difficult to convince us that Buonaparte took the step of quitting Egypt on the vague intelligence afforded by the journals, and without confidential communication with his own family.

To return to the state of the French Government. The death of Joubert not only disconcerted the schemes of Siéyes, but exposed him and his party to retaliation. Bernadotte was minister of war, and he, with Jourdan and Augereau, were all warm in the cause of Republicanism. Any of these distinguished generals was capable of leading the military force to compel such an alteration in the constitution as might suit the purpose of their party, and thus reversing the project of Siéyes, who, without Joubert, was like the head without the arm that should execute. Already Jourdan had made in the Council of Five Hundred a speech on the dangers of the country, which, in point of vehemence, might have been pronounced in the ancient hall of the Jacobins. He in plain terms threatened the *Modérés* with such a general insurrec-

tion as had taken place in the year 1792, and proposed to declare the country in danger. He was answered by Lucien Buonaparte, *Chairman and President who had just been elected to the Convention*

movement, if any additional reverse had been sustained on the frontier.

But as if the calamities of France, which of late had followed each other in quick succession, had attained their height of tide, the affairs of that country began all of a sudden to assume a more favourable aspect. The success of General Brune in Holland against the Anglo-Russian army, had obliged the invaders of Holland to retreat, and enter into a convention for evacuation of the country on which they had made their descent. A dispute, or misunderstanding, having occurred between the Emperors of Austria and Russia, the Archduke Charles, in order, it was alleged, to repel an incursion of the French into the countries on the Meuse, withdrew a great part of his army from the line of the

the formidable Suwarrow, who had already advanced to communicate with that general, found his right flank uncovered by his defeat, and had the greatest difficulty in executing a retrograde movement before General Lecourbe.

The news of these successes induced the Republicans to defer their attack upon the moderate party; and on so nice a point do the greatest events hang, that had a longer period intervened between these victories and the arrival of Buonaparte, it is most

when the presence of a chief of first-rate talents was indispensable, and when no favourite name had yet been found, to fill the public voice with half such loud acclaim as his own.

CHAPTER XVI.

Continued from the last page.

Sittings removed from Paris to St. Cloud—Commotion in the Council of Five Hundred—Napoleon menaced and assaulted,

and finally, extricated by his Grenadiers—Lucien Buonaparte, the President, retires from the Hall—Declares the Council dissolved—Provisional Consular Government of Buonaparte, Siéyes, and Ducos.

Buonaparte had caused himself to be preceded by an account of his campaigns in Africa and Asia, in which the splendid victory over the Turks at Aboukir enabled him to gloss over his bad success in Syria, the total loss of his fleet, and the danger of Malta, which was closely besieged by the English. Still, however, these despatches could never have led any one to expect the sudden return of a general engaged on a foreign service of the utmost importance, who, without having a better reason to allege, than his own opinion that his talents were more essential to his country in France than in Egypt, left his army to its fate, and came, without either order or permission from his government, to volunteer his services where they were not expected, or perhaps wished for. Another in the same circumstances, or perhaps the same general at another period of the Revolution, would have been received by the public with alienated favour, and by the government with severe inquiry, if not with denunciation.

On the contrary, such was the general reliance on the talents of Buonaparte, that, delighted to see him arrive, no one thought of asking wherefore, or by whose authority he had returned. He was received like a victorious monarch re-entering his dominions at his own time and pleasure. Bells were everywhere rung, illuminations made, a delirium of joy agitated the public mind, and the messenger who carried the news of his disembarkation to Paris, was received as if he had brought news of a battle gained.¹

The hall of the Council of Five Hundred re-echoed with cries of victory, while the orator, announcing the victories of Brune over the English, and Massena over the Russians, dwelt upon the simple fact of Buonaparte's return, as of interest equal to all these successes. He was heard with shouts of "Long live the Republic!" which, as the event proved, was an exclamation but very indifferently adapted to the occasion.

Josephine, and Joseph Buonaparte, apprised by the government of the arrival of Napoleon, hastened to meet him on the road; and his progress towards Paris was everywhere attended by the same general acclamations which had received him at landing.²

The members of Government, it must be supposed, felt alarm and anxiety, which they endeavoured to conceal under the ap-

¹ Thiers, tom. x., p. 346; Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 56; Laeretelle, tom. xiv., p. 385.

² "It was not like the return of a citizen to his country, or a general at the head of a victorious army, but like the triumph of a sovereign restored to his people."—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 57.

pearance of sharing in the general joy.¹ The arrival of a person so influential by his fame, so decided in his character, engaged with no faction, and pledged to no political system, was likely to give victory to one or the other party who were contend-

decision was likely to have most influence on the state of the nation.²

Napoleon, meanwhile, seemed to give his exclusive attention to literature, and, having exchanged the usual visits of form with the ministers of the Republic, he was more frequently to be found at the Institute, or discussing with the traveller Volney, and other men of letters, the information which he had acquired in Egypt on science and antiquities, than in the haunts of politicians, or the society of the leaders of either party in the state. Neither was he to be seen at the places of popular resort: he went into no general company, seldom attended the theatres, and, when he did, took his seat in a private box.³

Augereau did not appear—a cloud seemed to hang over the festival—Napoleon only presented himself for a very short time, and the whole was again the scene of an empty

GAUD, tom. I., p. 61.

¹ See *Mémoires de Gohier*, tom. I., pp. 193-212.

² Gourgand, tom. I., p. 63.

³ "Cover were laid for seven hundred. Napoleon remained at table but a short time—he appeared to be uneasy, and much preoccupied."—GOURGAND, tom. I., p. 63.

⁴ "Every one of the ministers wished to give him an entertainment, but he

In all this there was deep policy. No one knew better how much popular applause depends on the gloss of novelty, and how great is the difference in public estimation, betwixt him who appears to hunt and court acclamations, and the wiser and more dignified favourite of the multitude, whose popularity follows after him and seeks him out, instead of being the object of his pursuit and ambition. Yet under this still and apparently indifferent demeanour, Napoleon was in secret employed in collecting all the information necessary concerning the purposes and the powers of the various parties in the state; and as each was eager to obtain his countenance, he had no difficulty in obtaining full explanations on these points.

The violent Republicans, who possessed the majority in the Council of Five Hundred, made advances to him; and the generals Jourdan, Augereau, and Bernadotte, offered to place him at the head of that party, provided he would maintain the democratical constitution of the year Three.¹ In uniting with this active and violent party, Buonaparte saw every chance of instant and immediate success; but, by succeeding in the outset, he would probably have marred the farther projects of ambition which he already nourished. Military leaders, such as Jourdan and Bernadotte, at the head of a party so furious as the Republicans, could not have been thrown aside without both danger and difficulty: and it being unquestionably the ultimate intention of Buonaparte to usurp the supreme power, it was most natural for him to seek adherents among those, who, though differing concerning the kind of government which should be finally established, concurred in desiring a change from the republican model.

Barras, too, endeavoured to sound the purposes of the general of the army of Egypt. He hinted to him a plan of placing at the head of the Directory Hedouville,² a man of ordinary talent, then general of what was still termed the Army of England, of retiring himself from power, and of conferring on Napoleon the general command of the Republican forces on the frontiers, which he vainly supposed preferment sufficient to gratify his ambition.³

only accepted a dinner from the Minister of Justice (Cambacérès.) He requested that the principal lawyers of the Republic might be there. He was very cheerful at this dinner, conversed at large on the criminal code, to the great astonishment of Tronchet, Treillard, Merlin, and Target, and expressed his desire to see persons and property placed under the guard of a simple code, suitable to an enlightened age."—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 64.

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 67.

² Hedouville was born at Laon in 1755. In 1801, Buonaparte appointed him ambassador to Petersburg. On the restoration of the Bourbons he was made a peer of France, and died in 1825.

³ "On the 8th Brumaire (30th October,) Napoleon dined with Barras: a conversation took place after dinner. 'The Republic is falling,' said the director; 'things cannot go on; a change must take place, and Hedouville must be named president. As to you, general, you intend to rejoin the army; and, for my part, ill as I am, unpopular, and worn out, I am only fit to return to private life. Napoleon looked steadfastly at him without replying a word. Barras cast down his eyes, and remained silent. Thus the conversation ended.'—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 72; THIERS, tom. x., p. 359.

Buonaparte would not listen to a hint which went to remove him from the capital, and the supreme administration of affairs—he knew also that Barras's character was contemptible, and his resources diminished—that his subsequent conduct had cancelled the merit which he had acquired by the overthrow of Robespierre, and that to unite with him in any degree would be to adopt, in the public opinion, the very worst and most unpopular portion of the *Directorial Government*. He rejected the alliance of Barras, therefore, even when, abandoning his own plan, the director offered to concur in any which Napoleon might dictate.

A union with Siéyes, and the party whom he influenced, pro-

Directory it was espoused by Siéyes and Ducós; it possessed a large majority in the Council of Ancients, and a respectable minority in that of the Five Hundred. The greater part of the

of the Moderates was great, yet their subsequent objects, in case

himself had once pronounced “the masterpiece of legislation,

the aid of Buonaparte.¹ Fouclé, according to Napoleon, was not consulted—the *Memoirs* which bear his name aver the contrary—it is certain, that in his important capacity of minister of police, he acted in Buonaparte's favour during the revolution.² Some leading members of both legislative bodies were cautiously intrusted with what was going forward, and others were generally advised to hold themselves in readiness for a great movement.

A sufficient military force was next to be provided; and this was not difficult, for the reputation of Buonaparte ensured the conspirators unlimited influence among the soldiery. Three regiments of dragoons were enthusiastically petitioning the honour of being reviewed by Napoleon. The adherence of these troops might be counted upon. The officers of the garrison of Paris were desirous to pay their respects to him; so were the forty adjutants of the national guard, whom he himself had appointed when general of the troops in the interior. Many other officers, as well reduced as holding commissions, desired to see the celebrated general, that they might express their devotion to his person, and adherence to his fortunes. All these introductions had been artfully postponed.³

Two men of more renowned name, Moreau and Maedonald,⁴ had made tenders of service to Buonaparte. These both favoured the moderate party, and had no suspicion of the ultimate design of Napoleon or the final result of his undertaking.

A final resolution on 15th Brumaire determined the 18th (9th November) for the great attempt—an interval was necessary, but the risk of discovery and anticipation made it desirable that it should be as short as possible. The secret was well kept; yet being unavoidably intrusted to many persons, some floating and vague rumours did get abroad, and gave an alarm to the parties concerned.

Meanwhile, all the generals and officers whom we have named, were invited to repair to Napoleon's house at six o'clock on the

¹ "Talleyrand availed himself of all the resources of a supple and insinuating address, in order to conciliate a person whose suffrage it was important to him to secure."—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 66.—"It was he who disclosed to Buonaparte's views all the weak points of the government, and made him acquainted with the state of parties, and the bearings of each character."—FOUCHE, tom. i., p. 96.

² "Napoleon effected the 18th of Brumaire without admitting Fouclé into the secret."—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 66.—"Buonaparte was too cunning to let me into the secret of his means of execution, and to place himself at the mercy of a single man; but he said enough to me to win my confidence, and to persuade me that the destinies of France were in his hands."—FOUCHE, tom. i., p. 98.

³ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 74.

⁴ "Moreau, who had been at the dinner of the Legislative Body, and with whom Napoleon had there, for the first time, become acquainted, having learned from public report that a change was in preparation, assured Napoleon that he placed himself at his disposal, that he had no wish to be admitted into any secret, and that he required but one hour's notice to prepare himself. Macdonald, who happened then to be at Paris, had made the same tenders of service."—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 77.

Buonaparte, according to their petition. As an excuse for assigning so unusual an hour of rendezvous, it is said that the general was obliged to set out upon a journey. Many officers, however, understood or guessed what was to be done, and came armed with pistols as well as with swords. Some were without such information or presentiment. Lefebvre, the commandant of the guard of the Representative Bodies, supposed to be devoted to the Directory, had only received an invitation to attend this military assembly on the preceding midnight. Bernadotte, unacquainted with the project, and attached to the Republican faction, was, however, brought to Buonaparte's house by his brother Joseph.¹

The surprise of some, and the anxious curiosity of all, may be supposed, when they found a military levee so numerous and so brilliant assembled at a house incapable of containing half of them. Buonaparte was obliged to receive them in the open air. Leaving them thus assembled, and waiting their cue to enter on the stage, let us trace the political manœuvres from which the military were to take the signal for action.

Early as Buonaparte's levee had taken place, the Council of Ancients, secretly and hastily assembled, had met still earlier. The ears of all were filled by a report, generally circulated, that the Republican party had formed a daring plan for giving a new popular impulse to the government. It was said, that the resolution was taken at the Hôtel de Salm, amongst the party who

language inspired was rendered greater by the mysterious and indefinite manner in which they expressed themselves. They spoke of personal danger—of being overawed in their deliberations—of the fall of liberty, and of the approaching destruction of the Republic. "You have but an instant to save France," said Cornudet; "permit it to pass away, and the country will be a mere carcass, disputed by the vultures, whose prey it must become." Though the charge of conspiracy was not distinctly defined, the measures recommended to defeat it were sufficiently decisive.

¹ Gourgaud, tom. I. p. 78. For some curious historical notes on the 19th Brumaire, furnished to Sir Walter Scott by a distinguished authority, and of which great, although unacknowledged, use has since been made by M. Bourrienne, see Appendix to this volume, No. VIII.

² Afterwards Third Consul, Arch Treasurer, and Duke of Placentia.

By the 102d, 103d, and 104th articles of the Constitution, it was provided, that the Council of Ancients might, if they saw it expedient, alter the place where the legislative bodies met, and convoke them elsewhere; a provision designed, doubtless, to prevent the exercise of that compulsion, which the Parisians had at one time assumed over the National Assembly and Convention. This power the Council of Ancients now exercised. By one edict the sittings of the two councils were removed to St. Cloud; by another, the Council delegated to General Buonaparte full power to see this measure carried into effect, and vested him for that purpose with the military command of the department. A state messenger, the deputy Cornet,¹ was sent to communicate to the general these important measures, and require his presence in the Council of Ancients; and this was the crisis which he had so anxiously expected.²

A few words determined the numerous body of officers, by whom the messenger found him surrounded, to concur with him without scruple. Even General Lefebvre, who commanded the guard of the legislative bodies, declared his adhesion to Buonaparte.³

The Directory had not even yet taken the alarm. Two of them, indeed, Siéyes and Ducos, being in the secret of the conspiracy, were already at the Tuileries, to second the movement which was preparing. It is said that Barras had seen them pass in the morning, and as they were both mounted, had been much amused with the awkward horsemanship of Siéyes.⁴ He little guessed on what expedition he was bound.

When Buonaparte sallied forth on horseback, and at the head of such a gallant cavalcade of officers, his first movement was to assume the command of the three regiments of cavalry, already drawn up in the Champs Elysées, and to lead them to the Tuileries, where the Council of Ancients expected him. He entered their hall surrounded by his military staff, and by those other generals, whose name carried the memory of so many victories. "You are the wisdom of the nation," he said to the Council: "At this crisis it belongs to you to point out the measures which may save the country. I come, surrounded by the generals of the Republic, to promise you their support. I name Lefebvre my lieutenant. Let us not lose time in looking for precedents. Nothing in history ever resembled the end of the eighteenth century—nothing

¹ Buonaparte afterwards made Cornet a member of the Conservative Senate and grand officer of the Legion of Honour. On the restoration of the Bourbons, he became a peer of France.—See his "Notice Historique," published in 1819.

² Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 78.

³ "The messenger found the avenues filled with officers: Napoleon had the folding doors opened; and his house being too small to contain so many persons, he came forward on the steps in front of it, received the compliments of the officers, harangued them, and told them that he relied upon them all for the salvation of France. Enthusiasm was at its height: all the officers drew their swords, and promised their services and fidelity."—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 80.

⁴ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 85.

in the eighteenth century resembled this moment. Your wisdom has devised the necessary measure, our arms shall put it into execution." He announced to the military the will of the Council, and the command with which they had intrusted him; and it was received with loud shouts.

In the meanwhile the three directors, Barras, Gohier, and Moulins, who were not in the secret of the morning, began too late to take the alarm. Moulins proposed to send a battalion to surround the bouse of Buonaparte, and make prisoner the general, and whomsoever else they found there. But they had no longer the least influence over the soldiery, and had the mortification to see their own personal guard, when summoned by an aide-de-camp of Buonaparte, march away to join the forces which he commanded, and leave them defenceless.¹

..... consultate with Buona-
..... at haughtiness, and
..... soldiers, upbraided
him with the reverses of the country; not in the tone of an ordinary citizen, possessing but his own individual interest in the fate of a great nation, but like a prince, who, returning from a distant expedition, finds that in his absence his deputies have abused their trust, and misruled his dominions. "What have you done," he said, "for that fine France, which I left you in such a brilliant condition? I left you peace, I have found war—I left you the wealth of Italy, I have found taxation and misery. Where are the hundred thousand Frenchmen whom I have known!—all of them my companions in glory!—They are dead."² It was plain, that even now, when his enterprise was but commenced, Buonaparte had already assumed that tone, which seemed to account every one answerable to him for deficiencies in the public service, and he himself responsible to no one.

Barras, overwhelmed and stunned, and afraid, perhaps, of impeachment for his alleged peculations, beheld the courage which he was once supposed to possess, and submitted, in the most abject terms, to the will of the victor. He sent in his resignation, in

dered to attend him, as much, perhaps, to watch his motions as to

¹ Lacretelle, tom. xiv., p. 413. Thiers, tom. x., p. 370, Montgaillard, tom. v., p. 284, Gourgaud, tom. I., p. 82.

² Lacretelle, tom. xiv., p. 413.

³ "Then all at once concluding his harangue, in a calm tone he added, 'This state of things cannot last: it would lead us in three years to despotism.'

—MAD. DE STAEL, tom. II., p. 224, Thiers, tom. x., p. 370, Montgaillard, tom. v., p. 283.

⁴ Letter to the Directory.—See Gourgaud, tom. I., Appendix, p. 330.

do him honour, though the last was the ostensible reason. His colleagues, Gohier and Moulins, also resigned their office; Siéyes and Ducos had already set the example; and thus, the whole Constitutional Executive Council was dissolved, while the real power was vested in Buonaparte's single person. Cambacérès, minister of justice, Fouché, minister of police,¹ with all the rest of the administration, acknowledged his authority accordingly; and he was thus placed in full possession as well of the civil as of the military power.²

The Council of Five Hundred, or rather the Republican majority of that body, showed a more stubborn temper; and if, instead of resigning, Barras, Gohier, and Moulins, had united themselves to its leaders, they might perhaps have given trouble to Buonaparte, successful as he had hitherto been.

This hostile Council only met at ten o'clock on that memorable day, when they received, to their surprise, the message intimating that the Council of Ancients had changed the place of meeting from Paris to St. Cloud; and thus removed their debates from the neighbourhood of the populace, over whom the old Jacobinical principles might have retained influence. The laws as they stood afforded the young Council no means of evading compliance, and they accordingly adjourned to meet the next day at St. Cloud, with unabated resolution to maintain the democratical part of the constitution. They separated amid shouts of "Long live the Republic and the Constitution!" which were echoed by the galleries. The *tricoteuses*,³ and other more zealous attendants on their debates, resolved to transfer themselves to St. Cloud also, and appeared there in considerable numbers on the ensuing day, when it was evident the enterprise of Siéyes and of Buonaparte must be either perfected or abandoned.

The contending parties held counsel all the evening, and deep into the night, to prepare for the final contest on the morrow. Siéyes advised, that forty leaders of the opposition should be arrested;⁴ but Buonaparte esteemed himself strong enough to obtain a decisive victory, without resorting to any such obnoxious vio-

¹ "Fouché made great professions of attachment and devotion. He had given directions for closing the barriers, and preventing the departure of couriers and coaches. 'Why, good God?' said the general to him, 'wherefore all these precautions? We go with the nation, and by its strength alone: let no citizen be disturbed, and let the triumph of opinion have nothing in common with the transactions of days in which a factious minority prevailed.'"—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 87.

² Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 86.

³ The women of lower rank who attended the debates of the Council, plying the task of knitting while they listened to politics, were so denominated. They were always zealous democrats, and might claim in one sense Shakspeare's description of

"The free maids who weave their thread with bones."—S.

⁴ "The recommendation was a wise one; but Napoleon thought himself too strong to need any such precaution. 'I swore in the morning,' said he, 'to protect the national representation; I will not this evening violate my oath.'"—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 87.

lence. They adjusted their plan of operations in both Councils, and agreed that the government to be established should be provisionally intrusted to three Consuls, Buonaparte, Siéyes, and Ducos. Proper arrangements were made of the armed force at St. Cloud; and the command was confided to the zeal and fidelity of Murat. Buonaparte used some interest to prevent Bernadotte, Jourdan, and Augereau, from attending at St. Cloud the next day, as he did not expect them to take his part in the approaching crisis. The last of these seemed rather hurt at the want of confidence which this caution implied, and said, "What, general! dare you not trust your own little Augereau?"¹ He went to St. Cloud accordingly.

Some preparations were necessary to put the palace of St. Cloud in order, to receive the two Councils; the Orangerie being assigned to the Council of Five Hundred; the Gallery of Mars to that of the Ancients.

In the Council of Ancients, the *Modérés*, having the majority, were prepared to carry forward and complete their measures for a change of government and constitution. But the minority, having rallied after the surprise of the preceding day, were neither silent nor passive. The Commission of Inspectors, whose duty it

vague and inexplicit.

"The Constitution!" answered Buonaparte, giving way to a more natural expression of his feelings, and avowing his object more clearly than he had yet dared to do—"It was violated on

¹ Gouraud, tom. i., p. 57.

the eighteenth Fructidor—violated on the twenty-second Floreal—violated on the thirtieth Prairial. All parties have invoked it—all have disregarded it in turn. It can be no longer a means of safety to any one, since it obtains the respect of no one. Since we cannot preserve the Constitution, let us at least save Liberty and Equality, the foundations on which it is erected." He went on in the same strain to assure them, that for the safety of the Republic he relied only on the wisdom and power of the Council of Ancients, since in the Council of Five Hundred were found those men who desired to bring back the Convention, with its revolutionary committees, its scaffolds, its popular insurrections. "But I," he said, "will save you from such horrors—I and my brave comrades at arms, whose swords and caps I see at the door of the hall; and if any hired orator shall talk of outlawry, I will appeal to the valour of my comrades, with whom I have fought and conquered for liberty."¹

The Assembly invited the general to detail the particulars of the conspiracy to which he had alluded, but he confined himself to a reference to the testimony of Siêyes and Ducos; and again reiterating that the Constitution could not save the country, and inviting the Council of Ancients to adopt some course which might enable them to do so, he left them, amid cries of "Vive Buonaparte!" loudly echoed by the military in the courtyard, to try the effect of his eloquence on the more unmanageable Council of Five Hundred.

The deputies of the younger Council having found the place designed for their meeting filled with workmen,² were for some time in a situation which seemed to resemble the predicament of the National Assembly at Versailles, when they took refuge in a tennis-court. The recollection was of such a nature as inflamed and animated their resolution, and they entered the Orangerie, when at length admitted, in no good humour with the Council of Ancients, or with Buonaparte. Proposals of accommodation had been circulated among them ineffectually. They would have admitted Buonaparte into the Directory, but refused to consent to any radical change in the constitution of the year Three.

The debate of the day, remarkable as the last in which the Republican party enjoyed the full freedom of speech in France, was opened on nineteenth Brumaire, at two o'clock, Lucien Buonaparte being president. Gaudin, a member of the moderate party, began by moving, that a committee of seven members should be formed, to report upon the state of the Republic; and that mea-

¹ Thibaudeau, tom. i., p. 38; Montgaillard, tom. v., p. 267; Thiers, tom. x., p. 330; Laetzel, tom. xiv., p. 424; Gourgand, tom. i., p. 92.

² "So late as two o'clock in the afternoon, the place assigned to the Council of Five Hundred was not ready. This delay of a few hours was very unfortunate. The deputies formed themselves into groups in the garden: their minds grew heated; they sounded one another, interchanged declarations of the state of their feelings, and organized their opposition."

—GOURGAND, tom. i., p. 82.

gained so many victories?" and loaded him with reproaches. At this crisis a party of grenadiers rushed into the hall with drawn swords, and extricating Buonaparte from the deputies, bore him off in their arms breathless with the scuffle.¹

It was probably at this crisis that Augereau's faith in his ancient general's fortune began to totter, and his revolutionary principles to gain an ascendence over his military devotion. "A fine situation you have brought yourself into," he said to Buonaparte, who answered sternly, "Augereau, things were worse at Arcola—Take my advice—remain quiet, in a short time all this will change."² Augereau, whose active assistance and co-operation might have been at this critical period of the greatest consequence to the Council, took the hint, and continued passive.³ Jourdan and Bernadotte, who were ready to act on the popular side, had the soldiers shown the least hesitation in yielding obedience to Buonaparte, perceived no opening of which to avail themselves.

The Council remained in the highest state of commotion, the general voice accusing Buonaparte of having usurped the supreme authority, calling for a sentence of outlawry, or demanding that he should be brought to the bar. "Can you ask me to put the outlawry of my own brother to the vote?" said Lucien. But this appeal to his personal situation and feelings made no impression upon the Assembly, who continued clamorously to demand the question. At length Lucien flung on the desk his hat, scarf, and other parts of his official dress. "Let me be rather heard," he said, "as the advocate of him whom you falsely and rashly accuse." But his request only added to the tumult. At this moment a small body of grenadiers, sent by Napoleon to his brother's assistance, marched into the hall.

They were at first received with applause; for the Council, accustomed to see the triumph of democratical opinions among the military, did not doubt that they were deserting their general to range themselves on the side of the deputies. Their appearance was but momentary—they instantly left the hall, carrying Lucien in the centre of the detachment.

¹ "In the confusion, one of them, named Thomé, was slightly wounded by the thrust of a dagger, and the clothes of another were cut through."—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 95.

² Laeretelle, tom. xiv., p. 428; Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 91.

³ The *Moniteur* is anxious to exonerate Augereau from having taken any part in favour of the routed party on the nineteenth Brumaire. That officer, it says, did not join in the general oath of fidelity to the Constitution of the year Three. The same official paper adds, that on the evening of the nineteenth, being invited by some of the leading persons of the democratic faction, to take the military command of their partisans, he had asked them by way of reply, "Whether they supposed he would tarnish the reputation he had acquired in the army, by taking command of wretches like them?" Augereau, it may be remembered, was the general who was sent by Buonaparte to Paris to act as military chief on the part of the Directory in the revolution of the 18th Fructidor, in which the soldiery had willingly followed him. Buonaparte was probably well pleased to keep a man of his military reputation and resolved character out of the combat if possible.—S.

Matters were now come to extremity on either side. The Council, thrown into the greatest disorder by these repeated military incursions, remained in violent agitation, furious against Buonaparte, but without the calmness necessary to adopt decisive measures.

Meantime, the sight of Napoleon, almost breathless, and bearing marks of personal violence, excited to the highest the indignation of the military. In broken words he told them, that when he wished to show them the road to lead the country to victory and fame, "they had answered him with daggers."

Cries of resentment arose from the soldiery, augmented when the party sent to extricate the president brought him to the ranks as to a sanctuary. Lucien, who seconded his brother admirably, or rather who led the way in this perilous adventure, mounted on horseback instantly, and called out, in a voice naturally deep and sonorous, "General, and you, soldiers! the President of the Council of Five Hundred proclaims to you, that factious men, with drawn daggers, have interrupted the deliberations of the Assembly. He authorises you to employ force against these disturbers—The Assembly of Five Hundred is dissolved!"

Murat, deputed by Buonaparte to execute the commands of Lucien, entered the Orangerie with drums beating, at the head of a detachment with fixed bayonets. He summoned the deputies to disperse on their peril, while an officer of the constitutional guard called out, he could be no longer answerable for their

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e drums at

Buonaparte affirms, that one of the general officers in his suite offered to take the command of fifty men, and place them in arm-

¹ Thibaudau tom i. p. 56. Lacretelle, tom. xv., p. 430; Thiers, tom. x. p. 315. Montgalliard, tom. v., p. 271

bush to fire on the deputies in their flight, which he wisely declined as a useless and gratuitous cruelty.¹

The result of these violent and extraordinary measures was intimated to the Council of Ancients; the immediate cause of the expulsion of the Five Hundred being referred to the alleged violence on the person of Buonaparte, which was said by one member to have been committed by Arena, while another exaggerated the charge, by asserting that it was offered in consequence of Buonaparte's having made disclosure of some mal-practices of the Corsican deputy while in Italy. The *Moniteur* soon after improved this story of Arena and his single poniard, into a party consisting of Arena, Marquetzi, and other deputies, armed with pistols and daggers. At other times, Buonaparte was said to have been wounded, which certainly was not the case. The effect of the example of Brutus upon a republican, and an Italian to boot, might render the conduct ascribed to Arena credible enough; but the existence of a party armed with pocket-pistols and daggers, for the purpose of opposing regular troops, is too ridiculous to be believed. Arena published a denial of the attempt;² and among the numbers who witnessed the scene no proof was ever appealed to, save the real evidence of a dagger found on the floor, and the torn sleeve of a grenadier's coat, circumstances which might be accounted for many ways. But having served at the time as a popular apology for the strong measures which had been adopted, the rumour was not allowed to fall asleep. Thomé, the grenadier, was declared to have merited well of his country by the Legislative Body, entertained at dinner by the general, and rewarded with a salute and a valuable jewel by Josephine. Other reports were put in circulation concerning the violent purposes of the Jacobins. It was said the ancient revolutionist, Santerre, was setting a popular movement on foot, in the Fauxbourg Saint Antoine, and that Buonaparte, through the ex-Director Moulins, had cautioned him against proceeding in his purpose, declaring, that if he did, he would have him shot by martial law.

But the truth is, that although there can be no doubt that the popular party entertained a full purpose of revolutionizing the government anew, and restoring its republican character, yet they were anticipated and surprised by the movement of the 18th and 19th Brumaire, which could not, therefore, in strict language, be justified as a defensive measure. Its excuse must rest on the proposition which seems undoubted, that affairs were come to such extremity that a contest was unavoidable, and that therefore it was necessary for the moderate party to take the advantage of

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 97.

² "I have heard some of Arena's countrymen declare that he was incapable of attempting so rash an act. The contrary opinion was, however, so prevalent, that he was obliged to retire to Leghorn, where he made an appeal to the justice of the first consul; who gave him no reply: but I never heard him say that he had noticed the attitude attributed to Arena."—SAVARY. tom. i., p. 154.

Character and of all the gave to the Council of Ancients such an explanation, as they, nothing loth to be convinced, admitted to be satisfactory. Both councils then adjourned till the 19th February, 1800, after each had devolved their powers upon a committee of twenty-five persons, who were instructed to prepare a civil code against the meeting of the legislative bodies. A provisional consular government was appointed, consisting of Buonaparte, Siéyes,¹ and Roger Ducos.

The victory, therefore, of the eighteenth and nineteenth Brumaire, was, by dint of sword and bayonet, completely secured. It remained for the conquerors to consider the uses which were to be made of it.

CHAPTER XVII.

Clemency of the New Consulate—Beneficial change in the Finances—Law of Hostages repealed—Religious liberty allowed—Improvements in the War Department—Pacification of La Vendée—Ascendancy of Napoleon—Disappointment of Siéyes—Committee formed to consider Siéyes' Plan of a Constitution—Rejected as to essentials—A new one adopted, monarchical in every thing but form—Siéyes retires from public life—General view of the new Government—Despotic Power of the First Consul.

THE victory obtained over the Directory and the democrats, upon the 18th and 19th Brumaire, was generally acceptable to the French nation. The feverish desire of liberty, which had been the characteristic of all descriptions of persons in the year 1792, was quenched by the blood shed during the Reign of Terror; and even just and liberal ideas of freedom had so far fallen

¹ "Metaphysicians have disputed, and will long dispute, whether we did not violate the laws, and whether we were not criminal; but these are mere abstractions, at best fit for books and tribunals, and which ought to disappear before imperative necessity: one might as well blame a sailor for waste and destruction, when he cuts away his masts to avoid a hurricane." *See* *the* *Notes* *on* *the* *Reign* *of* *Terror*.

into disrepute, from their resemblance to those which had been used as a pretext for the disgusting cruelties perpetrated at that terrible period, that they excited from association a kind of loathing as well as dread. The great mass of the nation sought no longer guarantees for metaphysical rights, but, broken down by suffering, desired repose, and were willing to submit to any government which promised to secure to them the ordinary benefits of civilisation.

Buonaparte and Siêyes—for, though only during a brief space, they may still be regarded as joint authorities—were enabled to profit by this general acquiescence, in many important particulars. It put it in their power to dispense with the necessity of pursuing and crushing their scattered adversaries; and the French saw a revolution effected in their system, and that by military force, in which not a drop of blood was spilt. Yet, as had been the termination of most recent revolutions, lists of proscription were prepared; and without previous trial or legal sentence, fifty-nine of those who had chiefly opposed the new Consulate on the 18th and 19th Brumaire were condemned to deportation by the sole *fiat* of the consuls. Siêyes is said to have suggested this unjust and arbitrary measure, which, bearing a colour of revenge and persecution, was highly unpopular. It was not carried into execution. Exceptions were at first made in favour of such of the condemned persons as showed themselves disposed to be tractable; and at length the sentence was altogether dispensed with, and the more obnoxious partisans of democracy were only placed under the superintendence of the police.¹ This conduct showed at once conscious strength, and a spirit of clemency, than which no attributes can contribute more to the popularity of a new government; since the spirit of the opposition, deprived of hope of success, and yet not urged on by despair of personal safety, gradually becomes disposed to sink into acquiescence. The democrats, or, as they were now termed, the anarchists, became intimidated, or cooled in their zeal; and only a few of the more enthusiastic continued yet to avow those principles, to breathe the least doubt of which had been, within but a few months, a crime worthy of death.

Other and most important decrees were adopted by the consuls, tending to lighten the burdens which their predecessors had imposed on the nation, and which had rendered their government so unpopular. Two of the most oppressive measures of the directors were repealed without delay.

The first referred to the finances, which were found in a state of ruinous exhaustion, and were only maintained by a system of compulsory and progressive loans, according to rates of assessment on the property of the citizens. The new minister of finance, Gaudin,² would not even go to bed, or sleep a single

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 120.

² Subsequently Duke of Gaëta, who had long occupied the place of chief clerk

night, until he had produced a substitute for this ruinous resource, for which he levied an additional rise of twenty-five per cent. on all contributions, direct and indirect, which produced a large sum. He carried order and regularity into all the departments of finance, improved the collection and income of the funds of the Republic, and inspired so much confidence by the moderation and success of his measures, that credit began to revive, and several loans were attained on easy terms.

The repeal of the law of hostages was a measure equally popular. This cruel and unreasonable enactment, which rendered

The churches were restored to public worship; pensions were allowed to such religious persons as took an oath of fidelity to the government; and more than twenty thousand clergymen, with whom the prisons had been filled, in consequence of intolerant laws, were set at liberty upon taking the same vow. Public and domestic rites of worship in every form were tolerated and protected; and the law of the decades, or Theophilanthropic festivals, was abolished. Even the earthly relics of Pope Pius VI., who had died at Valence, and in exile, were not neglected, but received, singular to relate, the rites of sepulture with the solemnity due to his high office, by command of Buonaparte,¹ who had first shaken the Papal authority; and in doing so, as he boasted in his Egyptian proclamations, had destroyed the emblem of Christian worship.

The part taken by Cambacérès, the minister of justice, in the revolution of Brumaire, has been ascribed to Buonaparte, and

of finance. "He was a man of mild manners, and of inflexible principles."

taken to relax the oppressive severity of the laws against the emigrants. Nine of them, noblemen of the most ancient families in France, had been thrown on the coast near Calais by shipwreck, and the directors had meditated bringing to trial those whom the winds and waves had spared, as fallen under the class of emigrants returned to France without permission, against whom the laws denounced the penalty of death. Buonaparte more liberally considered their being found within the prohibited territory, as an act, not of violation, but of inevitable necessity, and they were dismissed accordingly.¹

From the same spirit of politic clemency, La Fayette, Latour Maubourg, and others, who, although revolutionists, had been expelled from France for not carrying their principles of freedom sufficiently high and far, were permitted to return to their native country.

It may be easily believed that the military department of the state underwent a complete reform under the authority of Buonaparte. Dubois de Crancé, the minister at war under the directors, was replaced by Berthier; and Napoleon gives a strange picture of the incapacity of the former functionary. He declares he could not furnish a single report of the state of the army—that he had obtained no regular returns of the effective strength of the different regiments—that many corps had been formed in the departments, whose very existence was unknown to the minister at war; and, finally, that when pressed for reports of the pay, of the victualling, and of the clothing of the troops, he had replied, that the war department neither paid, clothed, nor victualled them. This may be exaggerated, for Napoleon disliked Dubois de Crancé² as his personal opponent; but the improvident and corrupt character of the directorial government renders the charge very probable. By the exertions of Berthier, accustomed to Buonaparte's mode of arrangements, the war department soon adopted a very different face of activity.³

The same department received yet additional vigour when the consuls called to be its head the celebrated Carnot, who had returned from exile, in consequence of the fall of the directors. He remained in office but a short time; for, being a democrat in principle, he disapproved of the personal elevation of Buonaparte; but during the period that he continued in administration, his services in restoring order in the military department and combining the plans of the campaign with Moreau and Buonaparte, were of the highest importance.

Napoleon showed no less talent in closing the wounds of internal war, than in his other arrangements. The Chouans, under various chiefs, had disturbed the western provinces; but the de-

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 125.

² After the 18th Brumaire, Dubois de Crancé withdrew into Champagne. He died in June 1814.

³ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 103.

spair of pardon, which drove so many malecontents to their standard, began to subside, and the liberal and accommodating measures adopted by the new Consular government, induced most to make peace with Buonaparte. Thus they did the more readily, that many of them believed the chief aim of the new order of

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downtown passage he went to the

tary commission, and condemned to be shot. They marched hand in hand to the place of execution, remained to the last in the same attitude, expressive of their partaking the same sentiments of devotion to the cause in which they suffered, and died with the utmost courage. George Cadoudal, left alone, became unable to support the civil war, and laid down his arms for a time. Buonaparte, whose policy it was to unite in the new order of

whether Buonaparte had any ultimate purpose of serving the Bourbon interest. He certainly did not intend to drive any but that all his sion upon to entertain desperately.

In another instance which happened at this period, Buonaparte boasts of having vindicated the insulted rights of nations. The

Senate of Hamburgh had delivered up to England Napper Tandy, Blackwell, and other Irishmen, concerned in the rebellion which had lately wasted Ireland. Buonaparte took this up in a threatening tone, and expounded to their trembling envoy the rights of a neutral territory, in language, upon which the subsequent tragedy of the Duke d'Enghein formed a singular commentary.¹

While Buonaparte was thus busied in adopting measures for composing internal discord, and renewing the wasted resources of the country, those discussions were at the same time privately carrying forward, which were to determine by whom and in what way it should be governed. There is little doubt, that when Sièyes undertook the revolution of Brumaire, he would have desired for his military assistant a very different character from Buonaparte. Some general would have best suited him who possessed no knowledge beyond that of his profession, and whose ambition would have been contented to accept such share of power as corresponded to his limited views and capacity. The wily priest, however, saw that no other coadjutor save Buonaparte could have availed him, after the return of the latter from Egypt, and was not long of experiencing that Napoleon would not be satisfied with any thing short of the lion's share of the spoil.

At the very first meeting of the consuls, the defection of Roger Ducos to the side of Buonaparte convinced Sièyes, Nov. 11. that he would be unable to support those pretensions to the first place in the government, to which his friends had expected to see him elevated. He had reckoned on Ducos's vote for giving him the situation of first consul; but Ducos saw better where the force and talent of the Consulate must be considered as reposed. "General," said he to Napoleon, at the first meeting of the Consular body, "the presidency belongs to you as a matter of right." Buonaparte took the chair accordingly as a thing of course. In the course of the deliberations, Sièyes had hoped to find that the general's opinions and interference would have been limited to military affairs; whereas, on the contrary, he heard him express distinctly, and support firmly, propositions on policy and finance, religion and jurisprudence. He showed, in short, so little occasion for an independent coadjutor, that Sièyes appears from this, the very first interview, to have given up all hopes of establishing a separate interest of his own, and to have

¹ The Senate of Hamburgh lost no time in addressing a long letter to Napoleon, to testify their repentance. He replied to them thus:—"I have received your letter, gentlemen; it does not justify you. Courage and virtue are the preservers of states; cowardice and crime are their ruin. You have violated the laws of hospitality, a thing which never happened among the most savage hordes of the Desert. Your fellow-citizens will for ever reproach you with it. The two unfortunate men whom you have given up, die with glory; but their blood will bring more evil upon their persecutors than it would be in the power of an army to do." A solemn deputation from the Senate arrived at the Tuileries to make public apologies to Napoleon. He again testified his indignation, and when the envoys urged their weakness, he said to them, "Well! and had you not the resource of weak states? was it not in your power to let them escape?"—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 128; Thibaudcau, tom. i., p. 169.

seen that the Revolution was from that moment ended. On his return home, he said to those statesmen with whom he had consulted and acted preceding the eighteenth Brumaire, as Talley-

This declaration must have announced to those who heard it, that the direct and immediate advantages proposed by the revo-

arbitrary pleasure of one man.

It was, in the meantime, necessary that some form of government should be established without delay, were it only to prevent the meeting of the two Councils, who must have resumed their authority, unless superseded by a new constitution previous to the 19th February, 1800, to which day they had been prorogued. As a previous measure, the oath taken by official persons was altered from a direct acknowledgment of the constitution of the year Three, so as to express a more general profession of adherence to the cause of the French nation. How to salve the wounded consciences of those who had previously taken the oath in its primitive form, no care was used, nor does any appear to have been thought necessary.²

The three consuls, and the legislative committees, formed themselves into a General Committee, for the purpose of

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announce to his party.

On being pressed by his colleagues in the committee, the metaphysical politician at length produced his full plan of the hier-

¹ Gourgaud, tom. I., p. 107, Fouché, tom. I., p. 120.

² Gourgaud, tom. I., p. 147.

³ The committee met in Napoleon's apartment, from nine in the evening

rarefied representation, whose authority was to emanate from the choice of the people and of a Conservative Senate, which was at once to protect the laws of the commonwealth, and *absorb*, as it was termed, all furious and over-ambitious spirits, by calling them, when they distinguished themselves by any irregular exertion of power, to share the comforts and incapacities of their own body, as they say spirits of old were conjured down, and obliged to abide in the Red Sea. He then brought forward his idea of a Legislative Body, which was to vote and decide, but without debate; and his Tribunal, designed to plead for, or to impeach the measures of government. These general outlines were approved, as being judged likely to preserve more stability and permanency than had been found to appertain to the constitutions, which, since 1792, had, in such quick succession, been adopted and abandoned.

But the idea which Siéyes entertained of lodging the executive government in a Grand Elector, who was to be the very model of a King of Lubberland, was the ruin of his plan. It was in vain, that in hopes of luring Buonaparte to accept of this office, he had, while depriving it of all real power, attached to it a large revenue, guards, honours, and rank. The heaping with such distinctions an official person, who had no other duty than to name two consuls, who were to carry on the civil and military business of the state without his concurrence or authority, was introducing into a modern state the evils of a worn-out Asiatic empire, where the Sultan, or Mogul, or whatever he is called, lies in his Haram in obscure luxury, while the state affairs are conducted exclusively by his viziers, or lieutenants.

Buonaparte exclaimed against the whole concoction.—“Who,” said he, “would accept an office, of which the only duties were to fatten like a pig upon so many millions yearly?—Or what man of spirit would consent to name ministers, over whom, being named, he was not to exercise the slightest authority?—And your two consuls for war and peace, the one surrounded with judges, churchmen, and civilians,—the other with military men and diplomatists,—on what footing of intercourse can they be said to stand respecting each other?—the one demanding money and recruits, the other refusing the supplies? A government involving such a total separation of offices necessarily connected, would be heterogeneous,—the shadow of a state, but without the efficient authority which should belong to one.”

Siéyes did not possess powers of persuasion or promptness of speech in addition to his other talents. He was silenced and

1 “Napoleon now began, he said, to laugh in Siéyes’s face, and to cut up all his metaphysical nonsense without mercy. ‘You take,’ he said, ‘the abuse for the principle, the shadow for the body. And how can you imagine, M. Siéyes, that a man of any talent, or the least honour, will resign himself to act the part of a pig fattening on a few millions.’ After this sally, which made those who were present laugh immoderately, Siéyes remained overwhelmed.”—NAPOLÉON, *Las Cases*, tom. iv., p. 335.

intimidated, and saw his favourite Elector-General, with his two Consuls, or rather viziers, rejected, without making much effort in their defence.

Still the system which was actually adopted, bore, in point of form, some faint resemblance to the model of Siéyes. Three Consuls were appointed; the first to hold the sole power of nomination to public offices, and of the administration of justice.

prepared for a retrograde movement.

The office of one of these supplementary consuls was offered to Siéyes, but he declined to accept of it, and expressed his wish to retire from public life. His disappointment was probably con-

a consequence not probably unforeseen by Buonaparte, when he loaded him with wealth.

To return to the new constitution. Every species of power and faculty was heaped upon the chief consul, with a liberality which looked as if France, to atone for her long jealousy of those who had been the administrators of her executive power, was now determined to remove at once every obstacle which might stand

¹ Las Cases, tom. iv., p. 313.

² "Upon the occasion of this gift, the following sorry rhymes were in every one's mouth,—

"Buonaparte à Siéyes a fait présent de Crône,
Siéyes à Buonaparte a fait présent du Trône."

—MOTTEILLARD, tom. v., p. 318.

³ "Siéyes was the most unfit man in the world for power, but his perceptions were often luminous, and of the highest importance. He was fond of money, but of strict integrity"—NAPOLKOV, *Courpaul*, tom. iv., p. 152.

in the way of Buonaparte to arbitrary power. He possessed the sole right of nominating counsellors of state, ministers, ambassadors, officers, civil and military, and almost all functionaries whatsoever. He was to propose all new laws, and take all measures for internal and external defence of the state. He commanded all the forces, of whatever description, superintended all the national relations at home and abroad, and coined the public money. In these high duties he had the advice of his brother consuls, and also of a Council of State. But he was recognised to be independent of them all. The consuls were to be elected for the space of ten years, and to be re-eligible.

The Abbé Siéyes's plan of dividing the people into three classes, which should each of them declare a certain number of persons eligible to certain gradations of the state, was ostensibly adopted. The lists of these eligible individuals were to be addressed by the various electoral classes to the Conservative Senate, which also was borrowed from the abbé's model. This body, the highest and most august in the state, were to hold their places for life, and had a considerable pension attached to them. Their number was not to exceed eighty, and they were to have the power of supplying vacancies in their own body, by choosing the future senator from a list of three persons; one of them proposed by the chief consul, one by the Legislative Body, and one by the Tribunal. Senators became for ever incapable of any other public duty. Their duty was to receive the national lists of persons eligible for official situations, and to annul such laws or measures as should be denounced to their body, as unconstitutional or impolitic, either by the Government or the Tribunal. The sittings of the Senate were not public.

The new constitution of France also adopted the Legislative Body and the Tribunal proposed by the Abbé Siéyes. The duty of the Legislative Body was to take into consideration such laws as should be approved by the Tribunal, and pass or refuse them by vote, but without any debate, or even an expression of their opinion.

The Tribunal, on the contrary, was a deliberative body, to whom the chief consul, and his Council of State, with whom alone lay the initiative privilege, were to propose such laws as appeared to them desirable. These, when discussed by the Tribunal, and approved of by the silent assent of the Legislative Body, passed into decrees, and became binding upon the community. The Legislative Body heard the report of the Tribunal, as expressed by a deputation from that body; and by their votes alone, but without any debate or delivery of opinion, refused or confirmed the proposal. Some of the more important acts of government, such as the proclamation of peace or war, could only take place on the motion of the chief consul to the Tribunal, upon their recommending the measure to the Legislative Body; and, finally, upon the legislative commissions affirming the proposal. But the

power of the chief consul was not much checked by this restriction ; for the discussion on such subjects was only to take place on his own requisition, and always in secret committee ; so that the greatest hinderance of despotism, the weight of public opinion formed upon public debate, was totally wanting.

A very slight glance at this Consular form of government is sufficient to show, that Buonaparte selected exactly as much of the ingenious constitution of Siéyes as was applicable to his own object of acquiring supreme and despotic authority, while he got rid of all, the Tribune alone excepted, which contained, directly or indirectly, any check or balance affecting the executive power. The substitution of lists of eligible persons or candidates, to be made up by the people, instead of the popular election of actual representatives, converted into a metaphysical and abstract idea the real safeguard of liberty. It may be true, that the authority of an official person, selected from the national lists, might be said originally to emanate from the people ; because, unless his

representative ; and the popular interference in the state, which had hitherto comprehended the former privilege, was now re-

the people themselves.

All the other balances and checks which the Abbé had designed to substitute instead of that which arises from popular election, had been broken and cast away ; while the fragments of the

to be thrown aside at pleasure.

Neither were the other constitutional authorities calculated to offer effectual resistance to the engrossing authority of this all-

powerful officer. All these bodies were, in fact, mere pensioners. The Senate, which met in secret, and the Legislative Body, whose lips were padlocked, were alike removed from influencing public opinion, and being influenced by it. The Tribunal, indeed, consisting of a hundred persons, retained in some sort the right of debate, and of being publicly heard. But the members of the Tribunal were selected by the Senate, not by the people, whom except in metaphysical mockery, it could not be said to represent any more than a bottle of distilled liquor can be said to represent the sheaf of grain which it was originally drawn from. What chance was there that, in a hundred men so chosen, there should be courage and independence enough found to oppose that primary power, by which, like a steam-engine, the whole constitution was put in motion? Such tribunes were also in danger of recollecting, that they only held their offices for four years, and that the senators had their offices for life; while a transition from the one state to the other was in general thought desirable, and could only be gained by implicit obedience during the candidate's probation in the Tribunal. Yet, slender as was the power of this tribunate body, Buonaparte showed some jealousy even of this slight appearance of freedom; although, justly considered, the Senate, the Conservative Body, and the Tribunal, were but three different pipes, which, separately or altogether, uttered sound at the pleasure of him who presided at the instrument.

The spirit of France must have been much broken when this arbitrary system was adopted without debate or contradiction; and, when we remember the earlier period of 1789, it is wonderful to consider how, in the space of ten years, the race of men, whose love of liberty carried them to such extravagances, seems to have become exhausted. Personal safety was now a principal object with most. They saw no alternative between absolute submission to a military chief of talent and power, and the return to anarchy and new revolutionary excesses.

During the sitting of Buonaparte's Legislative Committee, Madame de Staël expressed to a representative of the people, her alarms on the subject of liberty. "Oh, madam," he replied, "we are arrived at an extremity in which we must not trouble ourselves about saving the principles of the Revolution, but only the lives of the men by whom the Revolution was effected."¹

Yet more than one exertion is said to have been made in the committee, to obtain some modification of the supreme power of the chief consul, or at least some remedy in case of its being abused. Several members of the committee which adjusted the new constitution, made, it is said, an effort to persuade Buonaparte, that, in taking possession of the office of supreme magistrate, without any preliminary election, he would evince an ambition which might prejudice him with the people; and, entreat-

¹ *Consid. sur. la Rév. Française*, tom. ii., p. 248.

ing him to be satisfied with the office of generalissimo of the armies, with full right of treating with foreign powers, invited him to set off to the frontier and resume his train of victories. "I will remain at Paris," said Buonaparte, biting his nails to the quick, as was his custom when agitated—"I will remain at Paris—I am chief consul."

Chénier hinted at adopting the doctrine of absorption, but was instantly interrupted—"I will have no such mummary," said Buonaparte; "blood to the knees rather."¹ These expressions may be exaggerated; but it is certain that, whenever there was an attempt to control his wishes, or restrict his power, such a discontented remark as intimated "that he would meddle no more in the business," was sufficient to overpower the opposition. The committee saw no option betwixt submitting to the authority of this inflexible chief, or encountering the horrors of a bloody civil war. Thus were lost at once the fruits of the winter, the summer

advantages which it ensures, for a single day, returned to be the vassals of a despotic government, administered by a chief whose right was only in his sword. A few reflections on what

noble, that, in serving their country, they had no other object be-

haps not to Europe, in the eighteenth century. We may, there-

both objects were to be best obtained.

The first alternative was the re-establishment of the Republic, upon some better and less perishable model than those which had been successively adopted and abandoned by the French, in the several phases of the Revolution. But Buonaparte had already determined against this plan of government, and seemed unalterably convinced, that the various misfortunes and failures which had been sustained in the attempt to convert France into a republic, afforded irrefragable evidence that her natural and proper constitutional government must be monarchical. This im-

¹ *Mémoires de Fouché*, tom. I., p. 104.—S.

portant point settled, it remained, 1st, To select the person in whose hand the kingly power was to be intrusted. 2dly, To consider in what degree the monarchieal principle should be mingled with, and qualified by, securities for the freedom of the people, and checks against the encroachments of the prince.

Having broken explicitly with the Republicans, Buonaparte had it in his power, doubtless, to have united with those who desired the restoration of the Bourbons, who at this moment formed a large proportion of the better classes in France. The name of the old dynasty must have brought with it great advantages. Their restoration would have at once given peace to Europe, and in a great measure reconciled the strife of parties in France. There was no doubt of the possibility of the counter-revolution; for what was done in 1814 might have been still more easily done in 1799. Old ideas would have returned with ancient names, and at the same time security might have been given, that the restored monarch should be placed within such legal restraints as were necessary for the protection of the freedom of the subject. The principal powers of Europe, if required, would have gladly guaranteed to the French people any class of institutions which might have been thought adequate to this purpose.

But, besides that such a course cut off Buonaparte from any higher reward of his services, than were connected with the rank of a subject, the same objections to the restoration of the Bourbon family still prevailed, which we have before noticed. The extreme confusion likely to be occasioned by the conflicting claims of the restored emigrants, who had left France with all the feelings and prejudices peculiar to their birth and quality, and those of the numerous soldiers and statesmen who had arisen to eminence during the revolution, and whose pretensions to rank and office would be urged with jealous vehemence against those who had shared the fortunes of the exiled monarch, was a powerful objection to the restoration. The question concerning the national domains remained as embarrassing as before; for, while the sales which had been made of that property could scarce be cancelled without a severe shock to national credit, the restored Bourbons could not, on the other hand, fail to insist upon an indemnification to the spirituality, who had been stripped of their property for their adherence to their religious vows, and to the nobles, whose estates had been forfeited for their adherence to the throne. It might also have been found, that, among the army, a prejudice against the Bourbons had survived their predilection for the Republic, and that although the French soldiers might see with pleasure a crown placed on the brow of their favourite general, they might be unwilling to endure the restoration of the ancient race, against whom they had long borne arms.

All these objections against attempting to recall the ancient dynasty, have weight in themselves, and may readily have appeared insuperable to Buonaparte; especially considering the

conclusion to be, that if the Bourbons were found ineligible, the crown of France—with a more extended empire, and more unlimited powers—was in that case to rest with Buonaparte himself. There is no doubt that, in preferring the title of the Bourbons founded on right to his own, which rested on force and such more

world, the temptation was immense; and Buonaparte was, in some measure, unfettered by the circumstances which might have withheld some of his contemporaries from snatching at the crown that seemed to await his grasp. Whatever were the rights of the Bourbons, abstractedly considered, they were not of a kind to force themselves immediately upon the conscience of Buonaparte. He had not entered public life, was indeed a mere boy, when the general voice of France, or that which appeared such, drove the ancient race from the throne; he had acted during all his life hitherto in the service of the French government *de facto*; and it was hard to require of him, now of a sudden, to

he had attained by his own talents, was too natural a course of action to be loaded with censure by any one, who, if he takes the trouble to consider the extent of the temptation, must acknowledge in his heart the difficulty of resisting it.

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us no farther. We cannot for an instant sanction the monstrous accumulation of authority which engrossed into his own hands all the powers of the State, and deprived the French people, from that period, of the least pretence to liberty, or power of protecting themselves from tyranny. It is in vain to urge, that they had not yet learned to make a proper use of the invaluable privileges of which he deprived them—equally in vain to say, that they consented to resign what it was not in their power to defend. It is a poor apology for theft, that the person plundered knew not the value of the gem taken from him; a worse excuse for robbery, that the party robbed was disarmed and prostrate, and submitted without resistance, where to resist would have been to die. In choosing to be the head of a well-regulated and limited monarchy, Buonaparte would have consulted even his own

interest better, than by preferring, as he did, to become the sole animating spirit of a monstrous despotism. The communication of common privileges, while they united discordant factions, would have fixed the attention of all on the head of the government, as their mutual benefactor. The constitutional rights which he had reserved for the Crown would have been respected, when it was remembered that the freedom of the people had been put in a rational form, and its privileges rendered available by his liberality.

Such checks upon his power would have been as beneficial to himself as to his subjects. If, in the course of his reign, he had met constitutional opposition to the then immense projects of conquest, which cost so much blood and devastation, to that opposition he would have been as much indebted, as a person subject to fits of lunacy is to the bonds by which, when under the influence of his malady, he is restrained from doing mischief. Buonaparte's active spirit, withheld from warlike pursuits, would have been exercised by the internal improvement of his kingdom. The mode in which he used his power would have gilded over, as in many other cases, the imperfect nature of his title, and if he was not, in every sense, the legitimate heir of the monarchy, he might have been one of the most meritorious princes that ever ascended the throne. Had he permitted the existence of a power expressive of the national opinion to exist, co-equal with and restrictive of his own, there would have been no occupation of Spain, no war with Russia, no imperial decrees against British commerce. The people who first felt the pressure of these violent and ruinous measures, would have declined to submit to them in the outset. The ultimate consequence—the overthrow, namely, of Napoleon himself, would not have taken place, and he might, for aught we can see, have died on the throne of France, and bequeathed it to his posterity, leaving a reputation which could only be surpassed in lustre by that of an individual who should render similar advantages to his country, yet decline the gratification, in any degree, of his personal ambition.

In short, it must always be written down, as Buonaparte's error as well as guilt, that, misusing the power which the 18th Brumaire threw into his hands, he totally destroyed the liberty of France, or, we would say, more properly, the chance which that country had of attaining a free, and, at the same time, a settled government. He might have been a patriot prince, he chose to be a usurping despot—he might have played the part of Washington, he preferred that of Cromwell.¹

¹ The constitution of the year VIII, so impatiently expected by all ranks of citizens, was published and submitted to the sanction of the people on the 13th of December, and proclaimed on the 24th of the same; the provisional government having lasted forty-three days. The Legislative Body and the Tribunal entered on their functions the 1st day of January, 1800.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Proceedings of Buonaparte in order to consolidate his power—His great success—Causes that led to it—Cambacérès and Le Brun chosen Second and Third Consuls—Talleyrand appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Fouché Minister of Police—Their Characters—Other Ministers nominated—Various Changes made, in order to mark the Commencement of a new Era—Napoleon addresses a Letter personally to the King of England—Answered by Lord Grenville—Negotiation for Peace

Italy—His Measures for that purpose.

THE structure of government which Buonaparte had selected

to secure the selection of the official individuals to himself, he eluded entirely the principle by which Sièyès had proposed to elaborate his native

lists of eligibility,

his hierarchy divid-

these lists of eligi-

own pleasure, and that of his counsellors, the two new consuls,

Buonaparte named sixty senators; the senators named a hun-

dred tribunes, and three hundred legislators; and thus the whole

bodies of the State were filled up, by a choice emanating from

been, was to be merged in that of the new system; as the statuary throws into the furnace broken fragments of bronze of every various description, without regarding their immediate appearance or form, his purpose being to unite them by fusion, and bestow upon the mass the new shape which his art destines it to represent.

With these views, Napoleon said to Sièyès, who reprobated the admission of Fouché into office and power, "we are creating a new era. Of the past, we must forget the bad, and only remem-

ber the good. Time, habits of business, and experience, have formed many able men, and modified many characters."¹ These words may be regarded as the key-note of his whole system. Buonaparte did not care what men had been formerly, so that they were now disposed to become that which was suitable for his interest, and for which he was willing to reward them liberally. The former conduct of persons of talent, whether in politics or morality, was of no consequence, providing they were willing, now, faithfully to further and adhere to the new order of things. This prospect of immunity for the past, and reward for the future, was singularly well calculated to act upon the public mind, desirous as it was of repose, and upon that of individuals, agitated by so many hopes and fears as the Revolution had set afloat. The consular government seemed a general place of refuge and sanctuary to persons of all various opinions, and in all various predicaments. It was only required of them, in return for the safety which it afforded, that they should pay homage to the presiding deity.

So artfully was the system of Buonaparte contrived, that each of the numerous classes of Frenchmen found something in it congenial to his habits, his feelings, or his circumstances, providing only he was willing to sacrifice to it the essential part of his political principles. To the Royalist, it restored monarchical forms, a court, and a sovereign—but he must acknowledge that sovereign in Buonaparte. To the churchman, it opened the gates of the temples, removed the tyranny of the persecuting philosophers—promised in course of time a national church—but by the altar must be placed the image of Buonaparte. The Jacobin, dyed double red in murder and massacre, was welcome to safety and security from the aristocratic vengeance which he had so lately dreaded. The regicide was guaranteed against the return of the Bourbons—they who had profited by the Revolution as purchasers of national domains, were ensured against their being resumed. But it was under the implied condition, that not a word was to be mentioned by those *ci-devant* democrats, of liberty or equality: the principles for which forfeitures had been made, and revolutionary tribunals erected, were henceforth never to be named. To all these parties, as to others, Buonaparte held out the same hopes under the same conditions—"All these things will I give you, if you will kneel down and worship me." Shortly afterwards, he was enabled to place before those to whom the choice was submitted, the original temptation in its full extent—a display of the kingdoms of the earth, over which he offered to extend the empire of France, providing always he was himself acknowledged as the object of general obedience, and almost adoration.

The system of Buonaparte, as it combined great art with an apparent generosity and liberality, proved eminently successful

¹ Gourgand, tom. i., p. 118.

among the people of France, when subjected to the semblance of a popular vote. The national spirit was exhausted by the changes and the sufferings, the wars and the crimes, of so many years; and in France, as in all other countries, parties, exhausted by the exertions and vicissitudes of civil war, are in the very situation where military tyranny becomes the next crisis. The rich favoured Buonaparte for the sake of protection,—the poor for that of relief,—the emigrants, in many cases, because they desired to return to France,—the men of the Revolution, because they were afraid of being banished from it;—the sanguine and courageous crowded round his standard in hope of victory,—the timid cowered behind it in the desire of safety. Add to these the vast multitude who follow the opinions of others, and take the road which lies most obvious, and is most trodden, and it is no wonder that the 18th Brumaire, and its

tion of the people.

sular Government, we

millions of citizens,

ceding system had been received with. The vote was doubtless a farce in itself, considering how many constitutions had been adopted and sworn to within so short a space; but still the num-

possession of the power.

selected from the cargo of vice, "what has been thy former conduct; but, henceforth, see thou continue faithful to me, or this," striking his hand on his musket, "shall punish thy want of fidelity."

¹ Out of 3,012,500 votes, 1502 rejected the new constitution; 3,011,007 accepted it.—See THIRALDEAU, tom. I., p. 117

For second and third consuls, Buonaparte chose Cambacérés,¹ a lawyer, and a member of the moderate party, with Lebrun,² who had formerly co-operated with the Chancellor Maupeou. The former was employed by the chief consul as his organ of communication with the Revolutionists, while Lebrun rendered him the same service with the Royal party; and although, as Madame de Staël observes, they preached very different sermons on the same texts,³ yet they were both eminently successful in detaching from their original factions many of either class, and uniting them with this third, or government party, which was thus composed of deserters from both. The last soon became so numerous, that Buonaparte was enabled to dispense with the *bascule*, or trimming system, by which alone his predecessors, the directors, had been enabled to support their power.

In the ministry, Buonaparte acted upon the same principle, selecting and making his own the men whose talents were most distinguished, without reference to their former conduct. Two were particularly distinguished, as men of the most eminent talents, and extensive experience. These were Talleyrand and Fouché. The former, noble by birth, and Bishop of Autun, notwithstanding his high rank in church and state, had been deeply engaged in the Revolution. He had been placed on the list of emigrants, from which his name was erased on the establishment of the Directorial government, under which he became minister of foreign affairs. He resigned that office in the summer preceding 18th Brumaire; and Buonaparte, finding him at variance with the Directory, readily passed over some personal grounds of complaint which he had against him, and enlisted in his service a supple and dexterous politician, and an experienced minister; fond, it is said, of pleasure, not insensible to views of self-interest, nor too closely fettered by principle, but perhaps unequalled in ingenuity. Talleyrand was replaced in the situation of minister for foreign affairs, after a short interval, assigned for the purpose of suffering the public to forget his prominent share in the scandalous treaty with the American commissioners, and continued for a long tract of time one of the closest sharers of Buonaparte's councils.⁴

If the character of Talleyrand bore no strong traces of public virtue or inflexible morality, that of Fouché was marked with

¹ "Cambacérés was of an honourable family in Languedoc; he was fifty years old; he had been a member of the Convention, and had conducted himself with moderation: he was generally esteemed, and had a just claim to the reputation which he enjoyed of being one of the ablest lawyers of the republic."—*NAPOLEON, Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 153.

² "Lebrun was sixty years of age, and came from Normandy. He was one of the best writers in France, a man of inflexible integrity; and he approved of the changes of the Revolution only in consideration of the advantages which resulted from them to the mass of the people, for his own family were all of the class of peasantry."—*Ibid.*, p. 153.

³ *Consid. sur la Rév. Française*, tom. ii., p. 255.

⁴ *Thibaudeau*, tom. i., p. 115; *Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 115.

still darker shades. He had been dipt in some of the worst transactions of the Reign of Terror, and his name is found among the agents of the dreadful crimes of that unhappy period. In the days of

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funds. To atone for the imperfections of a character stained with perfidy, venality, and indifference to human suffering, Fouché brought to Bona

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extensive knowledge of the revolutionary springs, and the address with which he could either put them into motion, or prevent them from operating, Fouché, in the latter part of his life, displayed a species of wisdom which came in place of morality and benevolence.

Loving wealth and power, he was neither a man of ardent passions, nor of a vengeful disposition; and though there was no

he gained the full credit, while the harsh measures of which he was the agent, were set down to the necessity of his situation.

person by whom that formidable office had been first placed on an effectual footing.¹

¹ Gouraud, tom. I., p. 116.

Of the other ministers, it is not necessary to speak in detail. Cambacérès retained the situation of minister of justice,¹ for which he was well qualified; and the celebrated mathematician, Laplace, was preferred to that of the Interior, for which he was not, according to Buonaparte's report, qualified at all.² Berthier, as we have already seen, filled the war department, and shortly afterwards Carnot; and Gaudin administered the finances with credit to himself. Forfait, a naval architect of eminence,³ replaced Bourdon in the helpless and hopeless department of the French Admiralty.

A new constitution having been thus formed, and the various branches of duty distributed with much address among those best capable of discharging them, other changes were at the same time made, which were designed to mark that a new era was commenced, in which all former prejudices were to be abandoned and done away.

We have noticed that one of the first acts of the Provisional Government had been to new-modify the national oath, and generalize its terms, so that they should be no longer confined to the constitution of the year Three, but should apply to that which was about to be framed, or to any other which might be produced by the same authority.⁴ Two subsequent alterations in the constitution, which passed without much notice, so much was the revolutionary or republican spirit abated, tended to show that farther changes were impending, and that the Consular Republic was speedily to adopt the name, as it already had the essence, of a monarchy. It was scarcely three months since the President of the Directory had said to the people, on the anniversary of the taking of the Bastile,—“Royalty shall never raise its head again. We shall no more behold individuals boasting a title from Heaven, to oppress the earth with more ease and security, and who considered France as their private patrimony, Frenchmen as their subjects, and the laws as the expression of their good-will and pleasure.” Yet now, in contradiction to this sounding declamation, the national oath, expressing hatred to royalty, was annulled, under the pretext that the Republic, being

1 “When Cambacérès afterwards vacated the office, Buonaparte appointed M. d’Abrial, who died in 1820, a peer of France. On remitting the folio to the new minister, the First Consul addressed him thus: “M. d’Abrial, I know you not, but am informed you are the most upright man in the magistracy; it is on that account I name you minister of justice.”—BOURRIENNE, tom. ii., p. 118.

2 “Laplace, a geometrician of the first rank, soon proved himself below mediocrity as a minister. On his very first essay, the consuls found that they had been mistaken; not a question did Laplace seize in its true point of view: he sought for subtleties in every thing; had none but problematical ideas, and carried the doctrine of infinite littleness into the business of administration.”—NAPOLEON, *Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 116.

3 “Forfait, a native of Normandy, had the reputation of being a naval architect of first-rate talent, but he was a mere projector, and did not answer the expectations formed of him.”—NAPOLEON, *Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 115.

4 *Moniteur*, 31st Dec. 1799.

universally acknowledged, had no occasion for the guard of such disclamations.

In like manner, the public observance of the day on which Louis XVI. had suffered decapitation, was formally abolished. Buonaparte, declining to pass a judgment on the action as just, politic, or useful, pronounced that, in any event, it could only be regarded as a national calamity, and was therefore in a moral, as well as a political sense, an unfit epoch for festive celebration. An expression of the first consul to Siéyes was also current at the same time, which, although Buonaparte may not have used it, has been generally supposed to express his sentiments. Siéyes had spoken of Louis under the established phrase of the Tyrant. "He was no tyrant," Buonaparte replied; "had he been such,

the Luxembourg palace, occupied by the directors, to the royal residence of the Tuilleries. Madame de Stael beheld the entrance of this fortunate soldier into the princely residence of the Bourbons. He was alone accompanied by a single man, known to

the doors were thrown open with a bustle and violence, expressive of the importance of the occasion. But the hero of the scene, in ascending the magnificent staircase, up which a throng of courtiers followed him, seemed totally indifferent to all around, his features bearing only a general expression of indifference to events, and contempt for mankind.¹

delay; and that the French expected from him either the conclusion of an honourable peace, or the restoration of victory to

energy.

Hitherto, in diplomacy, it had been usual to sound the way for

¹ Las Cases, tom. iv. p. 317.

² "The choice of this residence was a stroke of policy. It was there that the King of France was accustomed to be seen; circumstances connected with that monarchy were there presented to every eye; and the very influence of the walls on the minds of spectators was, if we may say so, sufficient for the restoration of regal power."—MAD. DE STAEL, tom. II., p. 236.

opening treaties of peace by obscure and almost unaccredited agents, in order that the party willing to make propositions might not subject themselves to a haughty and insulting answer, or have their desire of peace interpreted as a confession of weakness. Buonaparte went into the opposite extreme, and addressed the King of England in a personal epistle. This Letter,¹ like that to the Archduke Charles, during the campaign of 1797, intimates Buonaparte's affectation of superiority to the usual forms of diplomacy, and his pretence to a character determined to emancipate itself from rules only designed for mere ordinary men. But the manner of the address was in bad taste, and ill calculated to obtain credit for his being sincere in the proposal of peace. He was bound to know so much of the constitutional authority of the monarch whom he addressed, as to be aware that George III. would not, and could not, contract any treaty personally, but must act by the advice of those ministers whose responsibility was his guarantee to the nation at large. The terms of the letter set forth, as usual, the blessings of peace, and urged the propriety of its being restored; propositions which could not admit of dispute in the abstract, but which admit much discussion when coupled with unreasonable or inadmissible conditions.

The answer transmitted by Lord Grenville, in the forms of diplomacy, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dwelt on the aggressions of France, declared that the restoration of the Bourbons would have been the best security for their sincerity, but disavowed all right to dictate to France in her internal concerns. Some advances were made to a pacific treaty; and it is probable that England might at that period have obtained the same or better terms than she afterwards got by the treaty of Amiens.

1 " French Republic—Sovereignty of the People—Liberty—Equality. .

" Buonaparte, First Consul of the Republic, to his Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland.

" Paris, 5th Nivose, 8th year of the Republic,
(25th Dec. 1799.)

" Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the first magistracy of the Republic, I think it proper, on entering into office, to make a direct communication of it to your Majesty. The war, which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world, must it be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding? How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, beyond what their safety and independence require, greatness the benefits of commerce, internal prosperity, and the happiness of families? How is it that they do not feel that peace is the first necessity as well as the first glory? These sentiments cannot be foreign to the heart of your Majesty, who reign over a free nation, and with the sole view of rendering it happy. Your Majesty will only see, in this overture, my sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a proceeding prompt, entirely confidential, and disengaged from those forms which, necessary perhaps to disguise the dependence of weak States, prove only in the case of the strong the mutual dependence of each other. France and England, by the abuse of their long time, for the misfortune of all nations, retard the period of their being exhausted. But I will venture to say, the fate of all civilized nations is attached to the termination of a war which involves the whole world.

" BUONAPARTE."

It may be added, that the moderate principles expressed by the consular government, might, in the infancy of his power, and in a moment of considerable doubt, have induced Buonaparte to make sacrifices, to which, triumphant and established, he would not condescend. But the possession of Egypt, which Buonaparte must have insisted on, were it only for his own reputation, was likely

Buonaparte, in the check received before Acre, had been found not absolutely invincible. The exploits of Suwarrow over the French were recent, and had been decisive. The state of the interior of France was well known; and it was conceived, that though this successful general had climbed into the seat of supreme power which he found unoccupied, yet that two strong parties, of which the Royalists objected to his person, the Republicans to his form of government, could not fail, the one or other, to deprive him of his influence.

The treaty was finally broken off, on the score that there was

in regard to Buonaparte's sincerity in the negotiation, but there can be none as to the reality of his joy at its being defeated. The voice which summoned him to war was that which sounded

from the last descendant of the Stuart family appeared there, congratulating the King of Britain on his acceding to the doctrine of legitimacy, and summoning him to make good his principles, by an abdication of his crown in favour of the lineal heir.¹

The external situation of France had, as we before remarked, been considerably improved by the consequences of the battle of Zurich, and the victories of Moreau. But the Republic derived yet greater advantages from the breach between the Emperors of Austria and Russia. Paul, naturally of an uncertain temper, and offended by the management of the last campaign, in which Korsakow had been defeated, and Suwarrow checked, in consequence of their being unsupported by the Austrian army, had withdrawn his troops, so distinguished for their own bravery as well as for the talents of their leader, from the seat of war. But the Austrians, possessing a firmness of character undismayed by defeat, and encouraged by the late success of their arms under

¹ See *Moniteur*, 23 Pluviose, 10th February 1800, and Thibaudeau, tom. I. p. 194.

the veteran Melas, had made such gigantic exertions as to counter-balance the loss of their Russian confederates.¹

Their principal force was in Italy, and it was on the Italian frontier that they meditated a grand effort, by which, supported by the British fleet, they proposed to reduce Genoa, and penetrate across the Var into Provence, where existed a strong body of Royalists ready to take arms, under the command of General Willot, an emigrant officer. It was said the celebrated Piechgru, who, escaped from Guiana, had taken refuge in England, was also with his army, and was proposed as a chief leader of the expected insurrection.

To execute this plan, Melas was placed at the head of an army of 140,000 men. This army was quartered for the winter in the plains of Piedmont, and waited but the approach of spring to commence operations.

Opposed to them, and occupying the country betwixt Genoa and the Var, lay a French army of 40,000 men; the relics of those who had been repeatedly defeated in Italy by Suwarrow. They were quartered in a poor country, and the English squadron, which blockaded the coast, was vigilant in preventing any supplies from being sent to them. Distress was therefore considerable, and the troops were in proportion dispirited and disorganized. Whole corps abandoned their position, contrary to orders; and, with drums beating, and colours flying, returned into France. A proclamation from Napoleon was almost alone sufficient to remedy these disorders. He called on the soldiers, and particularly those corps who had formerly distinguished themselves under his command in his Italian campaigns, to remember the confidence he had once placed in them.² The scattered troops returned to their duty, as war-horses when dispersed are said to rally and form ranks at the mere sound of the trumpet. Massena, an officer eminent for his acquaintance with the mode of carrying on war in a mountainous country, full of passes and strong positions, was intrusted with the command of the Italian army, which Buonoparte³ resolved to support in person with the army of reserve.

¹ Thibaudeau, tom. i., p. 182; Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 16, 24.

² These disorders gave rise to many general orders from Napoleon; in one of them he said—"The first quality of a soldier is patient endurance of fatigue and privation; valour is but a secondary virtue. Several corps have quitted their positions; they have been deaf to the voice of their officers. Are, then, the heroes of Castiglione, of Rivoli, of Neumark no more? *They* would rather have perished than have deserted their colours. Soldiers, do you complain that your rations have not been regularly distributed? What would you have done, if, like the fourth and twenty-second light demi-brigades, you had found yourselves in the midst of the desert, without bread or water, subsisting on horses and camels? *Victory will give us bread*, said they; and you—you desert your colours! Soldiers of Italy, a new general commands you; he was always in the foremost ranks, in the moments of your brightest glory; place your confidence in him; he will bring back victory to your colours."—GOURGAUD, tom. i., p. 160.

³ In a proclamation issued to the armies, he said—"Soldiers! it is no longer the frontiers that you are called on to defend, the countries of your enemies

The French army upon the Rhine possessed as great a superiority over the Austrians, as Melas, on the Italian frontier, enjoyed over Massena. Moreau was placed in the command of a large army, augmented by a strong detachment from that of General Brune, now no longer necessary for the protection of Holland, and by the army of Helvetia, which, after the defeat of Korsakow, was not farther required for the defence of Switzerland. In bestowing this great charge on Moreau, the first consul showed himself superior to the jealousy which might have dissuaded meaner minds from intrusting a rival, whose military skill was often compared with his own, with such an opportunity of distinguishing himself.¹ But Buonaparte, in this and other cases, preferred the employing and profiting by the public service of men of talents, and especially men of military eminence, to any risk which he could run from their rivalry. He had the just confidence in his own powers, never to doubt his supremacy, and trusted to the influence of discipline, and the love of their profession, which induces generals to consent of any sacrifice and risk.

Championnet. He took care, at the same time, by changing the commands intrusted to them, to break off all combinations or connexions which they might have formed for a new alteration of the government.

General Moreau was much superior in numbers to Kray, the Austrian who commanded on the Rhine, and received orders to resume the offensive. He was cautious in his tactics, though a

those schemes formed with most distinction.

of marches, counter-marches, and desperate battles ensued, in

are to be invaded. At a fit season I will be in the midst of you, and Europe shall be made to remember that you belong to a valiant race."—Gottschall's, tom 4, p. 162.

¹ Jomini, tom xiv, p 35, 43; Thibaudan, tom 1, p 132-6, Gourgaud, tom 1, p. 162.

which General Kray, admirably supported by the Archduke Ferdinand, made a gallant defence against superior numbers.

In Buonaparte's account of this campaign,¹ he blames Moreau for hesitation and timidity in following up the advantages which he obtained.² Yet to a less severe, perhaps to a more impartial judge, Moreau's success might seem satisfactory, since, crossing the Rhine in the end of April, he had his headquarters at Augsburg upon the 15th July, ready either to co-operate with the Italian army, or to march into the heart of the Austrian territory. Nor can it be denied that, during this whole campaign, Moreau kept in view, as a principal object, the protecting the operations of Buonaparte in Italy, and saving that chief, in his dauntless and desperate invasion of the Milanese territory, from the danger which might have ensued, had Kray found an opportunity of opening a communication with the Austrian army in Italy, and despatching troops to its support.

It may be remarked of these two great generals, that, as enterprise was the characteristic of Buonaparte's movements, prudence was that of Moreau's; and it is not unusual, even when there occur no other motives for rivals undervaluing each other, that the enterprising judge the prudent to be timid, and the prudent account the enterprising rash.

It is not ours to decide upon professional questions between men of such superior talents; and, having barely alluded to the topic, we leave Moreau at Augsburg, where he finally concluded an armistice³ with General Kray, as a con-^{15th July.}sequence of that which Buonaparte had established in Italy after the battle of Marengo. Thus much, therefore, is due in justice to Moreau. His campaign was, on the whole, crowned in its results with distinguished success.⁴ And when it is considered, that he was to manœuvre both with reference to the safety of the first consul's operations and his own, it may be doubted whether Buonaparte would, at the time, have thanked him for venturing on more hazardous measures; the result of which might have been either to obtain more brilliant victory for the army of the Rhine, in the event of success, or should they have miscarried, to have ensured the ruin of the army of Italy, as well as of that commanded by Moreau himself. There must have been a wide difference between the part which Moreau ought to act as subsidiary to Buonaparte, (to whom it will presently be seen he despatched a reinforcement of from fifteen to twenty thousand men,) and that which Buonaparte, in obedience to his daring genius, might have himself thought it right to perform. The commander-in-chief may venture much on his own responsibility, which must

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 167.

² "Moreau did not know the value of time; he always passed the day after a battle in total indecision."—*NAPOLEON, Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 174.

³ For the terms of the armistice, see *Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 185.

⁴ Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 355, 363; Thibaudau, tom. i., p. 342.

quired.

In committing the charge of the campaign upon the Rhine to Moreau, the first consul had reserved for himself the task of bring-

the present, that, on both occasions, the Austrians menaced Genoa; but in 1800, it was only from the Italian frontier and the Col di Tende, whereas, in 1795, the enemy were in possession of the mountains of Savoy, above Genoa. Switzerland, too, formerly neutral, and allowing no passage for armies, was now as open to the march of French troops as any of their own provinces, and of this Buonaparte determined to avail himself. He was aware of the Austrian plan of taking Genoa and entering Dalmatia, and

lands in Europe, by roads which afford but a dangerous passage to the solitary traveller, and through passes where one man can do more to defend, than ten to force their way. Artillery was to be

spies of Austria truly reported to their employers, were either conscripts, or veterans unfit for service; and caricatures were published of the first consul reviewing troops composed of children and disabled soldiers, which was ironically termed his army of reserve.¹ When an army so composed was reviewed by the first consul himself with great ceremony, it impressed a general belief that Buonaparte was only endeavouring, by making a show of force, to divert the Austrians from their design upon Genoa, and thus his real purpose was effectually concealed. Bulletins, too, were privately circulated by the agents of police, as if scattered by the Royalists, in which specious arguments were used to prove that the French army of reserve neither did, nor could exist—and these also were designed to withdraw attention from the various points on which it was at the very moment collecting.²

The pacification of the west of France had placed many good troops at Buonaparte's disposal, which had previously been engaged against the Chouans; the quiet state of Paris permitted several regiments to be detached from the capital. New levies were made with the utmost celerity; and the divisions of the army of reserve were organized separately, and at different places of rendezvous, but ready to form a junction when they should receive the signal for commencing operations.

CHAPTER XIX.

The Chief Consul leaves Paris on 6th May, 1800—Has an Interview with Necker at Geneva on 8th—Arrives at Lausanne on the 13th—Various Corps put in motion to cross the Alps—Napoleon, at the head of the Main Army, marches on the 15th, and ascends Mont St. Bernard—On the 16th, the Vanguard takes possession of Aosta—Fortress and Town of Bard threaten to baffle the whole plan—The Town is captured—and Napoleon contrives to send his Artillery through it, under the fire of the Fort, his Infantry and Cavalry passing over the Albaredo—Lannes carries Ivrea—Recapitulation—Operations of the Austrian General Melas—At the commencement of the Campaign, Melas advances towards Genoa—Actions betwixt him and Massena—In March, Lord Keith blockades Genoa—Melas compelled to retreat—Enters Nice—Recalled from thence by the news of Napoleon's having crossed Mont St. Bernard—Genoa surrenders—Buonaparte enters Milan—Battle of Montebello—The Chief Consul is joined by Desaix—Battle of Marengo on the 14th—Death of Desaix—Capitulation on the 15th, by which Genoa, &c., are yielded—Napoleon returns to Paris on the 2d July.

¹ "Europe was full of caricatures. One of them represented a boy of twelve years of age, and an invalid with a wooden leg; underneath which was written 'Buonaparte's army of reserve.'"—*NAPOLEON, Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 262.

² *Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 263.

On the 6th of May 1800, seeking to renew the fortunes of France, now united with his own, the chief consul left Paris, and, having reviewed the pretended army of reserve at Dijon

commenced.¹

On the 13th, arriving at Lausanne, Buonaparte joined the van of his real army of reserve, which consisted of six effective regiments, commanded by the celebrated Lannes. These corps, together with the rest of the troops intended for the expedition, had been assembled from their several positions by forced marches. Carnot, the minister at war, attended the first consul at Lausanne, to report to him that 15,000, or from that to the number of 20,000 men, detached from Moreau's army, were in the act of descending the Rhine.

¹ "The famous Necker solicited the honour of being engaged."

Alps. Thurreau, at the head of 5000 men, directed his march by Mont Cenis, on Exilles and Susa. A similar division, commanded by Chabran, took the route of the Little St. Bernard. Buonaparte himself, on the 15th, at the head of the main body of his army, consisting of 30,000 men and upwards, marched from Lausanne to the little village called St. Pierre, at which point there ended every thing resembling a practicable road. An immense, and apparently inaccessible mountain, reared its head among general desolation and eternal frost; while precipices, glaciers, ravines, and a boundless extent of faithless snows, which the slightest concussion of the air converts into avalanches capable of burying armies in their descent, appeared to forbid access to all living things but the chamois, and his scaree less wild pursuer. Yet foot by foot, and man by man, did the French soldiers proceed to ascend this formidable barrier, which nature had erected in vain to limit human ambition. The view of the valley, emphatically called "of Desolation," where nothing is to be seen but snow and sky, had no terrors for the first consul and his army. They advanced up paths hitherto only practised by hunters, or here and there a hardy pedestrian, the infantry loaded with their arms, and in full military equipment, the cavalry leading their horses. The musical bands played from time to time at the head of the regiments, and, in places of unusual difficulty, the drums beat a charge, as if to encourage the soldiers to encounter the opposition of Nature herself. The artillery, without which they could not have done service, were deposited in trunks of trees hollowed out for the purpose. Each was dragged by a hundred men, and the troops, making it a point of honour to bring forward their guns, accomplished this severe duty, not with cheerfulness only, but with enthusiasm. The carriages were taken to pieces, and harnessed on the backs of mules, or committed to the soldiers, who relieved each other in the task of bearing them with levers; and the ammunition was transported in the same manner. While one half of the soldiers were thus engaged, the others were obliged to carry the muskets, eartridg-boxes, knapsacks, and provisions of their comrades, as well as their own. Each man, so loaded, was calculated to carry from sixty to seventy pounds weight, up icy preeipices, where a man totally without encumbrance could ascend but slowly. Probably no troops save the French could have endured the fatigue of such a march; and no other general than Buonaparte would have ventured to require it at their hand.¹

He set out a considerable time after the march had begun, alone, excepting his guide. He is described by the Swiss peasant who attended him in that capacity, as wearing his usual simple dress, a grey surtout, and three-cornered hat. He travelled in silence, save a few short and hasty questions about the country,

¹ Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 184; Thibaudeau, tom. vi., p. 264; Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 267; Dumas, tom. ii.

addressed to his guide from time to time. When these were answered, he relapsed into silence. There was a gloom on his

the Swiss peasant who guided him felt fear as he looked on him. Occasionally his route was stopt by some temporary obstacle occasioned by a halt in the artillery or baggage; his commands on such occasions were peremptorily given, and instantly obeyed, his very look seeming enough to silence all objection, and remove every difficulty.

The army
courage equi
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Hitherto the soldiers had had no refreshment, save when they dipt a morsel of biscuit amongst the snow. The good fathers of the convent, who possess considerable magazines of provisions, distributed bread and cheese, and a cup of wine, to each soldier as he passed, which was more acceptable in their situation, than, according to one who shared their fatigues,¹ would have been the gold of Mexico²

The descent on the other side of Mont St. Bernard was as difficult to the infantry as the ascent had been, and still more so to the cavalry. It was, however, accomplished without any material loss, and the army took up their quarters for the night,

left behind,

Thus was achieved the celebrated passage of Mont St. Bernard, on the particulars of which we have dwelt the more will-

vered to have done so. This important manœuvre was accomplished by previously laying the street with dung and earth, over which the pieces of cannon, concealed under straw and branches

no intelligence with the town. Any signal previously agreed upon—a light shown in a window, for example—would have detected

is not fruitless to observe, that the resistance of this small place, which had been overlooked or undervalued in the plan of the

all the chances of war.

From this dangerous pass, the vanguard of Buonaparte now advanced down the valley to Ivrea, where Lannes carried the

at Ivrea, to refresh the troops after their fatigues, and to prepare them for future enterprises.

During this space, the other columns of his army were advancing to form a junction with that of the main body, according to

¹ Gourgaud, tom. I, p. 273, Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 185.

² "Supposing it had proved quite impossible to pass the artillery through the town of Bard, would the French army have repassed the Great Saint Bernard? No: it would have debouched as far as Ivrea—a movement which would necessarily have recalled Melas from Nice"—NAPOLKOV, *Gourgaud*, tom. I, p. 272.

³ Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 133, *Gourgaud*, tom. I, p. 274.

the city, where the approach of famine began to be felt. Men were already compelled to have recourse to the flesh of horses, dogs, &c. so that the place must

Genoa, Melas, in the beginning of May, left the prosecution of the blockade to General Ott, and moved himself against Suchet, whom he drove before him in disorder, and who, overborne by numbers, retreated towards the French frontier. On the 11th of May, Melas entered Nice, and thus commenced the purposed invasion of the French frontier. On the 14th the Austrians attacked Suchet, who

which put a stop to all his operations against Suchet, and recalled him to Italy to face a much more formidable antagonist. Finding, however, that the first general of Vienna had escaped, he

destroy the troops left to guard the frontier; who, besides, were necessarily divided, and exposed to be beaten in detail. Yet, if

sufficient to ensure its fall, and a corps of observation in front of Suchet, by means of which he might easily resume his plans against that general, so soon as the chief consul should be defeated or driven back.

The corps of observation already mentioned was under the command of General Elsnitz, strongly posted upon the Roje, and secured by intrenchments. It served at once to watch Suchet,

¹ Gourgaud, tom. I. p. 202; Thibaudan, tom. vi. p. 221.

and to cover the siege of Genoa from any attempts to relieve the city, which might be made in the direction of France.¹

Massena, in the meantime, no sooner perceived the besieging army weakened by the departure of Melas, than he conceived the daring plan of a general attack on the forces of Ott, who was left to carry on the siege. The attempt was unfortunate. The French were defeated, and Soult, who had joined Massena, was wounded and made prisoner. Yet Genoa still held out. An officer had found his way into the place, brought intelligence of Buonaparte's descent upon Piedmont, and inspired all with a new spirit of resistance. Still, however, extreme want prevailed in the city, and the hope of delivery seemed distant. The soldiers received little food, the inhabitants less, the Austrian prisoners, of whom they had about 8000 in Genoa, almost none.² At length, the situation of things seemed desperate. The numerous population of Genoa rose in the extremity of their despair, and called for a surrender. Buonaparte, they said, was not wont to march so slowly; he would have been before the walls sooner, if he was to appear at all; he must have been defeated or driven back by the superior force of Melas. They demanded the surrender of the place, therefore, which Massena no longer found himself in a condition to oppose.³

Yet could that brave general have suspended this measure a few hours longer, he would have been spared the necessity of making it at all. General Ott had just received commands from Melas to raise the blockade with all despatch, and to fall back upon the Po, in order to withstand Buonaparte, who, in unexpected strength, was marching upon Milan. The Austrian staff-officer who brought the order, had just received his audience of General Ott, when General Andrieux, presenting himself on the part of Massena, announced the French general's desire to surrender the place, if his troops were permitted to march out with their arms. There was no time to debate upon terms; and those granted to Massena by Melas were so unusually favourable, that perhaps they should have made him aware of the precarious state of the besieging army.⁴ He was permitted to evacuate Genoa without laying down his arms, and the convention was signed 5th June, 1800. Meantime, at this agitating and interesting period, events of still greater importance than those which concerned the fate of the once princely Genoa, were taking place with frightful rapidity.

¹ Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 198.

² Napoleon says, that Massena proposed to General Ott to send in provisions to feed these unhappy men, pledging his honour they should be used to no other purpose, and that General Ott was displeased with Lord Keith for declining to comply with a proposal so utterly unknown in the usages of war.—S. [Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 227.] It is difficult to give credit to this story.

³ Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 231; Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 228. See also Thiébaud, *Journal Historique du Siège de Gènes*.

⁴ "Massena ought to have broken off, upon the certainty that within four or five days the blockade would be raised; in fact, it would have been raised twelve hours after."—NAPOLEON, *Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 241.

Melas, with about one half of his army, had retired from his positions in the *Genova territory* and retreated on Turin.

to assemble such numerous forces as might harass and embarrass either his advance or his retreat. But Buonaparte's plan of the

veteran.

towards Genoa. But as the Austrian general was at the same time alarmed by the descent of General Thurreau's division from Mont Cenis, and their capture of Susa and La Brunette, Turin seemed ascertained to be the object of the French; and Melas acted on this idea. He sent a strong force to oppose the esta-

of the French; Lodi and Cremona were occupied, and Pizzighione was invested.¹

¹ Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 219. Gouraud, tom. i., p. 279.

² "One of the first persons who presented themselves to the eyes of the Milanese, whom enthusiasm and curiosity led by all the by roads to meet the

Meanwhile, Buonaparte, fixing his residence in the ducal palace of Milan, employed himself in receiving the deputations of various public bodies, and in re-organizing the Cisalpine government, while he waited impatiently to be joined by Monecy and his division, from Mont Saint Gothard. They arrived at length, but marching more slowly than accorded with the fiery promptitude of the first consul, who was impatient to relieve the blockade of Genoa, which place he concluded still held out. He now issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he described, as the result of the efforts he expected from them, "Cloudless glory and solid peace."¹ On the 9th of June his armies were again in motion.

Melas, an excellent officer, had at the same time some of the slowness imputed to his countrymen, or of the irresolution incident to the advanced age of eighty years,—for so old was the opponent of Buonaparte, then in the very prime of human life,—or, as others suspect, it may have been orders from Vienna which detained the Austrian general so long at Turin, where he lay in a great measure inactive. It is true, that on receiving notice of Buonaparte's march on Milan, he instantly despatched orders to General Ott, as we have already stated, to raise the siege of Genoa, and join him with all possible speed; but it seemed, that in the meantime, he might have disquieted Buonaparte's lines of communication, by acting upon the river Dora, attacking Ivrea, in which the French had left much baggage and artillery, and relieving the fort of Bard. Accordingly, he made an attempt of this kind, by detaching 6000 men to Chiavaso, who were successful in delivering some Austrian prisoners at that place; but Ivrea proved strong enough to resist them, and the French retaining possession of that place, the Austrians could not occupy the valley of the Dora, or relieve the besieged fortress of Bard.²

The situation of Melas now became critical. His communications with the left, or north bank of the Po, were entirely cut off, and by a line stretching from Fort Bard to Placentia, the French occupied the best and fairest share of the north of Italy, while he found himself confined to Piedmont. The Austrian army, besides, was divided into two parts,—one under Ott, which was still near Genoa, that had so lately surrendered to them,—one with Melas himself, which was at Turin. Neither were agreeably situated. That of Genoa was observed on its right by Suchet, whose army, reinforced with the garrison which, retaining their arms, evacuated that city under Massena, might soon be expected to renew the offensive. There was, therefore, the greatest risk, that Buonaparte, pushing a strong force across the Po, might attack and destroy either the division of Ott, or that of Melas

French army, was General Buonaparte. The people of Milan would not believe it: it had been reported that he had died in the Red Sea, and that it was one of his brothers who now commanded the French army."—*NAPOLEON, Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 280.

¹ *Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 282.

² *Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 283.

himself, before they were able to form a junction. To prevent such a catastrophe, Ott received orders to march forward on the Ticino, while Melas, moving towards Alexandria, prepared to resume his communications with his lieutenant-general.

Buonaparte, on his part, was anxious to relieve Genoa; news of the fall of which had not reached him. With this view he resolved to force the Austrians,

Austrians,
Casteggio at

part of the

and which was commanded by Ott, but which had moved westward, in conformity to the orders of Melas.

they found themselves at the bayonet's point, without having had any previous opportunity to estimate each other's force; a circumstance which led to much close fighting, and necessarily to much slaughter. At length the Austrians retreated, leaving the field of battle covered with their dead, and above 5000 prisoners in the hands of their enemies.¹

General Ott, who had been killed at the battle of Casteggio, was the first to fall.

tended to withhold him from the fate he was about to meet, he had received letters from Buonaparte, inviting him to come to him without delay. The tone of the letters expressed discontent

¹ Gouraud, tom. I. p. 277. Thibaudau, tom. vi. p. 200. At the battle of Montebello, which afterwards gave him his title, General Lanzer added to his already high reputation. In describing the desperate conflict—"bones," he said, "crashed in my division, like hailstones against windows."

and embarrassment. "He has gained all," said Desaix, who was much attached to Buonaparte, "and yet he is not happy." Immediately afterwards, on reading the account of his march over St. Bernard, he added, "He will leave us nothing to do." He immediately set out post to place himself under the command of his ancient general, and, as it eventually proved, to encounter an early death. They had an interesting conversation on the subject of Egypt, to which Buonaparte continued to cling, as to a matter in which his own fame was intimately and inseparately concerned. Desaix immediately received the command of the division hitherto under that of Boudet.¹

In the meanwhile, the headquarters of Melas had been removed from Turin, and fixed at Alexandria for the space of two days; yet he did not, as Buonaparte had expected, attempt to move forward on the French position at Stradella, in order to force his way to Mantua; so that the first consul was obliged to advance towards Alexandria, apprehensive lest the Austrians should escape from him, and either, by a march to the left flank, move for the Ticino, cross that river, and, by seizing Milan, open a communication with Austria in that direction; or, by marching to the right, and falling back on Genoa, overwhelm Suchet, and take a position, the right of which might be covered by that city, while the sea was open for supplies and provisions, and their flank protected by the British squadron.

Either of these movements might have been attended with alarming consequences; and Napoleon, impatient lest his enemy should give him the slip, advanced his headquarters on the 12th to Voghera, and on the 13th to St. Julian, in the midst of the great plain of Marengo. As he still saw nothing of the enemy, the chief consul concluded that Melas had actually retreated from Alexandria, having, notwithstanding the temptation afforded by the level ground around him, preferred withdrawing, most probably to Genoa, to the hazard of a battle. He was still more confirmed in this belief, when, pushing forward as far as the village of Marengo, he found it occupied only by an Austrian rear-guard, which offered no persevering defence against the French, but retreated from the village without much opposition. The chief consul could no longer doubt that Melas had eluded him, by marching off by one of his flanks, and probably by his right. He gave orders to Desaix, whom he had intrusted with the command of the reserve, to march towards Rivolta with a view to observe the communications with Genoa; and in this manner the reserve was removed half a day's march from the rest of the army, which had like to have produced most sinister effects upon the event of the great battle that followed.

Contrary to what Buonaparte had anticipated, the Austrian general, finding the first consul in his front, and knowing that

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 280.

Suchet was in his rear, had adopted, with the consent of a council of war, the resolution of trying the fate of arms in a general battle. It was a bold, but not a rash resolution. The Austrians were more numerous than the French in infantry and artillery; much superior in cavalry, both in point of numbers and of discipline; and it has been already said, that the extensive plain of Marengo was favourable for the use of that description of force. Melas, therefore, on the evening of the 13th, concentrated his forces in front of Alexandria, divided by the river Bormida from the purposed field of fight; and Napoleon, undeceived concerning the intentions of his enemy, made with all haste the necessary preparations to receive battle, and failed not to send orders to Desaix to return as speedily as possible and join the army. That general was so far advanced on his way towards Rivolta before these counter orders reached him, that his utmost haste only

with Marengo. Behind this first line was placed a brigade of cavalry, under Kellermann, ready to protect the flanks of the line, or to debouche through the intervals, if opportunity served, and attack the enemy. About a thousand yards in the rear of the first line was stationed the second, under Lannes, supported by Champeaux's brigade of cavalry. At the same distance, in the rear of Lannes, was placed a strong reserve, or third line, consisting of the division of Carra St. Cyr, and the consular guard, at the head of whom was Buonaparte himself. Thus the

June 14. French were drawn up on this memorable day in three distinct divisions, each composed of a *corps d'armée*, distant about three-quarters of a mile in the rear of each other.

The force which the French had in the field in the commencement of the day, was above twenty thousand men; the reserve, under Desaix, upon its arrival, might make the whole amount to thirty thousand. The Austrians attacked with nearly forty thousand troops. Both armies were in high spirits, determined to

formed by nature for such an encounter, when the fate of kingdoms was at issue.

Early in the morning the Austrians crossed the Bormida, in three columns, by three military bridges, and advanced in the same order. The right and the centre columns, consisting of infantry, were commanded by Generals Haddiek and Kaine; the left, composed entirely of light troops and cavalry, made a detour round Castel-Ceriolo, the village mentioned as forming the extreme right of the French position. About seven in the morning, Haddiek attacked Marengo with fury, and Gardanne's division, after fighting bravely, proved inadequate to its defence. Victor supported Gardanne, and endeavoured to cover the village by an oblique movement. Melas, who commanded in person the central column of the Austrians, moved to support Haddiek; and by their united efforts, the village of Marengo, after having been once or twice lost and won, was finally carried.

The broken divisions of Victor and Gardanne, driven out of Marengo, endeavoured to rally on the second line, commanded by Lannes. This was about nine o'clock. While one Austrian column manœuvred to turn Lannes's flank, in which they could not succeed, another, with better fortune, broke through the centre of Victor's division, in a considerable degree disordered them, and thus uncovering Lannes's left wing, compelled him to retreat. He was able to do so in tolerably good order; but not so the broken troops of Victor on the left, who fled to the rear in great confusion. The column of Austrian cavalry who had come round Castel-Ceriolo, now appeared on the field, and threatened the right of Lannes, which alone remained standing firm. Napoleon detached two battalions of the consular guard from the third line, or reserve, which, forming squares behind the right wing of Lannes, supported its resistance, and withdrew from it in part the attention of the enemy's cavalry. The chief consul himself, whose post was distinguished by the furred caps of a guard of two hundred grenadiers, brought up Monnier's division, which had but now entered the field at the moment of extreme need, being the advance of Desaix's reserve, returned from their half day's march towards Rivolta. These were, with the guards, directed to support Lannes's right wing, and a brigade detached from them was thrown into Castel-Ceriolo, which now became the point of support on Buonaparte's extreme right, and which the Austrians, somewhat unaccountably, had omitted to occupy in force when their left column passed it in the beginning of the engagement. Buonaparte, meantime, by several desperate charges of cavalry, endeavoured in vain to arrest the progress of the enemy. His left wing was put completely to flight; his centre was in great disorder, and it was only his right wing, which, by strong support, had been enabled to stand their ground.

In these circumstances, the day seemed so entirely against him, that, to prevent his right wing from being overwhelmed, he was

compelled to retreat in the face of an enemy superior in num-

Desaix's troops. This division, being the sole remaining reserve, had now at length arrived on the field, and, by Buonaparte's

At this time, and when victory seemed within his grasp, the strength of General Melas, eighty years old, and who had been many hours on horseback, failed entirely; and he was obliged to leave the field, and retire to Alexandria, committing to General Zach the charge of completing a victory which appeared to be already gained.

But the position of Desaix, at St. Julian, afforded the first consul a rallying point, which he now greatly needed. His army of reserve lay formed in two lines in front of the village, their flanks sustained by battalions *en potence*, formed into close columns of infantry; on the left was a train of artillery; on the right, Kellermann, with a large body of French cavalry, which, routed in the beginning of the day, had rallied in this place. The ground that Desaix occupied was where the high-road forms a sort of defile, having on the one hand a wood, on the other a thick plantation of vines.

The French soldier understands better perhaps than any other in the world the art of rallying, after having been dispersed.

said, "The battle is lost—I suppose I can do no more for you than secure your retreat!"—"By no means," answered the first consul, "the battle is, I trust, gained—the disordered troops whom you see are my centre and left, whom I will rally in your rear—I'll push forward your column."

Desaix, at the head of the ninth light brigade, instantly rushed forward, and charged the Austrians, wearied with fighting the whole day, and disordered by their hasty

14th June

pursuit. The moment at which he advanced, so critically favourable for Buonaparte, was fatal to himself. He fell, shot through the head.¹ But his soldiers continued to attack with fury, and Kellermann, at the same time charging the Austrian column, penetrated its ranks, and separated from the rest six battalions, which, surprised and panic-struck, threw down their arms; Zach, who, in the absence of Melas, commanded in chief, being at their head, was taken with them. The Austrians were now driven back in their turn. Buonaparte galloped along the French line, calling on the soldiers to advance. "You know," he said, "it is always my practice to sleep on the field of battle."²

The Austrians had pursued their success with incautious hurry, and without attending to the due support which one corps ought, in all circumstances, to be prepared to afford to another. Their left flank was also exposed, by their hasty advance, to Buonaparte's right, which had never lost order. They were, therefore, totally unprepared to resist this general, furious, and unexpected attack. They were forced back at all points, and pursued along the plain, suffering immense loss; nor were they again able to make a stand until driven back over the Bormida. Their fine cavalry, instead of being drawn up in squadrons to cover their retreat, fled in disorder, and at full gallop, riding down all that was in their way. The confusion at passing the river was inextricable—large bodies of men were abandoned on the left side, and surrendered to the French in the course of the night, or next morning.³

It is evident, in perusing the accounts of this battle, that the victory was wrested out of the hands of the Austrians, after they had become, by the fatigues of the day, too weary to hold it. Had they sustained their advance by reserves, their disaster would not have taken place. It seems also certain, that the fate of Buonaparte was determined by the arrival of Desaix at the moment he did,⁴ and that in spite of the skilful disposition by which the chief

¹ The *Moniteur* put in the mouth of the dying general a message to Buonaparte, in which he expressed his regret that he had done so little for history, and in that of the chief consul an answer, lamenting that he had no time to weep for Desaix. But Buonaparte himself assures us, that Desaix was shot dead on the spot. [Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 300.] Nor is it probable that the tide of battle, then just upon the act of turning, left the consul himself time for set phrases, or sentimental ejaculations.—S. Savary, who was *nide-de-camp* to Desaix, had the body wrapped up in a cloak, and removed to Milan, where, by Napoleon's directions, it was embalmed, and afterwards conveyed to the Hospice of Saint Bernard, where a monument was erected to the memory of the fallen hero. "Desaix," said Napoleon, "loved glory for glory's sake, and France above every thing. Luxury he despised, and even comfort. He preferred sleeping under a gun in the open air to the softest couch. He was of an unsophisticated, active, pleasing character, and possessed extensive information." The victor of Marengo shed tears for his death.—MONTMOLON, tom. iv., p. 256.

² Thibaudeau, tom. vi., p. 312.

³ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 296, 303; Jomini, tom. xiii., p. 278, 296; Dumas, tom. ii.; Savary, tom. i., p. 176.

⁴

—"Desaix, who turn'd the scale,
Leaving his life-blood in that famous field,

consul was enabled to support the attack so long, he must have been utterly defeated had Desaix put less despatch in his counter-march. Military men have been farther of opinion, that Melas was guilty of a great error, in not occupying Castel-Cerulo on the advance; and that the appearances of early victory led the Austrians to be by far too ungarded in their advance on Saint Julian.

In consequence of a loss which seemed in the circumstances altogether impossible, Melas applied to save the remainder of his

fied places which the Austrians possessed in Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Venetians. Buonaparte then made goodly conquests there.

appeared to wane and dwindle after Buonaparte's departure, so they revived with even more than their original brilliancy, as soon as this Child of Destiny had returned to preside over them. An armistice was also agreed upon, which it was supposed might afford time for the conclusion of a victorious peace with Austria; and Buonaparte extended this truce to the armies on the Rhine, as well as those in Italy.

(Where the clouds break, we may discern the spot
In the blue haze,) sleeps, as thou saw'st at dawn,
Just where we enter'd, in the Hospital-church."

Monks' Italy, p. 10.

¹ See Gouraud, tom. 1. p. 303.

² "The victory of Marengo had revived the hopes of the Italian people. Each resumed his post, each returned to his functions, and the machinery of government was in full operation in the course of a few days."—SAYANV, tom. 1. p. 102.

³ "Though Massena was guilty of an error in embarking his troops at Genoa, instead of conducting them by land, he had always displayed much character and energy. In the midst of the fire and confusion of a battle, his demeanour was eminently noble. The din of the cannon cleared his ideas, and gave him penetration, spirit, and even gaiety."—NAPOLEON, *Gouraud*, tom. 1. p. 313.

that province.¹ These conciliatory steps had the effect of making men of the most opposite parties see their own interest in supporting the government of the first consul.

The presence of Napoleon was now eagerly desired at Paris. He set out from Milan on the 24th June,² and in the passage through Lyons paused to lay the foundation-stone for rebuilding the Place Bellecour; a splendid square, which had been destroyed by the frantic vengeance of the Jacobins when Lyons was retaken by them from the insurgent party of Girondins and Royalists. Finally, the chief consul returned to Paris upon the 2d July. He had left it on the 6th of May; yet, in the space of not quite two months, how many hopes had he realized! All that the most sanguine partisans had ventured to anticipate of his success had been exceeded. It seemed that his mere presence in Italy was of itself sufficient at once to obliterate the misfortunes of a disastrous campaign, and restore the fruits of his own brilliant victories, which had been lost during his absence. It appeared as if he was the sun of France—when he was hid from her, all was gloom—when he appeared, light and serenity were restored. All the inhabitants, leaving their occupations, thronged to the Tuileries to obtain a glimpse of the wonderful man, who appeared with the laurel of victory in the one hand, and the olive of peace in the other. Shouts of welcome and congratulation resounded from the gardens, the courts, and the quays, by which the palace is surrounded; high and low illuminated their houses; and there were few Frenchmen, perhaps, that were not for the moment partakers of the general joy.³

1 "General Jourdan felt grateful on finding that the first consul had not only forgotten the past, but was also willing to give him so high a proof of confidence. He devoted all his zeal to the public good."—*NAPOLEON, Gourgaud*, tom. i., p. 310.

2 "The first consul's train consisted of two carriages. Duroc and Bourrienne were in the same carriage with him. I followed with General Bassières in the other. There is no exaggeration in saying, that the first consul travelled from Milan to Lyons between two rows of people in the midst of unceasing acclamations. The manifestations of joy were still greater at Dijon. The women of that delightful city were remarkable for the vivacity of an unaffected joy, which threw animation into their eyes, and gave their faces so deep a colour, as if they had trespassed the bounds of decorum."—*SAVARY*, tom. i., p. 187.

3 "The first consul was partaking also of the prevailing gladness when he learned that a courier from Italy had brought an account of the loss of the battle of Marengo. The courier had been despatched at the moment when Paris every thing seemed desperate, so that the report of a defeat was general in before the first consul's return. Many projects were disturbed by his arrival. On the mere announcement of his defeat, his enemies had returned to their work, and talked of nothing less than overturning the government, and avenging the crimes of the eighteenth Brumaire."—*SAVARY*, tom. i., p. 190.

CHAPTER XX.

Napoleon offers, and the Austrian Envoy accepts, a new Treaty—The Emperor refuses it, unless England is included—Negotiations with England—fail—Renewal of the War—Armistice—Resumption of Hostilities—Battle of Hohenlinden—Other Battles—The Austrians agree to a separate Peace—Treaty of Lunéville—Convention between France and the United States—The Queen of Naples repairs to Petersburg—Paul receives her with cordiality, and applies in her behalf to Buonaparte—His Envoy received at Paris with the utmost distinction, and the Royal Family of Naples saved for the present—Rome restored to the authority of the Pope—Napoleon demands of the King of Spain to declare War against Portugal—Olivrenia and Almeida taken—Malta, after a Blockade of Two Years, obliged to submit to the English.

Napoleon was obliged to withdraw with great loss from the

Austrian envoy, the conditions of a treaty, having for its basis that of Campo Formio, which, after the loss of Italy on the fatal field of Marengo, afforded terms much more favourable than the Emperor of Germany was entitled to have expected from the victors. The Austrian envoy accordingly took upon him to subscribe these preliminaries; but they did not meet the approbation of the Emperor, who placed his honour on observing accurately the engagements which he had formed with England, and who refused to accede to a treaty in which she was not included. It was added, however, that Lord Minto, the British ambassador at Vienna, had intimated Britain's willingness to be included in a treaty for general pacification.¹

This proposal occasioned a communication between France and Britain, through Monsieur Otto, commissioner for the care of

French prisoners. The French envoy intimated that
 AUG 24 as a preliminary to Britain's entering on the treaty, she must consent to an armistice by sea, and suspend the advantages which she derived from her naval superiority, in the same manner as the first consul of France had dispensed with

¹ "Count St. Julien arrived at Paris on the 21st July, 1800, with a letter from the Emperor of Germany to the first consul, containing these expressions: 'You will give credit to what Count Saint Julien will say to you on my behalf, and

prosecuting his victories by land. This demand would have withdrawn the blockade of the British vessels from the French seaports, and allowed the sailing of reinforcements to Egypt and Malta, which last important place was on the point of surrendering to the English. The British ministers were also sensible that there was, besides, a great difference between a truce betwixt two land armies, stationed in presence of each other, and a suspension of naval hostilities over the whole world; since in the one case, on breaking off the treaty, hostilities can be almost instantly resumed; on the other, the distance and uncertainty of communication may prevent the war being recommenced for many months; by which chance of delay, the French, as being inferior at sea, were sure to be the gainers. The British statesmen, therefore, proposed some modifications, to prevent the obvious inequality of such armistices. But it was replied on the part of France, that though they would accept of such a modified armistice, if Great Britain would enter into a separate treaty, yet the chief council would not consent to it if Austria was to be participant of the negotiation.¹

Here, therefore, the overtures of peace betwixt France and England were shipwrecked, and the Austrian Emperor was reduced to the alternative of renewing the war, or entering into a treaty without his allies. He appears to have deemed himself obliged to prefer the more dangerous and more honourable course.

This was a generous resolution on the part of Austria; but by no means politic at the period, when their armies were defeated, their national spirit depressed, and when the French armies had penetrated so far into Germany. Even Pitt himself, upon whose declining health the misfortune made a most unfavourable impression, had considered the defeat of Marengo as a conclusion to the hopes of success against France for a considerable period. "Fold up the map," he said, pointing to that of Europe; "it need not be again opened for these twenty years."

Yet, unwilling to resign the contest, even while a spark of hope remained, it was resolved upon in the British councils to encourage Austria to farther prosecution of the war. Perhaps, in recommending such a measure to her ally, at a period when she had sustained such great losses, and was in the state of dejection to which they gave rise, Great Britain too much resembled an eager and over-zealous second, who urges his principal to continue a combat after his strength is exhausted. Austria, a great and powerful nation, if left to repose, would have in time recruited her strength, and constituted once again a balance against the power of France on the continent; but if urged to farther exertions in the hour of her extremity, she was likely to sustain such addi-

¹ For copies of the papers relative to the commencement of negotiations for peace with France, through the medium of M. Otto, see *Annual Register*, vol. xliii., p. 209. See also Jomini, tom. xlv., p. 19; and Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 4.

tional losses, as might render her comparatively insignificant for a number of years. Such at least is the conclusion which we, who have the advantage of considering the measure with reference to its consequences, are now enabled to form. At the emergency, things were viewed in a different light. The victories of Szwarrow and of the Archduke Charles were remembered, as well as the recent defeats sustained by France in the year 1799, which had greatly tarnished the fame of her arms. The character of Buonaparte was not yet sufficiently estimated. His failure before Acre had made an impression in England which was not cured by the

tured on such new and daring manœuvres as Napoleon employed, was likely to behold them miscarry at length, and thus to fall as rapidly as he had risen.

Influenced by such motives, it was determined in the British cabinet to encourage the Emperor, by a loan of two millions, to place himself and his brother, the Archduke John, in command of the principal army, raise the whole national force of his mighty empire, and at the head of the numerous forces which he could summon into the field, either command a more equal peace, or try the fortunes of the most desperate war.

The money was paid, and the Emperor joined the army; but the negotiations for peace were not broken off. On the contrary, they were carried on much on the terms which Saint Julien had subscribed to, with this additional and discreditable circumstance, that the first demand on a pledge of the Austrian sincerity, re-
oldstadt, Ulm, and
the hands of the
were compelled to

submit. But the only advantage purchased by this surrender, which greatly exposed the hereditary dominions of Austria, was an armistice of forty-five days, at the end of which hostilities were again renewed.¹

In the action of Haag, the Archduke John, whose credit in the army almost rivalled that of his brother Charles, obtained considerable advantages;² and, encouraged by them, he ventured on the 3d of December, 1800, two days afterwards, a great and decisive encounter with Moreau. This was the occasion on which that general gained over the Austrians the bloody and most important victory of Hohenlinden,—an achievement which did much

¹ Gourgaud, tom. ii., Thibaudeau, tom. vi., p. 396; Annual Register, vol. xlv., p. 206.

² The margin of the text contains a list of names and dates, which are mostly illegible due to the quality of the scan.

to keep his reputation for military talents abreast with that of the first consul himself. Moreau pursued his victory, and obtained possession of Salzburg. At the same time Augereau, at the head of the Gallo-Batavian army, pressed forward into Bohemia; and Macdonald, passing from the country of the Grisons into the Val-teline, forced a division of his army across the Mincio, and communicated with Massena and the French army in Italy. The Austrian affairs seemed utterly desperate. The Archduke Charles was again placed at the head of her forces, but they were so totally discouraged, that a retreat on all points was the only measure which could be executed.

Another and a final cessation of arms was now the only resource of the Austrians; and, in order to obtain it, the Emperor was compelled to agree to make a peace separate from his allies. Britain, in consideration of the extremity to which her ally was reduced, voluntarily relieved him from the engagement by which he was restrained from doing so without her participation. An armistice shortly afterwards took place, and the Austrians being now sufficiently humbled, it was speedily followed by a peace. Joseph Buonaparte, for this purpose, met with the Austrian minister, Count Cobentzel, at Luneville, where the negotiations were carried on.

There were two conditions of the treaty, which were peculiarly galling to the Emperor. Buonaparte peremptorily exacted the cession of Tuscany, the hereditary dominions of the brother of Francis, which were to be given up to a prince of the House of Parma, while the archduke was to obtain an indemnity in Germany. The French Consul demanded, with no less pertinacity, that Francis (though not empowered to do so by the Germanic constitution) should confirm the peace, as well in his capacity of Emperor of Germany, as in that of sovereign of his own hereditary dominions. This demand, from which Buonaparte would on no account depart, involved a point of great difficulty and delicacy. One of the principal clauses of the treaty included the cession of the whole territories on the left bank of the Rhine to the French Republic; thereby depriving not only Austria, but Prussia, and various other princes of the German empire, of their possessions in the districts, which were now made over to France. It was provided that the princes who should suffer such deprivations, were to be remunerated by indemnities, as they were termed, to be allotted to them at the expense of the Germanic body in general. Now, the Emperor had no power to authorise the alienation of these fiefs of the empire, without consent of the Diet, and this was strongly urged by his envoy.

Buonaparte was, however, determined to make peace on no other terms than those of the Emperor's giving away what was not his to bestow. Francis was compelled to submit, and, as the necessity of the case pleaded its apology, the act of the Emperor was afterwards ratified by the Diet. Except in these mortify-

ing claims, the submission to which plainly intimated the want of power to resist compulsion, the treaty of Lunéville¹ was not much more advantageous to France than that of Campo Formio; and the moderation of the first consul indicated at once his desire of peace upon the continent, and considerable respect for the

out of a sum of money, which, in part at least, was to be dedicated to their own private use. Since that time the aggressions committed by the French on the American navy had been so numerous, that the two republics seemed about to go to war, and the United States actually issued letters of marque for making re-

the space of eight years, agreeing on certain modifications of the right of search, declaring that commerce should be free between the countries, and that the captures on either side, excepting such as were contraband, and destined for an enemy's harbour, should be mutually restored. Thus Buonaparte established peace between France and the United States, and prevented the latter, in all probability, from throwing themselves into a closer union with Britain, to which their common descent, with the similarity of manners, language, and laws, overcoming the recollection of recent hostilities, might have otherwise strongly inclined them.

Still more important results were derived by Napoleon, from the address and political sagacity, with which, in accommodating matters with the court of Naples, he contrived to form what finally became a strong and predominating interest in the councils, and even the affections of a monarch, whose amity was, of all others, the most important to his plans. The prince alluded to was the Emperor of Russia, who had been, during the preceding year, the most formidable and successful enemy encountered by France since her Revolution. A short resumption of facts is necessary, to understand the circumstances in which the negotiation with Naples originated.

When Buonaparte departed for Egypt, all Italy, excepting Tuscany, and the dominions assigned to Austria by the treaty of Campo Formio, was in the hands of the French; while Naples was governed by the ephemeral Parthenopean republic, and the city of the Popes by that which assumed the superb title of Roman. These authorities, however, were only nominal; the French gene-

¹ For a copy of the Treaty, see *Annual Register*, vol. xliii. p. 270.

² For a copy of the Convention, see *Annual Register*, vol. xliii. p. 282.

rule exercised the real authority in both countries. Suddenly, and as if by magic, this whole state of affairs was changed by the military talents of Suwarow. The Austrians and Russians gained great successes in the north of Italy, and General MacDonald found himself obliged to evacuate Naples, and to concentrate the principal resistance of the French in Lombardy and Piedmont. Cardinal Ruffo, a soldier, churchman, and politician, put himself at the head of a numerous body of insurgents, and commenced war against such French troops as had been left in the south, and in the middle of Italy. This movement was actively supported by the British fleet. Lord Nelson recovered Naples; Rome surrendered to Commodore Trowbridge. Thus, the Parthenopean and Roman republics were extinguished forever.¹ The royal family returned to Naples, and that fine city and country were once more a kingdom. Rome, the capital of the world, was occupied by Neapolitan troops, generally supposed the most indifferent of modern times.

Replaced in his richest territories by the allies, the King of Naples was bound by every tie to assist them in the campaign of 1806. He accordingly sent an army into the March of Ancona, under the command of Count Roger de Damas, who, with the assistance of insurrectionary forces² among the inhabitants, and a body of Austrians, was to clear Tuscany of the French. Undeterred by the battle of Marengo, the Count de Damas marched against the French general Miollis, who commanded in Tuscany, and sustained a defeat by him near Sienna. Retreat became now necessary, the more especially as the armistice which was entered into by general Melas deprived the Neapolitans of any assistance from the Austrians, and rendered their whole expedition utterly hopeless. They were not even included by name in the armistice, and were thus left exposed to the whole vengeance of the French. Damas retreated into the territories of the Church, which were still occupied by the Neapolitan forces. The consequence of these events was easily foreseen. The Neapolitan troops, so soon as the French could find leisure to look towards them, must be either destroyed entirely, or driven back upon Naples, and that city must be again forsaken by the royal family, happy if they were once more able to make their escape to Sicily, as on the former occasion.³

At this desperate crisis, the Queen of the two Sicilies took a resolution which seemed almost as desperate, and could only have been adopted by a woman of a bold and decisive character. She resolved, notwithstanding the severity of the season, to repair in person to the court of the Emperor Paul, and implore his inter-

¹ Botta, *Storia d'Italia*, tom. iii., p. 479.

² These were, at this period, easily raised in any part of Italy. The exactions of the French had entirely alienated the affections of the natives, who had long since seen through their pretexts of affording them the benefit of a free government.—S.

³ Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 89; Jomfal, tom. xiv., p. 215.

cession with the first consul, in behalf of her husband and his territories.

We have not hitherto mentioned, except cursorily, the powerful prince whose mediation she implored. The son and successor

he afterwards discarded and abandoned, swelling trifles of dress or behaviour into matters of importance, and neglecting, on the other hand, what was of real consequence;—governed, in short,

one.

The Emperor had first distinguished himself by an energetic defence of the rights of sovereigns, and a hatred of whatever belonged to or was connected with the French Revolution, from a political maxim to the shape of a coat or a hat. The brother of Louis XVI., and inheritor of his rights, found a refuge in the Russian dominions; and Paul, fond, as most princes are, of military glory, promised himself that of restoring the Bourbon dynasty by force of arms.

The train of victories acquired by Suwarrow was well calculated to foster these original partialities of the Emperor; and,

Italicus.

The very first and only misfortune which befell Suwarrow, seems to have runned him in the opinion of his capricious master. The defeat of Korsakow by Massena, near Zurich, had involved Suwarrow in great momentary danger as he advanced into Switzerland, reckoning on the support of that general, whose disaster left his right uncovered. Now, although Suwarrow saved his army on this occasion by a retreat which was not without

precluded every explanation and apology, rankled to the soul of the Emperor.¹ He recalled his services from the borders of Germany, as I recollect his remark as I left the emperor with a calm smile of respect and dignifiedness, that the only thanks I could give were those of silence.

In the meanwhile, Paul gathered up scattered soldiers of various ranks to form the Austrian prisoners into, and a supply of their having completed to get into the war of Russia again, and on the morning of the 12th, when he was in bed all of this was over, at the extreme day of Russia to the French.

The Austrians on the 12th of October were forced as before, usually in the day of their captivity. They endeavored to explain, that the success of the Austrian expedition was essentially necessary, in order, to be of an advantage to the Austrian territory; they lost the chance of the success of the Russians in the expedition, upon the condition that I should be allowed to place them at my disposal. The language of Austria even proposed, in despite of the categorical refusal, to be proper to his fatherland of Russia, to place a fortress at the head of the Austrian expedition, as a proof, which, if it had been accepted, might have given rise to an entire military struggle between the expedition, determined then, as I would be killed of the veteran Russian, and the French, with the intent of the conquest, and which perhaps obtained the only chance which Europe possessed at the time, of opposing to the latter a rival worthy of himself; for Suvarrow had never yet been conquered, and possessed an irresistible influence over the minds of his soldiers. These great generals, however, were not destined ever to decide the fate of the world by their meeting.

Suvarrow, a Russian in all his feelings, broke his heart, and died under the unmerited displeasure of his Emperor, whom he had served with so much fidelity.² If the memory of his unfortunate sovereign were to be judged of according to ordinary rules, his conduct towards his distinguished subject would have left on it an indelible stigma. As it is, the event must pass as another proof, that the Emperor Paul was not amenable, from

¹ "In 1800, Suvarrow returned to Russia with scarcely a fourth of his army. The Emperor Paul complained bitterly of having lost the flower of his troops, who had either been succeeded by the Austrians or the English. He reproached the Cabinet of Austria with having profused, after the request of Parliament, to replace the King of Sardina on his throne, and with being destitute of grand and generous ideas, and wholly governed by calculation and interested motives. The Emperor did every thing in his power to cherish these seeds of discontent, and to make them productive."—NATOLSON, *Geography*, tom. II, p. 131.

² "I had hit upon the bent of Paul's character. I seized time by the forelock; I collected the Russians; I clothed them, and sent them back to him without any expence. From that instant that generous heart was devoted to me."—NATOLSON, *Les Cotes*, tom. v., p. 174.

³ Suvarrow died at Petersburg, in May, 1800, of that accumulated chagrin, that proud and sullen resentment which is familiarly called a broken heart; he expired in a small wooden house, under the displeasure of his master, at a distance from his family, and abandoned by his friends.—S.

the construction of his understanding and temperament, to the ordinary rules of censure.

Meanwhile, the proposals of Austria were in vain. The Czar was not to be brought back to his former sentiments. He was like a spoiled child, who, tired of his favourite toy, seems bent to break asunder and destroy what was lately the dearest object of his affection.

When such a character as Paul changes his opinion of his

tion which the Emperor Peter felt for Frederick of Prussia, could not well be entertained for any one now alive, unless it were the first consul of France; and on him, therefore, Paul was now disposed to turn his eyes with a mixture of wonder, and of a wish to imitate what he wondered at.¹ This extravagance of admiration is a passion natural to some minds, (never strong ones,) and may be compared to that tendency which others have to be in love all their lives, in defiance of advancing age and other obstacles.

to grant them such an amnesty.

¹ "Paul attacked in some of Count de Ségur's memoirs, &c. rather early."

In what had been long termed the patrimony of St Peter.¹ This unexpected turn of circumstances originated in high policy on

extirpated the order of Malta, the sworn persecutors of the Moslem faith! On his return to France, all this was to be forgotten, or only remembered as a trick played upon the infidels. He was, as we have said, aware of the necessity of a national faith to support the civil government; and as, while in Egypt, he affected to have destroyed the Catholic religion in honour of that of Mahomed, so, returned to Europe, he was now desirous to become the restorer of the temporal territories of the Pope, in order to obtain such a settlement of church affairs in France, as might procure for his own government the countenance of the Sovereign Pontiff, and for himself an admission into the pale of Christian princes. This restitution was in some measure consistent with his policy in 1798, when he had spared the temporalities of the Holy See. Totally indifferent as Napoleon was to religion in his personal capacity, his whole conduct shows his sense of its importance to the existence of a settled and peaceful state of society.

Besides evacuating the Ecclesiastical States, the Neapolitans were compelled by Murat to restore various paintings, statues, and other objects of art, which they had, in imitation of Buonaparte, taken forcibly from the Romans,—so captivating is the influence of bad example. A French army of about eighteen thousand men was to be quartered in Calabria, less for the purpose of enforcing the conditions of peace, than to save France the expense of supporting the troops, and to have them stationed where they might be embarked for Egypt at the shortest notice.

¹ Jomini, tom. xiv., p. 220.

The harbours of the Neapolitan dominions were of course to be closed against the English. A cession of part of the isle of Elba, and the relinquishment of all pretensions upon Tuscany, summed up the sacrifices of the King of Naples, who, considering how often he had braved Napoleon, had great reason to thank the Emperor of Russia for his effectual mediation in his favour.¹

These various measures respecting foreign relations, the treaty of Luneville, the acquisition of the good-will of the Emperor Paul, the restoration of Rome to the Pope's authority, and the mildness of the penalty inflicted on the King of Naples, seemed all to spring from a sound and moderate system, the object of which was rather the consolidation of Napoleon's government, than any wish to extend its influence or its conquests. His plans, in after times, often exhibited a mixture of the greatest good sense and prudence, with rash and splenetic explosions of an over-eager ambition, or a temper irritated by opposition; but it is to be remembered that Buonaparte was not yet so firm in the authority which he had but just acquired, as to encourage any display of the infirmities of his mind and temper.

His behaviour towards Portugal was, however, of a character deviating from the moderation he had in general displayed. Portugal, the ancient and faithful ally of England, was on that account the especial object of the first consul's displeasure. He, therefore, demanded of the King of Spain, who, since the peace between the countries, had been the submissive vassal of France, to declare war on the Prince Regent of Portugal, although the husband of his daughter. War accordingly was declared, in obedience to the mandate of the first consul, and the Spanish armies, together with an auxiliary army of French under Leclerc, entered Portugal, took Olivenza and Almeida, and compelled the prince regent, 6th of June, 1801, to sign a treaty, engaging to shut his ports against the English, and surrendering to Spain, Olivenza, and other places on the frontier of the Guadiana. Buonaparte was highly discontented with this treaty, to which he would not accede; and he refused, at the same time, to withdraw from Spain the army of Leclerc. On the 29th September, he condescended to grant Portugal peace under some additional terms,² which were not in themselves of much consequence, although the overbearing and peremptory conduct which he exhibited towards the Peninsular powers, was a sign of the dictatorial spirit which he was prepared to assume in the affairs of Europe.

The same disposition was manifested in the mode by which Buonaparte was pleased to show his sense of the King of Spain's complaisance. He chose for that purpose to create a kingdom and a king—a king, too, of the house of Bourbon. An infant of Spain obtained the throne of Tuscany, under the name of Etruria,

¹ Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 93.

² See the Treaty, Annual Register, vol. xliii., p. 294.

rent from the house of Austria.¹ Madame de Staël terms this the commencement of the great masquerade of Europe; but it was more properly the second act. The stage, during the first, was occupied by a quadrille of republics, who were now to be re-

placed by an autocrat;—his display of power pleased applause ensued, while the Buonaparte the well-known line—

"J'ai fait des rois, madame, et n'ai pas voulu l'être"

While all the continent murmured there still was not a man so ready to avail himself of the opportunity, remained at war; w

affected zeal for liberty, under the government of an arbitrary ruler. On every point the English courtiers were

that conquest of Europe, could the master, as he might now be called, of the land, have enjoyed, at the same time, the facilities which can only be afforded in communication by sea.

It was in vain that Buonaparte, who, besides his natural hardness of perseverance, connected a part of his own glory with the uncorruption of Egypt, &c.

pointment.

The chance of relieving Egypt was abandoned.

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obtained the very spot which Buonaparte had fixed upon for

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peror Paul imagined he had rights upon that island, in consequence of his having declared himself Grand Master of the Order of Saint John; and although, by his deserting the coalition, and

¹ Botta, tom. iv., p. 83. Gourgaud, tom. ii., p. 94. Montgaillard, tom. v., p. 430.

abandoning the common cause, he had lost all right to expect that Great Britain should surrender to him an important acquisition made by her own arms, yet, with his usual intemperate indulgence of passion, he conceived himself deeply injured by its being withheld,¹ and nourished from that time an implacable resentment against England and her government, the effects of which are afterwards to be traced.

CHAPTER XXI.

Internal Government of France—General Attachment to the Chief Consul—Plot to remove him by Assassination—Defeated—Vain hopes of the Royalists, that Napoleon would restore the Bourbons—Infernal Machine—It fails—Suspicion first falls on the Republicans—The actual Conspirators executed—Use made by Buonaparte of the Conspiracy to consolidate Despotism—System of Police—Fouché—His Skill, Influence, and Power—Apprehension entertained by the Chief Consul of the effects of Literature—Persecution of Madame de Staël—The Concordat—Plan for a general System of Jurisprudence—Amnesty granted to the Emigrants—Plans of Public Education—Hopes of a General Peace.

WE return to the internal government of France under the chief consul.

The events subsequent to the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, seemed to work a miraculous change on the French nation. The superior talents of Napoleon, with the policy exercised by Talleyrand and Fouché, and the other statesmen of ability whom he had called into administration, and who desired at all events to put an end to further revolutionary movements—but, above all, the victory of Marengo, had at once created and attached to the person of the chief consul an immense party, which might be said to comprehend all those, who, being neither decided Royalists nor determined Republicans, were indifferent about the form of the government, so they found ease and protection while living under it.²

¹ "Paul had been promised Malta, the moment it was taken possession of, and accordingly he was in great haste to get himself nominated Grand-Master. But when Malta had fallen, the English ministers denied that they had promised it to him. It is confidently stated, that Paul felt so indignant, that seizing the despatch, in full council, he ran his sword through it, and ordered it to be sent back in that condition, by way of answer."—NAPOLÉON, *Les Cases*, tom. v., p. 174.

² "The first consul restored order to all the branches of the administration, and probity in the dealings of private individuals with the government. He caused a strict examination to be made of the accounts of all persons presenting themselves as creditors of the state, and took a detailed cognizance of all the frauds and peculations to which the public purse had been a prey during the administration of the Directory. He had had some misgivings on the subject previously to his coming to power; but he was soon convinced that he

But, on the other hand, the heads of the two factions continued to exist; and, as the power of the first consul became at once more absolute and more consolidated, it grew doubly hateful and formidable to them. His political existence was a total obstruction to the systems of both parties, and yet one which it was impossible to remove. There was no national council left, in which the authority of the first consul could be disputed, or his measures impeached. The strength of his military power bid defiance alike to popular commotions, if the Democrats had attempted the means of sedition, and to the scattered chance remained for whom the Republicans might have been successful. None, save that, being mortal, Napoleon was subject to be taken off by assassination.

The Democrats were naturally the first to meditate an enter-

de Brie,¹ had at one time determined to raise a legion of assassins, armed with poniards, who should devote themselves to the pious task of exterminating all foreign princes, statesmen, and ministers—in short, all who were accounted the foes of freedom, without pity or distinction. In a party entertaining such principles, there could be no scruple on the score of morality; and where they had been so lately professed by thousands, it seemed natural that, amid the multitude, they must have made a deep impression on some enthusiastic and gloomy disposition, which might be easily provoked to act upon them.

It is no wonder, therefore, that some obscure Jacobins should

said to have aimed a dagger at Buonaparte in the Council of Five Hundred, was at the head of the conspiracy. He was a Corsican.³

had not suspected one half of the danger which actually existed.

¹ August 26, 1792. See *Biographie Moderne*, tom. i., p. 338, and Montgallard, tom. iii., p. 115.

² See *ante*, p. 272.

³ In 1797, Arena was appointed one of the deputies from Corsica to the Council of Five Hundred.

With him, Ceracchi¹ and Diana, two Italian refugees; a painter called Topino-Lebrun;² and two or three enthusiasts of low condition, formed a plot for the purpose of assassinating the chief consul at the Opera-house. Their intention was detected by the police; Ceracchi and Diana were arrested in the lobby;³ armed, it was said, and prepared for the attempt, and Napoleon was congratulated by most of the constituted Oct. 10. authorities upon having escaped a great danger.⁴

Crassons, president of the Tribunal, made a singular speech on the occasion, which would almost bear a double interpretation. "There had been so many conspiracies," he said, "at so many different periods, and under so many different pretexts, which had never been followed up either by inquiry or punishment, that a great number of good citizens had become sceptical on the subject of their existence. This incredulity was dangerous," he argued; "it was time it should be ended." With this view, Monsieur Crassons recommended, that the persons guilty on the present occasion should be prosecuted and punished with all the solemnity and rigour of the laws.

Buonaparte replied, with military indifference, that he had been in no real danger. "The contemptible wretches," he said, in something like a renewal of his Egyptian vein, "had no power to commit the crime they meditated. Besides the assistance of the whole audience, I had with me a piquet of my brave guard, from whom the wretches could not have borne a look."⁵ So ended this singular discourse; and it is remarkable that neither were the circumstances of the plot made public, nor the conspirators punished, till the more memorable attempt on Napoleon's life by the Royalists.

The Royalists, as a party, had far more interest with Buonaparte than the Democrats. The former approved of the principles

¹ Giuseppe Ceracchi was born at Rome in 1760. He was a sculptor, had been a pupil of Canova, and had modelled the bust of Napoleon.—"When he entered into the plot, he endeavoured to procure another sitting, under pretence of making an essential improvement on the bust. Fortunately, at that time, the consul had not a single moment's leisure; and thinking that want was the real cause of the urgent solicitations of the sculptor, he sent him six thousand francs."—*NAPOLEON, Les Césars*, tom. iii., p. 10.

² Topino-Lebrun, an historical painter, and pupil of David was born at Marseilles in 1769.

³ "The first consul's box was in the first tier in front: his access to it was by the public entrance. In this attempt originated the idea of a private entrance."—*SAVARY*, tom. i., p. 229.

⁴ "An individual named Harel, one of the accomplices, in the hope of large remuneration, made some disclosures to Bourrienne, secretary of the first consul. Harel being brought forward, corroborated his first information, and designated the conspirators."—*FOUCHE*, tom. i., p. 170.—"After dinner, Buonaparte threw a great-coat over his little green uniform, and got into his carriage, accompanied by Duroc and myself. He arrived and entered his box without interruption. In about half an hour he desired me to go into the corridor, and observe what passed. Scarcely had I left the box, when, hearing a great noise, I learned that a number of persons had been arrested. I returned to inform the first consul, and we drove instantly back to the Tuileries."—*BOURRIENNE*.

⁵ *Mémoires de Fouché*, tom. i., p. 172.

and form of his government,—it was only necessary for their conversion, that they should learn to endure his person; whereas the Jacobins being equally averse to the office to which he aspired, to his power, and to himself, there were no hopes of their being brought to tolerate either the monarch or the man. Of the latter, therefore, Napoleon entertained equal dislike and distrust; while, from obvious causes, his feelings towards the former were in some measure friendly.

The Royalists, too, for some time entertained a good opinion of Buonaparte, and conceived that he intended, in his own time and in his own way, to act in behalf of the exiled royal family. The enthusiastic of the party were at a loss to conceive that the throne of France should be again erected, and that any one but a Bourbon should dare to ascend it. It seemed to them impossible that the monarchy should revive without the restoration of the legitimate monarch, and they could not believe that a Corsican soldier of fortune would meditate an usurpation, or that France would be for a moment tolerant of his pretensions. The word liberty had, indeed, misled the people of France for a time, but, that

your friends."¹

D'Armande answered the letter with a letter, in which he said,

A free agent, and more so, I am, than ever before.

¹ "The letter was forwarded to the Consul Lebrun, through the Abbé de Montesquieu. Lebrun was reprimanded for having received a letter from the Jacobins, who had been forbidden to do so."

cination, but the instant she touched on the subject of politics, the interesting duchesse received an order to quit Paris.

As soon as the Royalists discovered, by the failure of these and similar applications, as well as by the gradual tendency of Buonaparte's measures, that the restoration of the Bourbons was the thing farthest from his purpose, their disappointment exasperated them against the audacious individual, whose single person seemed now the only obstacle to that event. Monarchical power was restored, in spirit at least, if not in form; was it to be endured, the more zealous followers of the Bourbons demanded of each other, that it should become the prize of a military usurper? This party, as well as that of the Jacobins, contained doubtless many adherents, whom the enthusiasm of their political principles disposed to serve their cause, even at the expense of great crimes. The sentiments of the princes of the royal family upon such a subject, were becoming their high ranks.¹ They were resolved to combat Buonaparte's pretensions with open force, such as befitted their pretensions as head of the chivalry of France, but to leave to Jacobins the schemes of private assassination. Still there must have been many, among those characters which are found during the miseries and crimes of civil war, who conceived that the assassination of the chief consul would be received as good service when accomplished, although it might not be authorised beforehand. Nay, there may have been partisans zealous enough to take the crime and punishment on themselves, without looking farther than the advantage which their party would receive by the action.

A horrible invention, first hatched, it is said, by the Jacobins,²

sation turning on London, the emigrants, and the French princes, Madame de Guiche mentioned, that as she happened, a few days before, to be at the house of the Count d'Artois, she had heard some persons ask the prince what he intended to do for the first consul in the event of his restoring the Bourbons; and that the prince had replied, 'I would immediately make him constable of the kingdom, and every thing else he might choose. But even that would not be enough: we would raise on the Carrousel a lofty and magnificent column, surmounted with a statue of Buonaparte crowning the Bourbons.' As soon as the first consul entered, Josephine eagerly repeated to him the circumstance which the duchess had related. 'And did you not reply,' said her husband, 'that the corpse of the first consul would have made the pedestal of the column?' The duchess received orders that very night to quit Paris."—*LAS CASES*, tom. i., p. 272.

¹ The opinions of the royal family were nobly expressed in a letter written by the Prince of Condé to the Comte d'Artois, at a later period, 24th January, 1802, which will be hereafter quoted at length.—S.

² It is said in the *Memoirs of Fouché*, (vol. i., p. 180,) that the infernal machine was the invention originally of a Jacobin named Chevalier, assisted by Veyeer, one of the same party; that they even made an experiment of its power, by exploding an engine of the kind behind the Convent de la Salpêtrière; that this circumstance drew on them the attention of the police, and that they were arrested. It does not appear by what means the Royalists became privy to the Jacobin plot, nor is the story in all its parts very probable; yet it would seem it must be partly true, since the attempt by means of the infernal machine was at first charged upon the Jacobins, in consequence of Chevalier's being known to have had some scheme in agitation, to be executed by similar means in the course of the previous year.—S.

was adopted by certain Royalists of a low description, remarkable as actors in the wars of the Chouans, of whom the leaders were named Carbon and St. Regent. It was a machine consisting of a barrel of gunpowder, placed on a cart to which it was strongly secured, and charged with grape-shot so disposed around the barrel, as to be dispersed in every direction by the explosion. The fire was to be communicated by a slow match. It was the purpose of the conspirators, undeterred by the indiscriminate slaughter which such a discharge must occasion, to place the machine in the street through which the first consul was to go to the opera, having contrived that it should explode, exactly as his carriage should pass the spot; and, strange to say, this stratum, which seemed as uncertain as it was atrocious, was within a hair's-breadth of success.

On the evening of the 24th December, 1800, Buonaparte has informed us, that though he himself felt a strong desire to remain at home, his wife and one or two intimate friends insisted that

cars

street

St. Nicase, intercepted the progress of the chief consul's coach, which

mary St. Regent. The report was heard several times

¹ Las Cases, tom. i., p. 374

² "I was in the house when the first consul arrived. On entering his box, as usual, he took the front seat, and as all eyes were fixed upon him, he affected the greatest calm"—*Bot. 1801*

³ Las Cases, tom. i., p. 374, Fouché, tom. i., p. 184, Savary, tom. i., p. 227.

more enthusiastic than ever. Relief was ostentatiously distributed amongst the wounded, and the relatives of the slain ; and every one, shocked with the wild atrocity of such a reckless plot, became, while they execrated the perpetrators, attached in proportion to the object of their cruelty. A disappointed conspiracy always adds strength to the government against which it is directed ; and Buonaparte did not fail to push this advantage to the uttermost.

Notwithstanding that the infernal machine (for so it was not unappropriately termed) had in fact been managed by the hands of Royalists, the first suspicion fell on the Republicans ; and Buonaparte took the opportunity, before the public were undeceived on the subject, of dealing that party a blow, from the effects of which they did not recover during his reign. An arbitrary decree of the Senate was asked and readily obtained for the transportation beyond seas of nearly one hundred and thirty of the chiefs of the broken faction of the Jacobins, among whom were several names which belonged to the celebrated Reign of Terror, and had figured in the rolls of the National Convention. These men were so generally hated, as connected with the atrocious scenes during the reign of Robespierre, that the unpopularity of their characters excused the irregularity of the proceedings against them, and their fate was viewed with complacency by many, and with indifference by all. In the end, the first consul became so persuaded of the political insignificance of these relics of Jacobinism, (who, in fact, were as harmless as the fragments of a bomb-shell after its explosion,) that the decree of deportation was never enforced against them ; and Felix Lepelletier Chaudien, Talot, and their companions, were allowed to live obscurely in France, watched closely by the police, and under the condition that they should not venture to approach Paris.¹

The actual conspirators were proceeded against with severity. Chevalier and Veycer, Jacobins, said to have constructed the original model of the infernal machine, were tried before a military commission, condemned to be shot, and suffered death accordingly.

Arena, Ceracchi, Topino-Lebrun, and Demerville, were tried before the ordinary court of criminal judicature, and condemned by the voice of a jury ; although there was little evidence against them, save that of their accomplice Harel, by whom they had been betrayed. They also were executed.

At a later period, Carbon and St. Regent, Royalists, the agents in the actual attempt of 24th December, were also tried, condemned, and put to death. Some persons tried for the same offence were acquitted ; and justice seems to have been distributed with an impartiality unusual in France since the Revolution.

¹ Montgaillard, tom. v., p. 414 ; Fouché, tom. i., p. 191.

kingdom, and the possessing himself of uncontrolled power over the lives, properties, thoughts, and opinions, of those who were born his fellow-subjects, and of whom the very meanest but lately boasted himself his equal. He has himself expressed his purpose respecting the Constitution of the year Eight, or Consular Government, in words dictated to General Gourgaud:—

“The ideas of Napoleon were fixed; but the aid of time and events were necessary for their realization. The organization of the Consulate had presented nothing in contradiction to them; it taught unanimity, and that was the first step. This point gained, Napoleon was quite indifferent as to the form and denominations of the several constituted bodies. He was a stranger to the Revolution. It was natural that the will of these men, who had followed it through all its phases, should prevail in questions as difficult as they were abstract. The wisest plan was to go on from day to day—by the polar star by which Napoleon meant to guide the Revolution to the haven he desired.”¹

If there is any thing obscure in this passage, it received but too luminous a commentary from the course of Buonaparte's actions; all of which tend to show that he embraced the Consular

taken in a decoy are first introduced within a wider circuit of nets, in order to their being gradually brought within that strict enclosure where they are made absolute prisoners. He tells us in plain terms, he let the revolutionary sages take their own way in arranging the constitution; determined, without regarding the rules they laid down on the chart, to steer his course by one fixed point to one desired haven. That polar star was his own selfish interest that he was determined to reach. Which...

was in both instances equally grievously mistaken.

With the views which he entertained, the chief consul regarded the conspiracies against his life as affording a pretext for extending his power too favourable to be neglected. These repeated attacks on the Head of the state made it desirable that some mode should be introduced of trying such offences, briefer and more arbitrary than the slow forms required by ordinary juris-

¹ Gourgaud, tom. i., p. 154.

prudence. The prompt and speedy justice to be expected from a tribunal freed from the ordinary restraint of formalities and justice, was stated to be more necessary on account of the state of the public roads, infested by bands called *Chauffeurs*, who stopped the public carriages, intercepted the communications of commerce, and became so formidable, that no public coach was permitted to leave Paris without a military guard of at least four soldiers on the roof. This was used as a strong additional reason for constituting a special court of judicature.

Buonaparte could be at no loss for models of such an institution. As hero of the Revolution, he had succeeded to the whole arsenal of revolutionary weapons forged in the name of Liberty, to oppress the dearest rights of humanity. He had but to select that which best suited him, and to mould it to the temper of the times. The country which had so long endured the Revolutionary Tribunal, was not likely to wince under any less stern judicature.

The court which Government now proposed to establish, was to consist of eight members thus qualified. 1. The president and two judges of the ordinary criminal tribunal. 2. Three military men, bearing at least the rank of a captain. 3. Two citizens, to be suggested by Government, who should be selected from such as were by the constitution qualified to act as judges. Thus five out of eight judges were directly named by the Government for the occasion. The court was to decide without jury, without appeal, and without revision of any kind. As a boon to the accused, the court were to have at least six members present, and there was to be no casting vote; so that the party would have his acquittal, unless six members out of eight, or four members out of six, should unite in finding him guilty; whereas in other courts, a bare majority is sufficient for condemnation.

With this poor boon to public opinion, the special Commission Court was to be the jurisdiction before whom armed insurgents, conspirators, and in general men guilty of crimes against the social compact, were to undergo their trial.

The counsellor of state, Portalis, laid this plan before the Legislative Body, by whom it was, according to constitutional form, referred to the consideration of the Tribunate. It was in this body, the only existing branch of the constitution where was preserved some shadow of popular forms and of free debate, that those who continued to entertain free sentiments could have any opportunity of expressing them. Benjamin Constant, Daunon, Chenier, and others, the gleanings as it were of the liberal party, made an honourable but unavailing defence against this invasion of the constitution, studying at the same time to express their opposition in language and by arguments least likely to give offence to the Government. To the honour of the Tribunate, which was the frail but sole remaining barrier of liberty, the project had nearly made shipwreck, and was only passed by a small majority of forty-nine over forty-one. In the Legislative Body there was

also a strong minority.¹ It seemed as if the friends of liberty, however deprived of direct popular representation, and of all the means of influencing public opinion, were yet determined to

or any others entertaining, or supposed to entertain, opinions inimical to the present state of affairs; and the law now passed entitled the government to treat them as suspected persons, and as such, to banish them from Paris or from France. Thus was the chief consul invested with full power over the personal liberty of every person whom he chose to consider as the enemy of his government.

Buonaparte was enabled to avail himself to the uttermost of the powers which he had thus extracted from the constitutional bodies, by the frightful agency of the police. This institution

carion-crows to diminish their number; yet, as the excellence of these guardians of the public depends in a great measure on their familiarity with the arts, haunts, and practices of culprits, they cannot be expected to feel the same horror for crimes, or criminals, which is common to other men. On the contrary, they have a sympathy with them of the same kind which hunters entertain for the game which is the object of their pursuit. Besides, as much of their business is carried on by the medium of spies, they must be able to personate the manners and opinions

consequences can be hardly with any probability attributed to worthy or innocent persons; but there is no character so pure,

¹ Montgaillard, tom. v, p. 422, Fouché, tom. i, p. 196.

rious terrors, putting a stop to all discussion of public measures, which was not in the tone of implicit approbation.

The expense of maintaining this establishment was immense; for Fouché comprehended amongst his spies and informers, persons whom no ordinary gratuity would have moved to act such a part. But this expense was provided for by the large sums which the minister of police received for the telegrams which he

thus the vices of the capital were made to support the means by which it was subjected to a despotic government. His auto-biography contains a boast, that the private secretary of the chief consul was his pensioner,¹ and that the lavish profusion of Josephine made even her willing to exchange intelligence concerning the chief consul's views and plans.² Thus was Fouché not only a spy upon the people in behalf of Buonaparte, but a spy also on Buonaparte himself.

of the palace over a high flame, the mind master of the house

it was unfortunate for Buonaparte that he found at his disposal so ready a weapon of despotism as the organized police, wielded by a hand so experienced as that of Fouché.

¹ "Bourienne offered to inform me exactly of all the proceedings of Buona-

liberty; and the resolution of a few members of the Tribunal, to make some efforts to check the advance of Buonaparte to arbitrary power, was supposed to be taken in her saloon, and under her encouragement. For this she was only banished from Paris.¹ But when she was about to publish her excellent and spirited book on German manners and literature, in which, unhappily, there was no mention of the French nation, or its supreme chief, Madame de Staël's work was seized by the police, and she was favoured with a line from Savary, acquainting her that the air of France did not suit her health, and inviting her to leave it with all convenient speed.² While in exile from Paris, which she accounted her country, the worthy Prefect of Geneva suggested a mode by which she might regain favour. An ode on the birth of the King of Rome was recommended as the means of conciliation. Madame de Staël answered, she should

which she was every where followed, she was at length obliged to escape to England, by the remote way of Russia. Chénier, author of the Hymn of the Marseillois, though formerly the panegyrist of General Buonaparte, became, with other literary persons who did not bend low enough to his new dignity, objects of persecution to the first consul. The childish pertinacity with which Napoleon followed up such unreasonable piques, belongs indeed, chiefly, to the history of the Emperor, but it showed its blossoms earlier. The power of indulging such petty passions,

ing the churches, and renewing the exercise of the Christian religion, and by the restoration of the Pope to his temporal domi-

¹ *Considerations sur la Révolution Française*, tom. ii., p. 301.

² "Madame de Staël had not been banished by the Emperor."

the first of these is the fact that the majority of the population of the United States is now living in the cities. This is a result of the fact that the cities have become the centers of industry and commerce, and the people have been drawn to them in search of employment and better living conditions.

The second of these factors is the fact that the cities have become the centers of education and culture. The universities and colleges are located in the cities, and the people are drawn to them in search of knowledge and intellectual stimulation. This has led to the development of a new class of people, the middle class, who are educated and cultured, and who are able to support themselves by their own efforts.

The third of these factors is the fact that the cities have become the centers of political and social activity. The people are drawn to the cities in search of a better life, and they are able to organize themselves into political and social groups. This has led to the development of a new form of government, the city government, which is able to manage the affairs of the city more effectively than the state government.

The fourth of these factors is the fact that the cities have become the centers of the arts and sciences. The people are drawn to the cities in search of a better life, and they are able to support themselves by their own efforts. This has led to the development of a new class of people, the middle class, who are educated and cultured, and who are able to support themselves by their own efforts.

The fifth of these factors is the fact that the cities have become the centers of the economy. The people are drawn to the cities in search of a better life, and they are able to support themselves by their own efforts. This has led to the development of a new class of people, the middle class, who are educated and cultured, and who are able to support themselves by their own efforts.

The sixth of these factors is the fact that the cities have become the centers of the culture. The people are drawn to the cities in search of a better life, and they are able to support themselves by their own efforts. This has led to the development of a new class of people, the middle class, who are educated and cultured, and who are able to support themselves by their own efforts.

The seventh of these factors is the fact that the cities have become the centers of the industry. The people are drawn to the cities in search of a better life, and they are able to support themselves by their own efforts. This has led to the development of a new class of people, the middle class, who are educated and cultured, and who are able to support themselves by their own efforts.

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of whom were of course emigrants, were also but little edifying. Acting upon the article of the Concordat already noticed, and caused, as the letter¹ itself states, "by the exigencies of the times, which exercises its violence even on us," the Pope required of each of these reverend persons, by an especial mandate, to accede to the compact, by surrendering his see, as therein provided. The order was peremptory in its terms, and an answer was demanded within fifteen days. The purpose of this haste was to prevent consultation or combination, and to place before each bishop, individually, the choice of compliance, thereby gaining a right to be provided for in the new hierarchy; or of refusal, in which case the Pope would be obliged to declare the see vacant, in conformity to his engagement with Buonaparte.

The bishops in general declined compliance with a request, which, on the part of the Pope, was evidently made by compulsion. They offered to lay their resignation at his Majesty's feet,

and preferred exile and poverty to any provision which they

very different eyes. The Christian religion was, as to the Jews and Greeks of old, a stumbling-block to the Jacobins, and foolishness to the philosophers. It was a system which they had attacked with a zeal even as eager as that which they had directed against monarchical institutions; and in the restoration of the

¹ The Pope's Brief to the Archbishops and Bishops of France. See Annual Register, vol. xiii., p. 308.

step of re-establishing religion, and termed the Concordat the greatest error of his reign. But such observations could only occur him in a moment of silence or abstraction. He still knew

The first consul took care, accordingly, to make his full advantage of the Concordat, by introducing his own name as much as possible into the catechism of the Church, which, in other respects, was that drawn up by Bossuet. To honour Napoleon, the catechumen was taught, was the same as to honour and serve God himself—to oppose his will, was to incur the penalty of eternal damnation.²

In civil affairs, Buonaparte equally exerted his talents, in con-

better guaranteed than the pleasure of an arbitrary prince and his council of state, is as insecure as the situation of a pearl suspended

department of France and gave strength to the law.

Tronchet,³ Bigot de Préameneu,⁴ and Maleville,⁵ juris-consults of the highest character, and associated them with the Minister of Justice, Cambacérès, in the task of adjusting and reporting a plan for a general system of jurisprudence. The progress and

² Montholon, *loc. cit.* p. 372.

theon

⁴ *Revue de France*, 1801, p. 100.

step of re-establishing religion, and termed the Concordat the greatest error of his reign. But such observations could only escape him in a moment of pique or provocation. He well knew

The first consul took care, accordingly, to make his full advantage of the Concordat, by introducing his own name as much as possible into the catechism of the Church, which, in other respects, was that drawn up by Bossuet. To honour Napoleon, the catechumen was taught, was the same as to honour and serve God himself—to oppose his will, was to incur the penalty of eternal damnation.²

In civil affairs, Buonaparte equally exerted his talents, in connecting the safety and interests of the nation with his own ag-

better guarantee than the pleasure of an arbitrary prince and his council of state, is as insecure as the situation of a pearl suspended

departments of France, and suppressing the partial and temporary regulations made in the various political crises of the Revolution, were designed to be the basis of a uniform national system. For this purpose, an order of the consuls convoked Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet,³ Bigot de Préameneu,⁴ and Maleville,⁵ juris-consults of the highest character, and associated them with the Minister of Justice, Cambacérés, in the task of adjusting and reporting a plan for a general system of jurisprudence. The progress and

¹ Montholon tom. i. p. 303.

tuon.

⁴ Bigot de Préameneu was born in Brittany about the year 1770. In 1800 he

termination of this great work will be hereafter noticed. The chief consul himself took an active part in the deliberations.

An ordinance, eminently well qualified to heal the civil wounds of France, next manifested the talents of Buonaparte, and, as men hoped, his moderation. This was the general amnesty granted to the emigrants. A decree of the Senate, 26th April, 1802, permitted the return of these unfortunate persons to France, providing they did so, and took the oath of fidelity to Government, within a certain period. There were, however, five classes of exceptions, containing such as seemed too deeply and strongly pledged to the house of Bourbon, ever to reconcile themselves to the government of Buonaparte. Such were, 1st, Those who had been chiefs of bodies of armed royalists;—2d, Who had held rank in the armies of the allies; 3d, Who had belonged to the household of the princes of the blood;—4th, Who had been agents or encouragers of foreign or domestic war;—5th, The generals and admirals, together with the representatives of the people, who had been guilty of treason against the Republic, together with the prelates, who declined to resign their sees in terms of the Concordat. It was at the same time declared, that not more than five hundred in all should be excepted from the amnesty. Buonaparte truly judged, that the mass of emigrants, thus winnowed and purified from all who had been leaders, exhausted in fortune and wearied out by exile, would in general be grateful for permission to return to France, and passive, nay, contented and attached subjects of his dominion; and the event in a great measure, if not fully, justified his expectations. Such part of their property as had not been sold, was directed to be restored to them;¹ but they were subjected to the special superintendence of the police for the space of ten years after their return.²

With similar and most laudable attention to the duties of his high office, Buonaparte founded plans of education,³ and particularly, with Monge's assistance, established the Polytechnic school, which has produced so many men of talent. He inquired anxiously into abuses, and was particularly active in correcting those which had crept into the prisons during the Revolution, where great tyranny was exercised by monopoly of provisions, and otherwise.⁴

¹ "At one time I intended to form a mass or a *syndicate* of all the unsold property of the emigrants, and on their return, to distribute it in certain proportions among them. But when I came to grant property to individuals, I soon found that I was creating too many wealthy men, and that they repaid my favours with insolence."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, tom. iii., p. 213.

² Fouché, tom. i., p. 226; Montgaillard, tom. v., p. 464.

³ "One of my grand objects was to render education accessible to every one. I caused every institution to be formed upon a plan which offered instruction to the public, either gratis, or at a rate so moderate, as not to be beyond the means of the peasant. The museums were thrown open to the *canaille*. My *canaille* would have become the best educated in the world. All my exertions were directed to illuminate the mass of the nation, instead of brutifying them by ignorance and superstition."—NAPOLEON, *O'Meara*, vol. ii., p. 385.

⁴ "At the time of my downfall, the state prisons contained two hundred and fifty individuals, and I found nine thousand in them, when I became consul."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, tom. v., p. 53.

In amending such evils, Buonaparte, though not of kingly birth, showed a mind worthy of the rank to which he had ascended. It is only to be regretted, that in what interfered with his personal wishes or interest, he uniformly failed to manifest the sound and correct views, which on abstract questions he could form so clearly.

Other schemes of a public character were held out as occupying the attention of the chief consul. Like Augustus, whose situation his own in some measure resembled, Napoleon endeavoured, by the magnificence of his projects for the improvement of the state, to withdraw attention from his inroads upon public freedom. The inland navigation of Languedoc was to be completed, and a canal, joining the river Yonne to the Saône, was to connect the south part of the Republic so completely with the north, as to establish a communication by water between Marseilles and Amsterdam. Bridges were also to be built, roads to be laid out and improved, museums founded in the principal towns of France, and many other public labours undertaken, on a scale which should put to shame even the boasted days of Louis XIV. Buonaparte knew the French nation well, and was aware that he should best reconcile them to his government, by indulging his own genius for bold and magnificent undertakings, whether of a military or a civil character.

But although these splendid proposals filled the public ear, and flattered the national pride of France, commerce continued

to be found in a general peace; and a variety of circumstances, some of them of a character very displeasing to the first consul, seemed gradually preparing for this desirable event.

CHAPTER XXII.

Return to the external Relations of France—Her universal Ascendency—Napoleon's advances to the Emperor Paul—Plan of destroying the British—Death of Paul—

by—General Hutchinson
Belliard capitulates—as
was shown—as in Egypt brought to a victorious Conclusion.

HAVING thus given a glance at the internal affairs of France during the commencement of Buonaparte's domination, we return to her external relations, which, since the peace of Lunéville,

had assumed the appearance of universal ascendancy, so much had the current of human affairs been altered by the talents and fortunes of one man. Not only was France in secure possession, by the treaty of Luneville, of territories extending to the banks of the Rhine, but the surrounding nations were, under the plausible names of protection or alliance, as submissive to her government as if they had made integral parts of her dominions. Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, were all in a state of subjection to her will; Spain, like a puppet, moved but at her signal; Austria was broken-spirited and dejected; Prussia still remembered her losses in the first revolutionary war; and Russia, who alone could be considered as unmoved by any fear of France, was yet in a situation to be easily managed, by flattering and cajoling the peculiar temper of the Emperor Paul.

We have already observed, that Buonaparte had artfully availed himself of the misunderstanding between Austria and Russia, to insinuate himself into the good graces of the Czar. The disputes between Russia and England gave him still further advantages over the mind of that incautious monarch.

The refusal of Britain to cede the almost impregnable fortress of Malta, and with it the command of the Mediterranean, to a power who was no longer friendly, was aggravated by her declining to admit Russian prisoners into the cartel of exchange betwixt the French and British. Buonaparte contrived to make his approaches to the Czar in a manner calculated to bear upon both these subjects of grievance. He presented to Paul, who affected to be considered as the Grand Master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, the sword given by the Pope to the heroic John de la Valette, who was at the head of the Order during the celebrated defence of Malta against the Turks.¹ With the same view of placing his own conduct in a favourable contrast with that of Great Britain, he new-clothed and armed eight or nine thousand Russian prisoners, and dismissed them freely, in token of his personal esteem for the character of the Emperor.

A more secret and scandalous mode of acquiring interest is said to have been attained, through the attachment of the unfortunate prince to a French actress of talents and beauty, who had been sent from Paris for the express purpose of acquiring his affections. From these concurring reasons, Paul began now openly to manifest himself as the warm friend of France, and the bitter enemy of Britain. In the former capacity, he had the weak and unworthy complaisance to withdraw the hospitality which he had hitherto afforded to the relics of the royal family of Bourbon, who were compelled to remove from Mittau, where they had been hitherto permitted to reside.

To gratify his pique against England, Paul gave hearing at least to a magnificent scheme, by which Buonaparte proposed to accom-

plish the destruction of the British power in India, which he had in vain hoped to attain by the possession of T—t. The
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William march to India, was in the power of the Emperor of Russia. A controversy being in dependence betwixt England and the northern courts, afforded the pretext for throwing his weight into the scale against her at this dangerous crisis.

The right of search at sea, that is, the right of stopping a ship.

On this point, this principle was now anxiously reclaimed by France, as the most effective argument for the purpose of irritating the neutral powers against Great Britain, whose right of search, which could not be exercised without vexation and inconvenience to their commerce, must necessarily be unpopular amongst them. Forgetting that the danger occasioned by the gigantic power of France was infinitely greater than any which could arise from the maritime claims of England, the northern courts became again united on the subject of what they termed the freedom of the seas. Indeed, the Emperor Paul, even before the offence arising out of his dominions, it

But upon the fresh provocation which he conceived himself to have received, the Emperor became outrageous, and took the most violent measures for seizing the persons and property of the English, that ever were practised by an angry and unreasonable despot.

Prussia, more intent on her own immediate aggrandisement, than mindful of the welfare of Europe in general, took advantage of the universal ill-will against England, to seize upon the King's continental dominions of Hanover, with peculiar breach of public faith, as she herself had guaranteed the neutrality of that country.

The consequences, with regard to the northern powers, are well known. The promptitude of the administration sent a strong fleet to the Baltic; and the well-contested battle of Copenhagen detached Denmark from the Northern Confederacy. Sweden had joined it unwillingly; and Russia altered her course of policy in consequence of the death of Paul. That unhappy prince had surmounted the patience of his subjects, and fell a victim to one of those conspiracies, which in arbitrary monarchies, especially such as partake of the Oriental character, supply all the checks of a moderate and free constitution, where the prerogative of the crown is limited by laws. In these altered circumstances, the cause of dispute was easily removed, by the right of search being subjected to equitable regulations and modifications.

Buonaparte received the news of Paul's death with much more emotion than he was usually apt to testify. It is said, that, for the first time in his life, a passionate exclamation of "*Mon Dieu!*" escaped him, in a tone of sorrow and surprise. With Paul's immense power, and his disposition to place it at the disposal of France, the first consul doubtless reckoned upon the accomplishment of many important plans which his death disconcerted. It was natural, also, that Napoleon should be moved by the sudden and violent end of a prince, who had manifested so much admiration of his person and his qualities. He is said to have dwelt so long on the strangeness of the incident, that Fouché was obliged to remind him, that it was a mode of changing a chief magistrate, or a course of administration, which was common to the empire in which it took place.¹

The death of Paul, so much regretted by Buonaparte, was nevertheless the means of accelerating a peace between France and Great Britain, which, if it could have been established on a secure basis, would have afforded him the best chance of maintaining his power, and transmitting it to his posterity. While the Czar continued to be his observant ally, there was little pro-

1 "Mais enfin, que voulez vous? C'est une mode de destitution propre à ce pais-là!"—S.—"I told him, that whatever might be the mode of deposition practised in Russia, luckily the south of Europe was a stranger to such treacherous habits and attempts; but my arguments could not convince him; he gave vent to his passion in ejaculations, stampings of the foot, and short fits of rage. I never beheld so striking a scene."—FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 205.

spect that the first consul would be moderate enough in the terms which he might have proffered, to permit the British Ministry to treat with him.

Another obstacle to peace was at this time removed, in a manner not more acceptable to Buonaparte than was the death of the Emperor Paul. The possession of Egypt by the French was a point which the first consul would have insisted upon from strong personal feeling. The Egyptian expedition was intimately connected with his own personal glory, nor was it likely that he would have sacrificed its results to his desire of peace with Great Britain. On the other hand, there was no probability that England would accede to any arrangement which should sanction the existence of a French colony, settled in Egypt with the express purpose of destroying our Indian commerce. But this obstacle to peace was removed by the fate of arms.

Affairs in Egypt had been on the whole unfavourable to the French, since that army had lost the presence of the commander-in-chief. Kleber, on whom the command devolved, was discontented both at the unceremonious and sudden manner in which the duty had been imposed upon him, and with the scarcity of

which it was provided that the French should evacuate Egypt, and that Kleber and his army should be transported to France in safety, without being molested by the British fleet. When

Sur Sidney's ministerial powers were superseded by his appointment. Such was the alleged informality on which the treaty fell to the ground; but the truth was, that the arrival of Kleber and his army in the south of France, at the very moment when the successes of Suwarrow gave strong hopes of making some impression on her frontier, might have had a most material effect upon the events of the war. Lord Keith, therefore, who com-

the possession of the country, and reconcile the inhabitants to the French government. He was as moderate in the imposts as the exigencies of his army permitted, greatly improved the condition of the troops, and made, if not peace, at least an effectual truce, with the restless and enterprising Murad Bey, who still continued to be at the head of a considerable body of Mamelukes. Kleber also raised among the Greeks a legion of fifteen hundred or two thousand men; and with more difficulty succeeded in levying a regiment of Copts.

While busied in these measures, he was cut short by the blow of an assassin. A fanatic Turk, called Soliman Haleby, a native of Aleppo, imagined he was inspired by Heaven to slay the enemy of the Prophet and the Grand Seigneur. He concealed himself in a cistern, and springing out on Kleber when there was only one man in company with him, stabbed him dead.¹ The assassin was justly condemned to die by a military tribunal; but the sentence was executed with a barbarity which disgraced those who practised it. Being impaled alive, he survived for four hours in the utmost tortures, which he bore with an indifference which his fanaticism perhaps alone could have bestowed.²

The Baron Menou, on whom the command now devolved, was an inferior person to Kleber. He had made some figure amongst the nobles who followed the revolutionary cause in the Constituent Assembly, and was the same general whose want of decision at the affair of the Sections had led to the employment of Buonaparte in his room, and to the first rise, consequently, of the fortunes which had since swelled so high. Menou altered for the worse several of the regulations of Kleber, and, carrying into literal execution what Buonaparte had only written and spoken of, he became an actual Mahomedan, married a native Turkish woman, and assumed the name of Abdallah Menou. This change of religion exposed him to the ridicule of the French, while it went in no degree to conciliate the Egyptians.³

The succours from France, which Buonaparte had promised in his farewell address to the Egyptian army, arrived slowly, and in small numbers. This was not the fault of the chief consul,

¹ The remains of Kleber were interred with great pomp, and a monument was raised to his memory. Buonaparte evinced sincere regret at the loss of this excellent officer, and caused a medal to be struck upon the occasion, with the words "General Kleber, born in 1753, assassinated at Cairo, the 14th of June, 1800;" and on the reverse, "Surnamed, from his stature and intrepidity, the French Hercules; he braved death a thousand times in the field, and fell under the dagger of an assassin." Kleber and Desaix were Napoleon's favourite lieutenants. "Both," he said, "possessed great and rare virtues, though their characters were very dissimilar. Kleber's was the talent of nature; Desaix's was entirely the result of education and assiduity; Kleber was an irreparable loss to France; he was a man of the brightest talents and the greatest bravery."

² His body was embalmed and brought by the French savans from Egypt, to be deposited in the museum of natural history at Paris.

³ Montholon, tom. i., p. 78; Memoirs of the Duke of Rovigo, vol. i., p. 243; Las Cases, tom. i., p. 226.

who had commanded Gantheaume to put to sea with a squadron, having on board four or five thousand men; but being pursued by the English fleet, that admiral was glad to regain the harbour of Toulon. Other efforts were made with the same indifferent success. The French ports were too closely watched to permit the sailing of any expedition on a large scale, and two frigates, with five or six hundred men, were the only reinforcements that reached Egypt.

Meantime the English Cabinet had adopted the daring and manly resolution of wresting from France this favourite colony by force. They had for a length of time confined their military efforts to partial and detached objects, which, if successful, could not have any effect on the general results of the war, and which, when they miscarried, as was the case before Cadiz, Ferrol, and elsewhere, tended to throw ridicule on the plans of the Ministry, and however undeservedly, even upon the character of the forces employed on the service. It was by such ill-considered and imperfect efforts that the war was maintained on our part, while our watchful and formidable enemy combined his mighty means to effect objects of commensurate importance. We, like puny fencers, offered doubtful and uncertain blows, which could only affect the extremities, he never aimed, save at the heart, nor thrust, but with the determined purpose of plunging his weapon to the hilt.

The consequence of these partial and imperfect measures was, that even while our soldiers were in the act of gradually attaining that perfection of discipline by which they are now distinguished, they ranked—most unjustly—lower in the respect of their countrymen, than at any other period in our history. The pre-eminent excellence of our sailors had been shown in a thousand actions; and it became too usual to place it in contrast with the failure of our expeditions on shore. But it was afterwards found that our soldiers could assume the same superiority, whenever the plan of the campaign offered them a fair field for its exercise. Such a field of action was afforded by the Egyptian expedition.

This undertaking was the exclusive plan of an ill-requested statesman, the late Lord Melville;¹ who had difficulty in obtaining even Mr. Pitt's assent to it.

terms inferring a solemn protest against the risk about to be incurred. "It is with the utmost reluctance" (such, or nearly such, were the words of George III.) "that I consent to a measure which sends the flower of my army upon a dangerous expedition against a distant province."² The event, however, showed, that

¹ Henry Dundas, created in 1802, Baron Dundas and Viscount Melville, died in May, 1811.

² At an after period, the good King made the following acknowledgment of

in arduous circumstances, the daring game, if previously well considered, is often the most successful.

On the 8th March, 1801, General Sir Ralph Abercrombie, at the head of an army of seventeen thousand men, landed in Egypt, in despite of the most desperate opposition by the enemy. The excellence of the troops was displayed by the extreme gallantry and calmness with which, landing through a heavy surf, they instantly formed and advanced against the enemy. On the 21st of March, a general action took place. The French cavalry attempted to turn the British flank, and made a desperate charge for that purpose, but failed in their attempt, and were driven back with great loss. The French were defeated, and compelled to retreat on Alexandria, under the walls of which they hoped to maintain themselves. But the British suffered an irreparable loss in their lamented commander, Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who was mortally wounded in the course of the action. In this gallant veteran his country long regretted one of the best generals, and one of the worthiest and most amiable men, to whom she ever gave birth.

The command descended on General Hutchinson, who was soon joined by the Capitan Pacha, with a Turkish army. The recollections of Aboukir and Heliopolis, joined to the remonstrances and counsels of their English allies, induced the Turks to avoid a general action, and confine themselves to skirmishes, by which system the French were so closely watched, and their communications so effectually destroyed, that General Belliard, shut up in a fortified camp in Cairo, cut off from Alexandria, and threatened with insurrection within the place, was compelled to capitulate, under condition that his troops should safely be transported to France, with their arms and baggage. This was on the 28th of June, and the convention¹ had scarce been signed, when the English army was reinforced in a manner which showed the bold and successful combination of measures under which the expedition had been undertaken.

An army of seven thousand men, of whom two thousand were sepoys, or native Indian troops, were disembarked at Cosseir, on the Red Sea, and, detached from the Indian settlements, now came to support the European part of the English invasion. The Egyptians saw with the extremity of wonder, native troops, many of them Moslemah, who worshipped in the mosques, and observed the ritual enjoined by the Prophet, perfectly accomplished in the European discipline. The lower class were inclined to think, that

his mistake. When Lord Melville was out of power, his majesty did him the honour to visit him at Wimbledon, and partook of some refreshment. On that occasion the King took an opportunity to fill a glass of wine, and having made the company do the same, he gave as his toast, "The health of the courageous minister, who, against the opinion of many of his colleagues, and even the remonstrances of his king, had dared to conceive and carry through the Egyptian expedition."—S.

¹ For a copy of the Convention, see *Annual Register*, vol. xliii., p. 221.

this singular reinforcement had been sent to them in consequence of Mohammed's direct and miraculous interposition; only their being commanded by English officers did not favour this theory.

In consequence of these reinforcements, and his own confined situation under the walls of Alexandria, Menou saw himself constrained to enter into a convention for surrendering up the province of Egypt. He was admitted to the same terms of composition which had been granted to Belliard; and thus the war in that quarter was, on the part of Great Britain, triumphantly concluded.

The conquest of this disputed kingdom excited a strong sensation both in France and Britain; but the news of the contest

descent on Britain." But it seems to have occurred to him presently afterwards, that the loss of this disputed province might, instead of being an argument for carrying the war to extremity, be considered as the removal of an obstacle to a treaty of peace.¹

CHAPTER XXIII.

Preparations for the Invasion of Britain—Nelson put in command of the Sea—Attack of the Boulogne Flotilla—Pitt leaves the Ministry—succeeded by Mr. Addington—Negotiations for Peace—Just punishment of England, in regard to the conquered Settlements of the enemy—Forced to restore them all, save Ceylon and Trinidad—Malta is placed under the guarantee of a Neutral Power—Preliminaries of Peace signed—Joy of the English Populace, and doubts of the better classes—Treaty of Amiens signed—The ambitious projects of Napoleon, nevertheless, proceed without interruption—Extension of his power in Italy—He is appointed Consul for life, with the power of naming his Successor—His Situation at this period.

As the words of the first consul appeared to intimate, preparations were resumed on the French coast for the invasion of Great Britain. Boulogne, and every harbour along the coast, was crowded with flat-bottomed boats, and the shores covered with

¹ "Napoleon never ceased to regret, that Egypt ought to have remained in the possession of the English."

camps of the men designed apparently to fill them. We need not at present dwell on the preparations for attack, or those which the English adopted in defence, as we shall have occasion to notice both, when Buonaparte, for the last time, threatened England with the same measure. It is enough to say, that, on the present occasion, the menaces of France had their usual effect in awakening the spirit of Britain.

The most extensive arrangements were made for the reception of the invaders should they chance to land, and in the meanwhile, our natural barrier was not neglected. The naval preparations were very great, and what gave yet more confidence than the number of vessels and guns, Nelson was put into command of the sea, from Orfordness to Beachyhead. Under his management, it soon became the question, not whether the French flotilla was to invade the British shores, but whether it was to remain in safety in the French harbours. Boulogne was bombarded, and some of the small craft and gun-boats destroyed—the English admiral generously sparing the town; and not satisfied with this partial success, Nelson prepared to attack them with the boats of the squadron. The French resorted to the most unusual and formidable preparations for defence. Their flotilla was moored close to the shore in the mouth of Boulogne harbour, the vessels secured to each other by chains, and filled with soldiers. The British attack in some degree failed, owing to the several divisions of boats missing each other in the dark; some French vessels were taken, but they could not be brought off; and the French chose to consider this result as a victory, on their part, of consequence enough to balance the loss at Aboukir;—though it amounted at best to ascertaining, that although their vessels could not keep the sea, they might, in some comparative degree of safety, lie under close cover of their own batteries. Meantime, the changes which had taken place in the British administration, were preparing public expectation for that peace which all the world now longed for.

Mr. Pitt, as is well known, left the Ministry, [Feb. 1801,] and was succeeded in the office of first Minister of State by Mr. Addington, now Lord Sidmouth. The change was justly considered as friendly to pacific measures; for, in France especially, the gold of Pitt had been by habit associated with all that was prejudicial to their country. The very massacres of Paris, nay, the return of Buonaparte from Egypt, were imputed to the intrigues of the English minister; he was the scape-goat on whom were charged as the ultimate cause, all the follies, crimes, and misfortunes of the Revolution.

A great part of his own countrymen, as well as of the French, entertained a doubt of the possibility of concluding a peace under Mr. Pitt's auspices; while those who were most anti-Gallican in their opinions, had little wish to see his lofty spirit stoop to the task of arranging conditions of treaty on terms so different from

what his hopes had once dictated. The worth, temper, and talents of his successor, seemed to qualify him to enter into a negotiation to which the greater part of the nation was now inclined, were it but for the sake of experiment.

Buonaparte himself was at this time disposed to peace. It was necessary to France, and no less necessary to him, since he otherwise must remain obliged to undertake the hazardous alternative

difficulty brought to consent to the evacuation of Egypt, there being every reason to believe that he was already possessed of the news of the convention with Menou. At any rate, the French cause in Egypt had been almost desperate ever since the battle of Alexandria, and the first consul was conscious that in this sacrifice he only resigned that which there was little chance of his being able to keep. It was also stipulated, that the French should evacuate Rome and Naples; a condition of little consequence, as they were always able to reoccupy these countries when their interest required it. The Dutch colony of the Cape of Good Hope was to be restored to the Batavian republic, and declared a free port.

In respect of the settlements which the British arms had conquered, England underwent a punishment not unmerited. The conquest of the enemy's colonies had been greatly too much an object of the English Ministry; and thus the national force had been frattered away upon acquisitions of comparatively petty importance, which, from the local interests of the

of Wallate, were now to be returned without any equivalent. Had the gallant soldiers, who perished miserably for the sake of these sugar-islands, been united in one well-concerted expedition, to the support of Charette, or to the defence of the

stipulated for and guaranteed. Britain restored porto Ferraje, and what other places she had occupied in the isle of Elba, or on the Italian coast; but the occupation of Malta for some time threatened to prove an obstacle to the treaty. The English considered it as of the last consequence that this strong island should

remain in their possession, and intimated that they regarded the pertinacious resistance which the first consul testified to this proposal, as implying a private and unavowed desire of renewing, at some future opportunity, his designs on Egypt, to which Malta might be considered as in some measure a key. After much discussion, it was at length agreed that the independence of the island should be secured by its being garrisoned by a neutral power, and placed under its guarantee and protection.

The preliminaries of peace were signed 10th October, 1801. General Law de Lauriston,¹ the school companion and first aide-de-camp of Buonaparte, brought them over from Paris to London, where they were received with the most extravagant joy by the populace, to whom novelty is a sufficient recommendation of almost any thing. But amidst the better classes, the sensation was much divided. There was a small but energetic party, led by the celebrated Windham, who, adopting the principles of Burke to their utmost extent, considered the act of treating with a regicide government as indelible meanness, and as a dereliction, on the part of Great Britain, of those principles of legitimacy, upon which the social compact ought to rest. More moderate anti-Gallicans, while they regretted that our efforts in favour of the Bourbons had been totally unavailing, contended with reason, that we were not so closely leagued to their cause as to be bound to sacrifice our own country, in a vain attempt to restore the exiled family to the throne of France. This was the opinion entertained by Pitt himself, and the most judicious among his followers. Lastly, there was the professed Opposition, who, while rejoicing that we had been able to obtain peace on any terms, might now exult in the fulfilment of their predictions of the bad success of the war. Sheridan summed up what was perhaps the most general feeling in the country, with the observation, that "it was a peace which all men were glad of, and no man could be proud of."

Amiens was appointed for the meeting of commissioners, who were finally to adjust the treaty of pacification, which was not ended till five months after the preliminaries had been agreed on. After this long negotiation, the treaty was at length signed, 25th March, 1802. The isle of Malta, according to this agreement, was to be occupied by a garrison of Neapolitan troops, while, besides Britain and France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia, were to guarantee its neutrality. The Knights of St. John were to be the sovereigns, but neither French nor English were in future to be members of that order. The harbours were to be free to the commerce of all nations, and the order was to be neutral towards all nations save the Algerines and other piratical states.

Napoleon, had he chosen to examine into the feelings of the English, must have seen plainly that this treaty, unwillingly acceded to by them, and only by way of experiment, was to have a

¹ General Law of Lauriston was born at Pondicherry in 1768. He died at Paris in 1823.

duration long or short, in proportion to their confidence in, or doubt of, his own good faith. His ambition, and the little scruple which he showed in gratifying it, was, he must have been sensible, the terror of Europe; and until the fears he had excited were disarmed by a tract of peaceful and moderate conduct on his part, the suspicions of England must have been constantly awake, and the peace between the nations must have been considered as precarious as an armed truce. Yet these considerations could not induce him to lay aside, or even postpone, a train of measures,

nating influence of that country over her continental neighbours.

By the treaty of Luneville, and by that of Tolentino, the independent existence of the Cisalpine and Helvetican republics had

Directory was overthrown in France, it was not his purpose that a directorial form of government should continue to subsist in Italy. Measures were on this account to be taken, to establish in that country something resembling the new consular model adopted in Paris.

For this purpose, in the beginning of January, 1802, a convention of 450 deputies from the Cisalpine states arrived at Lyons, (for they were not trusted to deliberate within the limits of their

transacted here on Jan. 3.

A committee of safety of the Italian convention, to whom had been intrusted the negotiation of the

secure, unless Buonaparte should be prevailed upon to fill that situation, not, as it was carefully explained, in his character of head of the French government, but in his individual capacity. Napoleon graciously inclined to their suit. He informed them,

that he concurred in the modest opinion they had formed, that their republic did not at present possess an individual sufficiently gifted with talents and impartiality to take charge of their affairs, which he should, therefore, retain under his own chief management, while circumstances required him to do so.

Having thus established his power in Italy as firmly as in France, Buonaparte proceeded to take measures for extending his dominions in the former country and elsewhere. By a treaty with Spain, now made public, it appeared that the duchy of Parma was to devolve on France, together with the island of Elba, upon the death of the present duke—an event at no distant date to be expected. The Spanish part of the province of Louisiana, in North America, was to be ceded to France by the same treaty. Portugal, too, though the integrity of her dominions had been guaranteed by the preliminaries of the peace with England, had been induced, by a treaty kept studiously private from the British court, to cede her province of Guiana to France. These stipulations served to show that there was no quarter of the world in which France and her present ruler did not entertain views of aggrandisement, and that questions of national faith would not be considered too curiously when they interfered with their purpose.

While Europe was stunned and astonished at the spirit of conquest and accumulation manifested by this insatiable conqueror, France was made aware that he was equally desirous to consolidate and to prolong his power, as to extend it over near and distant regions. He was all, and more than all, that sovereign had ever been; but he still wanted the title and the permanence which royalty requires. To attain these was no difficult matter, when the first consul was the prime mover of each act, whether in the Senate or Tribunate; nor was he long of discovering proper agents eager to gratify his wishes.

Chabot de L'Allier took the lead in the race of adulation.—Arising in the Tribunate, he pronounced a long eulogium on Buonaparte, enhancing the gratitude due to the hero by whom France had been preserved and restored to victory. He therefore proposed that the Tribunate should transmit to the Conservative Senate a resolution, requesting the Senate to consider the manner of bestowing on Napoleon Buonaparte a splendid mark of the national gratitude.

There was no misunderstanding this hint. The motion was unanimously adopted, and transmitted to the Convention, to the Senate, to the Legislative Body, and to the Consuls.

The Senate conceived they should best meet the demand now made upon them, by electing Napoleon first consul for a second space of ten years, to commence when the date of the original period, for which he was named by the Constitution, should expire.

The proposition of the Senate being reduced into the form of a decree, was intimated to Buonaparte, but fell short of his wishes; as it assigned to him, however distant it was, a period at which

he must be removed from authority. It is true, that the space of seventeen years, to which the edict of the Senate proposed to extend his power, seemed to guarantee a very ample duration; and in point of fact, before the term of its expiry arrived, he was prisoner at Saint Helena. But still there was a termination, and that was enough to mortify his ambition.

He thanked the Senate, therefore, for this fresh mark of their

to the people one more acceptable to Buonaparte's ambition, requesting their judgment, whether the chief consul should retain his office, not for ten years longer, but for the term of his life. By thus juggling, the proposal of the Senate was set aside, and that assembly soon found it wisest to adopt the more liberal views suggested by the consuls, to whom they returned thanks, for

a hint.

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ministers with whom the registers were finally deposited, were

¹ Montgaillard, tom v. pp 470, 476, Jomina, tom xv p 17 "For six weeks" says De la Harpe.

He did not, however, venture to propose to the people another innovation, which extended beyond his death the power which their liberal gift had continued during his life. A simple decree of the Senate assigned to Buonaparte the right of nominating his successor, by a testamentary deed. So that Napoleon might call his children or relatives to the succession of the empire of France, as to a private inheritance; or, like Alexander, he might leave it to the most favoured of his lieutenant-generals. To such a pass had the domination of a military chief, for the space of betwixt two and three years, reduced the fierce democracy and stubborn loyalty of the two factions, which seemed before that period to combat for the possession of France. Napoleon had stooped on them both, like the hawk in the fable.

The period at which we close this chapter was a most important one in Napoleon's life, and seemed a crisis on which his fate, and that of France, depended. Britain, his most inveterate and most successful enemy, had seen herself compelled by circumstances to resort to the experiment of a doubtful peace, rather than continue a war which seemed to be waged without an object. The severe checks to national prosperity, which arose from the ruined commerce and blockaded ports of France, might now, under the countenance of the first consul, be exchanged for the wealth that waits upon trade and manufactures. Her navy, of which few vestiges were left save the Brest fleet, might now be recruited, and resume by degrees that acquaintance with the ocean from which they had long been debarred. The restored colonies of France might have added to the sources of her national wealth, and she might have possessed—what Buonaparte on a remarkable occasion declared to be the principal objects he desired for her—ships, colonies, and commerce.

In his personal capacity, the first consul possessed all the power which he desired, and a great deal more than, whether his own or the country's welfare was regarded, he ought to have wished for. His victories over the foes of France had, by their mere fame, enabled him to make himself master of her freedom. It remained to show—not whether Napoleon was a patriot, for to that honourable name he had forfeited all title when he first usurped unlimited power—but whether he was to use the power which he had wrongfully acquired, like Trajan or like Domitian. His strangely-mingled character showed traits of both these historical portraits, strongly opposed as they are to each other. Or rather, he might seem to be like Socrates in the allegory, alternately influenced by a good and a malevolent demon; the former marking his course with actions of splendour and dignity; while the latter, mastering human frailty by means of its prevailing foible, the love of self, debased the history of a hero, by actions and sentiments worthy only of a vulgar tyrant.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Different Views entertained by the English Ministers and the Chief Consul of the effects of the Treaty of Amiens—Napoleon, misled by the Shouts of a London Mob, misunderstands the Feelings of the People of Great Britain—His continued encroachments on the Independence of Europe—His conduct to Switzerland—Interferes in their Politics, and sets himself up, uninvited, as Mediator in their concerns—Ney enters Switzerland at the head of 40,000 men—The patriot, Reding, disbands his Forces, and is imprisoned—Switzerland is compelled to furnish France with a Subsidiary Army of 16,000 Troops—The Chief Consul adopts the title of Grand Mediator of the Helvetic Republic.

THE eyes of Europe were now fixed on Buonaparte, as master of the destinies of the civilized world, which his will could either maintain in a state of general peace, or replunge into all the miseries of renewed and more inveterate war. Many hopes were entertained, from his eminent personal qualities, that the course in which he would direct them might prove as honourable to himself as happy for the nations over whom he now possessed such unbounded influence. The shades of his character were either lost amid the lustre of his victories, or excused from the necessity of his situation. The massacre of Jaffa was little known, was acted afar off, and might present itself to memory as an act of military severity, which circumstances might palliate, if not excuse.

Napoleon, conscious of his fall, retired to the island of Elba.

him, and to preserve it, he had only to will that it should continue; and the season seemed eminently propitious for taking the advice of Cineas to the King of Epirus, and reposing himself after his labours. But he was now beginning to show, that, from the times of Pyrrhus to his own, ambition has taken more pleasure in

little more than a year, again renewed the horrors of war. We shall then resume the internal history of France and her ruler.

Although the two contracting powers had been able to agree upon the special articles of the peace of Amiens, they possessed extremely different ideas concerning the nature of a state of pacification in general, and the relations which it establishes between two independent states. The English minister, a man of the highest personal worth and probity, entertained no doubt that peace was to have its usual effect, of restoring all the ordinary amicable intercourse betwixt France and England; and that, in matters concerning their mutual allies, and the state of the European republic in general, the latter country, on sheathing the sword, had retained the right of friendly counsel and remonstrance. Mr. Addington could not hope to restore the balance of Europe, for which so much blood had been spilled in the eighteenth century. The scales and beams of that balance were broken into fragments, and lay under the feet of Buonaparte. But Britain did not lie prostrate. She still grasped in her hand the trident of the ocean, and had by no event, in the late contest, been reduced to surrender the right of remonstrating against violence and injustice, and of protecting the feeble, as far as circumstances would still permit.

But Buonaparte's idea of the effects of the treaty of Amiens was very different. It was, according to his estimation, a treaty, containing every thing that Britain was entitled to expect on the part of herself and her allies, and the accepting of which excluded her from all farther right of interference in the affairs of Europe. It was like a bounding charter, which restricts the right of the person to whom it is granted to the precise limits therein described, and precludes the possibility of his making either claim or acquisition beyond them. All Europe, then, was to be at the disposal of France, and states created, dissolved, changed and rechanged at her pleasure, unless England could lay her finger on the line in the treaty of Amiens, which prohibited the proposed measure. "England," said the *Moniteur*, in an official tone, "shall have the treaty of Amiens, the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing but the treaty of Amiens!" In this manner the treaty was, so far as England was concerned, understood to decide, and that in favour of France, all questions which could possibly arise in the course of future time between the two countries; while, in ordinary candour, and in common sense, it could be only considered as settling the causes of animosity between the parties, as they existed at the date of the pacification.

The insular situation of England was absurdly alleged as a reason why she should not interfere in continental politics; as if the relations of states to each other were not the same, whether divided by an ocean or a line of mountains. The very circumstance had been founded upon eloquently and justly by one of her own

used by France in the sense of another poet, and made a reason for thrusting England out of the European world, and allowing her no vote in its most important concerns.²

To such humiliation it was impossible for Britain to submit. It

about the carnage of Lauriston, and shouting "Buonaparte for ever!" had misled the ruler of France into an opinion that peace was indispensably necessary to England: for, like other foreigners, misapprehending the nature of our popular government, he may easily enough have mistaken the cries of a London mob for the voice of the British people. The mistake also seemed to

tugal, he had acquired the province of Guiana, so far as it belonged to that power. By another with Spain, he had engrossed the Spanish part of Louisiana, and, what was still more ominous,

¹ "Thrice happy Britain, from the kingdoms rent,
To sit the Guardian of the Continent"

ADDISON.—S

² ——"penitus tota divisos orbe Britannos"

VIRGIL.—S.

the reversion of the duchy of Parma, and of the island of Elba,¹ important as an excellent naval station.

In the German Diet for settling the indemnities, to be granted to the various princes of the empire who had sustained loss of territory in consequence of late events, and particularly of the treaty of Luneville, the influence of France predominated in a manner which threatened entire destruction to that ancient confederation. It may be in general observed, that towns, districts, and provinces were dealt from hand to hand like cards at a gaming-table; and the powers of Europe once more, after the partition of Poland, saw with scandal the government of freemen transferred from hand to hand, without regard to their wishes, aptitudes, and habits, any more than those of cattle. This evil imitation of an evil precedent was fraught with mischief, as breaking every tie of affection betwixt the governor and governed, and loosening all attachments which bind subjects to their rulers, excepting those springing from force on the one side, and necessity on the other.

In this transfer of territories and jurisdictions, the King of Prussia obtained a valuable compensation for the Duchy of Cleves, and other provinces transferred to France, as lying on the left bank of the Rhine.² The neutrality of that monarch had been of the last service to France during her late bloody campaigns, and was now to be compensated. The smaller princes of the empire, especially those on the right bank of the Rhine, who had virtually placed themselves under the patronage of France, were also gratified with large allotments of territory; whilst Austria, whose pertinacious opposition was well remembered, was considered as yet retaining too high pretensions to power and independence, and her indemnities were as much limited as those of the friends of France were extended.

The various advantages and accessions of power and influence which we have hitherto alluded to, as attained by France, were chiefly gained by address in treating, and diplomatic skill. But shortly after the treaty of Amiens had been signed, Buonaparte manifested to the world, that where intrigue was unsuccessful, his sword was as ready as ever to support and extend his aggressions.

The attack of the Directory on the Swiss Cantons had been always considered as a coarse and gross violation of the law of nations, and was regarded as such by Buonaparte himself. But he failed not to maintain the military possession of Switzerland by the French troops; nor, however indignant under the downfall of her ancient fame and present liberties, was it possible for that country to offer any resistance, without the certainty of total destruction.

¹ See Annual Register, vol. xliv., p. 608.

² Jomini, tom. xv., p. 25; Annual Register, vol. xliv., p. 640.

The eleventh article of the treaty of Lunéville seemed to afford the Swiss a prospect of escaping from this thralldom, but it was in words only. That treaty was declared to extend to the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics. "The contracting parties guarantee the *independence* of the said republics," continues the treaty, "and the right of the people who inhabit them to adopt what form of government they please." We have seen how far the Cisalpine republic profited by this declaration of independence; the proceedings respecting Switzerland were much more glaring.

There was a political difference of opinion in the Swiss Cantons, concerning the form of government to be adopted by them; and the question was solemnly agitated in a diet held at Berne. The majority inclined for a constitution framed on the principle

obtaining the countenance of France, in order to the free enjoyment of the constitution which his countrymen had chosen, and betook himself to Paris to solicit Buonaparte's consent to it. This

Swiss had so long lived in freedom, happiness, and honour. Buonaparte congratulated them on the wisdom of their choice. It was, indeed, sure to meet his approbation, for it was completely subversive of all the old laws and forms, and so might receive any modification which his policy should dictate, and it was to be administered of course by men, who, having risen under his influence, must necessarily be pliant to his will. Having made his

positions enough to be found in a proclamation addressed by one independent nation to another. But what follows is still more

is true, I had resolved not to intermeddle with your affairs, having always found that your various governments have applied to me for advice which they never meant to follow, and have sometimes made a bad use of my name to favour their own private interests and passions. But I neither can, nor ought to remain insensible to the distress of which I see you the prey. I recall

exercise the most arbitrary power over a free and independent people, is equally remarkable at the close of the manifesto. The proclamation commands, that a deputation be sent to Paris, to consult with the chief consul; and concludes with an assertion of Buonaparte's "right to expect that no city, community, or

points.

As the presence of such an army within a few miles of the frontiers of the Swiss Confederation, was a constant menace to the peace of the country, the Diet of Schwitz also dissolved itself in consequence of the interference, as they stated,² of an armed force of foreigners, whom it was impossible, in the exhausted state of the country, to oppose.

Switzerland was thus, once more, occupied by French soldiers. The patriots, who had distinguished themselves in asserting her rights, were sought after and imprisoned. Aloys Reding was

mands of your master." He was imprisoned in the castle of Aarsbourg.³

envoy (Mr. Moore) to the diet of Schweitz, to inquire by what means she could give assistance to their claims of independence; but ere his arrival, the operations of Ney had rendered all farther resistance impossible. A remonstrance was also made by England to the French Government upon this unprovoked aggression on the liberties of an independent people¹ But it remained unanswered and unnoticed, unless in the pages of the *Moniteur*, where the pretensions of Britain to interfere with the affairs of the Continent, were held up to ridicule and contempt. After this period, Buonaparte adopted, and continued to bear, the title of Grand Mediator of the Helvetic Republic, in token, doubtless, of the right which he had assumed, and effectually exercised, of interfering in their affairs whenever it suited him to do so.²

¹ For Lord Hawkesbury's note-verbal to M. Otto, Oct. 10, 1802, together with the French reply, see the *Moniteur* and the *Minister's weekly and annual*

APPENDIX.

No. I.

BUONAPARTE'S LETTER TO GENERAL PAOLI.

[See p. 9.]

GENERAL,

I was born when our country was perishing. Thirty thousand Frenchmen, vomited on our coasts, drowning the throne of liberty in streams of blood—such was the odious spectacle which first presented itself to my sight.

The cries of the dying, the groans of the oppressed, the tears of despair, were the companions of my infancy.

You quitted our island, and with you disappeared the hope of happiness. Slavery was the reward of our submission; weighed down under the triple chain of the soldier, the legislator, and the collector of imposts, our countrymen live despised—despised by those who have the forces of the administration in their hands. Is not this the severest of suffering for those who have the slightest elevation of sentiment? Can the wretched Peruvian, groaning under the tortures of the rapacious Spaniard, experience a vexation more galling?

The traitors to our country—the wretches whom the thirst of sordid gain has corrupted—to justify themselves, have circulated calumnies against the national government, and against you in particular. Writers, adopting them as truths, transmit them to posterity.

While reading them, my blood has boiled with indignation; and at length I have resolved to disperse these delusions, the offspring of ignorance. An early study of the French language, long observation, and documents drawn from the portfolios of the patriots, have led me to promise myself some success.

I wish to compare your government of our country with the present one. I wish to brand with infamy the men who have betrayed the common cause. I wish to summon before the tribunal of public opinion the men now in power—to set forth their vexatious proceedings, expose their secret intrigues, and, if possible, interest the present minister¹ in the deplorable situation we are now in.

If my fortune had permitted me to live in the capital, I should doubtless have found out other means of making known the wrongs of my country: but, obliged to serve in the army, I find myself compelled to resort to this, the only means of publicity; for, as to private memorials, they would either not reach those for whom they were intended, or, stifled by the clamour of interested individuals, they would only occasion the ruin of the author.

Still young, my undertaking may be a rash one; but a love of truth, my native land, and fellow-countrymen—that enthusiasm, with which the prospect of an amelioration in our state always inspires me, will be my support. If you, general, condescend to approve of a labour, of which your deeds will form so large a portion—if you condescend to encourage the efforts of a young man, whom you have known from the hour of his birth, and whose parents were always attached to the good cause, I shall dare to augur favourably of my success.

I at one time indulged a hope, that I should have been able to go to London, to express to you in person the sentiments you have given birth to in my bosom, and to converse together on the misfortunes of our country; but the distance is an obstacle. The day, perhaps, will arrive, when I shall be able to overcome it.

With respect to the group of people I am going to talk to, you

Your very humble, and very obedient Servant,
 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE,
Officer in the Regiment of La Fère

AUXOYNE-EN-BOURGOYNE, }
12th June, 1789 }

No. II.

LETTER OF NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE TO M. MATTEO BUTTAFUOCO,
DEPUTY FROM CORSICA TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY.

[See p 10]

From Bonifacio to Cape Corso, from Ajaccio to Bastia, there is one chorus of

M. Paoli had dreamed of being a Solon, but had been unsuccessful in his imitation. He had placed every thing in the hands of the people or their representatives, so that it was impossible even to exist without pleasing them. A strange error which places under the control of a brutal and mercenary plebeian, the man who alone, by his education, his illustrious birth, and his fortune, is formed for governing. In the long run, so palpable a dereliction of reason cannot fail to bring on the ruin and dissolution of the body-politic, after having exposed it to every species of suffering.

You succeeded to your wish. M. Paoli, constantly surrounded by enthusiastic and hot-headed persons, never imagined that there could be any other passion than the devotion to liberty and independence. Finding that you had some knowledge of France, he did not trouble himself to do more than take your own word for your moral principles. He got you appointed to treat at Versailles respecting the accommodation which was negotiating under the mediation of the cabinet. M. de Choiseul saw you, and knew you; minds of a certain stamp are speedily appreciated. In a short time, in place of being the representative of a free people, you transformed yourself into the clerk of a minister; you communicated to him the instructions, the plans, the secrets of the Cabinet of Corsica.

This conduct, which is considered here as base and atrocious, appears to me quite natural; but this is because, in all sorts of affairs, we should understand one another, and reason with coolness.

The pride censures the coquette, and is laughed at by her in return;—this, in a few words, is your history. The man of principle judges you harshly, but you do not believe that there is a man of principle. The common people, who are always led away by virtuous demagogues, cannot be appreciated by you, who do not believe in virtue. You cannot be condemned but by your own principles, like a criminal by the laws; but those who know the refinement of your principles, find nothing in your conduct but what is very simple. This brings us back, then, to what we have already said, that, in all sorts of affairs, the first thing requisite is to understand one another, and then argue coolly. You are also protected by a sort of sub-defence, not less effectual, for you do not aspire to the reputation of a Cato or a Catinat. It is sufficient for you to resemble a certain class; and, among this certain class, it is agreed that he who may get money, and does not profit by the opportunity, is a ninny; for money procures all the pleasures of sense, and the pleasures of sense are the only pleasures. Now, M. de Choiseul, who was very liberal, made it impossible for you to resist him—particularly as your ridiculous country paid you for your services, according to her laughable custom, by the honour of serving her.

The treaty of Compiègne being concluded, M. de Chauvelin and twenty-four battalions landed on our shores. M. de Choiseul, to whom the celerity of the expedition was most important, had uneasiness on the subject, which, in his confidential communications, he could not disguise from you. You suggested that he should send you there with a few millions. As Philip took cities with his Mule, you promised to make every thing yield to him without opposition. No sooner said than done—and there you are, recrossing the sea, throwing off the mask, and, with money and your commission in your hand, opening negotiations with those whom you thought would be most easily gained over.

Never imagining that a Corsican could prefer himself to his country, the Cabinet of Corsica had intrusted you with her interests. Never dreaming, for your part, that any man would not prefer money and himself to his country, you sold yourself and hoped to buy every body. Profound moralist as you were, you knew how much the enthusiasm of each individual was worth; some pounds of gold, more or less, formed, in your eyes, all the shades which diversify character.

You are mistaken, however:—the weak-minded were certainly shaken, but they were terrified by the horrible idea of mangling the bosom of their country. They thought they saw their fathers, their brothers, their friends, who perished in defending her, raise their heads from the tomb to load them with curses. These ridiculous prejudices were strong enough to stop you in your career; you lamented having to do with a people so childish in its notions. But, sir, this refinement of sentiment is not bestowed on the multitude; and, therefore, they live in poverty and wretchedness; while a man who has got proper notions, if circumstances favour him ever so little, knows the way to rise very speedily. This is pretty exactly the moral of your story.

When you made your report of the obstacles which prevented you from realizing your promises, you proposed that the Royal Corsican regiment should be bought. You hoped that its example would enlighten our too simple and ho-

nest peasants, and accustom them to those to which they felt so much more

¹ Clement Paoli, elder brother of the general, a good soldier an excellent

possible to corrupt, were of such a stamp, that the empire of the French could only be established on their total destruction. Alas! this plan was but too punctually executed. Some perished, victims of crimes unjustly imputed to them; others, betrayed by their own hospitality, and by their own confidence, expiated on the scaffold the sighs and tears into which they had been surprised by dissimulation. A great number, crowded by Narbonne-Fridzelar into the town of Toulon, poisoned by unwholesome food, tortured by their chains, and sinking under the most barbarous treatment, lived a short time in their misery, merely to see death slowly approaching. O God, witness of their innocence, why didst thou not become their avenger?

In the midst of this general calamity, in the midst of the groans and lamentations of this unfortunate people, you, however, began to enjoy the fruit of your labours—honours, dignities, pensions, all were showered upon you. Your prosperity would have advanced still more rapidly, had not Du Barri overthrown M. de Choiseul, and deprived you of a protector, who duly appreciated your services. This blow did not discourage you: you turned your attention to the *bureaux*; you merely felt the necessity of greater assiduity. This flattered the persons in office, your services were so notorious. All your wishes were granted. Not content with the lake of Biguglia, you demanded a part of the lands of many communities. Why, it is said, did you wish to deprive them of these lands? I ask, in my turn, what regard ought you to have for a nation by whom you knew yourself to be detested?

Your favourite project was, to divide the island among ten Barons. How! not satisfied with having assisted in forging the chains with which your country was bound, you wished still further to subject her to the absurd feudal government! But I commend you for having done as much harm to the Corsicans as you possibly could. You were at war with them; and, in war, to do evil for one's own advantage, is a first principle.

But let us pass over all these paltry matters—let us come to the present moment, and conclude a letter, which, from its frightful length, cannot fail to fatigue you.

The state of affairs in France prognosticated extraordinary events. You became alarmed for the effect of them in Corsica. The same madness with which we were possessed before the war, began, to your great scandal, to infect that amiable people. You comprehended the consequences: for, if noble sentiments were to gain an ascendancy in public opinion, you would become no better than a traitor, instead of being a man of prudence and good sense. What was still worse, if ever noble sentiments were again to stir the blood of our ardent countrymen, and if ever a national government were to be the result of such sentiments, what would become of you? Your own conscience then began to terrify you. Restless, however, and unhappy as you were, you did not yield to your conscience. You resolved to risk every thing for every thing—but you played your game skillfully. You married, to strengthen your interest. A respectable man, who, relying on your word, had given his sister to your nephew, found himself abused. Your nephew, whose patrimony you had swallowed up in order to increase an inheritance which was to have been his own, was reduced to poverty, with a numerous family.

Having arranged your domestic affairs, you cast your eyes over the country. You saw it smoking with the blood of its martyrs, heaped with numerous victims, and, at every step, inspiring only ideas of vengeance. But you saw the ruffian soldier, the insolent pettifogger, the greedy tax-gatherer, lord it without contradiction; and the Corsican, groaning under the weight of triple chains, neither daring to think of what he was, nor to reflect on what he still might be. You said to yourself, in the joy of your heart, "Things go on well, and the only thing is to keep them so." And straightway you leagued yourself with the soldier, the pettifogger, and the tax-gatherer. The only point now to be attended to was, to procure deputies who should be animated by congenial sentiments; for, as to yourself, you could never suppose that a nation which was your enemy would choose you for her representative. But you necessarily changed your opinion, when the letters of convocation, by an absurdity which was perhaps the result of design, determined that the deputy from the nobility should be appointed by an assembly composed of only twenty-two persons. All that was necessary was to obtain twelve votes. Your associates in the higher council laboured with activity. Threats, promises, caresses, money, all were put in action. You succeeded. Your friends were not so successful among the Commons. The first president failed; and two men of exalted ideas—the one the son, the brother, the nephew, of the most zealous defenders of the common cause—the other a person who had seen Sionville and Narbonne, and whose

league.

Corsica is united to France, Paoli recalled; and in an instant the prospect changes, and opens to your view a course of events which you could not have dared to hope for.

I beg your pardon, sir; I took up my pen to defend you; but my heart revolts against so uniform a system of treason and atrocity. What! did you, a son of the same country, never feel any thing for her? What! did your heart experience no emotion at the sight of the rocks, the trees, the houses, the spots which were the scenes of your infant amusements? When you came into the world, your country nourished you with her fruits; when you came to the years of reason, she placed her hopes in you; she honoured you with her confidence; she said to you, "My son, you see the wretched state to which I am reduced by the injustice of men;—through my native vigour, I am recovering a degree of strength which promises me a speedy and infallible recovery; but I am again threatened! Fly, my son, hasten to Versailles; inform the great king of every thing, dissipate his suspicions, request his friendship."

Well! a little gold made you betray her confidence; and forthwith, for a little gold, you were seen, like a parricide, tearing open her bosom. Ah, sir, I am far from wishing you ill; but there is an avenging conscience! Your countrymen, to whom you are an object of horror, will enlighten France as to your character. The wealth, the pensions, the fruits of your treasons, will be taken from you. In the decrepitude of old age and poverty, in the frightful solitude of wickedness, you will live long enough to become a prey to the torments of conscience. The father will point you out to his son, the master to his pupil, saying, "Young people, learn to respect your country, virtue, fidelity, and humanity."

And you, respectable and unhappy woman, whose youth, beauty, and innocence were vilely prostituted, does your pure and chaste heart beat under a hand so criminal? In those moments in which nature gives the alarm to love, when, withdrawn from the chimeras of life, unmingled pleasures succeed each other with rapidity, when the mind, expanded by the fire of sentiment, enjoys only the pleasure of causing enjoyment, and feels only the pleasure of exciting feeling,—in those moments you press to your heart, you become identified with that cold and selfish man, who has never deviated from his character, and who, in the course of sixty years, has never known any thing but the care of his own interest, an instinctive love of destruction, the most infamous avarice, the base pleasures of sense! By and by, the glare of honours, the trappings of riches, will disappear; you will be loaded with general contempt. Will you seek, in the bosom of him who is the author of your woes, a consolation indispensable to your gentle and affectionate mind? Will you endeavour to find in his eyes tears to mingle with yours? Will your failing hand, placed on his bosom, seek to find an agitation like that in your own? Alas, if you surprise him in tears, they will be those of remorse; if his bosom heave, it will be with the convulsions of the wretch who dies abhorring nature, himself, and the hand that guides him.

O Lameth! O Robespierre! O Pétion! O Volney! O Mirabeau! O Barrabave! O Bailly! O La Fayette! this is the man who dares to seat himself by your side! Dropping with the blood of his brethren, stained by every sort of vice, he presents himself with confidence in the dress of a general, the reward of his crimes! He dares to call himself the representative of the nation—he who sold her—and you suffer it! He dares to raise his eyes, and listen to your discourse, and you suffer it! Is it the voice of the people that sent him? He never had more than the voice of twelve nobles. Ajaccio, Bastia, and most of the districts, have done that to his effigy which they would have been very glad to do to his person.

But you, who are induced, by the error of the moment, or perhaps temporary abuses, to oppose any fresh changes, will you tolerate a traitor? a man who, under the cool exterior of a man of sense, conceals the avidity of a laquety? I cannot imagine it. You will be the first to drive him away with ignominy, as soon as you are aware of the string of atrocities of which he has been the author.

I have the honour, &c.

BONAPARTE.

*From my closet at Milleli,
23d January, 1790.*

No. III.

THE SUPPER OF BEAUCAIRE.

July 29, 1793

[See p. 14]

following terms —

Nemois—Is Cartaux's army strong? It is said to have lost a great many men in the attack, but if it be true that it has been repulsed, why have the Marseillais evacuated Avignon?

Marseillaise — This is a very different story from what we have been told. I

eyes to the want of skill among your leaders, and put no faith in their calculations. Of all counsellors, self-love is the most dangerous. You are naturally impetuous: they are leading you to your destruction, by the self-same means which have ruined so many nations—by inflaming your vanity. You possess considerable wealth, and a large population—these they exaggerate. You have rendered signal services to the cause of liberty—of these they remind you, without, at the same time, pointing out to you, that the genius of the republic was not that time with you, that it has now abandoned you.

Your army, you say, is at Aix with a large train of artillery, and skilful generals; well, do what it may, I tell you it will be beaten. You had three thousand six hundred men—a full half is dispersed. Marseilles, and a few refugees from the department, may offer you four thousand: that is the utmost. You will then have between five and six thousand troops, without unity, without order, without discipline.

You have, you say, good generals. I do not know them, and shall not, therefore, dispute their abilities; but they will be absorbed in details, they will not be seconded by the subalterns, they will be unable to do any thing to maintain the reputation they may possess; for it would require at least two months to get their army into tolerable discipline; and in four days Cartaux will have passed the Durance—and with what soldiers? Why, with the excellent light troop of the Allobroges, the old regiment of Burgundy, and the brave battalion of the Cote d'Or (which has been a hundred times victorious in battle,) and six or seven other corps, all disciplined soldiers, encouraged by their successes on the frontiers, and *against your army!* You have some twenty-four pounders, and eighteen pounders, and you fancy yourselves impregnable. In this you but follow the vulgar opinion; but military men will tell you, and fatal experience is about to convince you, that good four-pounders and eight-pounders are preferable on many accounts to pieces of heavy calibre! You have cannoniers of the new levy—your adversaries have gunners from regiments of the line, the best masters of their art in all Europe!

What will your army do if it concentrates itself at Aix? It is lost. It is an axiom in the military art, that the army which remains in its intrenchments is beaten: experience and theory agree upon this point; and the walls of Aix are not equal to the worst field-intrenchment, especially if you bear in mind their extent, and the houses which skirt them on the exterior within pistol-shot. He you well assured then that this course, which to you appears the best, is the very worst. Besides, what means will you possess of supplying the town, in so short a time, with every kind of provisions? Will your army offer battle? Why, it is the weaker in numbers—it has no cavalry—its artillery is less adapted for the field—it would be broken, and from that moment defeated without resource, for the cavalry would prevent it from rallying.

Expect, then, to see the war carried into the Marseilles territory. There a tolerably powerful party is for the Republic; this will be the moiment for the struggle; the junction will be made; and your city, the centre of the commerce of the Levant, the *entrepôt* of the south of Europe, is lost! Recollect the recent example of Lille,¹ and the barbarous laws of war.

What infatuation has all at once possessed your townsmen? What fatal blindness is leading them to their ruin? How can they fancy themselves powerful enough to oppose the whole Republic? Even should they compel this army to fall back upon Avignon, can they doubt that, in a few days, fresh troops would come to supply the place of the former? The Republic, which gives the law to Europe, will she receive it from Marseilles?

United with Bourdeaux, Lyons, Montpellier, Nîmes, Grenoble, the Jura, the Eure, the Calvados, you undertook a revolution. You had a probability of success; those who spurred you on might be ill-intentioned men; but you were an imposing mass of strength. On the contrary, now that Lyons, Nîmes, Montpellier, Bourdeaux, the Jura, the Eure, Grenoble, Caen, have accepted the constitution;—now that Avignon, Tarascon, Arles, have submitted, acknowledge that in obstinacy there is folly. The fact is, that you are under the influence of individuals who, *lacking no property of their own to look after*, are involving you in their ruin.

Your army will be composed of the best-conditioned, the richest portion of your city; for the Sans-Culottes could but be too easily turned against you. You are about, then, to risk the life of your youthful population, young men accustomed to hold the commercial balance of the Mediterranean, and enrich

¹ A small town in the department of Vaucluse, four leagues east of Avignon, having resisted Cartaux's army, was carried by assault, 20th July, 1793.—8.

you by their economy and their speculations, against veteran soldiers a hun-

Marseillais — You better not say that

Militaire — Ah! how I shall get busy at the end of the month

Marseillais — You are a good fellow

Marseillais — We shall attack Cartaux in our mountains, where his cavalry will be of no service to him

Militaire — As if an army engaged in protecting a town could choose the

Marseillais — You fancy us then to be a weak nation

Militaire — Such is civil war! men revile one another—defest one another—

" You have reminded me of one fact, the assault of Lisle. I do not justify it, but will explain to you how it happened. The inhabitants killed the trumpeter who was sent to them; they resisted without the slightest chance of success; the town was taken by assault; the soldiers entered it amidst fire and slaughter: it was impossible to restrain them, and fury did the rest.

Those soldiers whom you call brigands, are our best troops, and most disciplined battalions: their reputation is above calumny.

Dubois-Crancé and Albitte, constant friends of the people, have never deviated from the right line. Certainly they are "wicked men" in the eyes of the bad: but Condorcet, Brissot, Barbaroux, were also "wicked men," so long as they remained uncontaminated. It will ever be the fate of the good to be ill-spoken of by the worthless. You imagine they show you no mercy; on the contrary, they are treating you like wayward children. Do you think, if they had been otherwise disposed, that the merchants of Marseilles would have been suffered to withdraw the goods which they had at Beaucaire? They could have sequestered them till the war was over. They were unwilling to do so; and, thanks to them, you can now return quietly to your homes.

You call Cartaux an assassin. Well! let me tell you, that that general takes the greatest pains to preserve order and discipline; witness his conduct at St. Esprit and at Avignon. He ordered a sergeant to prison because he had violated the asylum of a citizen who concealed one of your soldiers. In the eyes of the general, this sergeant was culpable for having entered, without direct orders, a private dwelling. Some people of Avignon were punished for pointing out a house as belonging to an aristocrat. A prosecution is now going on against a soldier, on a charge of theft. On the contrary, your army killed, assassinated more than thirty persons, violated the asylums of families, and filled the prisons with citizens, on the vague pretence that they were brigands.

Do not be in alarm about the army. It esteems Marseilles, because it knows that no town has made so many sacrifices for the public good. You have eighteen thousand men on the frontier; and you have not spared yourselves under any circumstances. Shake off, then, the yoke of the few aristocrats who govern you; return to sounder principles, and you will have no truer friend than the army.

Marseillaise.—Ah! your army! It has greatly degenerated from the army of 1789. That army would not take up arms against the nation. Yours should imitate so worthy an example, and not turn their arms against their fellow-citizens.

Militaire.—With such principles, La Vendée would now have planted the white flag on the again reared walls of the Bastille, and the Camp of Jalès been dominant at Marseilles.

Marseillaise.—La Vendée is anxious for a king—a counter-revolution: the war of La Vendée, of the camp of Jalès, is that of fanaticism, of despotism. Ours, on the contrary, is that of true Republicans, friends of the laws, of order; enemies of anarchy and of bad men. Is not ours the tri-coloured flag? and what interest could we have in wishing for slavery?

Militaire.—I well know that the people of Marseilles differ widely from those of La Vendée as to the subject of counter-revolution. The people of La Vendée are robust and healthy: the people of Marseilles weak and sickly. They stand in need of honey, to induce them to swallow the pill: to establish among them the new doctrine, they must be deceived. But after four years of revolution, after so many plots, and counterplots, and conspiracies, all the perversity of human nature has been developed under all its different aspects, and bad men have perfected their subtlety. You have, you say, the tri-coloured flag? Paoli also hoisted it in Corsica to have time to deceive the people, to crush the true friends of liberty, to entice his countrymen to join him in his ambitious and criminal projects; he hoisted the tri-coloured flag, and he nevertheless fired upon the vessels of the Republic, and drove our troops from the fortresses; he disarmed all the detachments he could surprise; he collected forces to drive the garrison from the island; he plundered the magazines, selling at a low price every thing found within them, to secure money to carry on his revolt; he confiscated the property of the wealthiest families, because they were attached to the unity of the Republic; he got himself appointed generalissimo, and he declared all those who should continue in our armies enemies of their country. Before this, he had caused the failure of the expedition to Sardinia:

and yet he had the shamelessness to call himself the friend of France and a

Marseillaise—Ah! sir, who is to bring the good about? Can it be by

Militaire—At last you are brought to reason. Very well, very well.

we are and ourselves.

No. IV.

LETTERS OF NAPOLEON TO JOSEPHINE.

[See p. 166.]

[In the Best Edition of the Works of Napoleon.]

(1.)

NAPOLEON TO JOSEPHINE.

(Translation.)

Fort Braux, the 14th Germinal,
(April 4,) 1796.

"I have received all thy letters but not one of them has affected me as much as thy last."

the world is a desert, where I remain an isolated being, without enjoying the sweets of confidence. Thou hast deprived me of more than my soul; thou art the only thought of my life. If I am tired of the troubles of business—if I dread the result—if mankind disgust me—if I am ready to curse this life—I place my hand upon my heart—there thy portrait beats—I look at it, and love becomes to me absolute happiness; all is smiling, save the time when I am separated from my beloved.

"By what is it that thou hast been able to captivate all my faculties, and to concentrate in thyself my moral existence? It is a magic, my sweet love, which will finish only with my life. To live for Josephine—there is the history of my life. I am trying to reach thee—I am dying to be near thee. Fool that I am, I do not perceive that I increase the distance between us. What lands, what countries separate us! What a time before you read these weak expressions of a troubled soul in which you reign! Ah! my adorable wife! I know not what fate awaits me, but if it keep me much longer from thee, it will be insupportable—my courage will not go so far. There was a time when I was proud of my courage; and sometimes, when contemplating on the ills that man could do me, on the fate which destiny could reserve for me, I fixed my eyes steadfastly on the most unheard-of misfortunes without a frown, without alarm. But now, the idea that my Josephine may be unwell, the idea that she may be ill, and, above all, the cruel, the fatal thought, that she may love me less, withers my soul, stops my blood, renders me sad, cast down, and leaves me not even the courage of fury and despair. Formerly I used often to say to myself, men cannot hurt him who can die without regret; but now, to die without being loved by thee, to die without that certainty, is the torment of hell; it is the lively and striking image of absolute annihilation—I feel as if I were stifled. My incomparable companion, thou whom fate has destined to make along with me the painful journey of life, the day on which I shall cease to possess thy heart will be the day on which parched nature will be to me without warmth or vegetation.

"I stop, my sweet love, my soul is sad—my body is fatigued—my head is giddy—men disgust me—I ought to hate them—they separate me from my beloved.

"I am at Port Maurice, near Oneille; to-morrow I shall be at Albenga; the two armies are in motion—We are endeavouring to deceive each other—Victory to the most skilful! I am pretty well satisfied with Beaulieu—If he alarm me much, he is a better man than his predecessor. I shall beat him I hope in good style. Do not be uneasy—love me as your eyes—but that is not enough—as yourself, more than yourself, than your thought, your mind, your sight, your all. Sweet love, forgive me—I am sinking. Nature is weak for him who feels strongly, for him whom you love!"

(2.)

"Albenga, 16th Germinal, (April 6.)"

"[It is one hour after midnight. They have just brought me a letter. It is sad—my soul is affected by it: It is the death of Chauvet. He was commissary-in-chief of the army. You have seen him sometimes with Barras. My love, I feel the want of consolation that is to be obtained by writing to thee—to thee alone!—Chauvet is dead! He was attached to me. He has rendered essential services to his country. His last words were, that he was setting off to join me. Soul of my existence! write to me by every courier, otherwise I cannot live. I am here very much occupied; Beaulieu moves his army. We are in sight. I am a little fatigued; I am every day on horseback. Adieu, adieu, adieu. I am going to sleep. Sleep consoles me—it places me at thy side. But alas! on waking, I find myself three hundred leagues from thee!"]

(3.)

"Albenga, 18 Germinal, (April 8.)"

"My brother [Joseph] is here. He has heard of my marriage with pleasure. He is most anxious to know thee. I am trying to decide him to go to Paris. His wife has been brought to bed of a girl. He sends you a present of a box of Genoese sugar-plums. You will receive some oranges, perfumes, and orange-flower water, which I send you. Junot and Murat present you their respects."]

(4.)

*"Headquarters, Carru, April 24**"To my Sweet Mary*

I have just received your letter of the 21st inst. and
 am glad to hear from you. I am well and hope
 these few lines will find you the same. I am
 thinking of you very much and hope to hear from
 you soon. I am sure you are all well and happy.
 I am your affectionate father,
 J. M.

(5.)

*Fortone midi le 27 prarial.**A Josephine*

I have just received your letter of the 21st inst. and
 am glad to hear from you. I am well and hope
 these few lines will find you the same. I am
 thinking of you very much and hope to hear from
 you soon. I am sure you are all well and happy.
 I am your affectionate father,
 J. M.

quelquefois je me dis je m'alarme sans raison déjà elle est guérie elle part elle est partie, elle est peut-être déjà à lion—vaine imagination—tu es dans ton lit souffrante, plus belle, plus intéressante plus adorable tu es pâle et tes yeux sont plus languissans mais quand sera tu guérie? si un de nous deux devoit être malade ne doit il pas être moi, plus robuste et plus courageux j'eusse supporté la maladie plus facilement la destinée est cruelle elle me frappe dans toi.

ce qui me console quelque fois c'est de penser qu'il dépend du sort de te rendre malade mais qu'il ne dépend de personne de m'obliger à te survivre.

dans ta lettre ma bonne nurse ale soin de me dire que tu es convaincue que je t'aime au delà de ce qu'il est possible d'imaginer, que tu es persuadée que tous mes instans te sont consacrés que jamais il ne se passe une heure sans penser à toi, que jamais il ne m'est venu dans l'idée de penser à une autre femme qu'elles sont toutes à mes yeux sans grâce sans beauté et sans esprit que toi toi toute entière telle que je te vois telle que tu es pouvoit me plaire et absorber toutes les facultés de mon âme que tu en n'as touché toute l'étendue que mon cœur n'a point de replis que tu ne voyes point de pensées qui ne te sont subordonnées, que mes forces mes bras mon esprit sont tout à toi, que mon âme est dans ton corps, et que le jour ou tu n'aurais change ou ou tu cesserois de vivre seroit celui de ma mort, que la nature, la terre n'est belle à mes yeux que parceque tu l'habites—si tu ne crois pas tout cela si ton âme n'en est pas convaincue pénétrée, tu m'insignes, tu ne m'aimes pas—il est un fluide magnétique entre les personnes qui s'aiment—tu sais bien que jamais je ne pourrois te voir un instant encore moins t'en offrir un, lui déchirerois le cœur et le voir seroit pour moi la même chose et puis si je t'ai portée la main sur ta personne sacrée—non je ne l'oserais jamais mais je sorterois d'une vie ou ce qui existe de plus vertueux m'auroit trompé.

Mais je suis sûr et fier de ton amour—les malheurs sont des épreuves qui nous décèlent mutuellement toute la force de notre passion un enfant adorable comme la maman n'en voit le jour et pourroit passer plusieurs ans dans tes bras—malheureux! je me contenterois d'une journée—Mille baises sur tes yeux, sur tes lèvres sur ta langue sur ton cœur—adorable femme quelle est ton ascendant! je suis bien malade de ta maladie, j'ai encore une fièvre brûlante! ne garde pas plus de 6 heures le Simplex et qu'il retourne de suite me porter la lettre chérie de ma Souveraine.

te souviens tu de ce rêve ou j'étois tes souliers tes chignons et je te faisais entrer toute entière dans mon cœur—pourquoi la nature n'a-t-elle pas arrangé cela comme cela—il y a bien des choses à faire.

N. B.

A la Citoyenne

Bonaparte,

Rue Chautreine, No. 6

Paris.

(6.)

de Pistoia en toscane le 8 messidor.

A Josephine,

Depuis un mois je n'ai reçu de mon bonne amie que 2 billets de trois lignes chacun—a-t-elle des affaires? celle d'écrire à son bon ami n'est donc pas un besoin pour elle des lors celle d'y penser—vivre sans penser à Josephine ce seroit pour ton mari être mort et ne pas exister—ton image embellit ma pensée et égaye le tableau sinistre et noir de la mélancolie et de la douleur—un jour peut-être viendra ou je te verrai, car je ne doute pas que tu ne sois encore à Paris et bien ce jour là je te montrerai mes poches pleines de lettres que je ne t'ai pas envoyées par qu'elles étoient trop bêtes, bien c'est le mot. bon dieu dis moi toi qui sais si bien faire aimer les autres sans aimer saurez tu me guérir de l'amour??? je paierai ce remède bien chère tu devois partir le 5 prairial—bon que j'étois je tendois le 13 comme si une jolie femme pouvoit abandonner ses habitudes, ses amis, et M^e. Tallien et un dîné chez bars, et une représentation d'une pièce nouvelle et fontane* oui fontano* tu aime tout plus que ton mari tu n'as pour lui qu'un peu d'estime et une portion de cette bienveillance dont ton cœur abonde tous les jours j'ai récapitulé tes torts, tes fautes je me bat le flanc pour ne te plus aimer bah n'est-ce pas que je t'aime davantage enfin mon incomparable petite mère je vais te dire mon secret. Moeque toi de moi reste à Paris, aie des amans, que tout le monde le sache, n'en crains jamais ch! bien je t'en aimerai 10 fois davantage—et ce n'est pas folie fièvre délire! et je ne guérirai pas de cela—oh si par dieu j'en guérirai—mais ne vas pas me dire que tu es malade—n'entends pas de te justifier bon dieu tu es pardonné

je t'aime à la folie et jamais mon pauvre cœur ne cessera de donner tout* à*
l'amour* si tu ne m'aimes pas mon sort seroit bien byzant tu ne m'a pas écrit

ton sein

A la Citoyenne

Bonaparte,

Rue chautrenne N^o 6

Paris

No. V.

DESCENT OF THE FRENCH IN SOUTH WALES, UNDER GENERAL TATE.

[See p 199]

We have found some arms & cart bullock & horses & descent in the

Nov 1st and 2d, 1796, (Brest)

Colonel Shee tells me that General Quantin has been dispatched from Flushing with 2000 of the greatest reprobates in the French army, to land in England, and do as much mischief as possible, and that we have 3000 of the same stamp, whom we are also to discharge on the English coast.

from a conversation I had a few days since with Colonel Shee, wherein I told him that, if we were once settled in Ireland, I thought we might make a piratical visit in that quarter; and, in fact, I wish it was we that should have the credit and profit of it. I should like, for example, to pay a visit to Liverpool myself, with some of the gentlemen from Ormond Quay, though I must say the citizens of the Legion Noire are very little behind my countrymen either in appearance or morality, which last has been prodigiously cultivated by three or four campaigns in Bretagne and La Vendée. A thousand of these desperadoes, in their black jackets, will edify John Bull exceedingly, if they get safe into Lancashire.

Nov. 26th.

To-day, by the general's orders, I have made a fair copy of Colonel Tate's instructions, with some alterations from the rough draught of yesterday, particularly with regard to his first destination, which is now fixed to be Bristol. If he arrives safe, it will be very possible to carry it by a *coup-de-main*, in which case he is to burn it to the ground. I cannot but observe here that I transcribed, with the greatest *sang froid*, the orders to reduce to ashes the third city of the British dominions, in which there is, perhaps, property to the amount of £5,000,000.

No. VI.

HUONAPARTE'S CAMP LIBRARY.

[See p. 203.]

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Le Coran

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Montesquieu—L'Esprit des Loix

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No. VII.

BUONAPARTE, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, TO THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT.

[See p. 212.]

Alexander to the Egyptians
 "I am the first of my name to appear before you, and to declare to you that I am the friend of the Egyptians, and that I am the enemy of the Turks."
 "I am the first of my name to appear before you, and to declare to you that I am the friend of the Egyptians, and that I am the enemy of the Turks."
 "I am the first of my name to appear before you, and to declare to you that I am the friend of the Egyptians, and that I am the enemy of the Turks."

All the Egyptians shall be appointed to all the public situations. The most wise, the most intelligent, and the most virtuous, shall govern; and the people shall be happy.

There were formerly among you great cities, great canals, and a great commerce. What has destroyed them all? What! but the avarice, the injustice, and the tyranny of the Mamelones.

Cadis, Cheiks, Imans, Tehorbadgis! tell the people that we are the friends of the true Mussulmans. Is it not we, who have destroyed the Pope; who said that it was necessary to make war on Mussulmans? Is it not we, who have destroyed the Knights of Malta, because these madmen believed that it was the good pleasure of God, that they should make war on Mussulmans? Is it not we, who have been in all ages the friends of the Grand Signior, (on whose desires be the blessings of God!) and the enemy of his enemies? And, on the contrary, have not the Mamelones always revolted against the authority of the Grand Signior, which they refuse to recognize at this moment?

Thrice happy those who shall be with us! they shall prosper in their fortune and their rank. Happy those who shall be neutral! they shall have time to know us thoroughly, and they will range themselves on our side.

But woe, woe, woe, to those who shall take up arms in favour of the Mamelones, and combat against us! There shall be no hope for them: they shall all perish.

	(Signed)	BUONAPARTE.
A true copy.	(Signed)	BERTHIER.

No. VIII.

HISTORICAL NOTES ON THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE.¹

[See p. 266.]

The following facts, which have never been made public, but with which we have been favoured from an authentic channel, throw particular light on the troubled period during which Napoleon assumed the supreme power—the risks which he ran of being anticipated in his aim, or of altogether missing it.

In the end of July, 1799, when all those discontents were fermenting, which afterwards led to the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire.

General Augereau, with one of the most celebrated veterans of the Republican army, attended by a deputation of six persons, amongst whom were Salicetti and other members of Convention, came on a mission to General Bernadotte, their minister at war, at an early hour in the morning.

Their object was to call the minister's attention to a general report, which announced that there was to be a speedy alteration of the constitution and existing order of things. They accused Barras, Siéyes, and Fouché, as being the authors of these intrigues. It was generally believed, they said, that one of the directors (Barras) was for restoring the Bourbons; another (Siéyes is probably meant) was for electing the Duke of Brunswick. The deputation made Bernadotte acquainted with their purpose of fulminating a decree of arrest against the two official persons. Having first inquired what proofs they could produce in support of their allegations, and being informed that they had no positive proof to offer, the minister informed them that he would not participate in the proposed act of illegal violence. "I require your word of honour," he said, "that you will desist from this project. It is the only mode to ensure my silence on the subject." One of the deputation, whom the minister had reason to regard as a man of the most exemplary loyalty, and with whom he had had connexions in military service, replied to him, "Our intention was to have placed you in possession of great power, being well persuaded that you would not abuse it. Since you do not see the matter as we do, the affair is at an end. We give up our scheme. Let the affair be buried in complete oblivion." In

¹ "Les notes historiques, qui sont insérées comme appendice à la fin du dernier volume de la Vie de Napoleon, sont attribuées au General Bernadotte, actuellement Roi de Suède, mais qu'il faut plutôt regarder comme l'ouvrage d'un ami indiscret. C'est pourtant dans ces notes que, sans les citer jamais, Bourrienne a évidemment puisé à pleines mains."—*Observations sur le 18 Brumaire de M. de Bourrienne, par M. BOULAY DE LA MEURTHE, Ancien Ministre d'Etat.*

¹ When Bernadotte came into the ministry, it became a question whether Buonaparte should not be sent for from Egypt—"It is the army you mean," said the minister,— "for as to the general, you know he has an eye to the dictatorship, and sending vessels to bring him to France, would just be giving it to him."

A French fleet was at that time cruising in the Mediterranean,—the minister insisted that it should be ordered to Toulon.

tors of that meeting. It has been believed by observers, and is believed still, that the state of excitement which you complain of, has originated in the instructions received by Salicetti."

Here Buonaparte lost temper, and declared that he would rather live in the woods, than continue to exist in the midst of a society which gave him no security.

"What security do you want?" answered General Bernadotte. Madame Buonaparte, fearing that the conversation would become too warm, changed the subject, addressing herself to M. R—, who was known to her. General Bernadotte did not persist in his questions, and, after some general conversation, he withdrew.

A few days afterwards, Joseph had a large party at Morfontaine. Buonaparte, meeting General Bernadotte coming out of the *Théâtre Français*, inquired if he was to be of the party on the following day. Being answered in the affirmative—"Will you," said he, "give me my coffee to-morrow morning? I have occasion to pass near your house, and shall be very glad to stop with you for a few moments." Next morning, Buonaparte and his wife arrived; Louis followed them a moment afterwards. Buonaparte made himself very agreeable.¹ In the evening there was some conversation between Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Joseph, and Lucien. Buonaparte conversed with Bernadotte, who saw, from his embarrassed air, and frequent fits of absence, that his mind was deeply occupied. He had no longer any doubt that it was Buonaparte's determined purpose to save himself, by the overthrow of the constitution, from the danger with which he was threatened in consequence of his leaving Egypt, abandoning his army, and violating the quarantine laws. He resolved to oppose it by every means in his power. On his return to Paris, he happened, accidentally, to be in a house belonging to a fellow-countryman and friend of Moreau's. That general having inquired if he had been at the party at Morfontaine, and if he had spoken with Buonaparte, and Bernadotte having told him he had, Moreau said, "That is the man who has done the greatest harm to the Republic."—"And," added Bernadotte, "who is preparing the greatest."—"We shall prevent him," replied Moreau. The two generals shook hands, and promised to stand by each other in resisting the deserter from Egypt. So they called him in presence of a number of persons, among whom was the ex-minister, Petiet.

The Directory, it is true, did not enjoy the public esteem. Siéyes stood first in reputation among the five members, but he was looked upon as being timid and vindictive. He was believed to be disposed to call the Duke of Brunswick to the throne of France. Barras was suspected by some persons of being in treaty with the Comte de Lille. Gohier, Moulines, and Roger Ducos, were very respectable men, but considered to be unfit for the government of a great nation. Gohier, however, was known to be one of the first lawyers of that period, to be of incorruptible integrity, and an ardent lover of his country.

When Siéyes obtained a place in the Directory, he had desired to have General Bernadotte for war-minister. Some confidential relations between them, and a certain degree of deference which Bernadotte paid to Siéyes, in consequence of his great celebrity, had flattered his self-love. Buonaparte's two brothers, Joseph and Lucien, thinking they should find in Bernadotte a ready instrument for the execution of the plans of their brother, whom they believed to be on the point of landing in France, agreed with Siéyes in bringing Bernadotte into the ministry. Gohier, Moulines, and Roger Ducos joined the Buonapartes and Siéyes; Barras alone inclined towards Duhois-Crancé; but he yielded with a good grace to the opinion of his colleagues.

The proposal was made to Bernadotte at a dinner at Joseph's, in the *rue du Rocher*. Joubert, one of the party, who had recently formed an intimacy with the candidate for the place of minister, was chosen by the Buonapartes to propose it to him. The proposal was refused, and the remonstrances of Joubert had no effect on the resolution of Bernadotte, which at that time appeared immovable. The Buonapartes, who were the prime movers of all the changes which took place, and enjoyed the distribution of all the great posts, were astonished when they heard General Joubert's report. They got several members of the council to endeavour to induce Bernadotte to accept. Their attempts

¹ It was by no means from friendship that Buonaparte went to Bernadotte's on this occasion; but really to render the Directory and the friends of the Republic suspicious as to that general's intentions.

were vain. Every solicitation was followed by a most obstinate refusal. But what could not be done by Bernadotte's friends and partisans, duped by the

rose and went to the drawing-room. Immediately afterwards there arrived several very distinguished members of the council, and a good many men of letters; Volney and Talleyrand were of the number. The conversation was general, and turned on the affairs of the west of France. Buonaparte, raising his voice a little, and addressing somebody near him, said—"Ah! you see a Chouan in General Bernadotte." The general, in answering him, could not refrain from smiling. "Don't contradict yourself," said he; "it was but the other day that you complained of my favouring the inconvenient enthusiasm of the friends of the Republic, and now you tell me that I protect the Chouans. This is very inconsistent." The company continued to increase every minute; and, the apartments not being very spacious, Bernadotte went away.

Many persons have thought that the answers given by Bernadotte to Buonaparte on this occasion, had retarded for twenty-four hours the movement which had been prepared. Others, on the contrary, have alleged that, the 17th being a Friday, Buonaparte, naturally superstitious, had deferred the execution of the project till the 18th.

On the 17th Brumaire, between eleven and twelve at night, Joseph Buonaparte, returning to his house in the *rue du Rocher* by the way of the *rue Cisalpine*, called at the house of Bernadotte. He, being in bed, sent to request Joseph to return next day. He did so before seven o'clock in the morning of the 18th. He told Bernadotte that his brother desired to speak with him; that the measures to be taken had been discussed the evening before, and that they wished to inform him of them. They both went immediately to Buonaparte's house in the *rue de la Victoire*. The court, the vestibule, and the apartments, were filled with generals and officers of rank. Many of the officers had the air of persons in a state of excitation from wine. Bernadotte was shown into a small room; Joseph did not go in. Buonaparte was sitting at breakfast with one of his aides-de-camp, who, as far as can be remembered, was Lemmarois. General Lefebvre, afterwards Duke of Dantzig, then commanding the 17th military division, of which Paris was the headquarters, was standing. Bernadotte, seeing him in that attitude, did not doubt that he was detained a prisoner. He immediately took a chair, sat down, and made a sign to Lefebvre to do the same. Lefebvre hesitated, but a glance from Buonaparte reassured him. He sat down respectfully, looking at Buonaparte. The latter, addressing himself to Bernadotte, said, with embarrassment,—"Why, you are not in uniform!" On Bernadotte answering—"I am not on duty," Buonaparte replied—"You shall be immediately."—"I do not think so," said Bernadotte. Buonaparte rose, took Bernadotte by the hand, and carried him into an adjoining room. "This Directory governs ill," said he; "it would destroy the Republic if we did not take care. The Council of Ancients has named me commandant of Paris, of the national guard, and of all the troops in the division. Go and put on your uniform, and join me at the Tuileries, where I am now going."

Bernadotte having declined doing this, Buonaparte said—"I see you think you can count upon Moreau, Bournonville, and other generals. You will see them all come to me—Moreau himself;" and, speaking very fast, he named about thirty members of the Council of Ancients, whom Bernadotte had believed to be the greatest friends of the constitution of the year IV. "You don't know mankind," added he; "they promise much, and perform little."

Bernadotte having declared that he did not choose to be involved in a rebellion of this kind, nor to overturn a constitution which had cost the lives of a million of men,—"Well," said Buonaparte, "you will stay till I receive the decree of the Council of Ancients; for till then I am nothing." Bernadotte, raising his voice, said—"I am a man whom you may put to death, but whom you shall not detain against his will."—"Well, then!" said Buonaparte, softening his voice, "give me your word that you will do nothing against me."—"Yes, as a citizen; but if I am called upon by the Directory, or if the Legislative Body gives me the command of its guard, I shall oppose you, and you shall not have the upper hand."—"What do you mean by *as a citizen*?"—"I will not go to the barracks, nor places of public resort, to inflame the minds of the soldiers and the people."

"I am quite easy," answered Buonaparte; "I have taken my measures; you will receive no appointment; they are more afraid of your ambition than of mine. I wish merely to save the Republic; I want nothing for myself; I shall retire to Malmaison, after having brought about me a circle of friends. If you wish to be of the number, you shall be made very welcome." Bernadotte said in reply, as he was going away—"As to your being a good friend,

that may be; but I am convinced that you will always be the worst of masters."

Bernadotte went to the garden of the Tuileries, and passed along the front

he, Bernadotte, would mount his horse with his aides-de-camp, put himself under Moreau's command, address the troops, and cause Buonaparte to be immediately arrested and tried as a deserter from the army of Egypt, and as having violated the constitution, by accepting a command given him by a mere fraction of the Legislative Body. Moreau, bound down by the duty of military discipline, according to which he was under the orders of General Buonaparte, did not agree to Bernadotte's proposal; and the latter, therefore, did not think himself at liberty to go to the Luxembourg.

Bernadotte, from seven o'clock till ten, had conferences with Salicetti, Augereau, Jourdan, Gareau, and a dozen of the most influential members of the Council of Five Hundred. It was decided, that Salicetti should be named commandant of the guard of the troops in the capital, and they separated. Bernadotte told Buonaparte what had happened, and he, who dreaded so courageous an adversary as Bernadotte, charged Salicetti to be present next morning at five o'clock, at the preparatory meeting which was to take place before going to St. Cloud, and to tell every one of the deputies, that he, Buonaparte, had made the greatest efforts to prevent a decree of deportation being issued against the deputies who had formed the design of giving to Bernadotte the command of the armed force.

On the 19th, at seven o'clock in the morning, Generals Jourdan and Augereau, followed by eight or ten deputies of the Council of Five Hundred, (among whom were Gareau and Talot,) went to General Bernadotte's in the *rue Cisalpine*. They informed him that Salicetti had made them aware, on the part of Buonaparte, that Sieyès had proposed to arrest a number of the deputies of the two Councils, in order to prevent their appearing at St. Cloud. They asked Bernadotte what he thought of the events of the day. He saw nothing in the communication of Salicetti, but the desire of rendering these deputies favourable to Buonaparte. Some of these legislators seemed to feel grateful for the service which Buonaparte had done them the evening before. Bernadotte did not appreciate this act of generosity as they did; but he agreed in their opinion as to the conciliatory measures which they seemed to wish to adopt, and, entering into their views, he explained himself in these terms:—"Let one of you mount the tribune; let him describe succinctly the internal situation of France, and her successes abroad; let him say, that the departure of an army for Egypt, while it has involved us in war, has deprived us of an army of more than 30,000 veterans, and a great many experienced generals; that, nevertheless, the Republic is triumphant; that the coalition is broken up, since Suwarow is returned to Russia; that the English, with a prince of the blood at their head, have left the Batavian republic and retired to England; that the line of defence is maintained between the Alps and the Ligurian Apennines; that 200,000 conscripts are hastening to arrange themselves into battalions to reinforce the armies, and 40,000 cavalry are raising; that the insurrection of the west is reduced to a few scattered bands, and that a royalist army in the Upper Garonne has been destroyed or dispersed; that, to obtain a peace quite as honourable as that of Campo Formio, it is only necessary for France to maintain this formidable attitude; that, in order to maintain it, union and mutual confidence are indispensable; that, although the Council of Ancients have violated the constitution, in naming Buonaparte general-in-chief of the 17th division, and in giving him the command of the national guard and the guard of the Directory, the Council of Five Hundred is not now engaged in deliberating on this violation of the constitution, but rather on the means of giving security to the French people, the two Councils, and the Government of the State; that, for this purpose, the Council of Five Hundred names General Bernadotte colleague to General Buonaparte; that these two generals shall understand each other in regard to the employment of the armed force, and the distribution of commands, in case of this force being employed; but that the tranquillity which prevails in Paris and the vicinity, renders it certain that there will be no occasion for this force being put in motion. Send me this decree; in twenty minutes after receiving it, I shall be in the midst of you with my aides-de-camp; I shall take the command of the corps that I shall find on my way, and we shall see what is to be done. If it is necessary to declare Buonaparte an outlaw, you will always have on your side a general, and a great proportion at least of the troops."

The deputies immediately set off for St. Cloud. The unhappy custom of delivering set speeches from the tribune, produced the loss of precious time. The debate became warm; and the taking individually the oath to the constitution caused a useless loss of more than an hour and a half. No other resolution

